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Abstract: 
Major General Orde Charles Wingate (1903-1944) is one of the most controversial British military 
commanders of the last hundred years.  This controversy stems from two broad sources: the first of 
these was his idiosyncratic and occasionally tempestuous personality; the second is the alleged 
‘radicalism’ of his military ideas, both of which contributed to a series of feuds and acrimonies with 
other senior officers in the British Army.  Wingate first came to the notice of his seniors when he 
organised the Special Night Squads, a specialist counterterrorist force comprising British soldiers 
and Jewish police, in Palestine in 1938; in 1940-41, he planned and commanded covert operations, 
in cooperation with local guerrillas, inside Italian-occupied Ethiopia; he is best remembered in the 
UK, however, for his command of Long Range Penetration Groups, or ‘Chindits’, in Burma in 
1943-44.  The Chindit operations in particular split opinion in the literature, debates in which centre 
upon their cost-effectiveness and their actual worth, and many imply that they marked a major 
departure from British military thought and practice hitherto.  Some post-war authors have 
attempted to present Wingate as ‘ahead of his time’, a forerunner of various late twentieth and 
twenty-first century models of warfare.  However, a survey of Wingate’s own papers – closed to the 
public until 1995 – and other contemporary documents and testimony, reveals an organically 
evolving and increasingly coherent body of military ideas consistent with the military thought and 
practice of the British Army in the theatres where Wingate served, that did  not mark a radical 
departure from them until almost the end of his career. Wingate was firmly ‘of his time’, and not of 
any other. 
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                                             CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
       
      There was a man of genius, who might well have become also a man of destiny 
- Winston Churchill¹    
                                        
      Much of what he preached strategically, operationally, and tactically, was flawed, and      
      some of it was downright nonsense. 
      - Major General Julian Thompson² 
 
These two quotations provide but a tiny sample of opinions of Major General Orde Charles Wingate 
(1903-1944), a well-known and controversial figure in Britain and Israel.   His reputation, and 
popular image, stem from three episodes that occurred late in a military career beginning with his 
graduation from the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, in 1923 and ending with his death in 1944. 
The first of these was the Palestine Arab uprising of 1936-39, when Wingate, then a captain in the 
Royal Artillery, was authorised by two British General Officers Commanding (GOC) Palestine, 
General Sir Archibald Wavell and General Sir Robert Haining, to train Jewish policemen, in 
British-organised irregular units, in his personal brand of counter-insurgency.  These included figures 
such as Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon. They, and, later, Ariel Sharon identified Wingate as a major 
influence upon Israeli military thought.³  However, he roused strong feelings even then, as he 
deployed Jewish units, in majority Arab-inhabited areas, in pre-emptive and reprisal attacks on Arab 
villages believed to be hiding insurgents, and used some robust methods to extract intelligence from 
  
5 
suspected insurgents.
4
   The second episode began in 1940, when Wingate was summoned by Wavell, 
now Commander in Chief, Middle East, to take over an operation organised by G(R), an offshoot of 
the MI(R) covert warfare branch of the British War Office, aimed at escalating and steering guerrilla 
warfare in the province of Gojjam, in Italian-occupied Ethiopia, in the name of the exiled Emperor of 
Ethiopia, Haile Selassie.  This Wingate attempted, with mixed results, creating and utilising „Gideon 
Force‟, a purpose-organised regular formation, cooperating occasionally with local tribal irregulars.5 
 It was after Ethiopia that Wingate began to advocate what he claimed was a new form of warfare, 
designated Long Range Penetration (sic), which was based upon his interpretation of his operations 
in Gojjam and which he argued held the key to victory against the Axis.
6
   In Britain, Wingate is best 
remembered for the third episode, his command of brigade-sized Long Range Penetration Groups, 
light infantry units, ostensibly using „guerrilla‟ methods, and supplied and supported by air, in two 
major operations deep inside Japanese-occupied Burma, Operation Longcloth of February-May 1943 
and Operation Thursday of March-August 1944.  Thursday opened with two LRP brigades being 
inserted by air, and also featured a specialist unit of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF), 
No.1 Air Commando, providing transport, supply by airdrop and battlefield close air support.
7
   What 
links all these episodes is Wingate‟s raising and commanding specialist units intended to carry the war 
into areas the enemy considered under their control.    
      Wingate‟s Long Range Penetration Groups are better remembered as the Chindits, a propaganda 
name derived from Wingate‟s mispronunciation of Chinthey, the stone griffin-figures which guard 
Buddhist temples in Southeast Asia.
8
   Wingate died in an air crash during Thursday, and much of the 
literature centres upon a posthumous controversy concerning whether his Chindit operations were 
cost-effective in terms of lives lost versus objectives attained.  To Wingate‟s detractors, they were 
unsound, wasteful of lives and resources and an unnecessary diversion from the „real war‟ and the 
destruction of Japanese main force units at the front: Wingate himself was a charismatic charlatan 
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who owed his successes to his ability to cultivate friends in high places.  However, among his friends 
and supporters, Wingate is remembered as a military genius of the highest order whose ideas played 
a decisive part not only in the defeat of Japan in Southeast Asia but in earlier operations in Palestine 
and Ethiopia also. The debate has continued since the 1950s, a particular issue being the impact of 
Thursday on the Japanese offensive against Imphal and Kohima in March-July 1944, but the cost 
effectiveness of the earlier Chindit operation, Longcloth is also debated frequently.  The literature in 
English, therefore, is dominated by differing opinions of Wingate‟s Burma operations and the worth 
of his contributions to military thought.       
      The debate was codified in the 1950s, with two works, Volume III of the British Government‟s 
Official History of the War against Japan, authored largely by the former Director of Staff Duties, 
India, Major General S Woodburn Kirby, and Defeat into Victory, the memoirs of the British theatre 
commander in Burma, Field Marshal Lord Slim.
9
   Both clashed bitterly with Wingate when he was 
alive, and both books question not only his professional abilities, but, significantly, his mental stability 
also.
10
   Wingate was, putting it mildly, „unusual‟:  he regarded the Old Testament as literal history, 
political tract and tactical manual, became a fanatical Zionist and Islamophobe - the vehemence of this 
beliefs sometimes disturbing even his Jewish friends - and laced his speeches with portentous, Biblical 
rhetoric; in an army fixated on appearance, he was often scruffy and fully bearded, and on operations, 
wore an old-fashioned solar helmet¹¹; he ate six raw onions a day, and ordered all his officers to eat 
at least one¹²; he often carried out business in the nude, brushing himself with a wire brush instead of 
washing, sometimes during official briefings and press conferences¹³, and carried an alarm clock to 
time his meetings and show those around him that „time was passing‟.14  Moreover, published sources, 
even by admirers, agree that Wingate was a bloody-minded and disputatious individual of strong and 
frequently unorthodox opinions on many matters, who apparently sought out feuds and arguments, 
and was unafraid to „name and shame‟ those he saw as thwarting him, including senior officers, using 
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highly inflammatory language, in official documents.
15
   Yet, he could also be brittle: he attempted 
suicide in 1941, after the Ethiopian operation, due to a combination of depression, exhaustion and 
dementia arising from cerebral malaria, and the literature is full of anecdotes of tantrums, sulks and 
occasional physical assaults on soldiers and even subordinate officers.
16
   More recently, an Israeli 
journalist, Tom Segev, has suggested that Wingate committed atrocities during the Palestine revolt 
of 1936-39, a claim taken up with some enthusiasm by Israeli revisionist historians and anti-Zionist 
websites.
17
  Wingate‟s unusual and occasionally obtrusive personality traits cannot be dismissed as an 
influence upon the literature. 
      Wingate‟s many idiosyncrasies are taken as signs of madness by his detractors, the most 
vituperative among the historians being Duncan Anderson and Julian Thompson.
18
   In reaction, 
several of Wingate‟s friends and former subordinates, including Sir Robert Thompson, Major General 
Derek Tulloch and Brigadiers Michael Calvert and Peter Mead produced books in rebuttal, a process 
continued into the 1990s by the prolific and vociferous David Rooney.
19
   Consequently, the literature 
centres largely upon the theme of Wingate as „maverick‟: indeed, the five biographies - Leonard 
Mosley‟s Gideon Goes to War of 1955, Christopher Sykes‟ Orde Wingate of 1959, Trevor Royle‟s 
Orde Wingate: Irregular Soldier and David Rooney‟s Wingate and the Chindits: Redressing the 
Balance, both from 1995 and John Bierman and Colin Smith‟s Fire in the Night, from 2000 - all 
centre upon this theme, focusing upon Wingate‟s idiosyncrasies and his battles with his superiors and 
colleagues more than discussing his military ideas or assessing his true historical significance.   
      Other authors have attempted to examine these, but have been hampered by two factors. The first 
is that Wingate‟s personal papers and correspondence were guarded jealously by his sisters and his 
widow, Lorna, who refused all access to them until her death in 1995 following a dispute with 
Christopher Sykes.
20
   Secondly, there is the additional problem of many relevant official papers not 
becoming available until the 1970s or after, under the Thirty-Year Rule for British Governmental 
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papers.  Consequently, those trying to analyse Wingate‟s ideas before this time, such as Luigi 
Rossetto and Prithvi Nath, have been forced to rely upon quotations and paraphrases of these papers 
in Sykes, the Official History, Michael Calvert‟s Prisoners of Hope and Mosley‟s Gideon Goes to 
War, as well as anecdotal material in other memoirs.²¹  The papers, which consist of official 
documents authored by Wingate or pertinent to his operations from 1926 to 1944, a mixture of  his 
official and private correspondence from the early 1920s to his death, and other material assembled 
by Lorna Wingate and Wingate‟s friend and chief of staff, Major General Derek Tulloch, after 
Wingate‟s death, were sold by Wingate‟s son, the late Colonel Orde Jonathan Wingate, in 1995.  
Those relating to Wingate‟s time in Palestine went to the collection of the American publisher and 
politician, Steve Forbes - with microfilm copies being taken by the British Library - and the remainder 
to the Imperial War Museum.  While the Burma papers in the Imperial War Museum have been sifted 
and catalogued by Julian Thompson, those concerning Wingate‟s early life and his operations in 
Ethiopia - several hundred documents and letters - remained unexamined when work on this thesis 
began in 2000.  The Palestine Papers are readily available on microfilm at the British Library, but are 
also un-sifted.  The Burma papers have been consulted by David Rooney and Trevor Royle, but, 
apparently, in only a cursory way, likewise Royle‟s overview of some key files in the Public Record 
Office.²²  
      Another problem arises from Wingate‟s own literary style.  Wingate was a good writer with a 
sometimes entertainingly pungent style, and was always at pains to explain his process of reasoning 
in any situation.  However, apart from a single, brief allusion to the British Army‟s Field Service 
Regulations, in his Ethiopia papers, Wingate never, at any point, credited any source other than 
himself for his military ideas.²³ Moreover, where his papers have been consulted, by Sykes for instance, 
the aim has been to illustrate aspects of Wingate‟s personality and opinions, rather than to „place‟ his 
ideas in their historical contest or a wider conceptual framework.  The Wingate literature, therefore, 
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leans heavily upon limited interpretation of a limited range of sources. 
      An important gap in the existing research therefore suggests itself.  This arises from a failure to 
utilise Wingate‟s own writings in order to assess his military ideas on his own terms and in their 
historical and strategic context.  Were this rectified, it might give further, and perhaps more accurate 
insight into why Wingate was such a controversial figure then and now.  In order to explore this 
possibility, some deeper exploration of the literature is necessary, beginning with the principal works 
on either side of the „Wingate controversy‟, followed by those attempting to „place‟ Wingate in a 
niche within military thought and history.  This examination of the literature will be followed by a 
discussion of the implications of following new avenues of research. 
                  
       Wingate’s reputation as an issue 
 
Just as timing played so great a part in his rise to prominence, so the moment of his death may 
have been propitious for him.  He was killed at the height of his career and was not called 
upon to face the inevitable fact that his dreams and ambitions could never have been realised. 
 
     - Major General S Woodburn Kirby
24
  
 
The whole assessment was no more than a hatchet job by little men who could not have 
competed with Wingate either in military argument or in battle.  Not only has it failed but it 
has made him such a controversial figure that his reputation will live on forever. 
       
      - Sir Robert Thompson
25
   
  
The theme of the British „military establishment‟ objecting to Wingate‟s military ideas ran through the 
literature from the beginning.  Charles Rolo, an American journalist and literary critic, produced 
Wingate’s Phantom Army, an anecdotal narrative of Longcloth, in 1944, shortly after Wingate‟s 
death.  This work is characterized by hyperbole of the „they said it couldn‟t be done‟ variety: on 
Longcloth, for instance, „The more conventional military leaders were aghast...Wingate was an 
upstart, a madman.  Certainly it was not "pukka war" as they or anyone else knew it‟ and he later 
commented that: „Wingate‟s fixity of purpose led to countless clashes with brass-hats and complacent 
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officials, outraged by his forthright methods and assaults on red tape.‟26  This theme was taken up by 
Major General Bernard Fergusson, who commanded a Chindit column on Longcloth and a brigade 
on Thursday, and author of the best-known of all the Chindit memoirs, Beyond the Chindwin, his 
account of Longcloth, published in 1945.
27
   Fergusson also published a memoir of Thursday, The 
Wild Green Earth, in 1946,  which took up themes first presented at a lecture to the Royal United 
Services Institute (RUSI) in March 1946, implying that Wingate‟s ideas were a source of friction with 
certain others: „On the whole [Wingate] failed to convert current military thought to his belief in deep 
penetration.  He certainly convinced his lieutenants; but deprived of his fiery leadership and teaching, 
I cannot hope to succeed where he failed.‟28   Fergusson also felt strongly enough about the 
accusations evidently mounting by 1946 to include a defence of Wingate („Some of those who now 
whisper that he was not all that he was cracked up to be remind me of the mouse who has a swig of 
whisky, and then says: "Now show me that bloody cat"‟) but, unfortunately for the historian, was not 
specific about what these accusations might be.
29
    
      A similar phenomenon was apparent in Prisoners of Hope, Brigadier Michael Calvert‟s account 
of commanding 77th LRP Brigade on Operation Thursday.  While most of this work is a personal 
narrative, Calvert included a lengthy appendix giving testimony from the postwar interrogations of 
senior Japanese officers on the impact of Thursday on their operations in 1944, his reasons for 
including this being: 
 
      Two of the most controversial aspects of the campaign in Burma were the two Wingate             
      operations and the results they achieved.  Could the thirteen British...five Gurkha and three         
      West Africa battalions and their attendant ancillary forces, bases, and RAF and USAAF effort    
      [which made up Wingate's forces on Thursday] have been of greater use to the Burma                
       campaign if employed elsewhere in a more stereotyped role?
30
   
 
 
       Some forceful answers to Calvert‟s questions were supplied by Kirby and Slim in the 1950s.  In 
Volume III of the Official History, Kirby included an „Assessment of Wingate‟ - he was the only 
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Allied commander in Southeast Asia to receive this treatment - which began by attributing Wingate‟s 
success as much to the patronage of Wavell and, later, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, „who 
claimed Wingate as a genius‟, as to the validity of his ideas.³¹  Moreover, „Whether his theories were 
sound or unsound, he appeared as a "doer" at a time when something desperately needed to be done 
[about the dire predicament the Allies faced in Southeast Asia].‟³²  Kirby then implied that Wingate‟s 
success in getting his ideas put into practice owed more to force of argument and skilful self-publicity 
than to their intrinsic merit, this leading, as he became more ambitious, to megalomania: 
 
      The way in which his ideas on the use of long-range penetration forces grew in Wingate‟s           
      fertile imagination would form an interesting psychological study.  From his early conception      
      of  lightly armed troops penetrating behind the enemy lines and attacking communications as      
      part  of a larger operation by conventional forces, the operations of Special Force [the Chindits] 
      clearly became in his mind the only means by which northern Burma could be dominated.           
      Subsequently, much increased in numbers, the force would become the spearhead of a                
      victorious advance through southern Burma, Siam and Indo-China to win the war against           
      Japan.³³ 
 
 
      So determined was Wingate to demonstrate this model that „his handling of his forces 
became unsound‟, according to  Kirby, who listed a series of perceived mistakes made by 
Wingate on both Chindit operations to support this claim.
34
   Wingate was „so obsessed by his 
theories that he forgot that victory in Burma could be achieved only by the defeat of the enemy‟s 
main forces‟ and, in his belief that lightly equipped columns could defeat the Japanese, he  
underestimated them as an enemy.
35
 However, his influence with Churchill resulted in one-sixth 
of all British infantry in Southeast Asia being „locked up in LRP formations suitable only for 
guerilla [sic] warfare.‟36   To Kirby, Wingate‟s ideas represented an egregious misdirection of 
scarce manpower and resources, based upon shaky concepts, imposed upon the British Army in 
Southeast Asia largely by Churchill. 
      These complaints were echoed by Slim in Defeat into Victory.  Slim was candid about his clashes 
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of personality with Wingate, summarising him as a „strange, excitable, moody creature‟ and giving the 
reader several opportunities to contrast Wingate‟s histrionics with his own calm self-assurance.37   
However, the conqueror of the Japanese in Burma was critical of Wingate as military thinker also.  
He opened by dismissing Gideon Force - which had consisted of regular troops commanded by 
British officers -  as „Shifta or brigands‟ and by doubting whether a repeat in Burma would work 
„against a tougher enemy and in country not so actively friendly.‟38   Wingate was later described as 
„strangely naive when it came to the business of actually fighting the Japanese‟, an enemy who would 
not be scared into retreating by threats to their rear, but would have to be defeated in battle, Wingate‟s 
forces being too small and lightly-equipped to achieve this.
39
   This was demonstrated by Longcloth, 
an operation in which a thousand men failed to return from behind Japanese lines, which had „no 
immediate effect on Japanese dispositions or plans‟ and provided a „costly schooling‟ in jungle 
fighting and air supply: its only tangible value was as propaganda and a slight rise in British confidence 
in fighting the Japanese in the jungles of Burma.
40
    However, Wingate would not accept this  and – 
two ranks subordinate to Slim - repeatedly threatened to report Slim to Churchill.
41
   
      In his chapter on „lessons learned‟, Slim berated the plethora of special forces formed by the 
British in the Second World War, claiming that „Any well-trained infantry battalion should be able to 
do what a commando can do; [in Burma] they could and did‟ and arguing that special operations in 
future should be limited to small parties carrying out sabotage, subversion and assassination, on the 
lines of the Special Operations Executive (SOE): „Private armies...are expensive, wasteful and 
unnecessary‟, a drain on manpower leeching the best personnel away from units having to fight the 
enemy‟s main armies in battle.42   Kirby and Slim agreed broadly, therefore, that Wingate foisted an 
„unsound‟ form of warfare upon British forces in Southeast Asia principally via the patronage of 
high-level figures, and a degree of bitterness over this is apparent from both their works.  Slim also 
demonstrated animosity towards „special forces‟ in general, as a drain and diversion from forces 
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intended to destroy the enemy‟s main armies in battle.   
      By this time, the late 1950s, literature had been published suggesting that Wingate had been 
courting controversy ever since his time in Palestine, in particular, Wingate’s Phantom Army by 
Wilfred Burchett (1946) and Gideon goes to War by Leonard Mosley.  Burchett‟s politics must be 
considered in any reading of Wingate’s Phantom Army: a journalist and a lifelong Marxist, Burchett 
spent most of the 1950s and 60s in North Korea and North Vietnam, and was effectively exiled from 
his native Australia, as a traitor, for tricking Australian prisoners into participating in communist 
propaganda through a combination of blackmail and posing as a journalist conducting „interviews‟ 
wherein they were induced into condemning their government or confessing to „war crimes‟; he was 
a lifelong apologist for the communist regimes in North Korea and Bulgaria.
43
  Burchett portrayed 
Wingate as a kindred spirit, anti-imperialist and anti-British, and added to the existing controversy the 
suggestion that Wingate‟s politics were not only a major cause of friction with his colleagues, but lay 
at the heart of a quasi-revolutionary mission which framed his military operations.    In Palestine, 
Burchett alleged, Wingate almost single-handedly turned the tide of the Arab revolt, against 
obstruction from an anti-Semitic British High Command.  Later, Wingate saved Haile Selassie and 
Ethiopia from attempts upon them by „international sharks...racketeers and stock market strategists‟ 
firstly through encouraging the Emperor to appeal directly to „the people of England, America and 
China‟ and, secondly, by seizing and transforming previously half-hearted and inept British attempts 
to stimulate guerrilla warfare in Ethiopia.
44
     
      Mosley also presented a Wingate at odds with the rest of the British Army: he had Wingate 
dismiss General Headquarters, Jerusalem, as „a gang of anti-Jews‟, and implied that the passivity of 
timid Jewish politicians and the Islamophilia of the British was condemning Jewish settlers on the 
frontiers of Palestine, „with nothing but a few rook rifles per settlement‟ to massacre until Wingate 
galvanised them onto the offensive and shamed the British authorities into supporting them.
45
    Also 
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echoing Burchett, Mosley portrayed Wingate as rescuing Haile Selassie from a British colonial 
establishment which half-welcomed the Italian occupation of Ethiopia and treated him with 
supercilious dismissiveness until Wingate launched an assault upon the staff in Khartoum.
46
 The 
implication of both these works is that Wingate was a maverick and an „outsider‟, fighting the 
„establishment‟ from the early days of his career. 
      That the „establishment‟ might be extracting retribution via the published record was argued in the 
1960s and 70s by Tulloch, Mead and Thompson.  Derek Tulloch had been a close friend of Wingate 
since their time at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, in 1920-22, and served as his Brigadier, 
General Staff (Chief of Staff) on Thursday.  Tulloch had been consulted by the authors of the Official 
History, and, according to Mead, was growingly disturbed by its tone, particularly after Kirby became 
involved.
47
    He had in his possession a large body of Wingate‟s official papers - now added to those 
in the Imperial War Museum - and in 1972 produced his own account of Wingate in Burma, Wingate 
in Peace and War, based on these.  That Tulloch was writing to defend a departed friend must be 
considered in reading this work, which revolves partially around an alleged conspiracy to cancel 
Thursday, instigated by the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, Admiral Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, who allegedly preferred amphibious attacks directed at Singapore and Sumatra.
48
    
Once Thursday was launched, Tulloch claimed, Wingate planned to divert Chindit columns away 
from their initial mission, which was to support Chinese forces under the American General, Joseph 
Stilwell, advancing into central Burma in an attempt to restore land communications with China, and 
redirect them towards attacking the communications of the Japanese 15th Army, then engaged in its 
offensive against Imphal and Kohima, in what Tulloch called Wingate‟s „Plan B.‟49 Tulloch therefore 
developed one major existing theme, the notion of „Wingate versus the establishment‟ and suggested 
a new one, that his military prescience may have impacted upon the decisive battle of the Burma 
campaign.     
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      In 1972, Tulloch asked Peter Mead to assist him with research and „advise what more could be 
done to correct the Official History‟s assessment of Wingate.‟50 Mead was a Royal Artillery officer 
who had served with Tulloch on Wingate‟s staff on Thursday, and later transferred to the Army Air 
Corps, finishing his career in 1964 as its Director, with the rank of brigadier.  After Tulloch‟s death in 
1974, Mead continued his task of rebutting the Official History‟s perceived calumnies against 
Wingate, and produced Orde Wingate and the Historians in 1987.  As the title implies, this work was 
the first published historiography of Wingate, but much of it is a deliberate counterblast against the 
Official History. Upon reading the latter work in the 1970s, Mead dedicated himself „to unbend[ing] 
a piece of bent history.‟51 The central theme of Mead‟s work was the existence of an official 
anti-Wingate „line to take‟ originating shortly after Wingate‟s death.  Mead presented extensive 
evidence for this, but much of it was anecdotal, circumstantial and uncorroborated: for instance, 
Mead presented a story told him by Calvert, that Calvert had discovered in the War Office the minutes 
of a high-level meeting where it was decided „to discourage future officer intake [sic] from modeling 
themselves on Wingate‟, because Wingate was „a divisive influence in the Army‟, and also what he 
interpreted as derogatory comments made about the Chindit operations in Sandhurst and British 
Army Staff College training literature.
52
 Mead‟s overview of the existing literature was thorough but 
slanted, with anything less than hagiography being viewed as under the influence of the „conspiracy‟, 
even the broadly sympathetic, but balanced, works by Sykes and Shelford Bidwell.
53
 However, 
alongside this was some interesting original research, in which Mead demonstrated from 
documentary evidence that some senior officers were, indeed, obtuse and resistant about Wingate‟s 
ideas and also discovered the testimony of certain Japanese senior officers to the impact of Thursday 
upon their Imphal-Kohima offensive, apparently available to Kirby and his co-authors and, apparently, 
ignored by them.
54
 The principal value of Mead‟s work, therefore, was in presenting the first 
historiography of the Wingate controversy and in presenting some new documentary evidence, albeit 
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limited.  
      To further the aim of „restoring‟ Wingate‟s reputation, Mead enlisted the support of perhaps 
Wingate‟s highest-placed and most powerful posthumous supporter - Sir Robert Thompson.  
Thompson served throughout the Second World War with the Royal Air Force (RAF), including as 
an air liaison and forward observation officer on both Chindit operations and later became a globally 
respected expert on counterinsurgency, in which capacity he advised the administration in Malaya 
during the communist guerrilla insurgency of 1948-60 and the Nixon White House in the latter stages 
of the Vietnam War; his Defeating Communist Insurgency is still regarded as a seminal work in this 
field.
55
 Although he had written the foreword to Tulloch‟s book, Thompson did not, apparently, read 
the Official History until 1977, at Mead‟s suggestion.  After doing so, he accepted Mead‟s argument 
that official recognition and, by implication, correction of perceived inaccuracies in the Official 
History would be the only means of settling the controversy.  They subsequently presented the 
Cabinet Office with a suggested appendix, drafted by Mead, pointing out the alleged errors in the 
Official History and referring the reader to Sykes, Tulloch or Mead for guidance: their request that 
this be pasted into all copies of Volume III of the Official History has yet to be granted.
56
   Thompson, 
thereafter, was an outspoken defender of Wingate in print and on television, and his memoirs, Make 
For the Hills, published in 1989, contained five chapters, nearly a quarter of the book, devoted to the 
Chindit operations and an extended assessment of Wingate.  Thompson claimed that Wingate was 
first to realise that air supply could grant British forces superior relative mobility to the Japanese in the 
jungle and also, more contentiously, that he advocated close air support of troops fighting on the 
ground in the face of some apparent resistance from the RAF. He also claimed that Wingate was alone 
in advocating an overland offensive into northern Burma from India.  Thompson‟s core argument was 
that resentment against Wingate, culminating in the „hatchet job‟ of the Official History, came largely 
in reaction to Wingate‟s uncompromising and unsettling personality and the radicalism of his military 
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ideas, which others in India simply did not understand.
57
   Thompson was unequivocal about 
Wingate‟s historical significance: after presenting his assessment of the Chindit contribution to Imphal 
and Kohima - that it was a key factor in the Japanese defeat, and might have been greater, with more 
resources - Thompson commented that every time he saw the photograph of Slim and his Corps 
Commanders being knighted on the field of Imphal after the battle, „I see the ghost of Wingate present. 
He was unquestionably one of the great men of the century.‟58    Thompson‟s Wingate was, therefore, 
a misunderstood hero maligned by military Luddites.            
      A central message conveyed by several key works in the literature, then, is that Wingate aroused 
such strong feelings during his lifetime that some of the disputes he engaged in continued decades 
after his death.  Numerous authors portray Wingate taking on a perceived „military establishment‟, 
which, by the 1960s, was personified by S Woodburn Kirby, although Wingate‟s clashes with 
authority apparently began years before they met.  Moreover, this „establishment‟s‟ principal 
objection to Wingate was that he presented new forms of warfare challenging accepted ideas, a view 
confirmed, apparently, by Kirby and Slim.  It follows from this that investigating the nature of those 
ideas might provide some indication of why Wingate was such a controversial figure:  however, there 
appears to be disagreement among the few investigating them. 
       
       
 
 
       Previous work on Wingate’s military ideas 
 
      The operation was, in effect the old cavalry raid of military history on the enemy's             
      communications, which, to be effective against a stout-hearted opponent, must be             
      made in tactical co-ordination with a main attack elsewhere. 
            - Field Marshal Viscount Slim, commenting on Operation Longcloth
59
  
 
       From a point of view of statecraft, you do not try to make heroes of                                     
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       guerrillas.... [B]ecause if you do, every young man wants to copy that                                  
       revolutionary or guerrilla.  What you must do is give all the kudos to your regular            
       army, just like the Tsar did on the retreat from Moscow...  
           - Brigadier Michael Calvert 
60 
 
       [A] masterful description of manoeuvre warfare... 
             - General Sir Michael Rose, on Calvert's Prisoners of Hope
61 
 
 
There seems to be little agreement even among Wingate‟s own colleagues and contemporaries as to 
where his military ideas and practice fit.  Kirby described the Chindits as guerrilla forces; to Fergusson, 
the proud Highlander, Wingate was a leader of irregular forces in the tradition of Robert the Bruce 
and Bonnie Prince Charlie, while the novelist John Masters, who was Brigade Major, then acting 
commander of 111th Brigade on the second Chindit operation, claimed specifically they were based 
on the Long Range Desert Group.
62
 Subsequent authors can be divided broadly into those who view 
Wingate as a leader of guerrilla irregulars, those who see him as attempting to wage guerrilla 
operations with specially trained regular troops, and those, usually military officers, writing in staff 
college papers or publications based upon them, who attempt to project military doctrine of their own 
time onto Wingate‟s operations, with Wingate portrayed as „pioneering‟ said doctrine.  Among the 
„Wingate as guerrilla‟ school, Michael Elliot-Bateman placed Wingate firmly in the context of 
„people‟s war‟ while Robert Asprey and David Shirreff also described Wingate purely as a leader of 
irregulars.
63
    Yet, Otto Heilbrunn, John Terraine and John W Gordon placed Wingate firmly in the 
„special forces‟ camp, Heilbrunn in particular seeing him as one of several commanders of the Second 
World War creating special units to execute guerrilla-style warfare deep in the enemy‟s rear.64    This 
has some support from the official historian of British airborne forces, Lieutenant Colonel Terence 
Otway, who treated Thursday as a massive and protracted airborne operation.
65
  Of those seeing 
Wingate as a pioneer of „advanced‟ forms of warfare, Major Luigi Rossetto of the Canadian Army 
argued specifically against the „Wingate as guerrilla‟ school, claiming that Wingate was attempting a 
  
19 
practical application of Basil Liddell Hart‟s „Theory of the Indirect Approach‟; Robert Lyman‟s 
military biography of Slim, from 2004, also attempted to place the Chindit operations in the context 
of Slim‟s wider application of a form of „indirect approach‟.66  Conversely, Major John Atkins, 
another British Army officer, has contended that Wingate pioneered „nonlinear noncontiguous 
military operations‟, an apparent staple of post 1990s American military doctrine.67   It appears, 
therefore, that there are multiple interpretations of Wingate‟s military ideas and practice, and with 
little agreement between them.    
      The closest to a consensus falls among those who portray Wingate as a guerrilla leader.  
Elliot-Bateman‟s anthology, The Fourth Dimension of War, was produced in 1970, against the 
background of the Vietnam War.  His keynote essay dwelt upon how Sun Tzu‟s The Art of War had 
influenced „people‟s war‟, by which he meant explicitly the collapse of enemy resistance via a mixture 
of selective military action, guerrilla warfare, espionage and subversion as, he argued, had been 
practiced by Mao Tse-tung in the 1930s and 40s and Vo Nguyen Giap between then and 1970.
68
  
Wingate‟s operations in Ethiopia and Burma, and his theory of long-range penetration, were 
presented as examples of Sun Tzu‟s concept of cheng and ch’i, sometimes translated as „ordinary‟ 
and „extraordinary‟ force; as Elliot-Bateman explained it: „[T]he extraordinary or indirect force 
(known as the „ch‟i‟ force) act where and when their blows are not anticipated, while the normal force 
(known as the „cheng‟ force) fixes or distracts the enemy‟; depending upon circumstances, either may 
be the decisive force, but Elliot-Bateman clearly endorsed Sun Tzu‟s exhortation to „use the normal 
force to engage; use the extraordinary to win.‟69   While guerrillas could act in either role, 
Elliot-Bateman argued that Gideon Force and the Chindits represented a ch’i force in action, with the 
rest of Slim‟s forces in Burma being the cheng.70  However, there were differences: Wingate‟s 
operations involved infiltrating the enemy rear with specialist regular troops, whereas „classical‟ 
guerrilla warfare involved raising the penetration force from the local populace; moreover, whereas 
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„classical‟ guerrilla forces required the unqualified support of the majority of the local populace, 
long-range penetration forces did not.
71
 Whether Wingate encountered the ideas of Sun Tzu, perhaps 
via the 1910 translation by Lionel Giles, is unknown, and, in the absence of any direct evidence, 
speculation is all that is possible.   
      Robert Asprey published War in the Shadows in 1975 with a similar remit to Elliot-Bateman: „to 
explain the Vietnam war to American readers in the historical terms of guerrilla warfare.‟72  Asprey, 
too, assessed Wingate as a guerrilla commander, but was perhaps more prosaic than Elliot-Bateman, 
providing a highly critical narrative of Wingate‟s operations (and his behaviour), concluding by 
contrasting what he called the „qualitative‟ ideas of Wingate with the „saturation‟ approach of TE 
Lawrence, a distant relative of Wingate to whom this thesis will return.    Asprey did not explain his 
terms and definitions, but it can be inferred from his text that he understood Wingate‟s approach to 
centre upon small units of hand-picked and highly-trained men, striking at key targets, while 
Lawrence aimed at infesting enemy-held areas with as large a number of partisans as possible, to pin 
and distract the maximum number of enemy troops.
73
     
      David Shirreff‟s Bare Feet and Bandoliers, from 1995, is the only published book-length history 
of Wingate‟s operations in Ethiopia.  Shirreff did not theorise about the origins of Wingate‟s ideas, 
but he was unequivocal that Wingate was attempting a guerrilla war using local irregulars, comparing 
the Ethiopian „patriots‟ with the Spanish guerrillas of the Peninsular War of the 1800s and 
Lawrence‟s Arabs.  He argued that guerrillas were used most effectively to attack enemy lines of 
supply; cooperation with regular forces usually impaired them, but „the most effective patriot forces 
were those which had a hard core of regulars‟, Shirreff contending that Wingate‟s aim was to insert 
just such a „hard core‟ consisting of Gideon Force, which consisted of two battalions of Ethiopian and 
Sudanese regular troops under British officers.
74
    These authors portray Wingate as a new kind of 
military leader, attempting to create „extraordinary‟ forces, based upon guerrillas organised around 
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a smaller number of specialist regular troops, to wage a protracted campaign in the enemy rear. 
      The second group of authors has chosen to concentrate on the „special force‟ characteristics of 
Wingate‟s operations, although they do not ignore the guerrilla aspects, either.  Otto Heilbrunn‟s 
main academic interest was guerrilla warfare, as practiced by communist movements in the 1950s and 
60s, but his Warfare in the Enemy's Rear, from 1963 dealt with „The forces of the rear...the airborne 
troops, the Special Forces, the partisans and certain elements of the air forces‟ in the Second World 
War.
75
 Yet, he placed Wingate‟s Chindits in two contexts, the first being the many „special‟ 
units - Commandos, Long-Range Desert Group, Special Air Service - raised by the British in the 
Second World War, the second being the history of guerrilla warfare.
76
  The Chindits were regular 
soldiers trained to use guerrilla methods, „they would harass the enemy in guerrilla fashion, they 
would weaken him by destroying his supply dumps and supply lines, and they would tie down his 
forces which would have to protect their communications...and hunt the intruders.‟77 However, 
Wingate moved the Chindits towards „conventional‟ operations, aimed at seizing and holding ground, 
on Operation Thursday, which hinged upon Strongholds, fortified bases, supplied by air, from which 
Chindit columns sortied against Japanese communications in the early stages of the operation.
78
  
Heilbrunn argued that the impact of this was to reduce the number of Chindits available for aggressive 
operations, most of them now being tied up in defending the Strongholds.    Overall, however, 
Wingate‟s main contribution to military thought, according to Heilbrunn, „was his demonstration that 
professional soldiers could profitably adopt guerrillaism [sic] and we have drawn the conclusion that 
they [the Chindits] could have disorganized [sic] and demoralized [sic] the enemy, as they were 
ordered to, had they been given the chance.‟79   
      John W Gordon‟s essay on Wingate in the 1991 anthology, Churchill’s Generals, placed 
Wingate even more firmly in the Special Forces camp, Gordon stating that:  
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      To look at Wingate is to look at the British style of warfare.  For, while virtually all major           
      combatants in World War II experimented to some degree with so-called "special forces", it       
      was the British experiment with them that holds pride of place both as to scale and                      
      expectations. Moreover...Orde Wingate must be seen as Winston Churchill‟s paramount             
      theorist and most committed advocate of their use.
80 
 
 
      Gordon traced the British interest in „unconventional operations‟ from Lawrence to Churchill, 
who, in the post-Dunkirk period saw them as the best means to strike back at the Germans physically 
and, perhaps more important at that stage of the war, psychologically.  Churchill, he claimed, was 
inspired by the „conjunct operations‟ of the Napoleonic Wars and by the supposed extensive use of 
Special Forces by the Germans in the invasions of 1940, this leading to the creation of the 
Commandos and SOE.
81 
Wingate created the largest special force of the war, with Churchill‟s 
backing, and developed a doctrine for its use; however, „The units...would not be made up of 
guerrillas, with their free and easy ways, but of soldiers acting with the discipline, training and 
reliability of regular formations.‟82    Heilbrunn and Gordon therefore agree that Wingate attempted 
to use specialist regular units to wage guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.   
      Interestingly, the one published analysis of Wingate‟s operations by a true peer - a British officer 
of similar age, rank and experience - concentrated exclusively on their „regular‟ aspects.  Lieutenant 
Colonel Terence Otway commanded 9th Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, in the Normandy 
landings of June 1944, where he won the Distinguished Service Order and lost most of his battalion 
storming the German gun batteries at Merville on 6 June itself.  In 1951, he was commissioned to 
author the Official History of British airborne forces in the Second World War, this work being 
significant in presenting an assessment of Wingate, from another official historian, at odds with 
Kirby‟s.  Otway‟s remit was to extract „lessons learned‟ from the British use of airborne forces in the 
war, and Thursday was analysed accordingly, as an airborne operation, reliant on air support and 
supply.  Otway began by commenting that Longcloth „showed clearly the scope offered for applying 
new methods in the Burma theatre...prov[ing] that the power of supply and control [of behind the 
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lines operations] was limited only by the number of aircraft and trained crews available.‟83   There 
followed a narrative of the planning and execution of Thursday, stressing its air aspects - air supply, 
casualty evacuation, close air support, construction of airfields in hostile territory by airborne 
engineers - and also of the Stronghold concept.  Otway emphasised the operation‟s commencing with 
air landings, resulting in three brigades „embedded behind the enemy‟s lines and more or less at the 
centre of four Japanese divisions‟.84    Subsequent operations by these brigades created a „clamp‟ 
upon Japanese communications in northern Burma, undone when the Chindits were ordered north to 
support Stilwell.
85
    Otway evidently did not view the Chindits as a purely guerrilla force, his narrative 
emphasising the fierce, protracted battles taking place around some of the Strongholds, and the role 
of close air support by the Air Commando in inflicting mass destruction upon the Japanese.  In 
Otway‟s professional opinion, the Chindits were an air-inserted all arms main force unit capable of 
major engagements inflicting heavy casualties upon the Japanese.
86
    Moreover, they were successful 
in this role, Otway concluding that: 
 
      The main lesson that emerged from these operations was that Wingate‟s theories on Long          
      Range Penetration...had proved correct in detail....His force had gnawed a hole in the entrails     
      of three Japanese divisions which had weakened them to such an extent that their eventual          
      collapse was complete.
87
   
 
 
      Moreover, Thursday tested concepts useful in future airborne operations.  To Otway, therefore, 
Wingate was a successful theoretician and practitioner of airborne warfare.  
      Another interpretation of Wingate‟s ideas was presented by Luigi Rossetto in 1982, in his Major 
General Orde Charles Wingate and the Development of Long-Range Penetration, the published 
version of his master‟s thesis for the Royal Military College of Canada, completed in 1967.  Rossetto 
contended that Wingate‟s concept of long-range penetration was an offshoot of Basil Liddell Hart‟s 
„strategy of the indirect approach‟, defeating the enemy by following the line of least resistance to his 
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most vulnerable areas, there to „dislocate‟ his forces from their command, control and supply.88  
There is some historical evidence to support this idea.  Wingate and Liddell Hart met in 1938 and 
corresponded for some time afterwards, Wingate sending Liddell Hart copies of his training notes and 
memoranda for his operations in Palestine, and Liddell Hart providing Wingate a letter of introduction 
to Churchill; Liddell Hart also claimed that Wingate‟s actions in Palestine had been influenced by his 
ideas.
89
 Yet, Rossetto‟s work, in published form, was largely biographical and narrative and 
Wingate‟s military ideas formed one theme among several.  However, Rossetto did present the 
hypothesis that Wingate was attempting a new form of warfare, combining the „indirect approach‟ 
with his own ideas and resembling the Soviet concept of „deep battle‟, associated most closely with 
Marshal Mikhail Tukachevsky.  Therefore, according to Rossetto, authors who judge Wingate simply 
as a guerrilla leader or as a commander of Special Forces miss the point.
90
  
      This is original, but, for reasons discussed already, Rossetto had to rely upon the works of Mosley, 
Sykes, Slim and Kirby, papers available at the Public Record Office at the time, and some material on 
Palestine he obtained via contacts at RMCC to support his case.    Inevitably, therefore, his hypothesis 
was based largely upon secondary sources, and he was unable to establish any direct link between 
Wingate‟s ideas and Liddell Hart‟s, apart from the latter‟s own testimony, nor did he demonstrate 
empirically how the Chindit operations might have been the „indirect approach‟ in action.  The 
possibility of a link between Wingate‟s military thought and Liddell Hart‟s had been touched upon by 
Shelford Bidwell in his history of Thursday, and dismissed: „[I]t must be said that Wingate was no 
"Liddell-Hartist".  He was a "Wingate-ist": in his arrogance he admitted no mentor‟, an observation 
borne out by Wingate‟s never citing any source but himself for his ideas.91    Nonetheless, the idea that 
there was a possible link between the indirect approach and Wingate‟s concept of long-range 
penetration had become a theme in the literature. 
      This theme was taken up by Robert Lyman, a former British Army officer, in Slim, Master of War, 
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in 2004.  Lyman‟s claim was that it was Slim who continued the tradition of Liddell Hart into the war 
in Burma and beyond: „Slim‟s real contribution to the art of war was to provide a practical bridge 
between the original theory of the "indirect approach" expounded by Major General JFC Fuller, Sir 
Basil Liddell Hart and other members of the "English" school of military strategy during the inter-war 
era, and the modern [post 1990s] doctrine of "manoeuvre warfare"‟, encapsulated by Lyman as „the 
concentration of force to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum and moral 
dominance‟ and which he saw as demonstrated in Slim‟s victories at Imphal and Kohima in 1944 and 
Meiktila in 1945.
93
    The role of Wingate in this was to organise „long-range "hit and run" type 
operations [sic] behind enemy lines‟, in opposition to Slim‟s approach, which was to mass the greatest 
British force available against Japanese weakness.
94
    Lyman clearly viewed Wingate as more of a 
media and propaganda creation than a serious strategist: in his view, Longcloth was carried out 
without strategic rationale and was a far from unambiguous vindication of Wingate‟s ideas, but was 
built into a major victory by GHQ India in order to boost morale.  After this, the resources directed 
to Wingate by a grateful Churchill resulted in Wingate‟s ideas growing out of control, Wingate 
wishing to initiate large-scale operations on the Japanese lines of communication, yet „Slim knew that 
Wingate could never hope to achieve the decisive advantage he sought.  His aircraft-supplied troops, 
light in artillery and bereft of armour, would exhaust themselves quickly‟, something Lyman saw 
happening in the latter stages of Thursday, another operation launched without „strategic 
imperative‟.95   Wingate was  in „strategic competition‟ with Slim and is, in some ways, the „villain‟ 
of Lyman‟s book.  The resources diverted to Thursday, „a colossal military blunder‟, according to 
Lyman, were sources unavailable for Slim‟s planned decisive battle on the Imphal Plain, but Slim had 
no choice but to accede, due to pressure from Churchill; Wingate‟s „arrogant assumption that nothing 
else in the region mattered, and...the offensive methods he used to obtain what he wanted‟ led to 
numerous clashes with the stoic Slim, who seems to have understood the role of LRP better than 
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Wingate himself.
96
    If Rossetto‟s hypothesis is combined with Lyman‟s, this could be portrayed as 
a clash between two different interpretations of the indirect approach, were it not for Lyman‟s failure 
to establish empirically any link between Slim and Liddell Hart (and there is no record of any direct 
correspondence between the two at the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King‟s College). 
 Moreover, Lyman contradicted himself: in his introduction, Slim was clearly influenced by the 
„English manoeuvrist‟ school of strategy, the indirect approach in particular, yet, later, he merely 
shows a „common ancestry‟ with this „school‟, arising from „the demands of intelligent soldiering‟ 
rather than any theoretical input from elsewhere.
97
   Moreover, his views on Wingate and LRP echoed 
largely those of Slim in Defeat into Victory, a work he inevitably cited heavily.  Nevertheless, this is 
another work placing Wingate in a doctrinal context centering on Liddell Hart. 
      An alternative „placing‟ of Wingate was made by another British Army officer, Major John Atkins, 
in a monograph produced for the US Army Command and General Staff College, arguing that 
operations in Burma pioneered another key concept of post-1990s military doctrine, expressed in 
modern US military jargon as „nonlinear, noncontiguous operations‟.  Although no clear definition 
was provided, from the text it can be deduced that these are operations in which units move and fight 
in widely dispersed formations. Rather than forming a solid „front‟, facing the enemy, they aim to 
strike him in depth, using seaborne or airborne movement, and air support and air supply in lieu of 
conventional artillery and communications respectively, as Atkins argued, the US military have 
attempted in the post-2001 „War on Terror.‟98  Wingate‟s Chindits pioneered this type of operation, 
claims Atkins, and, perhaps unsurprisingly for a student at US Army Staff College, he suggests 
Wingate‟s inspiration may have been the Confederate cavalry raiders of the American Civil War.99  
Like these forces, Wingate‟s initial aim was to fill the enemy rear areas with mobile units, which would 
concentrate to attack key enemy installations, then disperse and use their superior mobility to avoid 
retribution.
100
    From the attachment of the Air Commando, these operations were supported 
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effectively by battlefield airpower, Atkins describing the accuracy of air attacks on Thursday as 
„superb‟.101   Overall, the Chindit operations „demonstrated that mobile, noncontiguous, nonlinear 
operations could succeed when supported by airpower‟, setting an example soon followed by all 
British forces in Burma.
102
 In contrast with Lyman, Atkins not only saw Wingate as playing a valuable 
part in the British victory in Burma, but as a forerunner of twenty-first century warfare. 
      The main impression gained from a survey of works trying to analyse Wingate‟s military ideas is 
of lack of consensus, and repeated attempts to project the ideas and concepts of others onto his.  To 
some authors, Wingate was a guerrilla commander, to others, an airborne commander or practitioner 
of manoeuvre warfare; he might also be a disciple of Robert the Bruce, Nathan Bedford Forrest or 
Basil Liddell Hart, according to source.  Moreover, most of these works consist of interpretations of 
the published work either of Wingate‟s peers and contemporaries or his biographers – and even those 
who knew him best could not agree on what he was trying to do or what spurred him to do it.  This 
begs the question of what a survey of Wingate‟s own papers and other contemporary documents 
might yield that is different from this, leading to the main theme of this thesis. 
     
      The thesis   
This thesis investigates the question, how far did the military thought and practice of Major General 
OC Wingate part company with British Army doctrine of his time?  This melds the controversy over 
Wingate‟s ideas with the debate over their origin.  The principal contention of this thesis is that the 
answer to this question is „Not as much as the previous literature has argued‟, that Wingate‟s thought 
and practice do not represent any significant departure from British Army war fighting methods of his 
time, but derived from a number of methods and practices prevalent in the Army of the period, and 
which were utilised as part of their military strategy by several British theatre commanders.   
      Methodology was straightforward, consisting of establishing the strategic situation faced by 
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British forces in the theatres where Wingate was deployed and the „official‟ British strategic and 
operational solutions to this, followed by examining Wingate‟s proposals, allowing comparison and 
contrast.   This entailed a survey of Wingate‟s papers in the Imperial War Museum and British Library 
and papers and correspondence held in other collections. Alongside this went a review of official 
British government and military papers, principally in the National Archives at Kew and the Churchill 
Archive at Cambridge, in order to ascertain the state of British Army doctrine for the span of 
Wingate‟s career, 1922 to 1944, alongside its approach to operations in this period. This was 
supplemented by interviews with a number of former Chindits and, most importantly, Sir Douglas 
Dodds-Parker, who served as Wingate‟s staff captain in Sudan and Ethiopia in 1940-41, before going 
on to become a senior operative with SOE and a minister in the Conservative government of 
1951-1956.  The thesis therefore combines published and unpublished material, including a higher 
proportion authored by Wingate himself than hitherto, with primary source oral testimony from 
contemporaries, at least one of them a significant practitioner of unorthodox warfare himself. 
       From this, a different pattern has emerged than found in material published hitherto.  There 
appears to be no single discrete model for Wingate‟s operations, no „mould‟ into which they can be 
neatly fitted. Rather than being identifiable as distinct guerrilla, airborne or special forces, Wingate‟s 
long range penetration operations combined all three methods, relying upon a core of lightly-armed 
regular forces, some inserted by air in later operations, cooperating with local irregulars and 
supported liberally by airpower, operating against vital targets in the enemy rear, thus forcing him to 
disperse his strength and be destroyed in detail, either by Allied heavy forces or LRP forces 
themselves.  Wingate‟s ideas evolved organically from his time in Palestine onwards, and had multiple 
roots.  His military experience was gained exclusively in or around Britain‟s imperial possessions in 
Africa, Asia and the Middle East.  The British Army of the time specialised in the „small wars‟ 
prevalent in these areas, and had developed coherent operational practices involving all-arms columns 
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penetrating rapidly into enemy territory, and, as early as the 1920s, was experimenting with air supply 
and close air support of these columns.  There was also a long-established practice of using locally 
recruited volunteers, under British officers, for scouting and ambush work in territory the enemy 
thought safe.  None of these ideas were new, and were all apparent in Wingate‟s operations. 
      The use of combined-arms columns operating in cooperation with local irregulars was extended 
into operations against regular armies from 1917 onwards, most notably by Wingate‟s distant - and 
much-loathed - relative, TE Lawrence.  Lawrence was one of the inspirations for the doctrine for 
directing armed resistance in Axis-occupied territory devised in 1939 by Lieutenant Colonel Colin 
Gubbins, then with the MI(R) covert operations organisation of the British War Office, and applied 
by G(R) - an offshoot of MI(R) - in planning for Ethiopia.  It was this operation that Wingate took 
over in late 1940, and his campaign in Ethiopia was based clearly upon his own interpretation of the 
existing doctrine, modified by conditions he discovered there.  Wingate‟s writings indicate that the 
operational concept he developed subsequently, long range penetration, was rooted explicitly in what 
happened in Ethiopia, and also that he intended to apply this model in Burma until conditions there 
modified it further.  Wingate‟s operational thought and practice was therefore multi-causal and 
evolving constantly; it also accorded with a number of other practices of the British Army of his time 
and before. 
      The structure of the thesis reflects this.  The next chapter summarises British Army doctrine in the 
inter-war period in both „small‟ and „large‟ wars, and, in the case of the former, focuses on the 
evolution in thought from Major General Charles Callwell to Major General Charles Gwynne, 
authors of the two most influential works on this type of operation in this period. The following 
chapter summarises Wingate‟s experiences in Sudan, in 1928-1933, and its possible influence on what 
came after, before discussing Wingate‟s opinions of Lawrence.  Chapter Four covers Wingate‟s time 
in Palestine, 1936-39, and demonstrates that Wingate‟s activities with the Special Night Squads were 
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far from the departure from British counterinsurgent methods that the literature sometimes made 
them seem, but actually formed an integral part of a British military strategy which proved highly 
successful, defeating the Arab revolt by 1939.  That Wingate‟s thought and practice demonstrably fit 
into contemporary British strategy is also a theme of Chapter Five, which covers Wingate‟s 
operations in Ethiopia in 1940-41.  The chapter demonstrates that the use of specialist forces to wage 
irregular and guerrilla warfare against Germany, Italy and their occupied territories was a cornerstone 
of British strategy in this period, principally because their expulsion from the Continent gave them 
little other option.  Such forces were used also in North and East Africa for a number of reasons, not 
least of which was the enthusiasm of the British theatre commander, Wavell, for this kind of unit.  The 
next two chapters deal with the first and second Chindit operations respectively, and demonstrate that 
the Chindit concept evolved organically from a model resembling the operations Wingate had 
commanded in Ethiopia, based upon the different geography, both physical and human, of Southeast 
Asia, the nature of the Japanese as an opponent, and the greater resources available.  Indeed, it was 
due to the latter that Wingate‟s plans not only evolved, but escalated, from his original scheme, 
involving auxiliary operations combining small numbers of British troops with local partisans, to a 
plan to inflict decisive, theatre-level defeat upon the Japanese through a major air-land offensive.  
Wingate hoped to prove this final concept on Operation Thursday, the operation on which he was 
killed.  The final chapter attempts to analyse and establish Wingate‟s true „place‟ in British military 
history, based upon the new evidence in this thesis, before reviewing the literature in the light of this 
new assessment and suggesting avenues for further research.  The thesis, therefore, centres upon the 
argument that Wingate presented a coherent, evolving model of warfare, derived from previous 
methods used by the British Army in extra-European operations, distilled through his own experience, 
and fitting into British strategy in the theatres where he was active, apart from a period at the end of 
this life.  
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      It is essential, therefore, to establish the state of British Army „doctrine‟ - presuming there was 
one - in the period of Wingate‟s career, in order to demonstrate just what Wingate was parting from 
or agreeing with.  The next chapter will consist of a review of the relevant British military procedures 
and fighting instructions of the day, as planned for major wars and actually practiced in the colonial 
„small wars‟ in which Wingate cut his teeth.   
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                                                                CHAPTER TWO 
                                               THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND 
 
     
      One point...is crystal clear: for whatever reasons, the British Army does not                        
      embrace a philosophy (for the want of a better word) which animates the actions of all      
      soldiers... 
            - Brian Holden Reid, 1990¹       
 
     [I]f an Army is to succeed, everyone in it must know the class of action other people on      
     their right and left, or in front of or behind them, will take under certain circumstances.    
     It is fatal not to work to a common doctrine... 
            - General Sir Philip Chetwode, 1923² 
         
 
       
      Introduction - Military Doctrine 
 
This chapter will establish the institutional context for Wingate‟s career, thought and practice.  The 
central theme of this thesis is whether Wingate offered a model of warfare differing radically from that 
endorsed by the British Army of his time, and it is therefore crucial to establish whether the British 
Army of the period 1923 - the year Wingate was commissioned - to 1944, the year of his death, had 
a prescribed model for war fighting, officially approved and agreed upon by all, and whether Wingate 
departed from it.  This chapter, therefore, examines whether the British Army of Wingate‟s day had 
a doctrine. 
      This task is made difficult by the British Army apparently shying away from formal, prescriptive 
military „doctrine‟ until recently, there being no identifiable, single codified British military doctrinal 
document until 1989, and even then, this document‟s definition of doctrine was vague: „Put most 
simply, doctrine is what is taught [consisting of] fundamental principles by which the military forces 
guide their actions in support of objectives.‟³ Other authors have been more explicit.  Shelford 
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Bidwell and Dominick Graham defined doctrine as:  
 
      [T]he definition of the aim of military operations; the study of weapons and other resources        
      and  the lessons of history, leading to deductions of the correct strategic and tactical principles    
      on which to base both training and the conduct of war... 
4 
 
 
      Colonel Trevor N Dupuy was even more prescriptive: 
 
 
      [Doctrine comprises] Principles, policies, and concepts which are combined into an integrated    
      system for the purpose of governing all components of a military force in combat, and                
      assuring consistent coordinated employment of these components.  The origin of doctrine can    
      be experience, or theory, or both....Doctrine is methodology and, if it is to work, all military       
      elements must know, understand and respect it.
5
  
 
 
      To draw these strands together, „doctrine‟ translates as „teaching‟ and has been transferred from 
religious to political to military usage to denote any attempt to create a coherent, systematic way of 
doing things, usually taking the form of an officially endorsed set of recommended actions or 
behaviour for any given situation.
6
   Doctrine acts as a bridge between theory and practice and is 
separate, yet interlinked with both: theory explains doctrine, practice enacts it.  This leads to the first 
identifiable characteristic of British military doctrine: it has tended to be empirical rather than 
theoretical.   Indeed, in discussing the history of „doctrine‟ in the British Army, Colin McInnes and 
John Stone identified „a traditional aversion in the British Army to theorising about war, and an 
organisational culture which emphasised "common sense"‟7   This was taken for granted at the time 
under survey here: writing in 1930, Liddell Hart proposed that: 
 
      [W]hat seems to be far more important than abstract principles are practical guides....Yet the      
      modern tendency has been to search for a "principle" which can be expressed in a single              
      word - and then needs several thousand words to explain it.  Even so, these "principles" are        
      so abstract that they mean different things to different men, and, for any value, depend on the     
      individual‟s own understanding of war....In contrast, certain axioms seem to emerge from a        
      close and extensive study of war.  These cannot be expressed in a single word, but they can        
      be put in the fewest words necessary to be practical.
8
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       This is not to imply that the British Army did not study and learn from experience: on the contrary, 
a wide variety of official pamphlets and unofficial but widely read and endorsed books and articles 
were published by the War Office, numerous headquarters and journals such as the Army Quarterly 
or the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute in the period 1918-1939; many of these will be 
cited below.  The key is that rather than viewing „military doctrine‟ as the link between theory and 
practice, it might, in the case of Britain in the interwar period, be more accurate to see it as the link 
between past military experience (or perceptions of it) and current military practice, and therefore as 
something developing organically over time. 
      There appear to be cultural reasons for this, in particular the image the British Army had of itself. 
In 1921, in the aftermath of victory in the First World War, Major FC Festing (later Field Marshal Sir 
Frank Festing) wrote that „Other armies may train successful armies in other ways, for armies adopt 
a discipline best suited to their national characteristics.  But the British system has stood the test of 
war over and over again.‟9   The influence on British military practice of belief in „national 
characteristics‟, that those of a certain ethnicity or culture will think, behave and react in certain, 
predictable ways, is a theme running through this thesis.  Wingate, like many Europeans of his time, 
was explicitly of this view, this thesis citing numerous examples of his beginning or resting a case on 
the assumed national characteristics of the enemy and claiming that his methods met or exploited 
them.  He was not alone in this attitude, a factor in Slim‟s prescribed tactics against the Japanese being 
his interpretation of their previous behaviour.
10
 Moreover, adapting operational and tactical methods 
to suit the „character‟ of the enemy was common in „small wars‟ and counterinsurgencies outside 
Europe, the very type of conflict in which Wingate acquired his operational experience, pre-1939. In 
the best-known contemporary work on this subject, Major General Charles Callwell discussed the 
different types of opponent faced by the British and other armies in such conflicts and how tactics 
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should be adapted to suit their favoured fighting style, and touched frequently upon „national 
characteristics‟, for instance in discussing intelligence gathering („The ordinary native found in 
theatres of war peopled by coloured races lies simply for the love of the thing, and his ideas of time, 
numbers and distance are of the vaguest...‟), the danger of treachery and the world view and favoured 
tactics of hill tribesmen („He is a fighter the world over, and always has been...[A]lthough once beaten, 
they take it like good sportsmen, hoping for better luck next time‟) and those living in jungles („[T]hey 
have not the love of war for its own sake nor the sporting instincts...of the hill man....[I]t would be 
absurd to place the races of West Africa on the same platform as warriors with the Pathans and 
Gurkhas...‟).11  Some argued that national characteristics applied also to major wars.  In 1933, Wavell, 
then commanding 6
th
 Infantry Brigade, suggested that such influences should be recognised in the 
form of a new branch of the War Office „to study ourselves, our national characteristics and our 
reactions as a nation to military matters‟ in the same way the Intelligence Branch studied those of 
other countries, so they could form the basis of a coherent recruiting and training programme.
12 
  
      David French sees the origins of the British attitude to doctrine as lying in the British perception 
of their own national character, which rejected intellectualising about practical matters such as war 
and politics as egregiously „foreign‟, and saw pragmatism as separating the British character from the 
European. French illustrated this with the example of the British officer, observing Wehrmacht 
exercises, as late as 1939, commenting that German junior officers lacked imagination because they 
all came to essentially the same solution to the same tactical problem, „What he failed to see was that 
this actually demonstrated that the German army possessed the inestimable advantage that its junior 
leaders had imbued a common understanding of their tactical doctrine.‟13   Belief that peoples acted 
in certain predictable ways, including in war, seems, therefore, to have been common among British 
Army officers of Wingate‟s time.  Their interpretation of their own „character‟ was that it embraced 
pragmatism and rejected abstract theorising.  
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       Yet, the British Army of the inter-war period was also aware of the potential value of „doctrine‟. 
 In 1923, Lieutenant General Sir Philip Chetwode, General Officer Commanding in Chief (GOC in 
C) Aldershot Command, argued that „if an Army is to succeed, everyone in it must know the class of 
action other people on their right and left, or in front of or behind them, will take under certain 
circumstances.  It is fatal not to work to a common doctrine...‟14 while in 1928, the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir George Milne, demanded „We must have one doctrine 
throughout the Army.‟15   Moreover, the Army believed it had this doctrine: the 1920 Field Service 
Regulations (FSR) declared itself explicitly the British Army‟s doctrine for land warfare, and in 1925, 
the future General Sir Henry Pownall, a gunner officer, reviewing the 1923 FSR’s chapters on 
artillery, welcomed it as the doctrine which the Royal Artillery lacked previously, while subsequent 
editions were identified as „doctrine‟ in review articles in official publications, with the term „British 
Defence Doctrine‟ being used in a review article in 1938, albeit in the context of a discussion of 
battlefield tactics.
16
 It appears, therefore, that many influential British Army officers of the 1920s and 
1930s not only believed that doctrine was important, but that they had one, centred upon Field 
Service Regulations.  Consequently, given its apparent contextual importance, there follows an 
analysis of what Field Service Regulations (FSR) actually said, and how it developed over the 
inter-war period.   
      However, a contention of this thesis is that the British Army of Wingate‟s time was not one army, 
but two.  The army for which FSR was intended as „doctrine‟ was organised, trained and equipped to 
execute major operations against other regular forces, presumably in Europe.  The rest of the Army, 
throughout the inter-war period, continued the traditional role of fighting „small wars‟ and police 
actions against irregular and tribal enemies in the Empire, particularly in India, the Middle East and 
Africa.  It was in the context of this „Imperial‟ army that Wingate gained his operational experience 
before 1939 and, as will be shown, it developed methods of its own that were extended into 
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operations against regular forces in North and East Africa in 1940-41, some of which Wingate 
furthered.  Consequently, a summary of British methods in Imperial operations follows that of FSR. 
   
      Field Service Regulations 
 
     Without a continental commitment there was little reason to adopt the organization, training,       
     equipment or doctrine necessary for meeting a threat in Europe....The training and equipment      
     of the British army responded to the needs of policing the empire, not to European warfare.  
            - Elizabeth Kier
17 
 
     [T]he periods between major European wars have not been characterised by inactivity or             
     genuine peace: the army‟s job in the 1840s, 1890s or 1920s was not to prepare for the next war  
     but to fight the current one.     
            - Hew Strachan
18 
 
 
Editions of Field Service Regulations were published in 1920, 1923-24, 1929 and 1935.  The later 
editions - authored in 1929 by Major General CP Deedes and in 1935 by Major General Archibald 
Wavell - leaned heavily upon the 1920 Edition, authored by Colonel JFC Fuller and reflecting his 
widespread philosophical and intellectual interests, particularly his interpretation of Clausewitz.
19
 The 
institutional background to these volumes was an army reverting to its pre-1914 role as a colonial 
police force.  This role was likely to expand, given that, under the terms of the 1919 peace settlements, 
Britain added to an already global empire colonial territory of the defeated powers, mandated under 
the League of Nations.  Indeed, after 1918, the idea grew within the Army that the First World War 
had been an aberration, a distraction from „real soldiering‟ in the Empire, and unlikely to be repeated. 
 In 1926, Milne described the war as  „abnormal‟ and opined that it would be unlikely that the British 
Army would ever fight another war in Europe, while as late as 1937, the Minister for the 
Co-Ordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, listed the creation of a continental expeditionary force 
third in the list of army priorities after the air defence of Great Britain and reinforcing Imperial 
garrisons.
20
   There was, therefore, as of the 1920s through to the late 1930s, a view, prevalent in 
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official circles, that British forces would not be committed to another major land war in Europe. 
      Nevertheless, the experience of large-scale operations against regular forces in 1914-18 had, 
unsurprisingly, wrought irrevocable changes, particularly upon military thought.  The most obvious 
manifestation of this was the literary output of a number of officers and ex-officers, of whom the best 
known are Liddell Hart and Fuller, both producing book-length works in print to this day. There were 
also papers published by these and many others in service journals, particularly The Army Quarterly 
and the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, as well as the various corps and regimental 
periodicals.  At the practical level, senior serving officers including Bernard Montgomery, William 
Slim and John Dill disseminated their interpretations of the British experience in the First World War 
as instructors at training institutions such as the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta (Wingate did 
not attend either, despite passing the entrance examination).  There was, therefore, much literary 
speculation and debate on the lessons of the First World War.   
      This impacted on all the editions of FSR.  Each edition began by discussing the role of the army, 
the chapter on „Military Policy and Plans‟ in the 1920 edition paraphrasing Clausewitz‟s definition of 
war as ‘an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.‟21   The aim of force was to „rapidly 
influence the enemy people in the desired direction‟ and „the ultimate objective, which is the 
destruction of the enemy’s main forces, must always be held in view, and all other undertakings 
subordinated to this objective‟ unless „questions of policy‟ resulted in lesser objectives being 
pursued.
22
  The Army was therefore committed to defeating the enemy army in battle, after which its 
government, under pressure from its civilian populace, would sue for peace.  FSR 1920, again 
echoing Clausewitz, stressed that the strategic outcome of a conflict hinged upon attacking the 
enemy‟s „centres of gravity‟, and that these attacks hinged on what was achievable at battlefield level: 
„The objective which appears most likely to lead to decisive results should, as a rule, be selected.  At 
the same time the relative probabilities of tactical success must receive full consideration.  A 
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strategical plan which ignores the probabilities of tactical success is foredoomed to failure‟, a 
proposition which may have been influenced by the British experience on the Western Front in 
1914-18.
23
   The „doctrine‟ of the recently victorious British Army in the early 1920s was therefore 
oriented „bottom-up‟: the prime objective was to destroy the enemy army in battle, the attainment of 
strategic aims hinging upon this.  Although the 1929 FSR still advocated destroying the enemy army, 
the apocalyptic tone of 1920 was moderated in favour of a holistic approach, use of force forming 
part of a coherent scheme of coercion and deterrence also involving diplomatic and economic 
pressure, while the 1935 edition saw Wavell take this a stage further, moving away from the bloody 
simplicity of the battlefield and arguing that the state imposed its will upon others „by employing part 
or all of the means of persuasion at its command.  These...include diplomacy, economic influence 
applied in the form of financial or commercial restrictions...and, in the last resort, the use of armed 
forces...‟; he implied also that political-strategic aims might be reached via manoeuvre, „by so 
interrupting vital lines of supply and commerce as to deny him the means of conducting his national 
life...‟24  
     At the battlefield level, FSR was non-prescriptive, as befits an army suspicious of abstract 
principles.  All editions stressed they should be interpreted according to circumstance; while there 
were principles of war, these were not laws, but guidelines for action, based upon past experience.
25
 
 These were first adumbrated by Fuller in the 1920 edition, and in the order given by Wavell in 1935, 
were: 
      - A Fixed Aim, with „all effort...continually directed towards its attainment...and every plan or 
action must be tested by its bearing upon this end.‟ 
      - Concentration „[T]he greatest possible force - moral, physical and material - should be 
employed at the decisive time and place in attaining the selected aim or objective‟ 
      - Co-operation, not only of all parts of an army, but with the other services and with the civil 
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authority 
      - Economy of force „A corollary of the principle of concentration is that of economy of force at 
less vital points [italics Wavell's]‟ 
      - Security, „[P]roviding adequate defence for vital and vulnerable points...so as to obtain freedom 
of action...‟ 
      - Offensive Action, which granted „power to force the enemy to conform [to our will]'       
      - Surprise, the aim being to create „a situation for which the enemy is unprepared...upset[ting] his 
plans and forc[ing] him to hurried and unconsidered action' via „calculated stratagem devised to 
mislead...by an unexpected rapidity of movement or by action in an unsuspected place.‟ 
      - Mobility was a corollary to surprise, and consisted specifically of „the power to move and to act 
more rapidly than the opponent.'
26
       
      At the heart of the interwar FSRs was belief in the primacy of human factors in war, particularly 
willpower, stated most explicitly in 1920:  
 
        Success in war depends more on moral than physical qualities.  Neither numbers, armament,     
        resources nor skill can compensate for lack of courage, energy, determination, and the bold      
        offensive spirit which springs from a national determination to conquer.  The development of   
        the necessary moral qualities is, therefore, the first objective to be attained in the training of      
        an army.  Next in importance are organization and discipline...The final essential is skilful,         
        resolute and understanding leadership.
27
  
 
 
      Belief in will, particularly the need for the British commander to impose his will upon the enemy 
commander‟s, was expected to shape the interpretation of FSR‟s principles of war.  While the 1929 
and 1935 FSRs both still saw success in war as hinging upon willpower, they departed from the 
narrow view of 1920.  The 1929 edition advocated the offensive as the best means of imposing British 
will upon the enemy, but practical reasons were given also: 
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      A commander who decides to assume the offensive is able to select his points of attack; he is      
     more likely to surprise his opponent, and to be able to develop superior force at the decisive        
     place.... By attacking, he will often force the enemy to conform to his movements and will           
     thus have taken the first step towards attaining the objective of a battle....
28
  
 
 
      Yet, Wavell‟s 1935 edition included a third volume, on operations and command of „higher 
formations‟, which not only presented mobile operations as a possible alternative to the seeking of 
major battle, but suggested an awareness of a level of war above that of the battlefield but below that 
of the direction of the war, what would later be identified as the operational level.
29
   In describing the 
need to pursue a fixed aim, it stated the need to „dispatch...one or more military expeditions, the aim 
of which is to defeat enemy forces or to occupy places of strategical importance‟ which may include 
the enemy capital, points or areas furthering an economic blockade, or „centres of his national effort‟, 
Wavell trying to instill the notion that such „expeditions‟ could be coordinated to produce a strategic 
outcome.
30
   He alluded also to manoeuvre, „movement that aims at inducing or forcing [the enemy] 
into an unfavourable position‟ and could consist of „attack or threat against the line of 
communications; a disposition of forces that threatens two or more of the enemy's vulnerable points 
and leaves him in doubt which is the real objective; the use of detachments to induce dispersion or 
prevent concentration‟, roles Wavell would assign to Wingate‟s Gideon Force in Ethiopia and the 
Chindits in Burma.
31
  Attacks on enemy communications, Wavell argued, „upset the equilibrium of 
the enemy commander‟, and may force him „to surrender or fight at a disadvantage; or, by a threat to 
do so, to cause him to disperse his forces for their protection.‟32   
      This is pertinent to this thesis in that Wingate can be shown firstly, to have understood the 
existence of this „new‟ level of war also, and, secondly, because his operational thought and action 
were aimed largely at how to strike most effectively at the enemy‟s communications in order to „upset 
his equilibrium‟, or, as Wingate put it, „attack his plan‟.  Such ideas were being promulgated several 
years before Wingate came to prominence, as the 1935 FSR demonstrates.  Consequently, while 
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„battle‟ remained at the heart of all editions of FSR, there was some evolution in the form it should 
take.   
      This becomes more apparent still in reviewing its recommendation of the best employment for 
each arm.  FSR 1920 saw battle as hinging upon infantry action at close quarters, with other arms, 
including tanks, supporting this.
33
    However, by 1929, an army could only succeed through the 
broader cooperation of an explicitly combined arms approach: „It must...be the aim of every 
commander so to combine the efforts of the component parts of his force as to ensure that his infantry 
reached their objective in the best possible condition for engaging in close fighting.‟34 Infantry was 
„the arm which confirms the victory and holds the ground won‟, but its vulnerability to defensive fire 
meant that its advance to close contact had to be covered by firepower from artillery and tanks, 
another point taken further in the 1935 edition, which recommended that plans for battle „should be 
made in terms of fire power rather than of men.‟35  As to how other arms might combine into the 
attack, the 1920 volume suggested that cavalry could „turn‟ the enemy flank, prior to and away from 
the main battle, to raid communications and threaten lines of retreat, while principal tank roles were 
assisting the infantry, destroying enemy tanks and „to exploit a success‟ (with no further detail 
provided) in that order, although commanders were advised to keep a reserve of tanks to „break up 
the enemy‟s reserves, to complete the demoralization of his troops, and to disorganize his staff 
arrangements and communications‟ following a breakthrough of the enemy front line.36    By the 
1930s, roles had evolved, reflecting technological change.  The 1929 and 1935 editions commented 
on tanks that their attributes enabled them to „strike a blow not only against an enemy‟s flanks, but 
also against his headquarters and rear services‟, and the task of making „flank or rear attacks‟ was 
added to the list given originally in 1920, these delivered by tanks supported by aircraft: one 
paragraph, plagiarising that on cavalry in the 1920 FSR, suggested that tanks and armoured cars 
could be directed around the enemy‟s flanks to attack reserves, gun positions and headquarters.37  
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The British Army, therefore, from 1918 was clearly partial to the concept of mobile operations in the 
enemy‟s rear areas, provided it had the weaponry.  However, this still lay firmly within an approach 
based upon battle, with mobile forces either supporting the battle or exploiting or finishing the 
situation battle created.   
      Battles would be fought to a single plan imposed via an autocratic, centralised system of 
command.  In the 1920 FSR, the commander was to delegate to subordinates „such powers as 
circumstances may render advisable.  In these cases, the powers entrusted to each commander, and 
his sphere of action, will be clearly stated in written instructions when not defined by regulations.‟38  
  By 1929, command philosophy had been modified: commanders allocated tasks to subordinates 
„who, within their individual scope, will use their own initiative in arranging the methods by which 
they will perform them.‟    However, the 1929 FSR warned that „delegation to a subordinate of undue 
liberty of action is as fatal an error as undue centralisation of authority‟ and while subordinates had to 
realise that „to remain inactive from fear of accepting responsibility is worse than to err in choosing 
their course of action‟ and should try to foresee what needed to be done next at all times, nonetheless 
they should remain fixed to their commanders‟ intent, if not to the letter of his orders.39    When it 
came to delegation of command authority, commanders were allowed to delegate upon subordinate 
commanders „acting at a distance‟ - the definition was no clearer than this - „such powers as he may 
consider advisable‟ but these should be stated in written instructions where not defined in regulations, 
thereby limiting a subordinate to following written orders.
40
    
      The 1935 edition brought a slight evolution, containing a new section on „Operation Instructions‟, 
which allowed subordinate commanders to act on their own judgement, but warned that these were 
to be used sparingly; as with previous editions, under normal circumstances, should a subordinate 
commander encounter an unforeseen situation, he was required to report this and await new orders, 
although under other circumstances a subordinate could depart from orders but „will be held 
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responsible for any failure that may ensue.‟41    Action, therefore, would be controlled centrally, with 
subordinate commanders allowed limited freedom of action, operating within a „master plan‟, 
controlled tightly from above.   As will be shown below, in this respect, Wingate was fully in 
accordance with prevailing thought, his operations being executed as much to a „master plan‟ as 
Montgomery‟s.    
      Moreover, all Wingate‟s proposed plans of action were rooted in widely held British assumptions 
about the opposing force‟s „national characteristics‟, and aimed at imposing his will upon them and 
so controlling their behaviour.  In Palestine, he aimed explicitly at producing a certain state of mind 
not only in the Arab insurgents, but upon their leadership and civilian supporters also.  In Ethiopia, 
he aimed again at breaking Italian morale, which proved a tougher task for him than it was for the 
British Army in the Western Desert at the same time.  In Burma, his aim was to disrupt and distract 
the Japanese planning process and, in doing so, create a situation Allied armies could exploit.  
Another echo of FSR is that his main instrument in all three campaigns was infantry, albeit with special 
organisation and training, but drawn generally from existing units - indeed, and surprisingly, given the 
claims of some authors, Wingate expressed misgivings about Commandos and other „special forces‟ 
in his official correspondence from Burma.  In Palestine, Wingate‟s Special Night Squads were a 
purely infantry force, albeit with at least one instance of ad hoc cooperation with aircraft; by the 
second Chindit operation, infantry units formed part of a combined arms approach utilising airpower 
for mobility and close support.  An argument could be constructed that Wingate‟s operations can be 
shown to be rooted in the doctrinal concepts and recommendations of FSR, with which he lived all 
his professional life.      
      However, FSR recommended its various doctrines should be interpreted in the light of experience. 
In Wingate‟s case, his experience was gleaned in the „other‟ British Army, a long way from Europe, 
in operations in a far-flung Empire.  Therefore, an overview of how the Army went about its business 
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in „small wars‟ in Africa and Asia is a crucial tool for placing Wingate more firmly in the context of 
his time and place.   
 
      ‘Frontier Warfare’ 
A common theme in studies of British colonial operations of the inter-war period is the apparent 
absence of any consistent „doctrine‟ guiding them. Tim Moreman and Tim Jones, for instance, 
emphasised the pragmatism  and organic evolution of ideas and practice that shaped the British 
approach to this type of campaign.
42
 Others, however, claim to detect some consistency: Hew 
Strachan and John Pimlott both argued that British „small wars‟ were characterised by a number of 
discernable characteristics: restraint in the use of military force, which was always viewed as a last 
resort, plus a recognition that the insurgents may have genuine grievances which excessive force 
might make worse.
43
 Edward Spiers noted that while improvisation was the keynote of all Imperial 
campaigning, due to the variety of terrain, climates and enemies, in most cases, the aim was to bring 
the usually poorly-armed enemy to battle, where they could be destroyed by superior British 
firepower.
44
 There is, therefore, some disagreement over whether there is any consistent and 
identifiable pattern to British colonial operations in the interwar period.   
      Yet, a survey of contemporary literature, official and unofficial, and of British activity in these 
„small wars‟, reveals certain methods, practices and attitudes recurring throughout.  It also suggests 
that some claims made in the literature must be nuanced.  In larger colonial conflicts of this period, 
or those in vital strategic areas, the British Government did attempt to find and treat with moderate 
elements among any insurgents; however, it seems to have had little compunction about using force 
to get them to listen.  Moreover, many officers evidently paid no more than lip service to notions of 
restraint or understanding the enemy‟s cause, consistently advocating aggressive and sometimes 
ruthless responses to disorder, the best known being the Amritsar incident of April 1919, when 
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Brigadier General Reginald Dyer ordered Gurkha troops to open fire on Indian rioters, killing 379.
45
 
The claim that insurgencies persisted because the authorities were not harsh enough was recurrent, 
even after the shock-wave of Amritsar, and was made not just by Wingate in Palestine but also by 
several others, including senior officers.  Indeed, many officers apparently held the Hobbesian view 
that anti-British insurgency constituted a criminal revolt against lawful authority - dismissed variously 
as „banditry‟, „dacoity‟ and, later in the period, „terrorism‟ – or arose from ignorant, excitable natives 
coming under the malign influence of populist agitators such as the „Mad Mullah‟ of Somaliland, Saya 
San in Burma in 1931 or Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, in 1929-1939.
46
     
      Such attitudes were expressed most lucidly in one of the most oft-mentioned books in British 
military literature, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, by Colonel (later Major General) 
Charles Callwell, published in three editions between 1896 and 1906.
47
    This work seems to have 
influenced not only at least two generations of colonial soldiers, including, possibly, Wingate, but also 
approved Army doctrine, the chapter on „Warfare in Undeveloped and Semi-Civilised Countries‟ in 
the 1929 edition of FSR, for instance, appearing to be virtually an unattributed summary of Chapters 
VI-VIII of the 1906 edition of Callwell.
48
    Moreover, given that Callwell intended to provide a digest 
of strategy and tactics in colonial warfare, he reflected prevailing opinion in the Army as much as 
influenced it, and many of the tactical and operational methods he described and approved can be 
observed in practice in Imperial operations in 1918-1939.   
      Many of these are described in another oft-cited work, Imperial Policing, published in 1939 by 
Major General Charles Gwynn; Gwynn‟s work not only provided narratives of colonial operations in 
1919-1939, but also offers a useful digest of prevailing British Army thought in this field as it stood 
at the end of this period.
 
  Perhaps the major evolution from Callwell‟s work is that Gwynn argued that 
Callwell‟s model of „small wars‟ - military campaigns aimed at defeating the insurgents in battle - now 
represented but one end of a spectrum of counter-insurgency also comprising the restoration of civil 
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order under martial law, or supporting police in the face of a threatened breakdown in order: indeed, 
Gwynn opened the main body of his text with a case study of the Amritsar episode as „how not to do 
things‟, wherein he made little attempt to conceal his disgust at what had happened there, and his low 
opinion of Dyer.
49
   The theory of „small wars‟ therefore evolved throughout the inter-war period, 
based on well-known and well tested principles and the lessons of experience.     
      This is pertinent to this thesis, in that Callwell, Gwynn and others developed a form of warfare 
different, in many key respects, from that derived from the experience of European wars and digested 
in FSR, and it was in the context of this form of warfare that Wingate‟s ideas developed. However, 
„Imperial Policing‟ or „Frontier Warfare‟ did share some ground with FSR.  In particular, some 
consistency with FSR’s recommendations for major wars was expressed in the belief that military 
action should be aimed at crushing the enemy‟s will under that of the British commander.  This was 
because a common theme in British „small wars‟ thought, from Callwell to Wingate, was that their 
opponents were unsophisticated and excitable „savages‟ or criminal miscreants who could be 
overawed or, if necessary, terrorised into recognising the folly of defying the Empire.  Callwell was 
firm that „boldness and vigour‟ were essential because „The lower races are impressionable.  They are 
greatly influenced by a resolute bearing...‟, caution being interpreted as weakness being another 
recurring claim throughout this period.
50
     
      As with Fuller, two decades later, Callwell advocated what was effectively a tactical solution to 
strategic problems: a swift offensive, aimed at bringing the insurgents to battle, would shatter their 
resolve and deter would-be allies and imitators, as „the impression made upon semi-civilised races...by 
a bold and resolute procedure‟, was always great.‟51 Such action would also reduce the risk of the 
Army becoming involved in „desultory‟ and protracted operations involving guerrilla warfare, in 
which the locals had the advantage.
52
  Emphasis upon will and resolve was redoubled in dealing with 
„insurrections‟ - politically motivated urban uprisings, distinct from „open‟ warfare against tribal 
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warriors or Boer guerrillas - „where the object is not only to prove to the opposing force unmistakably 
which is the stronger, but also to inflict punishment on those who have taken up arms.‟53    Here, even 
wholesale destruction of villages and hostage-taking were warranted and, although Callwell 
recommended such measures be sparing and carefully targeted, he tacitly acknowledged that 
„severity‟ was sometimes necessary pour encourager les autres: „Uncivilised races attribute leniency 
to timidity...fanatics and savages...must be thoroughly brought to book and cowed or they will rise 
again.‟54   
      Gwynn was less sanguinary than Callwell, but was also firm that swift, decisive action by the 
Army, under conditions of martial law, represented an economy of effort, his ideal also being to bring 
a situation under control before it could dissolve into guerrilla warfare, and that threatened rather than 
overt violence minimised the need for larger deployments and higher levels of force.
 
  However, while 
unequivocal that captured insurgents should be dealt with severely and summarily, Gwynn was less 
enthusiastic than many about collective punishments and reprisals against the communities supporting 
them, arguing that these were likely to prevent a willing acceptance of lawful authority.
55   The Army‟s 
aim in this type of operation was, therefore, to force rebellious natives to respect British authority, an 
analogue to FSR‟s emphasis upon imposing British will upon the opposition.  Arguments for boldness, 
aggression and „severity‟ towards insurgents recur throughout professional writing of this period and, 
as will be shown, Wingate‟s arguments for these place him firmly within this largely mainstream 
„school of thought‟.  The application of such methods in Palestine will be discussed below, but, suffice 
to say at this point, the expression of consistent attitudes becomes apparent from even a cursory 
survey of British „small wars‟ of 1919-1939.  
      There is stronger contemporary evidence for Callwell‟s „vigour‟ and „severity‟ than there is for the 
„restraint‟ advocated by Gwynn and identified by some historians.  Martial Law was enforced in rebel 
areas of Ireland in 1920-1921, 21 death sentences being passed upon IRA members and sympathisers 
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by courts martial, rebel houses being blown up and the Army‟s official Record of operations referring 
openly and with undisguised approval to unauthorised reprisals by troops in Cork in May-June 1920, 
placing Sinn Fein leaders in army convoys to forestall ambush, and the activities of the „Black and 
Tans‟, the mainly British volunteers in the Royal Irish Constabulary who became a metaphor for crass 
brutality on both sides of the Irish Sea. Moreover, the Record, an official War Office document, 
expressed contempt for political authorities throughout, effectively judging the effectiveness of any 
action by the strength of the outcry in the press and Parliament, which the authors viewed as a nest 
of IRA sympathisers.
56
 „Severity‟ was conspicuous in other Imperial operations of the time: martial 
law, including extensive use of the death penalty, and punitive measures, including the destruction of 
hostile villages (including by aerial bombing by the RAF) and the confiscation of crops and livestock, 
featured prominently in the suppression of the Iraq revolt in 1920-21, the Moplah rebellion in India in 
1921-22, and the Burma rebellion of 1931.
57
    The usefulness of reprisals was even discussed in the 
official press of the Indian Army, an unattributed article in the Journal of the United Services Institute 
of India discussing how operations could be executed on the Northwest Frontier „against a 
village...which has misbehaved itself, with the object of doing as much damage as possible‟, to capture 
„outlaws‟ and destroy houses sheltering them, or to carry off livestock, providing tactical templates 
for these, including the following advice: 
 
      It is...a good plan when searching houses to send a couple of villagers into every house               
      immediately in front of the search party.  Should the inmates prove truculent their own friends    
      will get the benefit of the first shot and the troops will know what to expect.
58
  
 
 
      As late as 1938, the Army and police in the Northwest Frontier kept a „hostage corps‟ of the sons 
of known hostiles, to be thrown into houses where tribesmen where known to be hiding, ahead of 
police search parties, or placed in the front lorries of convoys to prevent ambush.
59
   „Severity‟ was 
therefore, apparently, a typical part of such operations and received official approval. 
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      However, by the 1930s, more politically sophisticated means of directing force in insurrections 
were being introduced, Burma in 1931 seeing the introduction of the system of „Military Control‟ 
applied later in Palestine.
60
   Military Control represented a politico-military mean between civilian 
control and martial law; the Civil Administration, represented by the Viceroy or High Commissioner, 
remained supreme, but devolved all responsibility for public security and order on the General Officer 
Commanding (GOC) who controlled the Army and police.  The GOC and High Commissioner were 
supposed to confer regularly on policy, as were local commanders and District Commissioners.  
Troops and police were empowered to arrest and search without warrant, but civil law remained in 
force, reinforced by emergency measures.
61
 At some levels, therefore, this period saw an attempt to 
move away from the purely military „small wars‟ approach to one based upon military aid to the civil 
power, Gwynn‟s work perhaps reflecting this change in attitude.  
     Tactical methods remained more consistent, and were distinct from those propounded in the 
various editions of FSR.  FSR emphasised battle decided by firepower, conforming to a plan devised 
and directed by a strict command hierarchy.  However, the tactical and operational pattern developed 
in Imperial operations in the inter-war period was different, „success‟ in colonial operations being 
measured by killing or capturing rebel leaders or the rebels asking for terms.
61
 Operations centred on 
all-arms columns, widely separated and advancing on broad fronts, with aircraft acting in observation 
or in lieu of artillery, harrying the enemy, keeping him on the move and, once he was engaged, using 
superior mobility to outflank him, cut or threaten his line of retreat, „turn‟ him out of his position or 
defeat him in a converging attack or drive him onto a cordon established across his line of retreat.
63
  
This kind of open warfare differed from the tightly controlled and concentrated European battlefield 
envisaged by FSR.  Colonial operations of the British and other armies had traditionally centred upon 
such columns, sometimes purpose-organised for various missions but just as likely to comprise 
whatever troops could be scraped together in theatre.
64
   Callwell discussed column organisation for 
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particular types of „small war‟, and contended that separate, but cooperating columns could produce 
strategic results from the confusion they instilled about British objectives, the intimidatory effect of 
apparent British ubiquity and the subsequent panic-diffusion of enemy strength as native commanders 
tried to confront every column.
65
  Callwell‟s ideal pattern was to pin the enemy with a small force in 
front while larger columns turned his flanks. While an irregular enemy was unlikely to have any lines 
of communication to threaten, the appearance of large forces in his rear was likely to panic him into 
retreat from his position, the outflanking columns then destroying him in detail on the move.    
Emphasis throughout was upon speed, aggression and flexibility rather than weight of numbers, 
Callwell believing that such characteristics allowed small forces to overcome larger numbers of 
poorly-led natives through surprise and „moral force‟.66    This could be achieved through having 
columns carry their supplies with them, removing the need for lines of communication and, in a 
departure from the approach to major warfare encapsulated in FSR, through extensive devolution of 
command authority and tolerance of initiative, Callwell quoting the French general, Boguslawski, 
writing on the Vendee campaigns of the 1790s, „The leaders of the columns must be officers who, in 
certain cases, understand how to depart from the plan of operations on their own responsibility, if the 
general situation appears to have altered‟ and Field Marshal Lord Roberts‟ – an experienced „Imperial 
Warrior‟ if ever there was one - instructions that column commanders should be allowed the „utmost 
latitude of movement‟, arguing that such was essential in hill and jungle warfare.67    Operations in 
„small wars‟, therefore, centred upon mobile action by all-arms columns, aimed at manoeuvring the 
enemy into defeat in operations eschewing rigid planning or centralised command.  The theories and 
practices Wingate would place behind the Chindits were tried and trusted before 1943. 
      The period 1919-39 saw the melding of twentieth-century technology with these 
nineteenth-century techniques.  In Ireland in 1919-21, units of the Army and the Royal Irish 
Constabulary patrolled the countryside in columns of infantry or armed police carried in armoured 
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lorries, escorted by armoured cars; such columns regularly employed „cordon and search‟ techniques, 
cordoning off areas in which the IRA were believed to be active, while other columns, or cavalry units, 
carried out „drives‟, intended to push the IRA onto the cordon; although of limited use in actually 
catching IRA men, Charles Townshend recounts that these methods were deemed threat enough to 
force the IRA, on several occasions, to break down its large „Flying Columns‟ into smaller, less 
effective units.
68
    Aircraft were used for spotting, although this was hampered by the small number 
of machines available, inability to tell IRA men from civilians, and the lack of wirelesses capable of 
communicating from air to ground.
69
  In the Iraq rebellion of 1920-21, Baghdad and other towns 
were fortified while small columns, heavy in artillery and engineers, carried out punitive 
counter-attacks against rebel villages; later, very large columns, consisting of two squadrons of 
cavalry, an artillery brigade and six battalions of infantry, were used to establish a permanent presence 
in outlying areas.
70
   
      In the 1921 Moplah rebellion in southern India, columns of lorry-borne infantry occupied villages 
by surprise and cordoned rebels in inhospitable areas where they had the option of surrender or 
starvation.  Use was also made of a technique utilised extensively later on in Palestine, inducing 
ambushes of armed columns disguised as supply convoys; interestingly, Captain Carpendale, writing 
on the Moplah campaign for the United Services Institute of India, had clearly read Callwell, as he 
cites the same historical sources in support for these methods.
71
 In India from the 1920s, „frontier 
columns‟ included tanks, armoured cars and towed artillery, and experimented with night 
operations.
72
     
      The inter-war period saw the use of aircraft in support of such operations become commonplace. 
 In the 1920 Iraq rebellion, outlying British Army garrisons, their ground lines of communication cut 
by the rebels, were resupplied by aircraft, dropping ammunition and medical supplies.
73   
Following the 
suppression of the rebellion, at the behest of the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, the RAF took 
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over responsibility for keeping order in Britain‟s mandated territories in Iraq, Transjordan and 
Palestine: the subsequent policy of „Air Control‟ centred on RAF bombers, operating from defended 
bases, supporting fast-moving units of RAF armoured cars, a technique employed on numerous 
punitive operations from the 1920s through to the early 1930s, and which was sufficient to defeat a 
Wahhabi invasion of Transjordan, launched from Saudi Arabia, in 1924.
74
  In 1931, no less than 
twelve years before Wingate presented similar ideas as his own, Major LVS Blacker of the Guides 
Infantry was arguing that columns operating on the Northwest Frontier of India could be re-supplied 
by airdrop or air landing, increasing their mobility through removing the need for large numbers of 
slow-moving pack animals (Wingate used both animal and air supply), and their firepower through 
allowing greater numbers of automatic weapons to be carried, as well as improving morale through 
speedy casualty evacuation.
75
 Wingate presented similar arguments in 1943-44.   The Mohmand 
operation of July-October 1933 saw RAF aircraft, attached to columns, bombing snipers and, later, 
„any enemy seen.‟76    The second Mohmand operation, two years later, saw the operation‟s 
commander, Brigadier Claude Auchinleck, use aircraft to „weaken the resistance‟ of the Mohmands 
ahead of the advance of his ground forces, and support battalion columns used during the advance to 
outflank and „turn‟ the Mohmands out of strong defensive positions; moreover, increasing use was 
made of wireless to coordinate the movement of columns - something presented in the literature as 
another Wingate innovation - although this was undone frequently by degradation of high frequency 
signals in the mountainous terrain.
77
 Between larger engagements, ambushes were set along snipers‟ 
favourite paths, which were also bombed to prevent tribesmen returning to the sanctuary of their 
villages.
78
    
      Another military method used extensively by the British in their „small wars‟ was the creation of 
specialist units, raised and trained on the initiative of individuals or small groups of relatively junior 
officers, circumventing approved „chains of command‟, and intended to carry out tasks deemed 
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beyond the capability of British regular troops.  Callwell recommended that every force should have 
a „Corps of Scouts‟, reconnoitering, raiding and ambushing ahead of the main advance, consisting of 
purpose-trained and organised units answering directly to the force commander, made up either of 
Gurkhas - used in this role on the Northwest Frontier for ninety years - natives armed with British 
weapons and commanded by British officers, or second and third-generation white settlers familiar 
with the geography of the area of operations.
79
    An application of this in practice, and an apparent 
forerunner of Wingate‟s Special Night Squads, was the Corps of Gurkha Scouts formed by Captains 
NH Edwards and GG Rogers of the Northwest Frontier Force (NWFF) in 1919.  This consisted of 
two platoons drawn from all Gurkha units in the NWFF and directed by the Force HQ, organised 
specifically for night-time ambush work inside hostile tribal territory on the Northwest Frontier - the 
same role the SNS would fulfill in Palestine - and, although its war diary is incomplete, it seems to 
have been involved continuously in such activity from May to August 1919, during which time it 
carried out one successful ambush of a large Pathan force.
80
   
      Such specialist forces can be identified in other theatres, also: in September 1920, the Royal Irish 
Constabulary, its morale collapsing in the face of IRA terrorism directed at officers and their families 
began raising its Auxiliary Division. The „Auxies‟ consisted of independent, lorry-borne companies 
of ex-British Army officers, and, although technically police, received little in the way of police 
training, being in actuality an armed para-military force trained in counter-insurgency by the Army 
and intended to react swiftly with armed force to the appearance of IRA activity in a given area. 5th 
Division, for instance, trained „Black and Tans‟ and Auxiliaries in counter-ambush drills and night 
raiding in rebel areas under its remit.
81 
  Indeed, Charles Townshend identifies the Auxiliaries explicitly 
as „the nearest approach to a specialist counterinsurgency force so far‟, although poor discipline and 
a culture of heavy drinking led to them gaining a reputation for wildness and self-defeating brutality 
to equal the Black and Tans.
82
  According to Townshend, the British Army‟s performance against the 
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IRA began to improve when, from 1921, it abandoned its large motorised columns in favour of a new 
technique involving infantry patrols operating away from roads, gathering intelligence and carrying 
out the occasional ambush of the IRA.
83 
 Likewise, in Burma in 1931, British troops cordoned rebels 
in inhospitable areas, allowing „packs‟ of Burmese irregulars - presumably under British officers - to 
hunt them down.
84   
The use of irregular units as „special forces‟ to carry out certain missions therefore 
featured prominently in the British „small wars‟ and counterinsurgencies of Wingate‟s time. The 
supposedly innovative Special Night Squads, therefore, could be viewed as part of the continuum of 
established British Imperial military practice, not a new and dramatic departure from it.             
 
      It can be concluded that British colonial operations of the inter-war period were characterised by 
rapid, aggressive and occasionally ruthless displays of force to cow the insurgents into submission.  
Operations involved using mobile all-arms columns to dominate the countryside and isolate the 
insurgents, and routine use of ad hoc irregular specialist units, often raised from the local community 
and commanded by British officers, is also evident from some campaigns, their main roles being 
scouting, ambush work and taking the war to the enemy by hunting insurgents on their own territory. 
       Most significantly for this thesis, these methods were carried into the Second World War, in 
operations against the regular forces of the Italians, Germans and Vichy French in North Africa and 
the Middle East in 1940-41, British action in this period and theatre hinging upon manoeuvre by 
dispersed motorised columns.  The November 1941 edition of Notes from Theatres of War, the 
Army‟s official digest of lessons learned from operations, argued that „Mobile desert warfare appears 
to be largely a matter of columns of all arms, which may work over long distances very widely 
separated‟, and a key feature of British operations of this period was such columns moving through 
desert or mountain to bypass enemy positions and either cut their communications or line of retreat 
or surprise them with attack from the rear, as recommended by Callwell and exemplified by actions 
during Operation Compass, Wavell‟s offensive against the Italians in Cyrenaica in December 1940, 
  
62 
in particular XIII Corps‟ devastating attacks on the Italian Nibeiwa-Sidi Barrani camps on 9-11 
December 1940, and 7th Armoured Division opening the attack on Bardia in mid December by 
cordoning off the road between Bardia and Tobruk before advancing upon the town from behind.
84
 
This also happened in Italian East Africa: in April 1941, 24th Gold Coast Brigade made a 25-mile 
march through the Somali bush to occupy the road and river crossings north of Jelib on the Juba River, 
which was taken by the brigade‟s parent formation, 12th African Division, advancing „from three 
directions‟ the following day, the Italian garrison surrendering without a fight.85  Throughout, there 
was extensive utilisation of ad hoc task forces for manoeuvre at a level above the tactical but below 
the strategic.  In Eritrea, General Sir William Platt, GOC East Africa, formed Gazelle Force, 
commanded by Brigadier Frank Messervy and consisting of an Indian armoured car regiment, a 
motor-machinegun group of the SDF, and attached artillery, to harry Italian communications to the 
north and east of Kassala, a factor in the Italian withdrawal from Sudan; Gazelle Force then cut the 
roads around Agordat, causing another Italian retreat and after this, sought, unsuccessfully, to „turn‟ 
the Italians out of Keren via threatening their line of retreat.
86
  In Iraq, Habforce (Habbaniyeh Force, 
consisting of 4th Cavalry Brigade, reinforced by the Arab Legion, some RAF armoured cars and a 
battery of 25-pounders) was not intended as a manoeuvre force, but as something with an older 
pedigree, a „flying column‟ relieving beleaguered British garrisons; however, in June 1941, following 
the resolution of the Iraq crisis and during the Allied invasion of Syria, Habforce operated from Mosul 
against Vichy communication to the west of Palmyra, assisting in the Allied occupation of that town 
and destroying several German airfields.
87
  By the end of this period, use of „task forces‟ had 
percolated below divisional level in the Western Desert: „Jock Columns‟, named for Colonel „Jock‟ 
Campbell VC of the Royal Horse Artillery, who first devised them in December 1940, were created 
from 7th Armoured Division‟s artillery support group, and consisted of a battery of 25-pounder field 
guns, a company of lorry borne infantry and some armoured cars, executing harassing attacks on 
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advancing Italian and German formations and lines of supply, sometimes at some distance behind the 
front.
88
  They were used initially as a „make-shift‟, a means of sustaining offensive action when the 
remainder of the division was weakened by its logistic state: yet, their used proved popular, as by 
November 1941 Notes from the Theatres of War was extolling their use and recommending they be 
strengthened by adding tanks.
89
  
      Another pre-war practice continued into the Second World War was the creation of specialist 
units to wage war in enemy-occupied territory.  Although the continuous fronts in Europe made such 
operations highly difficult, the wider spaces and open flanks of the desert war were another matter.  
In June 1940, Wavell accepted a proposal from the desert explorer Ralph Bagnold, to create 
long-ranged motor patrols capable of crossing the sand sea to the south of the main operational area 
to reconnoitre Italian positions and force the Italians to divert troops from the Egyptian frontier by 
raiding targets of opportunity inside Libya.
90 Bagnold‟s Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) took its 
orders directly from Wavell himself at GHQ Middle East, and during Operation Compass, distracted 
Italian attention via raids on key airfields and supply roads. Wavell noted in official reports that 
Bagnold‟s attacks resulted in Italian supply convoys ceasing altogether in some areas and their 
forward troops becoming more cautious than previously.
91
  May 1941 saw the debut of the 
best-known penetration force of all, as L Detachment, Special Air Service, initially a small unit of 
volunteers commanded by Captain David Stirling of the Scots Guards, carried out its first airborne 
raid on an Italian airfield in Cyrenaica; following the failure of this mission, the SAS switched to 
long-ranged lorry and jeep-borne raids, focusing upon Axis airfields and operating initially alongside 
the LRDG.
92 
 Wingate‟s operations in Ethiopia and, initially, in Burma, came therefore at a time when 
the British Army already made extensive use of  scratch-assembled mobile columns and special forces, 
intended to harry enemy communications, and can be viewed as a continuation of established British 
practice, as will be discussed below.  
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      The proliferation of such forces in the British army of this time has been attributed to, amongst 
other things, a „cavalry‟ culture in 7th Armoured Division, officers‟ reading of Liddell Hart, or the 
influence of Brigadier Eric Dorman-Smith, Commandant of the Staff College at Haifa and Wavell and 
Auchinleck‟s roving „tactical consultant‟, as loathed in some quarters as Wingate.93 However, Wavell 
had been GOC Palestine, from where Lieutenant General Sir Richard O‟Connor came directly to take 
command of Western Desert Force (XIII Corps) in 1939.  O‟Connor and many other officers, 
particularly those in the Indian Divisions, had served on the Northwest Frontier, where similar 
methods had been applied for decades, a pioneer of their combination with tanks, wireless and aircraft 
being Claude Auchinleck, who would succeed Wavell as CinC Middle East in June 1941; Auchinleck 
and Dorman-Smith were both officers of the Indian Army.
94
 British methods in Africa in 1940-41 
might, therefore, be interpreted as an evolution from small war „doctrine‟, consisting of using trusted 
pre-war tactical and operational methods to fulfill the strategic mission of destroying the Italian armies 
in North and East Africa.   
      Another vital factor shaping operations was geography, the Libyan Desert and the savannah of 
southern Ethiopia being particularly suitable for mobile forces.  In other circumstances, they were not 
used.  In Eritrea, manoeuvre operations were precluded by the mountainous, heavily wooded terrain, 
in which any advance had to be along the few roads, passing through easily defended defiles.
95
   Italian 
resistance in Eritrea was broken not via manoeuvre, but by the seven-week siege and assault of the 
fortified town of Keren from February to March 1941.  Lieutenant General Sir William Platt, GOC 
Sudan and British commander at Keren, acknowledged the origin of methods used elsewhere in 
describing his own: „[A] certain amount of the lessons of Frontier warfare had to be unlearnt due to 
the influence of artillery, mortars, LMGs and aircraft on mountain warfare.‟96  Platt‟s methods 
involved a steady buildup of supplies, ammunition in particular - Platt would not begin an attack until 
his artillery had 600 rounds per gun - prior to deliberate, timetabled divisional assaults built around the 
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artillery fire plan, based on „the maximum number of guns‟, with tanks reverting to their „traditional‟ 
role of „shooting in‟ the infantry, the intention being to weaken the enemy gradually and methodically, 
rather than smash him with a single blow.
97
   Likewise, during the invasion of Syria in June 1941, a 
combination of hilly terrain crossed by rivers and unexpectedly tough resistance from the Vichy 
French defenders resulted in 8th Australian Division executing deliberate assaults in which firepower 
was prioritised over mobility.
98
  In these battles, Commonwealth forces fought in brigades and 
divisions, not columns.   Different methods of fighting, therefore, were emerging in this single theatre 
over a short period. 
      Wingate‟s operations in East Africa in 1940-41 therefore took place within an army whose senior 
commanders regularly used mobility to target key points in the enemy infrastructure with missions set 
to a level above the tactical but below the strategic.  Formations were organised to maximise their 
ability to do this, and permanent units and organisations specialising in this role, such as the LRDG 
were emerging to fit „troops to task‟.   Although Wingate would later employ all-arms columns, 
supported by air and coordinated by wireless, in mobile operations, aimed at manoeuvring his 
opponents into difficult or impossible positions, it is clear that these units were not „new‟ other than 
in their existence.  The theories and practices underpinning the Chindit operations turn out, when 
placed in the context of British Army operational practice of Wingate‟s time, to at least share ancestry 
with existing methods.  It therefore remains to explore and confirm the similarities and differences 
between Wingate‟s ideas and methods and those of FSR, British Army „small wars‟ practices, and 
subsequent developments, in tactical and operational methods during the Second World War.  This 
will begin with his time as a subaltern in the 1920s, and is made easier by his putting his thoughts on 
operations and tactics on paper from the earliest stages of his career. 
 
                                                       
  
66 
                                                      NOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO 
 
      1. Brian Holden Reid, „Is there a British military "philosophy?"', Major General JJG Mackenzie 
and Brian Holden Reid (Editors), Central Region vs. Out of Area: Future Commitments (London: 
Tri-Service Press 1990) pp.1-2 
      2. Quoted in David French, Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War against 
Germany 1919-1945 (Oxford: OUP 2000), pp.12-13 
      3. D/CGS/50/8, Design for Military Operations - The British Military Doctrine (London: MOD 
1989), p.3 
      4. Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of 
War 1904-1945 (London: George Allen & Unwin 1982), p.2 
      5. Trevor N Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (New York: Da Capo 1984), p.9 
      6. Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought Second Edition (London: MacMillan 1996), 
p.149 
      7. Colin McInnes & John Stone, „The British Army and Military Doctrine‟, in Michael Duffy, 
Theo Farrell and Geoffrey Sloan (Editors), Doctrine and Military Effectiveness: Strategic Policy 
Studies 1 (Exeter: Strategic Policy Studies Group 1997), p.16 
      8. Captain BH Liddell Hart, „The Essence of War‟, RUSI Journal, Volume LXXV, No.499, 
August 1930, p.490 
      9. Major FC Festing DSO psc RMLI, „The value of close order drill in training the soldier for war‟, 
RUSI Journal, Volume LXVI, 1921, p.116 
      10. Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp.17-18, 121, 143, 221, 368, 380, 537 
      11. Colonel CE Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice Bison Books Edition 
(Lincoln and London: Bison 1996), pp.29-32, 49-50, 289, 348-349 
      12. Brigadier AP Wavell CMG MC, „The Training of the Army for War‟, RUSI Journal Volume 
LXXVIII, 1933, pp.258-259 
      13. French, Raising Churchill's Army, p.45  
      14. Quoted in Ibid, pp.12-13 
  
67 
      15. Quoted in Ibid, p.13 
      16. Field Service Regulations 1923, Volume II - Operations (London: HMSO 1923), hereafter 
FSR 1923; „Anonymous‟, „Tactical Doctrine Up-To-Date: Field Service Regulations, Part II, 1935‟ 
in The Army Quarterly Volume 32 Number 2, July 1936,  pp.262-268; McInnes & Stone, „British 
Army and Military Doctrine‟, pp.18-20; Bidwell & Graham, Fire Power, p.151; „Infantryman‟, 
„British Defence Doctrine, a reply to Captain GC Wynne‟, The Army Quarterly, Volume 36, April 
1938, pp.88-101       
      17. Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1997), p.118 
      18. Hew Strachan, „The British Way in Warfare‟, in David Chandler (General Editor), The 
Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army (Oxford: OUP 1994), p.428 
      19. French, Raising Churchill's Army, p.13 
      20. Brian Bond, „The Army between the two World Wars 1918-1939‟, in Chandler (Ed), Oxford 
Illustrated History of the British Army, pp.264, 273-27 
      21. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (London; 
Everyman 1993) p.83               
      22. FSR 1920(ii), p.18 
      23. Ibid, p.19             
      24. Field Service Regulations 1929, Volume II - Operations, hereafter FSR 1929(ii) (London: 
HMSO 1930), pp.2, 4; Field Service Regulations 1935, Volume III - Operations: Higher 
Formations, hereafter FSR 1935(iii), (London: HMSO 1935), pp.1-2 
      25. Field Service Regulations 1920 Volume II, Operations, hereafter FSR 1920(ii) (London: 
HMSO 1920), pp.15-16; FSR 1929(ii), pp.6-7; FSR 1935(iii), pp.5-6 
      26. FSR 1935(iii), pp.5-8       
      27. FSR 1920(ii), pp.13-14           
      28. Ibid, p.42 
      29. See British Defence Doctrine, pp.1.9, 1.12 
      30. FSR 1935(iii), p.6 
  
68 
      31. Ibid, p.21        
      32. Ibid, p.22  
      33. FSR 1920(ii), pp.22-24       
      34. FSR 1929(ii), p.97 
      35. Ibid, p.11; Field Service Regulations, 1935, Volume II - Operations: General (London: 
HMSO 1935), p.25                              
      36. FSR 1920(ii), pp.22-24, 163, 185-186, 201             
      37. FSR 1929(ii), p.17, 125-126 
      38. Field Service Regulations 1920, Volume I - Organisation and Administration, hereafter FSR 
1920(i) (London: HMSO 1920), p.14       
      39. FSR 1929(ii), p.5 
      40. Ibid, pp.5-6; Field Service Regulations 1929, Volume I - Organisation and Administration 
(London: HMSO 1930), p.10  
      41. FSR 1935(ii), p.27-28 
      42. Tim Jones, Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SAS 1945-1952: A Special Type of Warfare 
(London: Frank Cass 2001), pp.5-13; TR Moreman, „"Small Wars" and Imperial Policing: The 
British Army and the theory and practice of colonial warfare in the British Empire, 1919-1939‟, in 
Brian Holden Reid (Editor) Military Power: Land Warfare in Theory and Practice (London: Frank 
Cass 1997), pp.108-110, 113-124 
      43. John Pimlott, „The British Experience‟, in Ian FW Beckett, The Roots of Counter-Insurgency: 
Armies and Guerrilla Warfare 1900-1945 (London: Blandford 1988) pp.17-21; Hew Strachan, The 
Politics of the British Army (Oxford: Clarendon 1997), pp.169-171 
      44. Edward Spiers, „The late Victorian Army: 1868-1914‟, in Chandler (Ed), Oxford Illustrated 
History of the British Army, pp.199-203 
      45. See Major General Charles W Gwynn KCB CMG DSO, Imperial Policing (London: 
Macmillan 1939), pp.34-64; Philip Anthony Towle, Pilots and Rebels: The use of aircraft in 
unconventional warfare (London: Brassey‟s 1989), pp.35, 40,43.  Dyer was actually a substantive 
Colonel, local acting Brigadier General. 
  
69 
      46. Anonymous, „The Burmese Rebellion 1931‟, Journal of the United Services Institute of India 
(JUSII) Volume LX 1932, pp.146-150, 153-154; „MFC‟, „Raids and Reprisals on the North-West 
Frontier‟, JUSII Volume LIV, 1922, pp.383-392 
      47. Callwell, Small Wars, cited already 
      48. Ibid, pp.71-108; FSR 1929(ii), pp.204-207 
      49. Gwynn, Imperial Policing, pp.3-5, 34-64 
      50. Callwell, Small Wars, p.72 
      51. Ibid, pp.76-78 
      52. Ibid, p.41 
      53. Ibid, pp.41-42, 147-149 
      54. Ibid, p.148 
      55. Gwynn, Imperial Policing, pp.14-21, 23-24, 99-100 
      56. PRO WO141/93, „Record of the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-21 and the part played by the 
Army in dealing with it, Volume I – Operations‟, pp.22, 24, 26 30-31, 33-35; PRO CJ 4/152, „The 
Black and Tans‟, pp.1-2; Charles Townshend, „The Anglo-Irish War‟, unpublished paper presented 
to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Foreign Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins School of 
Advanced International Studies, pp.12, 14-15, and Britain’s Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the 
Twentieth Century (London: Faber & Faber 1986), pp.57-58 
      57. Anonymous, „The Burmese Rebellion‟, pp.157-161; Captain W St J Carpendale, „The 
Moplah Rebellion 1921-22‟, USII Journal Volume LVI 1926, pp.79, 82, 86-87; Captain CMP 
Durnford, „The Arab Insurrection of 1920-21‟, USII Journal Volume LIV, pp.188-189; Towle, 
Pilots and Rebels, especially pp.20-23, 29, 41-45 
      58. „MFC‟, „Raids and Reprisals‟, p.391 
      59. AF Perrott, Inspector General of Police, Northwest Frontier Province, to Major General 
Richard O‟Connor of 18 October 1938, LHCMA O'Connor Papers File 3/2/1 
      60. „Burmese Rebellion‟, pp.155-157 
      61. Ibid, pp.155-156; Appendix C to PRO 191/88, „History and notes on operations; disturbances 
in Palestine‟, 1936-1939; O‟Connor to Major General DK McLeod of 21 May 1939, LHCMA 
  
70 
O‟Connor Papers, File 3/4/54 
      62. For instance, see PRO WO32/3522, Mohmand Operations 1933, Report and Decorations; 
PRO WO32/4148, Report on Mohmand Operations, 1935 
      63. See PRO WO32/3522; PRO WO32/4148; PRO WO191/75, Preliminary Notes on lessons of 
Palestine Rebellion 1936, February 1937, especially Para.26 and the whole of p.10; PRO WO191/88, 
History and Notes on Disturbances in Palestine, 1936-39, pp.2-3; PRO WO32/9401, Disturbances, 
1936, p.4; Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars, pp.64-65 
      64. Carpendale, „Moplah Rebellion‟, pp.77-78; Durnford, „Arab Insurrection‟, pp.186-188; 
Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars, p.64 
      65. Callwell, Small Wars, especially pp.108-114, 135-136, 140, 290-291, 362 
      66. Ibid, pp.125-149 
      67. Ibid, pp.80-81, 142 150-194, 171-172 
      68. Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars, p.64 
      69. PRO WO141/93, Record of the Rebellion in Ireland, Volume I, pp.32, 43-44; Volume IV 
Part I - 5th Division, pp.16-17; Townshend, „Anglo-Irish War‟, pp.33-35, and Britain’s Civil Wars, 
p.64 
      70. Durnford, „Arab Insurrection‟, pp.186-189 
      71. Carpendale, „Moplah Rebellion‟, pp.82-86, 88-89, compare with Callwell, Small Wars, 
pp.130, 133-135, 141; see also Gwynn, Imperial Policing, pp.98-100 
      72. Moreman, „"Small Wars" and Imperial Policing‟, pp.119-120; „Shpagwishtama‟, „The 
Changing Aspect of Operations on the North-West Frontier‟, JUSII Volume LXVI 1936, 
pp.103-104 
      73. Towle, Pilots and Rebels, p.14 
      74. Ibid, pp.13-27 
      75. Major LVS Blacker OBE, „Modernised Mountain Warfare‟, JUSII Volume LXI 1931, 
pp.89-95 
      76. PRO WO32/3522, pp.3, 7, 16-17 
      77. PRO WO32/4148, pp.4-5, 6-7, 9; „Shpagwishtama‟, „Changing Aspect of Operations on the 
  
71 
NW Frontier‟, p.109 
      78. Ibid, pp.2-3, 11, 14; „Shpagwishtama‟, „Changing Aspect of Operations on the NW Frontier‟, 
pp.105-107 
      79. Callwell, Small Wars, pp.144, 339-345, 350-351 
      80. India - Northwest Frontier Force Corps Troops - Corps of Gurkha Scouts, War Diary, 1919 
May-1919 August, in PRO WO95/5390 
      81. PRO CJ4/152, p.1; PRO WO141/93, Volume I, p.24; PRO WO141/93 Volume IV, pp.68-69; 
Townshend, „Anglo-Irish War‟, pp.15, 17, and Britain’s Civil Wars, pp.58-59 
      82. Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars, p.58 
      83. Ibid, p.66 
      84. Anonymous, „Burmese Rebellion‟, pp.160-161 
      85.Notes from the Theatres of War No.1 Cyrenaica (London: HMSO 1942), p.4; PRO 
WO106/2290, pp.43-48; Wavell‟s War Communiqués of 14 and 19 December 1940, in PRO 
WO106/2136, and 7 April 1941, in PRO WO106/2088 
      86. PRO WO106/2290, p.47; Wavell‟s Daily Sitreps of 21 and 22 April 1941, in PRO 
WO106/2088; Wavell‟s Daily Sitreps of 30 November 1940 and 29 January 1941, in PRO 
WO106/2088; Major General ISO Playfair, The Official History of the War in the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East, Volume I [hereafter OHM1] (London: HMSO 1954), pp.397, 399 
87. Wavell‟s War Communiqués of 27 January and 6 February 1941, in PRO WO106/2136; 
Major General RJ Collins, Lord Wavell: A Military Biography (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton 1948) p.396 
88. PRO WO32/11434, Para.ii).6; Telegram from CinC ME to War Office of 14 June 1941, in 
PRO WO106/3073, Iraq: Operations April-May 1941; Report from Wavell to the War Office 
of 27 July 1941, in PRO WO201/174, Plan „Exporter‟, June 1941; Wavell‟s Sitrep of 30 June 
1941, in PRO WO106/2089 
89.  Notes from Theatres of War No.1, pp.6-7; Notes from Theatres of War No.6: CYRENAICA, 
November 1941/January 1942 (London: War Office 1942) in PRO WO106/2223, p.3; 
Bidwell & Graham, Fire Power, pp.224, 250 
  
72 
90. John Connell, Wavell: Soldier and Scholar (London: Collins 1964), p.396 ; Colonel JW 
Hackett DSO MBE MC, „The Employment of Special Forces‟, RUSI Journal XCVII 1952, 
pp.29-30 
91. Wavell‟s Sitrep of 16 January 1941, in PRO106/2088, and War Communiqué of 12 April 
1941, in PRO 106/2136 
92. PRO WO218/173, L Detachment SAS Brigade (later 1 SAS Regt.) formation, training and 
report of operations in the Mediterranean area, May 1941-July 1942  
93. Corelli Barnett, The Desert Generals (London: Cassell 1983), pp.338-342; Bidwell and 
Graham, Fire Power, pp.226-227, 233, 238-239 
94. Moreman, „Small Wars and Imperial Policing‟, pp.116-120 
95. PRO WO106/2290, p.44 
96. PRO WO201/297, „Abyssinia and Eritrea: Operational Dispatch by Lt Gen. Sir William Platt‟, 
Part IA, p.5 
97. Ibid, Part II, pp.5-14; PRO WO106/2290 
98. PRO WO106/3073, Syria, Operations Summaries, May-July 1941 
            
      
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
                                                             
 
 
 
 
  
73 
 
                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           CHAPTER THREE 
                                   - WINGATE BEFORE PALESTINE, 1923-1936 
 
       [P]ossession of the interior lines gives a priceless advantage to the possessor...[and]           
       although it may be possible to derive special advantages from exterior lines...he who         
       deliberately divides his forces in order unnecessarily to assume them is a pedant with       
       little knowledge of war.  
            - Lieutenant Orde Wingate, 1926¹ 
 
      [C]olumns achieve their results by skilful concentration at the right time and in the           
      right place, where they will deliver the maximum blow against the enemy.  The essence     
      of LRP is concentration, the method of dispersal is only a means to achieve ultimate          
      concentration. 
            - Brigadier Orde Wingate, 1942²           
 
      Introduction 
This chapter covers the period from Wingate‟s gazetting as a second lieutenant in the Royal Artillery 
in 1923 to his arrival in Palestine in 1936.  The key episode in this period appears to be the four years 
he spent on attachment to the Sudan Defence Force, 1928-33, an experience which may have exerted 
more influence upon his subsequent military ideas than previous authors have appreciated.  However, 
papers survive from both before and after this period that indicate an interest in military theory and 
operations and opinions on operational and tactical methods broadly consistent with those expressed 
later in his career and also demonstrating characteristics common with those covered in the last 
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chapter.  Finally, it was during this period that Wingate appears to have encountered the ideas of his 
distant relative, TE Lawrence, which exerted a powerful influence upon his own - in some cases, 
through a determination to demonstrate that he and Lawrence were not alike.  This period therefore 
provides a logical starting point for a comparison between Wingate‟s ideas and those of the rest of the 
Army, and contends that the influence of Wingate‟s earliest military experience on his subsequent 
ideas should not be dismissed. 
 
      Wingate’s First Promotion Paper     
One of the earliest instances of Wingate committing his views to paper dates from 1926 when, as part 
of the examination for promotion from lieutenant to captain, he produced an essay on „Strategy in 
Three Campaigns‟ - the Russo-Japanese War, the German invasion of France in 1914 and Allenby‟s 
Palestine Campaign of 1917.  As the two quotations opening this chapter indicate, some consistency 
with later arguments was evident even at this early stage, in particular the belief that superior 
positioning and mobility allowed rapid concentration of force against a divided opponent.  However, 
Wingate was firm in this paper that this could be attained only if a force maintained its „interior lines‟ 
and held a central position against an opponent trying to surround it, a concept different from those 
he expressed later, and, indeed, the paper was, effectively, a polemic against the „strategy of 
envelopment‟ which Wingate saw as attempted by the Germans in France in 1914.  Wingate‟s views 
did not indicate any innovative tendencies on his behalf, and it could be argued that all he did was 
regurgitate the calls for concentration of force found in all inter-war editions of FSR.  He opened with 
an attack on the idea of fixed rules of strategy, stating that, if Napoleon had revealed „the science of 
war‟ (some familiarity with the works of Clausewitz and Jomini might be presumed, but is 
un-provable) then surely fewer military blunders would be evident since his time.  Instead, „we see 
generals making the same old mistakes, ignoring even their own maxims and failing to recognise the 
blunders of others‟ – powerful stuff from a junior officer.³ It might be possible to derive principles 
from „intermingling causes with effects‟, but Napoleon said he learned nothing from the sixty battles 
he fought and so, on that evidence alone, the reader should „cease to talk of "principles of strategy"'; 
the best that could be hoped for was to examine common conditions between battles and campaigns.
4
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It seems, then, that Lieutenant Wingate was as sceptical of abstract principles as many of his seniors 
in the interwar British Army.       
      Something else shared with others of his day was a propensity to begin and end his case on 
„national characteristics‟.  For instance, on the Schlieffen Plan: 
 
     Envelopment as strategy is folly, unless used to round up uncivilised or guerrilla                           
     enemies....But as in [Napoleon's] day, so today the Teuton loves envelopment.  He is never         
     happy unless his armies are scattered over vast tracts of territory, all approaching his                    
     concentrated enemy from different directions.
5
  
 
   
      While, on Russian attitudes to the expansion of the Empire: 
 
 
      The Russian people...knew little and cared less for the emperor‟s ambition to extend his              
      domains.  They were content to remain in their own country and could not see that any useful    
      purpose was to be served by enslaving the Manchu.  Their attitude was typical of the Slav          
      race...
6 
  
      
      Wingate went on to suggest that such national characteristics could lead to strategic blunder.  
Germany invaded France in 1914, attacking her strongest enemy, not her weakest - Russia - and 
seeing Schlieffen‟s plan to envelop the French army undone by Moltke the Younger‟s adjustments 
and by the French moving their reserves on interior lines to halt the German offensive at the Marne.
7
 
In the chapter on the Russo-Japanese War, which is incomplete, Wingate berated the Japanese for 
adopting „the absurd idea of envelopment for envelopment‟s sake‟ from their officers‟ staff training in 
Germany - presumably how the Japanese overcame this handicap to win the war was in the missing 
passages.
8
   From these examples, Wingate concluded „it is not possible to cut your enemy‟s 
communications at theatre level‟: by 1944 he would not only be saying the diametric opposite, but 
proposing a complete new model of warfare aimed at this very objective.  In 1926, he held up as the 
only true means to victory the suitably Clausewitzian-Jominian ideal of „obtaining superiority at the 
decisive point‟, which Allenby had achieved repeatedly in Palestine.9   Sykes recorded that, for this 
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paper, Wingate obtained a mark of 78%, two marks short of a distinction.
10
   While its analysis was 
puerile in places, the paper had a number of indications of what was to come later: firstly, Wingate 
recognised that speed and skill could compensate for numbers, an argument common also to Callwell 
and to all editions of FSR, as was his advocacy of concentration of force at the decisive point. Second 
is Wingate‟s belief in and espousal of national characteristics as the basis for military style, something 
shared with many other officers. Thirdly, it is apparent that the pontificating and sometimes scabrous 
literary style which was to get Wingate into serious trouble later in his career developed early.   
       
      The Sudan Defence Force 
The examination for captain came while Wingate was a subaltern in the Royal Garrison Artillery, 
stationed at The Royal Artillery Centre at Larkhill, and all the biographies concern themselves more 
with his social activities - hunting to hounds in particular - than his military interests at this time.  This 
uneventful period ended in autumn 1926, when the Army sent him on an Arabic language course at 
the School of Oriental Studies of the University of London.  A keen student, Wingate obtained a mark 
of 85% on his preliminary examination after just four and a half months and was encouraged by his 
tutor, Sir Thomas Arnold, to seek a posting to the Middle East or North Africa with a view to 
qualifying as an interpreter.¹¹ Wingate had been interested in serving in Egypt or Sudan since 1924, 
when he began regular correspondence with his father‟s first cousin, Sir Reginald Wingate.  „Cousin 
Rex‟ had been Kitchener‟s intelligence officer during the Omdurman campaign of 1898, Governor 
General of the Sudan, Sirdar, or commander in chief of the Egyptian Army and British High 
Commissioner in Cairo, in which capacity he had supported Lawrence and others in fomenting the 
Arab revolt of 1916-18, although he was forced to stand down in 1919 after failing to deal effectively 
with Arab nationalists.¹²  Sir Reginald encouraged Wingate to continue his Arabic studies in the 
Sudan, by attending the language classes run by the Sudan Agency, the colonial „government‟ of the 
  
77 
Sudan, and also suggested that Orde should apply for a posting with the Sudan Defence Force(SDF), 
producing a letter of introduction to the SDF‟s commander, Major General Sir Hubert Huddleson.¹³ 
This overcame the younger Wingate‟s not meeting the criteria to join the SDF - he had been 
commissioned fewer than five years and would normally require a recommendation from a serving 
officer of the SDF, which he did not have - and exemplifies one of the most significant factors in 
Wingate‟s career, his cultivation of powerful patrons to whom he could appeal outside the formal 
chain of command.
14
 This approach to service politics was important for two reasons: firstly, as a 
source of friction with peers, which may have some bearing upon the historical record; secondly, and 
more pertinent to this thesis, at later stages of his career, Wingate can be observed tailoring his 
military ideas specifically to present solutions to a potential patron‟s strategic or operational 
dilemmas. 
      Wingate served with the SDF from 1928 to 1933, the last four years as a Bimbashi, or acting local 
major.  For a young officer in his mid to late twenties, this marked a considerable promotion and the 
granting of independent command and freedom he may not have had otherwise.  This seems to have 
made a deep and lasting impression.  He was engaged on small operations throughout this time, which 
represents his longest continuous period of command, yet previous references to its possible impact 
upon his subsequent military practice are passing.  According to Mosley, „Orde Wingate regarded the 
Ethiopian frontier as a training ground upon which he could work out the theories of guerilla [sic] 
warfare which were already working in his brain‟15, while Royle commented that Wingate learned 
three lessons in Sudan:
 
   
     The first was that, properly trained and motivated, small groups of men could learn to survive     
     in a hostile environment.  Second, they could operate in isolation far from home base provided    
     they were properly led and had faith in their commanders.  Third, they had to be kept up to the    
     mark and galvanised by constant training...
16
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      Generally, however, the biographers focus more upon the impact upon Wingate‟s personal 
psychology, as he suffered his first major attack of clinical depression during this time, arising from 
a combination of too much time spent in the monotonous Sudanese desert, his first sight of death - a 
man killed by his soldiers - the sudden death of his sister and a major crisis in the religious faith on 
which much of his self-image rested.
17
   Yet, the length of his experience in the Sudan would suggest 
some impact upon Wingate‟s professional and intellectual development, and his protégé, Moshe 
Dayan, stated explicitly that Wingate put the lessons of his Sudan experience into practice in Palestine 
later on.
18
   Therefore, a survey of Wingate‟s time in Sudan is necessary to establish its importance in 
his military development. 
      The SDF demonstrated many of the characteristics of the locally-raised forces under British 
officers alluded to in the previous chapter, although it was a regular, not an irregular force.  It was a 
new force, founded in 1924, when Egyptian troops were withdrawn from Sudan following the 
assassination of the Sirdar, General Sir Lee Stack, and the revelation of widespread agitation in the 
ranks by Arab nationalists.
19
   In 1928, it consisted of the Camel Corps (a mixed force of mounted 
infantry), a motor transport and machine gun battalion and three infantry „corps‟ (actually battalions), 
the Equatorial Corps, the East Arab Corps and the West Arab Corps, Wingate being posted, in June 
1928, to the East Arab Corps, stationed along the border with Eritrea.
20
   He was made Bimbashi – 
acting local major - of Number 3 Idara, an Arab infantry company based at Gedaref; the majority of 
his 375 troops were Muslim Arabs, but there was a minority of black troops, a mixture of Somalis 
from southern Sudan and Muslim immigrants from other parts of Africa who had settled in Sudan 
following their Haj to Mecca.²¹  The amount of independence granted British officers was notable: 
each Bimbashi was personally responsible for enlisting his own recruits, devising a training 
programme, promoting and discharging his soldiers, and for administering all military law among 
them.
22
 Such independence of authority was continued in every force subsequently raised and trained 
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by Wingate, including the Chindits, but this was within an army more formal in its practices than the 
SDF, particularly after 1943.   
      Training was realistic, desert conditions allowing free use of live ammunition during exercises, 
and route marches of 5-600 miles were carried out upon a regular basis in remote areas in order to 
„show the flag‟; each Idara carried its own supplies on these marches, supplemented by game shot by 
the Bimbashi.  Each February, the SDF would concentrate for combined exercises with 47(B) 
Squadron RAF, the unit responsible for air control of the remoter regions of the Sudan, and Wingate 
participated in operational experiments in air-ground cooperation while with the SDF.²³ A number of 
characteristics of forces Wingate would command in the future were evident, the most obvious being 
the raising and training of forces by their own commanders for long-distance operations involving 
possible cooperation with aircraft. 
      Missions varied.  The threat of a possible revival of Mahdism was taken seriously into the 1930s 
and had resulted in uprisings in the majority Arabic provinces of Kordofan and Darfur in 1916, 1921 
and 1928; more frequent were small-scale police actions against tribal chiefs resisting Government 
control, particularly among the black hill tribes of southern Sudan.
24
   However, the problem with 
which Wingate was concerned for most of his time at Gedaref was Shifta, gangs of Ethiopian bandits 
crossing the border from Ethiopia and Eritrea to poach ivory, skins and meat or kidnap slaves  - many 
of them girls to be sold into prostitution - from the non-warlike Nuba tribes of the border area.
25
   
Shifta were a major nuisance to the Colonial authorities, so much so that many in Khartoum 
welcomed the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 as likely to put a stop to their activities, and the 
popular image of the Ethiopian as „a rascal, a thief and a slave-trader‟ was to have some bearing upon 
Wingate‟s operations with them in 1941.26   The SDF‟s main role in Wingate‟s time in Sudan was, 
therefore, as a para-military police force, intended to secure Sudan‟s frontiers from criminal incursion 
and keep the peace in the interior.   
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      For guidance on these roles, the Army and SDF had Callwell‟s recommendations upon „Bush 
Warfare‟ and FSR‟s chapter on „Warfare in Undeveloped and Semi-Civilised Countries‟, which 
leaned heavily upon Callwell.  Indeed, the 1929 edition semi-plagiarised Callwell, opening by stating 
that the principles of war still applied in campaigns in such countries, and the aim should be to break 
down enemy resistance through forcing them to concentrate for battle; this could be achieved by 
threatening their capital, their sacred sites or their wells and crops, as recommended by Callwell 
before.
27
   An alternative course of action which Callwell could not have anticipated, writing, as he 
was, in the 1900s, was „Air Control‟ - „an interruption of normal life which can be enforced by 
properly directed air attack until the enemy is ready to make terms‟ as FSR put it.28   However, aircraft 
were less effective in close or broken country (such as the Sudanese-Ethiopian border) or where 
friendly and hostile tribes were mixed: „In such circumstances the best chance of success lies in a 
well-planned combination of the action of aircraft with that of troops‟ which, in desert areas, should 
be mounted or supported by armoured cars.
29
   As noted previously, the SDF exercised annually with 
the Fairey IIIFs of 47(B) Squadron RAF, and operated with them under joint command of the Kaid 
all’Am, the GOC Sudan; the RAF provided close support for the SDF‟s Camel Corps during the 
attempted Mahdist uprising in Nuer in 1928 and a Nuba revolt in the Eliri Jebel in 1929, and resupply 
and reconnaissance for a number of long-range patrols during a border dispute with Italian Libya in 
1931.
30
   Although Wingate did not participate in these operations, he was surely aware of them, and 
these techniques would recur in his campaigns in 1941 and again in 1942-44. 
      Air control, or large-scale air-ground action, was of limited use against an opponent as diffuse and 
unpredictable as the Shifta, particularly as they had sanctuary across the border.  Control of the border 
had to be maintained through infantry or police patrolling, intended to track the gangs down and 
arrest or destroy them.³¹ Douglas Dodds-Parker, who served as a District Commissioner - responsible 
for policing - in the Sudan-Ethiopia border region in the late 1930s, and was also attached to the SDF, 
  
81 
recalled that the standard technique for dealing with Shifta was a version of the „drive‟, in which SDF 
or police patrols would push inwards from the border along the raider‟s favourite tracks, forcing them 
deeper into Sudan where they could be caught more easily.³²  Wingate‟s operations in Sudan were no 
major departure from this, as illustrated by the patrol in April 1931, pursuing two gangs of Shifta 
poaching in game reserves in the Dinder and Gallegu country.  Each of the gangs was a dozen strong, 
half of them slaves, and had not crossed the border to fight; Wingate therefore ordered that fire was 
only to be opened if they resisted arrest or seemed on the point of getting away.³³ He arranged his 
route of patrol in order to get between the gangs and their sanctuary and take them by surprise. On 
11 April, he took two sections of the Eastern Arab Corps out of Singa, on the Blue Nile, announcing 
that his destination was the town of Roseires to the south: instead, they headed for the island of Umm 
Orug on the River Dinder.
34
   There, on 19 April, two poachers were captured and given pardons 
upon condition that they disclosed where the main party was operating.  Wingate was able to 
surround a band of nine poachers near Ras Amer shortly after, and in the subsequent fight one of the 
poachers, evidently a former soldier of the SDF, wearing the remains of its uniform, was killed, this 
being the incident contributing to Wingate‟s attack of depression.  A similar action took place on 21 
April, when Wingate‟s patrol again surrounded and surprised a band of eleven poachers, killing one 
and arresting the rest.
35
  Wingate‟s tactics aimed at using cover and concealment to surround the 
gangs, then surprise them with attack from all sides: his aim was practical, as Shifta could out-run 
even a man on horseback in the rough country of the Dinder, and could get clean away if alerted.
36
   
Patrol tactics, therefore, depended upon deception, surprise and selection of the best areas of 
operation, all things Wingate would stress later.    
     These became more apparent still in Wingate‟s report of a later patrol, the following February.  
He chose to march on a route going from point-to-point along the frontier, including stretches of open 
desert, because: 
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      (1) That the approach of the patrol would be unexpected at almost every point of descent on      
      poaching areas, since by cutting across long stretches of waterless country each line...would       
      be out of reach of warning by fleeing poachers. 
      (2) That should Abyssinians be poaching on GALLEGU-DINDER the patrol would be              
      between them and their base.  This had special value in view of possible air cooperation.
37
  
 
 
      The aim was, therefore, to surprise and possibly ambush the Shifta as they tried to retreat to their 
„sanctuary‟ in Abyssinia, a pattern in accordance with SDF procedures as described by Dodds-Parker 
and which Wingate later hoped to repeat in counter-terrorist operations in Palestine.  A subsidiary aim 
was to experiment with cooperation between patrols and spotter planes: in the event, Wingate noted: 
 
       [P]oachers associate the appearance of aircraft with the approach of soldiery and are on their     
       guard.  As the only chance of catching them lies in achieving a complete surprise this would      
       not seem an advantage...With the legitimate presence of honey gatherers, etc, and the                
       apparent very great difficulty in seeing anything in the densely bushed areas it is very unlikely     
       that aircraft would be able to detect anything but a very considerable party of Abyssinian           
       poachers, and even in that event it would be impossible to see them once they had broken          
       up.
38
  
 
 
      In the earliest traceable example of his differing with institutional „accepted wisdom‟ on 
operations and tactics, Wingate concluded that the SDF's existing approach, based on „drives‟, 
limited its efficacy in dealing with poachers.  In a note on game protection in the Dinder area, he 
argued that while this deterred some poaching: 
 
        Owing to expence [sic] the measures taken against the poachers are limited to the                     
        maintenance of highly mobile patrols operating at irregular intervals and in various directions;   
        and it should be plainly understood that such wide toothed and occasional combing has not the 
        smallest chance of success in inhabited country.
39
  
 
 
      This arose from a common problem in counterinsurgency: inability to distinguish insurgents from 
civilians.  In particular, SDF patrols relied upon following the tracks of poacher gangs, in areas 
crossed regularly by nomads and their herds.
40
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       Whatever his criticisms of SDF procedures, there is no recorded evidence that Wingate deviated 
from or tried to change them.  Indeed, there was just one minor confrontation during Wingate‟s time 
in Sudan when, shortly after arrival, he was warned by the CO of the Eastern Arab Corps about 
discussing religion and politics - including Marxism - in the officers‟ mess.41 This aside, he seems to 
have been liked by his fellow officers in the SDF and respected for his prowess on the polo field.
42
 
Any major controversy over his character, therefore, began later.   
      It would appear that it was in Sudan that Wingate developed his skill - and taste - for training and 
leading forces „in his own image‟, free of intervention from above, as the Special Night Squads, 
Gideon Force and the Chindits were all to be.  While this was standard practice in parts of the Empire, 
it certainly was not with the „main‟ Army in England, something the „colonial‟ officer Wingate failed 
to appreciate at every turn.  Moreover, Wingate was evidently beginning to think critically about 
tactics, and was becoming confident enough to question accepted wisdom in official reports.  
However, it would be an exaggeration to claim he „parted company‟ with his colleagues in terms of 
military thought at this stage.  This period is also of interest in that some of the counter-insurgency 
practices Wingate applied in Palestine seem to have been learned from the SDF, in particular 
concentration upon insurgent entry and exit points and the use of deceptive movement to achieve 
surprise.  
  
      Wingate contra Lawrence 
 
By 1936, and Wingate‟s arrival in Palestine, other influences were apparent.  One seems unlikely, as 
it was that of an individual whom Wingate apparently detested and never missed an opportunity to 
disparage - TE Lawrence „of Arabia‟.  There is no record of their having met, although Lawrence‟s 
parents were guests at the Wingate family home in Reigate in the 1900s, and Wingate was stationed 
at Larkhill in 1923-27 while „Trooper Shaw‟ of the Royal Tank Corps - the pseudonym under which 
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Lawrence sought escape from the attention his own myth had created - was stationed close by at 
Bovington.
43
 However, there were connections between them.  Lawrence‟s father was Wingate‟s 
great uncle, thrice-removed on his mother‟s side, and many who knew both men, including Churchill, 
Wavell, Liddell Hart, Chaim Weizmann, Leo Amery and Field Marshal Sir Edmund Ironside detected 
similarities in appearance and personality between them.
44
    Sir Reginald Wingate, as GOC of the 
Hejaz Expeditionary Force, was Lawrence‟s operational commander in 1917 and provided the 
„Baksheesh and rifles‟ with which Lawrence enlisted the support of the Arab chiefs, almost 
bankrupting the Egyptian gold reserves in doing so.
45
    Wingate‟s two great benefactors, Wavell and 
Churchill, also knew Lawrence well.  In 1920, Churchill invited Lawrence to join the Colonial 
Office‟s recently formed Middle Eastern Department as Advisor on Arab affairs, originating the 
policy of controlling the Middle East using Lawrence‟s Hashemite allies, Faisal and Abdullah, the 
sons of Sherif Hussein of Mecca, and remained in contact with Lawrence until Lawrence‟s fatal 
motorcycle crash in 1935.
46
    Wavell made Lawrence‟s acquaintance while a staff officer in Egypt in 
1917, was assigned by Allenby to stop him entering Syria in 1920, when the French feared he might 
instigate a revolt, and in the 1920s and 1930s, Lawrence was an infrequent but welcome guest at 
Wavell‟s house.  Wavell liked Lawrence personally, but was unsure whether his reputation as a 
soldier was justified,  and implied that it was self-created: „His name will live for his words and spirit 
more than for his wars.‟47  Wingate and Lawrence, therefore, were not only distant relatives, but had 
numerous personal and professional contacts in common. 
      The notion, expressed by Wavell, that Lawrence was perhaps more capable as a man of letters 
than as a soldier also lay at the heart of Wingate‟s assessment of him.  Lawrence is today best known 
partially via David Lean‟s film of 1962, in which he was portrayed by Peter O‟Toole, and partially via 
The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, his personal account of the Arab revolt, published posthumously in 
1935.  Both these sources present what could be described as the „Lawrence Myth‟, that Lawrence 
  
85 
was the principal driving force behind the Arab revolt against the Turks of 1917-18, an event which 
saw the Bedouin liberate themselves from the Turkish yoke in a brilliant guerrilla campaign devised, 
commanded and led by Lawrence, only to then be betrayed by the imperialist ambitions of Britain and 
France.  It seems to have been in the wake of Lawrence‟s death in 1935 that Wingate became 
interested in him, and he was apparently familiar with the contents of Seven Pillars by the time of his 
arrival in Palestine, sixteen months later.  He was unimpressed with what he read, perhaps disgusted 
by some of it, in particular, perhaps, Lawrence‟s romanticisation of the Bedu’s homosexuality, and 
allusions to Lawrence and Seven Pillars in reports and correspondence indicated consistently 
Wingate‟s view that Lawrence was crassly overrated as both thinker and commander, and his Arabs, 
mere desert bandits who had to be bribed to do anything, little different from the Shifta he had chased 
in Sudan.
48
  Worst of all, Wingate argued, the „Lawrence Myth‟ was exerting a malign influence on 
British policy in the Middle East, and giving Arabs authority and influence they did not deserve.  In 
his paper, „Palestine in Imperial Strategy‟, written in 1939, Wingate commented on „that unfortunate 
masterpiece‟, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom: 
 
      The vanity of the principals plus a great amount of romantic dust has been allowed so far to        
      obscure what really did happen.  A ragged horde of at most a few thousand and often only a       
      few hundred Bedouin, paid in gold for approximately two days‟ fighting per month...caused       
      the Turks a certain amount of embarrassment and anxiety....In return for the highly paid              
      assistance of this small rabble of Hejazi Bedouin, we have handed over to the „Arabs‟ the            
      whole of Saudi Arabia, and the Yemen, Iraq, Trans-Jordan and Syria.  A more absurd                 
      transaction has seldom been seen.
49 
 
 
      In his written Appreciation of the analogous situation in Abyssinia in 1941 - to be cited extensively 
in the chapter on that episode - Wingate was at pains to emphasise the differences between 
Lawrence‟s methods and his own, in one passage effectively treating the words „Lawrence‟ and 
„wrong‟ as interchangeable.50    Most significantly, Wingate developed a vitriolic anti-Arabism and 
anti-Islamism, which would impact upon his actions in Palestine. This is discussed below, but at this 
  
86 
stage it is notable that there is no evidence of Wingate holding any opinion whatsoever on Middle 
Eastern politics before the period 1935-36, and it is unclear whether it was a cause or a product of his 
Zionism.  Sykes, the only one of Wingate‟s biographers to notice this, saw Wingate‟s anti-Arabism 
and rejection of Lawrence as coming first, and key in driving him towards Zionism, Wingate‟s 
„opposition temperament‟ meaning that, in the wake of the Arabophile enthusiasm engendered by 
Lawrence (and no doubt galvanised and made more irritating to Wingate by the publication of Seven 
Pillars and a wave of hagiographies following Lawrence‟s death) Wingate compulsively took the 
opposite stance.
51
    However, other reasons suggest themselves. Sir Reginald provided an 
alternative - and more authoritative - source of information from most of Lawrence‟s hagiographers, 
at least two of whom, Robert Graves and Basil Liddell Hart, were close friends of their subject and 
evidently took the „Lawrence Myth‟ at face value.52 Whatever its origins, Wingate‟s aversion to 
Lawrence and much of what he stood for was apparent throughout his life and work.    
      Wingate‟s attitude to Lawrence is relevant for two reasons.  Firstly, and touched upon already, is 
the part it played possibly in shaping his political beliefs and his relationship with his peers.  
Contemporary papers reveal that Wingate was not the lone voice that Sykes and Royle in particular 
portray, as there were many others, some very senior, who challenged the „Lawrence Myth‟ at the 
time.  The anonymous author of a Colonial Office memorandum from 1938 echoed Wingate in 
complaining of the distorting effect of the myth of the Arab Revolt, and the resulting overestimation 
of Arab resolve, upon British policy in Palestine; in actuality, he claimed, the Arabs had to be bribed 
constantly and provided no more than „nuisance value.‟53 Lawrence himself warranted just two 
mentions in the official British summary of the Arab revolt, one in a footnote; this document presents 
Lawrence as just the best-known of several staff officers of the British Military Mission to the Arabs, 
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel SF Newcombe.
54
    British official documents from 1917-1918 
were sceptical about the cost-effectiveness of the revolt, which was conditional upon British financial 
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and logistical support throughout - particularly rifles and ammunition - and in March 1918, faced 
extinction as funds began to run out.
55
    From Autumn 1917, a policy of giving the Arabs an incentive 
to attack trains on the Hejaz railway by allowing them to keep all they plundered from wrecked trains 
was adopted; this may have been at Lawrence‟s suggestion, he being candid about the Bedu‟s 
motivations in his published works.
56
    Forces involved in the Hejaz operations never consisted of just 
Bedu warriors: the Arabs were supported by British armoured cars, the Anglo-Egyptian Camel Corps 
and regular air-raids from January 1918 and the force jointly commanded by Feisal and Lawrence in 
Syria in September 1918 resembled less a guerrilla band than an all-arms mobile column, including 
450 Egyptian-trained Arab regulars, elements from the Camel Corps, an armoured car troop, a 
battery of 65mm French mountain guns, and Gurkha and Egyptian demolition parties, resupplied 
partially by air.
57
    There was, therefore, some organisational resemblance to the „frontier columns‟ 
discussed above, and, given their role was to operate against Turkish communications, their mission 
was not dissimilar, either.  Moreover, there is some resemblance also to Wingate‟s operational model, 
as applied two decades later.  
       Despite this, Lawrence had critics not only in Wingate but at the highest levels of the Army, both 
in his time and later.  The Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1917, Field Marshal Lord Robertson, 
had opposed the diversion of resources on this scale to the Hejaz as undermining Allenby‟s effort at 
the main front in Palestine, a forerunner of an argument directed at Wingate in 1943-44.
58
   Replying 
to Wingate‟s sending him a draft of  his paper „Palestine in Imperial Strategy‟ in 1939, General Sir 
Edmund Ironside - himself no stranger to covert operations
59
 - endorsed Wingate‟s views on the Arab 
revolt and referred to Lawrence as an „unfortunate charlatan...such an impossible creature that I 
cannot understand how this wretched myth has sprung up around him....Had it not been for men like 
Liddell Hart he might have been forgotten‟.60  Expressing general disdain for covert operations and 
irregular forces, General Sir William Platt, Commander of the British advance into Eritrea in 1941 
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(and emphatically no friend of Wingate, either), pronounced, „The curse of this war is Lawrence in the 
last.‟61  Indeed, Lawrence James, author of a recent biography of Lawrence, has assembled a large 
body of evidence to suggest that the „Lawrence myth‟ was beginning to unravel even by 1935, and 
that many who knew Lawrence in 1917-18 were never taken in to begin with.
62
    Wingate was, 
therefore, far from alone in taking issue with the popular image of Lawrence.  
       This makes the second factor linking Lawrence with Wingate seem all the more paradoxical.  Not 
only is there a detectable resemblance between Lawrence‟s military organisation and Wingate‟s, but 
an overview of Lawrence‟s military philosophy, laid out as Wingate would have read it, in Seven 
Pillars, Lawrence‟s earlier work, Revolt in the Desert, and the entry on „Guerilla Warfare‟ (sic) 
Lawrence authored for the 1929 edition of Encyclopedia Britannica, outline several other concepts 
which possibly influenced Wingate, perhaps unconsciously.  The first of these was directing effort 
against enemy communications, rather than armies, forcing the enemy to disperse to counter this. 
Commenting upon the inability of the Arabs to halt the Turkish advance on Mecca in late 1916, 
following a lengthy period of inertia, in his Britannica piece, Lawrence noted that: 
 
      [P]erhaps the virtue of irregulars lay in depth, not in face, and that it had been the threat of          
      attack by them upon the Turkish northern flank which had made the enemy hesitate for so          
      long.  The actual Turkish flank ran from their front line to Medina, a distance of some 50            
      miles, but if the Arab force moved towards the Hejas [sic] railway behind Medina, it might         
      stretch its threat...as far, potentially, as Damascus, 800 miles away to the north.
63
   
 
 
      Lawrence contended that such a move - directed at the Turks‟ point of critical 
vulnerability - would enable the Arabs to eject the Turks from their territory without the need for 
major battle.
64
    Lawrence advocated war based upon forcing an enemy wedded to the concept of 
decisive battle to disperse his strength; from Seven Pillars: 
 
       And how would the Turks defend [the Hejaz railway]?  No doubt by a trench line across the     
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       bottom, if we came like an army with banners; but suppose we were...an influence, an idea,       
       a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas?....It seemed       
       a regular soldier might be helpless without a target, owning only what he sat on, and                  
       subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at.
65
   
 
 
      Secondly, superior mobility meant attacks could be launched upon key points in the enemy 
infrastructure before he could react.  To have greatest strategic effect, attacks should be directed not 
at the enemy‟s armed strength, but at his supplies, with the aim of attaining material superiority. 
Should he advance, friendly forces should retreat:  
 
      We were to contain the enemy by the threat of a vast unknown desert, not disclosing ourselves  
      until we attacked.  The attack might be nominal, directed not against him but his stuff; so it         
      would not seek either his strength or his weakness, but his most accessible material.  In               
      railway-cutting it would be usually an empty stretch of rail; and the more empty, the greater       
      the tactical success.
66
   
 
 
 
       Consequently, the Arabs‟ greater mobility and familiarity with the desert should be used to 
manoeuvre them in a campaign of incessant „tip and run‟ attacks to which the Turks could launch no 
effective response.
67
    The main impact of this would be psychological, „arrang[ing] the mind of the 
enemy...then the minds of the enemy nation making the verdict‟, reflecting the common belief in will 
as the decisive factor in war discussed already.
68
    Moreover, Lawrence contended that irregulars had 
the advantage in operations targeting the enemy‟s will in that they lacked the predictability and 
reliance upon weight of force of regular units, which Lawrence saw as forcing human material to 
conform to a lowest common denominator that irregular warriors like the Bedu were free to ignore.
69
 
 Finally, to allow freedom of movement, a rebellion should have a population if not actively friendly, 
then at least sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy; „Rebellions can 
be made by 2% active in a striking force, and 98% passive sympathetic‟; to bring this about, a 
rebellion should have the ability to win popular support through an attractive political aim or what 
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Lawrence called „doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness)‟.70  „Doctrine‟, the 
political „message‟ aimed at promoting popular support for the Allied cause in enemy-occupied 
territory, featured prominently in Wingate‟s writings on „penetration warfare‟, particularly from the 
Ethiopia period.  Wingate also stressed the need to win over the population in the area of operations, 
as will be shown, but felt their role should be confined to scouting and providing information, rather 
than fighting, echoing Lawrence‟s belief that guerrilla warfare centred on an active minority.  These 
will be discussed in context below but at this stage, given the similarity between Lawrence‟s 
„doctrine‟ and Wingate‟s, and their views on the role of the general population in guerrilla warfare, it 
is difficult not to detect some influence of one on the other.   
      However, while Lawrence‟s abstractions in other areas may have been considered by Wingate, it 
would be rash to search for any direct link in tactical or operational thought.  At the heart of 
Lawrence‟s mode of warfare was victory through pure manoeuvre: striking at the enemy 
infrastructure would force him to disperse his forces and eventually break his will to fight through 
frustration and exhaustion, without the need to risk battle: 
 
      Most wars are wars of contact, both forces striving to touch to avoid tactical surprise.  Ours       
     should be a war of detachment.  We were to contain the enemy by the silent threat of a vast         
     unknown desert, not disclosing ourselves until we attacked.  The attack might be nominal,           
     directed not against him, but his stuff….We might turn our average into a rule…and develop      
      a habit of never engaging the enemy….Battles in Arabia were a mistake, since we profited in      
     them only by the ammunition the enemy fired off.  Napoleon said that it was rare to find              
     generals willing to fight battles; but the curse of this war was that so few would do anything        
     else….We had nothing material to lose, so our best line was to defend nothing and to shoot         
     nothing.
71
    
 
      Wingate, as will be shown, always stressed defeating the enemy in battle and saw the aim of his 
operations as forcing battle under the most advantageous circumstances.  If Wingate adopted some 
of Lawrence‟s concepts, beyond „doctrine‟, then he applied them within a different model of warfare. 
 However, the evidence indicates that Lawrence did affect this model.  Through his writing and 
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personal connections, Liddell Hart in particular, and against the background of growing popular 
revulsion at the „slaughter‟ of the Western Front, Lawrence created a body of enthusiasm in both the 
Army and the British political establishment for what, in his and Wingate‟s day, was called 
„Scallywagging‟, later „covert operations‟, the use of small specialist units or individual agents to sow 
and direct rebellion in enemy territory.  In 1939, Colonel JCF Holland, commanding MI(R), the 
forerunner of SOE, put Seven Pillars on his essential reading list for all MI(R) personnel and referred 
to the Arab revolt frequently in his official writings, while Wavell was firm that operations inside 
occupied Ethiopia in 1940-41 should conform with the model practiced by Lawrence.
72
 Wingate 
executed covert operations in Ethiopia under the auspices of both Wavell and MI(R) and so it seems 
Lawrence may have created, indirectly, an environment sympathetic to this model of warfare.  
Lawrence‟s impact on Wingate was therefore far greater than Wingate would have cared to admit.  
      
 
      Wingate’s Staff College Examination Papers 
Wingate read Seven Pillars after his return from Sudan, while Adjutant of 71st Territorial Army 
Artillery Brigade in 1935-36. Administrative and training duties aside, his main professional concern 
was entry to the Staff College at Camberley, without which it was unlikely he would reach senior rank. 
 He sat the entrance examination twice, in February and June 1936, and passed on the second attempt. 
 However, the next stage was to achieve nomination by a selection committee chaired by the Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS): Wingate was rejected at this stage, prompting the 
much-recounted incident of his introducing himself to the CIGS, Field Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell, 
during an exercise and presenting a copy of his article in the Journal of the Royal Geographical 
Society, on his expedition to find the „lost oasis‟ of Zerzura, with which he had closed his service in 
Sudan, with the implication that Deverell should reconsider.  Impressed by Wingate‟s audacity and, 
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apparently, by the article, Deverell promised to find Wingate a staff job appropriate to his rank and 
experience, and Wingate was assigned as an Intelligence Officer in HQ 5th Division, in Haifa, in 
September 1936.
73
  
      Two of Wingate‟s examination papers survive. Not only do these demonstrate the development 
of Wingate‟s ideas by this time, but they provide evidence that two key passions developed earlier 
than previous published works have detected.  Firstly, Wingate appears to have had an academic 
interest in Palestine some months before arriving there, suggesting, combined with his attitude to 
Lawrence, that he arrived with many of his opinions on the region forming already.  The second paper 
shows that his much-cited hatred and suspicion of staff officers may have originated even before the 
first of his numerous clashes with them. 
      It is possible that Wingate‟s interest in the Middle East was inspired by Sir Reginald, as his exam 
answer, „The importance of Palestine and Trans-Jordan to the Empire‟ concentrated entirely upon 
imperial geopolitics, without mentioning the ethno-nationalist issues which shape much of the politics 
of the region and which were to become his obsession.  He opened by outlining how the situation in 
the region had changed since 1914; previously, the region had been controlled by Turkey, no threat 
to „our communications with the east for the reason that she was not strong enough‟; the situation 
would be different were the region controlled by a rival European power, „The necessary measures 
for the defence of the Suez Canal and Egypt would have cost immense sums of money and would not 
even then have afforded real security.‟74    Once Turkey disappeared from the scene, however, the 
area became vital to the Empire's interests for several reasons.  First was the oil resources of Iraq; 
Britain could not rely upon sources of oil in the hands of other European countries, „The pipeline to 
Haifa is already of considerable military importance to our fleet...We must, therefore, control the 
territory through which it runs.  So long as Iraq is not controlled by any other power, we do...control 
the oil supplies from her oil fields‟   - Wingate would soon have a personal interest in the pipeline.  
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Secondly was air communications to India; were a foreign power to control Transjordan, it would 
soon dominate Iraq, as well, and be in a position to menace the air route across northern Arabia.    
Thirdly was British influence: „To cede the control of these territories to a strong, expanding and 
propagandist power would be to deal a decisive blow to our influence in the Near East.  Egyptians, 
Arabs, Iraqis and Persians, would all conclude that the domination of Great Britain was over...‟75   
This paper is interesting in indicating how far Wingate‟s opinions developed over the next three years. 
 He was to become an advocate of a „strong, expanding and propagandist‟ Jewish state in the region, 
and concluded that Arab opinion - and oil - was unimportant. However, his Jewish state, as he 
envisaged it, would be a guardian of British interests in the region, and Wingate would enlist similar 
geopolitical arguments to those given in the paper in its support.                              
      The question Wingate answered on the second paper has not been found, but appears to have 
concerned the sources of military inefficiency.  Wingate argued that the higher the rank, the greater 
the damage arising from narrow-mindedness, beginning with a definition of narrow-mindedness 
which provides an excellent example of his combative style:  
 
      Anyone who accepts this phrase without definition is guilty of slovenly thinking.  In the last        
      analysis it means that mental quality that clings to a particular view in disregard of facts and        
      opinions that are opposed to it.  It is always given a bad sense in use, and here means clinging     
      to views from stupidity or obstinacy when intelligent thought and admission of all the facts         
      would compel a departure from them....It has to be admitted that staff officers are peculiarly       
      prone to this fault.
76
   
 
 
 
      This was because „their long and arduous training tends to make them prize the ideas and opinions 
they have imbibed from their teachers.  The learning has cost them many pains [sic] and the thought 
that those pains, in some cases, have been thrown away is unacceptable to many of them.‟77    Wingate 
argued that their pride in their systems was such that they „would prefer failure along the right lines 
to success along the wrong ones.‟78  He then, prophetically, illustrated his point with a hypothetical 
  
94 
account of a campaign in East Africa; the commander of a „native corps‟ complains that the rigid 
march timetable drawn up by the staff actually stifles the main advantages of his troops, their ability 
to march across country at three times the rate of British troops and to live off the land: 
 
      The staff officer regards the native corps commander as an old-fashioned soldier who does not   
      know how to conduct a modern operation.  He prefers to believe, without investigation, the       
      civil authorities‟ view of the resources available.  He resents the tone adopted and the                 
      implication that he and the rest of the staff are making a blunder.  In short, he refuses to face       
      the facts, convinces himself that he is justified in dismissing his critic as an ignoramus, and           
      suppresses his evidence.
79 
 
 
      Although there is no evidence, it might be that this rather polemical paper stemmed from 
first-hand experience.  Wingate was certainly to accuse staff officers of all these sins in the future.  
Wingate‟s conclusion is interesting in illustrating that, at this time, he was still an advocate of 
concentration of effort, blaming on the German General Staff in 1914 „the pig-headed worship of the 
envelopment theory of strategy...which led directly to disaster.‟80 The examiner complimented 
Wingate‟s style and his ideas, and awarded him a „VG+' grade.  This is in contrast to his mark on the 
tactics paper, where, Tulloch recalled, instead of answering the question, Wingate „content[ed] 
himself with writing a thesis proving that the examiner did not know his subject‟, this presumably 
being Wingate‟s earlier, unsuccessful attempt.81   
      It appears, therefore, that Wingate arrived in Palestine with many of the opinions which were to 
shape his subsequent relationship with this peers, and their memories of him, developing already if not 
set firmly in his psyche. This reverses previous opinion of Wingate, influenced mainly by Mosley and 
Sykes, which argues that his Zionism, which arose from his personal opinions and early experiences, 
was the major influence upon his view of imperial strategy and the role of force within it, and that his 
problems with authority first arose in Palestine from an implied Arabophile conspiracy.
82
    Even a 
brief overview of Wingate‟s intellectual interests in this period suggests that the actuality was more 
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complex and deeper rooted. 
 
      Conclusions - Wingate before Palestine 
The Captain Wingate who arrived in Palestine in 1936 was an officer with some deep, and strongly 
held opinions already evident.  In a series of papers and reports he had exhibited not only a growingly 
combative style, but a consistent belief in the value of „interior lines‟ and the use of mobility and 
deception to achieve surprise and concentration of effort; he also demonstrated a belief that a people‟s 
„national characteristics‟ would affect their military behaviour.  He had also acquired several years‟ 
experience of commanding irregular forces in small-scale operations in rough country, courtesy of the 
SDF and, at the end of this period, had discovered the works of his relative, TE Lawrence.  Yet, at 
no point can he be viewed as a „maverick‟: while he commented critically upon some of the methods 
used by the SDF, he did not try to change them.  It is also evident that some of his opinions of 
Lawrence were shared by others, including senior officers, and his examination papers achieved good 
marks, despite their critical content and tone.  Moreover, as the previous chapter indicates, Wingate's 
SDF experience was shared by hundreds of other officers, in Africa and elsewhere.  As the next 
chapter will demonstrate, the diverse strands covered in the previous two chapters would come 
together in the hills of Galilee in 1938, the cradle of the „Wingate myth‟.     
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                                                          CHAPTER FOUR 
 
                    WINGATE AND COUNTERTERRORISM IN PALESTINE, 1937-39 
 
I cannot speak too highly…of the Special Night Squads….organized and trained by Captain 
OC WINGATE, Royal Artillery, from my Staff, who has shown great resource, enterprise 
and courage in leading and controlling their activities.  These Squads have been 
supplemented by Jewish supernumeraries who have done excellent work in combination with 
the British personnel.  The story of the inception and gradual development of this form of 
activity, and its successful results, provide a great tribute to the initiative and ingenuity of all 
concerned. 
      - General Sir Robert Haining, 1938
1 
 
[Captain Wingate’s] tendency…to play for his own ends and likings instead of playing for the 
side…has become so marked…as to render his services in the Intelligence Branch nugatory 
and embarrassing.  His removal to another sphere of action has been timely.   
      - General Sir Robert Haining, 1939
2 
 
      Introduction 
The Lexicon of the Israel Defence Force (IDF) states, „The teachings of Orde Charles Wingate, his 
character and leadership were a cornerstone for many of the Haganah’s commanders, and his 
influence can be seen in the Israel Defence Force‟s combat doctrine.‟3  Wingate‟s influence on Israeli 
military policy was confirmed by the founders of the IDF and the State of Israel: David Ben-Gurion, 
Israel‟s first Prime Minister, stated that had Wingate lived, he would have been the natural choice to 
lead the IDF during the 1948 War of Independence; to Moshe Dayan, „He was a military genius and 
a wonderful man‟; in 1976, Ariel Sharon told Brian Bond that Wingate was his boyhood hero and he 
„read avidly‟ about his exploits in Abyssinia and Burma; when asked about the comparative influence 
of Wingate and Liddell Hart over Israeli military doctrine, Yitzhak Rabin stated that Wingate‟s was 
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greater, as did Sharon‟s mentor, Major General Avraham Yoffe; Yigal Allon listed Wingate at the top 
of those who had exerted most influence, ahead of Liddell Hart and Yitzhak Sadeh.
4
 Until 1999, all 
school textbooks in Israel covered Wingate's contributions to Zionism without qualification or 
criticism.
5
   
      Another side to the story has emerged since the 1950s.  Sykes alleged frequent breakdowns in 
discipline among Wingate‟s Special Night Squads (SNS), and Royle provided evidence that 
Wingate‟s brand of „personal leadership‟ sometimes ran to enforcing discipline with his fists and 
boot.
6
   The SNS sometimes seemed dangerously amateurish, its first large action, at Dabburiya in 
July 1938, seeing one Jewish policeman killed and Wingate seriously wounded by fire from their own 
side.
7
  Most serious are allegations that the SNS were Jewish „death squads‟, fighting terror with 
terror.  Mosley claimed that Wingate tortured and then murdered a suspected terrorist on his very first 
patrol; this is uncorroborated, but Sykes alluded to „innocent loiterers [who] were shot among rebels 
who returned the fire‟ when the SNS raided the village of Beit Shean a few months later.8   Bierman 
and Smith mention one unauthorised killing of an Arab civilian, occurring while Wingate was on leave 
in London in autumn 1938, but imply that by then events were out of his control.
9
   However, the most 
serious allegations, surprisingly, have come from Israelis.  The post-Intifada period has seen the 
emergence of the so-called „New Historians‟, a group of revisionist Israeli writers including Benny 
Morris, Avi Shlaim, Tom Segev and Gideon Levy, using previously closed Hebrew and Arabic 
sources to argue that the Jewish State, from its earliest beginnings, has been neither as innocent nor 
as defenceless as is frequently claimed.
10
 In 1999, Segev published a history of the British Mandate 
including allegations that Wingate not only tortured and beat Arabs in reprisal for terrorist attacks, but 
personally murdered several.
11
   Segev gave no dates for these incidents and located only one, but his 
claim that many in the Zionist leadership viewed Wingate as more trouble than he was worth was 
corroborated by no less a source than Ben-Gurion, who had personal dealings with Wingate 
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throughout the period 1937-44.
12
 Outside Israel, Hew Strachan described Wingate‟s methods as 
„state terrorism‟, while Charles Townshend described the SNS as a „still more dubious‟ version of the 
Black and Tans.
13   
There appears, therefore, to be a very dark side to the Wingate myth.  
      As has been discussed already, „severity‟ against insurgents was advocated by Callwell and by 
several other senior British officers.  Whatever the misgivings expressed about such methods, 
post-Amritsar and post-Ireland, it can be demonstrated that if Wingate was ruthless in dealing with 
insurgents, then he had company.   However, the commonest impression given in  the pro-Wingate 
sources is that Wingate single-handedly turned the tide of the Arab revolt against obstruction from a 
British „military establishment‟ institutionally Islamophile and anti-Semitic, and from timid Jewish 
politicians.  Burchett, in 1946, suggested that „The Arab revolt was an ersatz production foisted on 
Palestine by the Axis, and more or less winked at by the British [therefore] we [sic] allowed Axis 
money and Axis arms to pour into Palestine to be used against the people we had lawfully permitted 
to settle there.‟14   Wingate, „after a lot of trouble‟, obtained authority to form „special light squadrons 
[sic]‟ and in a few weeks, „squashed‟ the rebels in his operational area; however: 
 
      Many of the General Staff officers, in accordance with the fashion of the day, had                        
      become anti-Semitic, and Wingate‟s exploits were not looked upon                                             
      favourably....The special squads were disbanded and after waiting around with nothing to do      
      Wingate left for England...
15
         
       
      Mosley dwelt also upon the attitude of the British authorities (having Wingate describe General 
Headquarters, Jerusalem, as „a gang of anti-Jews‟) and on the passivity of the Jewish leadership which 
condemned Jewish settlers in Galilee „with nothing but a few rook rifles‟ per settlement, to massacre, 
it only being after galvanisation by Wingate that the Jews went onto the offensive.
16
 Sykes quoted 
Wingate‟s disparagement of British tactics at length, and  Wingate‟s criticism of the British Army is 
taken at face value by those concerning themselves more directly with his military ideas.
17
  Rossetto 
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claimed that the Jews „never managed to form a common front with the British and preferred to 
follow a policy of strict self-defence‟ against Arab guerrillas; the British reliance on mechanised 
transport and heavy weaponry allowed the rebels to hit, run and then melt back into the countryside.
18
 
British action against the rebels was sporadic and timid, the rebels always being warned by the locals 
in time to either lay ambushes or escape: this situation was rectified only when Wingate realised that 
the British had to form „small squads‟ to meet the rebels on their own terms, principally operating by 
night which the British Army had, according to Rossetto, avoided previously.
19
 Royle emphasised 
Jewish criticism of British tactics, comparing them unfavourably with Wingate‟s.20  The consensus in 
the literature, therefore, is that Wingate was alone in his readiness and ability to tackle the Arab 
insurgents and was advocating ideas different not only from those of his peers in the British Army but 
from the Jewish military leadership also.   
      A study of official papers of the time, and the testimony of Jewish leaders and some of Wingate‟s 
colleagues does not support this.  In reality, it appears that the SNS operated within a British 
counterinsurgency strategy derived from established practice, adapting many of the methods 
described in Chapter Two of this thesis, and effective enough to force several changes in strategy 
upon the insurgents, and in which there was extensive Anglo-Jewish and Anglo-Arab cooperation.  
Moreover, Wingate‟s allegedly „radical‟ use of Jewish policemen and volunteers in counterinsurgent 
operations had the blessing of his commanders and the British High Commissioner in Palestine, in 
contravention of British Government policy.  The remainder of this chapter will clarify both these 
issues and the extent to which Wingate‟s tactical and operational thought at this time parted company 
with that of his colleagues – if at all.   
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      The Development of the Arab Revolt 
The Palestinian Arab revolt of 1936-39 arose from a long historical process.  Palestine was 
administered, from 1919, by the British Colonial Office acting under a Mandate from the League of 
Nations.  This was never easy politically, because the Balfour Declaration of 1917 committed the 
British to „use their best endeavours‟ to assist the creation of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine, 
while the „civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities‟ - Arabs making up 90% of 
Palestine‟s population in 1917 - would not be prejudiced.21 Transjordan, although previously part of 
Palestine and incorporated into the Mandate, was formed into a separate Arab Emirate, and Palestine, 
Transjordan and Iraq took on vital strategic importance for the Empire, as a buffer zone protecting 
Egypt and the Suez Canal, and as an aerial artery between Britain and India, as Wingate appreciated 
(see Chapter Three above).
22
  Apart from occasional outbreaks of sectarian rioting, there was relative 
peace until 1929, mainly because the Jews remained a minority, and a Jewish national homeland in 
Palestine seemed an unlikely prospect.  However, the mid 1920s saw Europe begin its greatest spasm 
of anti-Semitism, beginning in Poland in the 1920s and moving to unprecedented levels with the rise 
of the Nazis.  The USA had restricted all immigration in 1924, so Palestine now fulfilled the role 
Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern political Zionism, envisaged for it, a Jewish national sanctuary: 
Jewish immigration to Palestine, encouraged by the Nazis, rose from 4,000 arrivals per year in 1931 
to over 61,000 in 1935, plus perhaps 5-6000 illegal immigrants smuggled in per year.
23
  The perceived 
existential threat to the Palestinian Arabs posed now by this explosive increase in Jewish immigration 
produced a violent Arab nationalist response sharpened by militant Islam.  This was initiated by 
Sheikh Muhammad Izz al-Din al-Qassam, a Syrian cleric who had been preaching anti-colonial jihad 
since 1911, whose followers began attacking Jewish settlements in mid-1935.
24
  Qassam was killed in 
battle by the British in November 1935, and reacting to his „martyrdom‟, from early 1936, Muslim 
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clerics began to demand resistance to any Jewish takeover of Palestine, the most prominent being 
Haj-Amin al Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem and, since 1929, head of the Supreme Muslim Council, 
the Palestinian Arab „government‟ set up by the British.25 
      The subsequent insurgency fell into four broad phases:       
                   - Phase One.  The British traced the beginning of the revolt to 19 April 1936, when the Supreme 
Muslim Council called a general strike of Arab workers with the tacit backing of the Arab Higher 
Committee, an unofficial Arab „government‟ created in Palestine to represent Arab interests, also 
chaired by the Mufti.  The strike lasted six months, accompanied by rioting - mainly targeting Jewish 
areas and businesses - sabotage, murders of civilians from both communities, and, in the summer, the 
formation of large guerrilla units in the countryside.
26 
The British noted early that these units centred 
upon „volunteers‟ from Syria and Iraq, many of them apparently with regular army training; these 
were reinforced by local Palestinian Arabs, who were notably less aggressive and disciplined.
27
 Indeed, 
British official reports indicated that the rural Arab population was lukewarm towards the rebellion 
and, unless coerced directly by the guerrillas, were generally law-abiding; in the later stages of the 
campaign many cooperated actively with the British while a number turned violently upon the 
guerrillas.  Consequently, the „rebellion‟ resembled less an insurgency than an invasion, using guerrilla 
methods, in support of an elite of urban agitators centred on the Mufti.  The military direction of the 
guerrilla campaign was initially in the hands of Fawzi al-Quwuqji, a Syrian Druze and former officer 
in the Ottoman Army, who had led a revolt against the French in 1925 before being appointed 
Commandant of the Iraqi Army Military Training College.
28
 Quwuqji was enlisted by the Higher Arab 
Committee to give the insurgency direction and discipline; this he did, among other things producing 
a simple codified doctrine for guerrilla warfare dubbed the „Damascus FSR‟ when copies fell into 
British hands.
29
  Iraq, which had received nominal independence from Britain in 1932, and now the 
most pro-Axis of the Arab states, not only provided Quwuqji and volunteers for the guerrilla bands 
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but also spoke internationally on behalf of the Higher Arab Committee and pressured British policy 
with vague threats of escalation to a general confrontation in the Middle East.
30
 Contrary to 
Burchett‟s claims, Germany and Italy seem to have offered little more to the guerrillas than 
propaganda support, most of their weapons in actuality being leftovers from 1914-18 or previous 
rebellions.
31
   
      With just one brigade in Palestine, the British authorities were unable to carry out the rapid, 
vigorous response a Callwell or Gwynn might recommend.  Yet, Operations Instructions, an ad hoc 
„doctrine‟ for dealing with the insurgency, devised by Brigadier JF Evetts, Commander of Troops, 
Palestine, followed closely the „frontier warfare‟ tradition furthered by Callwell, FSR and recent 
British practice.   Evetts aimed to bring the guerrillas to battle by tempting them to attack convoys 
accompanied by armoured cars and lorries mounted with Royal Navy pom-pom guns, by occupying 
villages and waterholes they might contest, and offensive „cordon and sweep‟ operations intended to 
kill or capture rebel leaders.
32
 Evetts, therefore, seems to have envisaged a „small war‟, rather than a 
policing operation.  At the political level, the British Government announced in August 1936 that a 
Royal Commission, under Lord Peel, would be sent to Palestine to investigate Arab and Jewish 
grievances and to ascertain if the Mandate was being implemented satisfactorily; however, before it 
could convene, law and order should be restored.
33
   In the biggest movement of British troops since 
the First World War, two infantry divisions, the 5th and the 8th, were formed into the Palestine 
Expeditionary Force, under Lieutenant General JG Dill, raising the garrison to 80,000, alongside four 
squadrons from RAF Bomber Command.
34
   Orders in Council were passed authorising severe 
measures: martial law was imposed, allowing the death penalty for saboteurs, those illegally wearing 
British uniform or carrying concealed firearms and life imprisonment for those willingly supplying the 
rebels.
35
   Collective punishment of pro-rebel villages, consisting of fines, demolition of houses, and 
enforced curfews, was also allowed.
36
   This was offensive action, reinforced by „severity‟, as Callwell 
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had recommended.     
      The massive reinforcement allowed the British army to go onto the offensive.  „Preliminary Notes 
on Lessons of the Palestine Rebellion‟ of 1937 described and set tactical methods until 1938, when it 
was supplanted by „Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine‟, in time to be rendered 
irrelevant by a subsequent change in rebel methods.
37
 These documents did not depart from „frontier 
warfare‟ practice: infantry columns, small enough to tempt the guerrillas to try their chances but 
mobile enough to converge rapidly upon „the sound of the guns‟ were to sweep rebel areas on a wide 
front. Upon encountering a guerrilla band, standard procedure was to send an „XX‟ wireless call, for 
air support, or „GG‟ for tanks, these „fixing‟ the gang in its position before „shooting in‟ an infantry 
counterattack.
38
   Emphasis was on getting into bayonet and grenade range: Callwell was enthusiastic 
about the bayonet, believing that native irregulars had a terror of cold steel.
39
 The „Preliminary Notes‟ 
suggest this sentiment was common: 
 
       Infantry finding itself within 200 yards of the rebels should go straight in with                             
       bayonets and butts...Nine times out of ten the enemy will fire a few rounds wildly and try to       
       run away.  If encountered at longer range efforts should be made to pin the enemy to the           
       ground with fire while lightly equipped troops try to get round the flanks and behind him.
40
  
 
 
        However, the most notable feature of these operations was the use of aircraft in support of the 
columns on the ground, the RAF carrying out reconnaissance for army columns, „pinning‟ insurgents 
in villages while columns moved up, and providing close air support in response to „XX‟ calls, Dill 
complimenting them upon the speed with which they could respond.
41
    The methods applied by 
British forces in „small wars‟ elsewhere were therefore continued in Palestine.     
       - Phase Two began in September 1937 with the breakdown of the truce pending the report of the 
Peel Commission and ended with the defeat of the major guerrilla forces by the British army in early 
1938.  Three developments contributed to this.  The first was Sir Arthur Wauchope‟s replacement as 
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High Commissioner by the more hawkish Sir Harold MacMichael in February 1937; second was the 
employment by the Palestine Government of Sir Charles Tegart, former Commissioner of Police in 
Calcutta, as an advisor on police organisation and methods from December 1937 to June 1938; third 
was the refinement of Army tactical and operational methods.   Tegart‟s principal contributions were 
his recommendation that the northern border, with Lebanon and Syria, be closed by a barbed wire 
fence, covered by concrete blockhouses (the „Tegart Line‟) and, significantly for this thesis, 
recommending the forming of specialist counterinsurgency units.
42
  Such a „Third Force‟, part way 
between army and police, had been used in Palestine before: in 1921, the Palestine Gendarmerie had 
been formed by Colonel Wyndham Deedes, at the behest of the High Commissioner, in response to 
an outbreak of sectarian rioting. Although initially recruited on a „mixed‟ basis, issues of reliability led 
to it becoming „all-white‟, its members including large numbers of former Black and Tans and 
members of the RIC Auxiliary Division; Charles Townshend implies that the intention behind this 
force, which was disbanded in the mid 1920s, was to control Palestine through intimidation.
43
  Now, 
Tegart (an Ulsterman) called for the raising of „Rural Mounted Police‟, from „the tough type of man, 
not necessarily literate, who knows as much of the game as the other side‟, and composed „partly of 
British and Palestinians [from which ethnicity Tegart did not specify]‟.44  These would patrol rural 
areas, gathering information on the gangs and attacking any they encountered, freeing the Palestine 
Police for more orthodox police work.
45
 Tegart‟s proposal was rejected on the grounds stated by a 
senior government official that „In effect this will be rather like the "Black & Tans" with some of the 
original personnel of that body and might easily supply material for the same kind of reputation as they, 
rightly or wrongly, obtained in the Irish troubles.‟46  Wingate was not, therefore, first to suggest the 
formation of specialist counterinsurgent units, or, indeed, to utilise them. 
      Wavell succeeded Dill as GOC Palestine on 12 September 1937.  Martial law was lifted at the end 
of the general strike, and the resumption of hostilities in September 1937 was met with „Military 
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Control‟, described already.47 Operations consisted of action against guerrilla bands smaller and less 
aggressive than previously, confining themselves to robbing villages and ambushing small police and 
army patrols and, when engaged, preferring long-ranged fire-fights before a swift retreat.
48
  In 
response, the Army refined the system of mobile columns, with ten per brigade, now with mules, 
allowing them to pursue rebels into the hills, use superior mobility to harry the gangs, and if possible 
cut off a gang‟s routes of retreat and then „drive‟ in upon them, the Army destroying a number of large 
gangs in this way in early 1938.
49
   Twice in the space of a fortnight in November 1937, Evetts, now 
commanding 16th Brigade in Galilee, destroyed rebel gangs, one action involving a column of 2nd 
East Yorkshires climbing a several-thousand foot mountain in darkness to attack a rebel base, 
capturing its leader and an arsenal of weapons, earning Evetts one of several mentions in dispatches.
50
 
In March 1938, 16th Brigade fought the largest engagement of the rebellion, at Jenin, resulting in 
heavy rebel casualties; in the following fortnight, the Brigade destroyed the biggest guerrilla band in 
Galilee, killing its leader.
51
  British tactics, therefore, proved effective long before Wingate‟s 
involvement.  However, they forced a change in operational method upon the rebels that did, 
temporarily, nullify the British tactical advantage and was to provide Wingate with an opportunity.  
      - Phase Three lasted from March 1938 to the end of that year, the period in which Wingate 
created and led the SNS, which can now be seen not as a reaction to the inadequacy of British 
counterinsurgency techniques, but to a shift in rebel strategy.  Thanks to previous British success, the 
rebels were reduced to a strength of around 1,000 over the whole of Palestine, and switched to terror 
attacks on the rural Arab population, murdering or kidnapping Arabs known to have moderate views 
or suspected of supplying information to the government, or coercing villagers into acts of sabotage. 
The terrorist offensive was concentrated upon Galilee, southern Palestine being relatively peaceful 
until late in this period.
52
 As pointed out by Lieutenant General Sir Robert Haining, who succeeded 
Wavell as GOC in April 1938, the rebels now had no „centres of gravity‟ against which the Army 
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could concentrate.
53
  From May 1938, the British responded by billeting platoon-sized detachments 
of British troops in villages in terrorist-affected areas, protecting law-abiding Arabs and patrolling the 
surrounding area.
54
  Much of this patrolling was by night, Haining emphasising the need to be 
„top-dog‟ by night some time before Wingate began raising the SNS.55   25 villages were occupied 
by the end of May, as the Tegart line was completed, and there was nightly patrolling of the northern 
frontier until early December, when it was suspended following a temporary resumption of the rebels 
assembling in large gangs.
56 
 The gangs, from late May, switched their activities to sabotage and 
attacks on Jewish settlements, the situation Wingate‟s counterterrorist operations were intended to 
resolve.
57
 
 
      By October 1938, the British had reached the most critical stage of the rebellion.  Haining was 
forced to admit, in his Official Report for November that, due to overstretch, he had cancelled all 
offensive operations and: „The situation at this time was such that civil administration and control of 
the country was, for all practical purposes, non-existent.  The number of troops in the country was still 
insufficient to do more than hold down the essential localities and communications.‟58   Stuart Emeny 
of the News Chronicle, who was to die in the same air crash as Wingate in 1944, reported that the 
British had lost control over Palestine outside Haifa and Tel Aviv.
59
   Moreover, it was feared that the 
rebels were winning the battle for hearts and minds. Haining noted that: 
 
       [T]he steadily increasing number of...incidents, and the damage and dislocation                          
       caused to government property and communications forbids their dismissal as trivial.  They       
       are, in fact, symptomatic of what is now a very deep-seated rebellious spirit throughout the       
       whole Arab population, spurred on by the call of a Holy War.  The rebel gangs have now          
       acquired, by terrorist methods, such a hold over the mass of the population that it is not untrue  
       to say that every Arab in the country is a potential enemy of the government...He dare not be    
       otherwise, if called upon by the rebels to give his physical or financial aid to their cause.
60
            
 
 
      The Army was hampered by two developments.  Firstly, the Munich crisis in September resulted 
in reinforcements earmarked for Palestine being held in England and Egypt.
61
  Secondly, the collapse 
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of the Palestine Police, resulting from widespread bribery and intimidation of its 1,500 Arab officers, 
and from incompetence, insubordination and anti-Semitism among its British elements.
62
  On 12 
September, Haining took the Palestine Police under his direct command, Tegart was summoned from 
England for further consultations, and the force was „purged.‟63  The other response was to allow 
Wingate to organise the SNS, something he had been badgering GHQ in Jerusalem to do for several 
months.  
 
 
     
       Wingate and Anglo- Jewish cooperation  
Much of the Wingate literature has confined its consultation of Jewish/Israeli testimony almost 
entirely to those who knew Wingate personally.  Looking beyond this - even in the published 
record - reveals that not only did Anglo-Jewish military cooperation not begin with Wingate, but was 
extensive before his arrival.  This was idealistic as well as practical, Wingate being far from the only 
Zionist in the British Army.  Haggai Eshed, the biographer of Reuven Shiloah, founder of Mossad, the 
Israeli Secret Service, revealed the extent to which intelligence officers of the Haganah, the Jewish 
underground militia, found sympathisers among their counterparts in the British Army and RAF, 
among them Captain Alan Strange, a strong critic of „pro-Arab British policy‟ prior to Wingate‟s 
arrival, and Lieutenant Anthony Simonds.
64
   Simonds, an officer of the Royal Berkshire Regiment, 
was to become a close friend of Wingate and served under him in Ethiopia.  He was portrayed by 
Royle and Bierman and Smith as an affable lightweight, taken seriously neither by the Jewish 
leadership or his colleagues in the Army, and there is, indeed, a Wodehousian air to his 
correspondence with „My Dear Old Orde‟.65  However, Simonds emerges from these same letters as 
a strong idealist and natural sympathiser with „underdogs‟; he pointedly lived in the Jewish quarter of 
Jerusalem, was privately critical of perceived anti-Semitism in the Palestine Police, and was deemed 
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worthy of cultivation by Shiloah himself as early as 1934.
66
   He was also regarded highly enough by 
his superiors to be placed in charge of all political intelligence in Palestine from August 1937 and by 
1945 was a lieutenant colonel and senior operative of MI9, aiding the escape of shot-down Allied 
aircrew from occupied Europe.
67  
There was, therefore, a small body of vociferously pro-Jewish 
British officers serving in Palestine before Wingate‟s arrival.             
      Indeed, Wingate appears to have arrived late to this group.  According to Lieutenant Colonel Ivor 
Thomas, who, as a corporal, was Wingate‟s clerk at GHQ Jerusalem, Wingate showed little 
discernible interest in Jewish affairs until he began to learn Hebrew six months after arriving, this being 
purely for intelligence purposes.
68
 However late-developing it was, Wingate‟s Zionism is crucial to 
this study in that his actions in Palestine aimed at fulfilling his interpretation of Zionist policy, and 
formed three consecutive but overlapping strands.  First was an anthropological interest in Jewish 
culture perhaps originating in his role as an intelligence officer, transmogrifying rapidly into 
passionate enthusiasm and belief that the Jews could use their achievements in Palestine to establish 
their worthiness of a nation-state.  Second was a fierce anti-Islamism and anti-Arabism, alluded to by 
Sykes but passed over by subsequent authors, which may have derived from Wingate‟s religious 
beliefs and his antipathy to Lawrence.  This was expressed through ethnic stereotyping of Arabs, 
dismissal of their religion, aspirations and military potential, this hardening into belief that all Arabs 
were potential terrorists who needed to be either cowed into submission or expelled from Palestine 
altogether.  Thirdly came the belief that a Jewish state, holding Dominion status within the British 
Empire and with its own British-trained army, would be a bulwark of British interests in the Middle 
East, would secure the Empire the gratitude of „international Jewry‟, and provide a vital ally in the 
approaching clash with fascism.   
      Wingate was not alone in these opinions. Not only did Dill and his successors take the Army 
Council‟s initial instruction to „crush‟ the rebellion very seriously, and argued consistently, on 
  
113 
„Callwellian‟ lines, for greater „severity‟, but they were also prepared to enlist Jewish military 
support.
69
 Dill favoured a robust line with the Arabs throughout his time as GOC.  In his first dispatch, 
of October 1936, he argued that: „"[D]efensive duties" and dispersal do not work, & repressive 
measures, including martial law, resulted in a decrease in violence in early September.  Martial law 
would ensure that gang leaders were caught & punished, & the military could go on the offensive.‟70 
This was necessary because of Arab „national character‟.  „[T]he Arabs respect strength and regard 
forbearance as weakness, which they despise‟, Dill claiming that Arabs respected British authority 
most in those areas where measures were harshest.
71 
  Likewise, the Air Officer Commanding, 
Palestine and Transjordan, from 1938-39, Air Commodore Arthur Harris, advocated bombing rebel 
villages, as the RAF had done in Iraq and on the Northwest Frontier.
72
    
      However, arming the Jews was another issue.  Jews formed part of the Palestine Police and all of 
the irregular Supernumerary Police (JSP) which enlisted 3,000 volunteers between April and October 
1936.
73
 The JSP was confined initially to protecting settlements and sections of railway running 
through majority Jewish areas but it is evident that Dill not only wanted to expand their numbers, but 
use them offensively against the Arab insurgents.
74
   Nor was he alone: the unnamed author (possibly 
Evetts) of the „Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine‟ of 1938, advocated using a 
legalised Haganah:  
 
      There is little doubt that in the end the authorities benefited by the subterranean defence              
      organizations which their policy had forced underground, and it might perhaps have been           
      better to have legalised and controlled at an earlier period the very natural activities which          
      developed below the surface.
75 
 
 
      Wauchope opposed this vociferously, writing to Dill in December 1936 that „[T]he formation of 
armed Jewish units, or offensive action by Jews against Arabs [w]as a grave danger to the future of 
this country‟ and to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, a month later, „If Jewish units are allowed 
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to act offensively against Arabs in Palestine, I fear the chances of the two people [sic] ever living 
together amicably will vanish for generations.‟76  The status of Jewish units was raised in a secret 
dispatch of 26 January 1937 from Wauchope to the Colonial Office, prompting a conference in 
London in March, involving Wauchope, the CIGS, Deverell, other senior service officers and 
representatives of the Foreign Office, aimed at fixing policy on these issues.  The policy decided is 
worth dwelling on, as it stood until 1939 and therefore provided political context for Wingate‟s SNS 
operations.  It was agreed to follow Wauchope‟s line that, prior to the imposition of military control, 
„Jews should be employed for defensive purposes only, and only in areas mainly Jewish‟, restricting 
them to defending their own settlements: yet, they could receive appropriate training „in limited 
numbers‟, pending their use for railway protection work.77 However: 
 
      Any such training should...be carried out with the utmost discretion, in order to avoid giving      
      the impression...that His Majesty‟s Government already foresee that after the publication of        
      their decisions upon the Report of the Royal Commission [the Peel Commission] a state of         
      affairs will inevitably prevail in which the forces of authority will be ranged against the Arab        
      population.  As regards the employment of Jews even for defensive purposes in                          
      predominantly Moslem areas, it was agreed that this would be politically most undesirable.      
      [Italics mine]
78
  
 
 
      Once military control was authorised, decisions on the military employment of Jews would rest 
with the GOC, under the advice of the High Commissioner, who was authorised to report his 
objections to London if the GOC decided to employ Jewish units „for purposes or in circumstances 
to which there might appear to be grave political objection.‟79   In particular: 
       
 
      It was...agreed that in view of the possibly serious reactions which might thereby be provoked    
      in neighbouring Arab countries, the General Officer Commanding should not, in any                   
      circumstances, decide to use Jews for offensive purposes, without the prior authority of His       
      Majesty‟s Government.80   
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      From March 1937, JSP were authorised to carry out „hot pursuits‟ of fleeing gangs, and in 
summer that year they were placed formally under British Army command and training.
81
   
Ben-Gurion recalled that by then, both the Jews and the British Army accepted the JSP as „legal 
Haganah‟ and the best available source of military training for young Jewish men.82 Wingate, 
therefore, became involved in counterterrorist operations in Palestine at a time when Jewish militias 
and the British Army were already escalating the level of force used against the insurgents and 
beginning to cooperate in its application, even while theoretically constrained by British Government 
policy.  
 
   
       
      The genesis of the Special Night Squads 
 
Intelligence in Palestine was the responsibility of the RAF Intelligence Organisation, Jerusalem, 
reporting directly to the GOC or AOC: it was established practice to attach an Army subaltern, such 
as Simonds, but unusual for a captain of fourteen years‟ service, like Wingate, to be assigned, and it 
is possible that this was arranged by Deverell.
83
   The Intelligence Organisation operated up to six 
regional Special Service Officers (SSOs), whose duties were „to procure information of a military, 
political and topographical nature and to keep in touch with the feeling in the country by touring their 
districts‟; each SSO employed agents and was required to „maintain close liaison with their district 
commissioner, police and...military commanders.‟84   
      It was as a SSO that Wingate first visited Jewish settlements in Galilee, ordered by Wavell in 
February 1938 to discover the routes by which terrorist gangs and gun-runners were entering 
Palestine from Syria and Lebanon.
85
 Wingate led several JSP patrols in April and May, setting 
ambushes on fords across the Jordan and tracks leading from them, and from this concluded that 
static ambushes were „useless‟ under these circumstances, the maze of tracks leading from the Jordan 
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combining with the sound of the river and civilian activity to mean a successful ambush would be 
down to sheer luck.
86
   More effective, Wingate opined, would be the SDF method of patrols 
sweeping known infiltration routes - although he did not mention the SDF and presented the idea as 
original and his own.  Consequently, in early June, Wingate approached the local commander, Evetts, 
proposing to raise specialist patrol units to secure the areas around the northern settlements at night.
87
 
An appreciation written on 5 June 1938 indicates that Wingate was firm that JSP should participate: 
units could either be British, with Jewish supernumeraries acting as guides and interpreters, or 
British-trained JSP, „ideal for this task, as possessing expert local language both of area, and character 
and language of Arabs.  There is ample evidence of their courage and they are intensely keen and 
eager to learn‟; conversely, „Arab police are useless, being both sympathetic towards, and in awe of, 
the gangs....Trust will become appropriate after, and not before, the Government has scotched the 
terror.‟88  
       Fortuitously, Wingate‟s proposal offered a solution for operational and tactical problems vexing 
Evetts since 1936.  The rebellion entered its third phase - night-time terrorism by small bands - in 
March 1938 and the British response of village occupation and night-time patrolling of the 
surrounding countryside was proving of limited effectiveness. The official digest of lessons of the 
rebellion, of 1938 noted that: 
 
      [A]ny engagement at night inevitably favoured an enemy who was usually met behind good        
      cover in a carefully chosen position with a well-reconnoitred line of retreat behind him.  To         
      carry out offensive night operations of any extent was therefore to invite casualties from an        
      opponent more at home at night than the British soldier, whom night deprived of most of the      
      advantages of his superior weapons.
89
  
 
 
 
      In his 1936 „doctrine‟, Evetts criticised British night-time tactics in a series of passages that 
apparently influenced Wingate‟s organisation and training for the SNS.  He commented upon the 
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standard reaction to coming under fire at night: 
 
      There is a tendency at the moment for troops when sniped merely to return the fire with their     
      rifles in the hope of silencing it.  Such action is not only bad for training, morale and discipline,   
      but in a very large number of cases is a waste of ammunition.  Hostile night                                 
      snipers...undoubtedly gain a moral uplift, a great deal of amusement, and practically no               
      casualties from the bulk of our return rifle fire.  In addition...unaimed rifle fire at night is              
      likely to be a danger to our own troops and civilians...
90 
 
 
 
      Evetts‟ solution was the tactics of „hill warfare‟ in India, wherein parties of picked men located 
and outflanked ambush positions from higher ground; moreover, Evetts agreed with Callwell on the 
bayonet, for its terror effect and the lesser risk of British troops shooting each other in the dark
91: „The 
aim of infantry is to close with the enemy and kill him at short range with fire or the bayonet.  This 
principle...if applied correctly will have far more effect on enemy snipers than hundreds of unaimed 
rounds at long range.‟92 Ambushes and snipers should, ideally, be dealt with by: 
 
      [O]ffensive action of small patrols consisting of a few lightly clad men carrying the minimum      
      of equipment necessary, and if possible wearing rubber-soled shoes, either in ambush                  
      positions or working around the flanks or rear of the snipers‟ positions.93  
       
 
      JSP tactics in defending settlements from nighttime attacks were, for the period 1936-38, as 
desultory as those of the British; according to the official digest: 
 
      The normal procedure in the almost nightly "attacks" on Jewish colonies was somewhat as         
      follows.  The Arabs would take up positions behind suitable cover after dark from which they    
      could fire at longish range.  The first round would be the signal for the Supernumeraries to         
      man their defence posts and open heavy rifle fire in the direction of the enemy, accompanied       
      as a rule by Verey lights.  For a short time a fire fight would go on during which targets would   
      seldom be visible to either side and neither would move from their prepared cover.  Eventually   
      the Arabs, fearing the arrival of reinforcements and feeling that honour had been satisfied,           
      would withdraw in the dark and return to their homes for the night's rest....Action of this type     
      may sound very unenterprising, but on the other hand it is difficult to see what else the                
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      Supernumeraries could have done with their small numbers and lack of tactical training.
94
  
 
 
 
      The suggested solution was „[T]o organize and officer the Supernumeraries on the pattern of the 
regular police, and again, if possible, to place the whole police system under the commander of the 
military forces.‟95   Wingate had concluded already that „moving ambushes‟ of British troops and JSP, 
operating from Jewish settlements on the northern frontier, could combine with the Tegart Line to 
seal the frontier, but his model was applied eventually further south.  Rebels sabotaged the Iraq 
Petroleum Company‟s pipeline across northern Palestine, to the refinery and port at Haifa, from the 
beginning of the rebellion in 1936.
96
 The British patrolled the pipeline with armoured cars and lorry 
borne infantry, supplemented by machine gun posts with searchlights, with JSP covering the final 
twenty miles on the coastal plain, but found all these of limited use in the hilly area along the border 
with Syria: they concluded that attacks could be minimised, but not stopped altogether and that, „In 
any case, cunning will be the essence of success, which can only be obtained by surprise, and to gain 
that troops must be prepared to go on and on night after night without any visible results if they are 
to collect their bag in the end.‟97   Attacks escalated during the third phase of the rebellion, the pipeline 
being punctured several times a night.  Haining, upon succeeding Wavell in April 1938, made 
superiority at night a priority, as discussed already, and it was probably on the strength of this and 
Evetts‟ reputation that Haining became, temporarily, another Wingate backer.  In May 1938, with 
MacMichael‟s sanction, Haining authorised Evetts and Wingate to train Jewish Supernumeraries to 
patrol the pipeline and for night time „ambush work‟ in 16th Brigade's area.98    A month later, an 
Army Order was issued allowing JSP throughout Palestine to patrol and carry out ambushes outside 
their settlements.
99
  
 
       
  
119 
      The Evolution of the SNS  
The main sources for Wingate‟s military thought at this time are the reports and training literature he 
prepared in mid to late 1938, while commanding the SNS.  In these documents, Wingate presented 
his own solution to a strategic situation unacceptable to the British, aimed at producing a certain state 
of mind in the enemy, and pressuring him in order to affect his strategic decision-making through 
tactical action, as Wingate was to attempt again in 1941-44.  This can be seen as coming from the 
same culture that produced FSR and the organic „frontier war‟ doctrine encapsulated by Callwell, in 
particular, the use of special, locally-recruited units for counter-guerrilla work; indeed, while Callwell 
extolled such forces‟ usefulness as scouts, he also argued that their innate skills and local knowledge 
would make them valuable auxiliaries in battle, particularly in „hill warfare‟. 100    However, Wingate 
can be seen as parting company with the views of his colleagues, not only in tactical methods and the 
means used to instill them in his troops, but in his calls for the entire offensive against the insurgents 
to be centred upon SNS-type units.    
      On 5 June 1938, Wingate produced an appreciation of „the possibilities of night movements by 
armed forces of the Crown with the object of putting an end to terrorism in Northern Palestine‟, a 
document outlining his counterterrorist doctrine - and a „doctrine‟ is what this was, as force structures, 
training programmes and tactics can be seen as derived from recommendations made in this paper and 
its sequels.  Wingate began by setting out his objective, „To set up a system and undetected movement 
[sic] of troops and police by night, across country and into villages, surprising gangs, restoring 
confidence to peasants, and gaining government control of rural areas.‟101   He then stated why British 
forces had not achieved this, his phrasing not only exposing his stance on a number of issues, but 
suggesting a strong Evetts influence: 
 
        It has been admitted by the civil authority that, on the approach of darkness, the virtual             
        control of the country passes to the gangsters.  In the dark they are free to visit villages             
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        without the smallest risk of any action being taken against them.  They are free to move            
        without danger anywhere...Neither police nor troops move by night as a general rule.  When    
        they do move it is usually by car and on the main roads.  When ambushed in so doing, as is       
        to be expected, the practice has been to return fire, a useless proceeding by night, and, after      
        an exchange of shots, to allow the gangs to withdraw unpursued.  Surprise has always been      
        inflicted by the gangs, not by our forces, and such will continue to be the case so long as           
        present methods are followed.
102
 
 
       
      Wingate‟s comments on the results of this are interesting, given allegations made against him by 
Mosley and Segev: „The result of all this is that the gangs, who enjoy a warm bed as much as anyone, 
make a practice of visiting villages by night.  Here they oppress and terrorise the peasants in [a] 
manner which the Government could not rival even were its objective to do so. [Italics mine]‟103 His 
solution blended „village occupation‟, Evetts‟ recommended night tactics and the guerrillas‟ own 
methods: 
 
       There is only one way to deal with the situation; to persuade the gangs that, in their predatory   
       raids, there is every chance of their running into a government gang which is determined to        
       destroy them, not by an exchange of shots at a distance, but by bodily assault with bayonet        
       and bomb....What is needed, therefore, is to produce in the minds of the rebels the conviction    
       that the armed forces are able to move at night as freely and dispersedly [sic] as themselves,       
       without their being able to obtain, as  heretofore, previous knowledge of such movement, that   
       whenever they enter a village to prey it is more than likely that they will be surprised there;        
       that, even when they move across country by the most isolated tracks, they are liable suddenly  
       to be attacked - not by a distant exchange of shots, from which little is to be feared, but by         
       bodily encounter for which they are totally unfitted.
104 
 
 
      Wingate echoed Callwell and Evetts in arguing that guerrillas were „unfitted‟ for this kind of 
combat because of dislike of close combat, and an innate terror of cold steel: 
       
       The rebels have shown that, while they are able to face attacks when occupying covered and     
       previously prepared positions, they are quite unable to face any kind of charge or surprise          
       onslaught.  This is their character, and experience will not change it.  In person they are feeble   
       and their whole theory of war is to cut and run.  Like all ignorant and primitive people they are  
       especially liable to panic.
105
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      While this passage might have come from Callwell himself, it initiates a common theme in 
Wingate‟s military thought, reaching its apotheosis in Burma: military doctrine should be dialectical, 
human-centred and designed to direct British strength in command, training and „national character‟ 
against enemy weaknesses in these same areas, thereby turning superiority in training, aggression and 
initiative into operational and tactical advantages.  Here, British and Jewish troops were better 
educated and armed, and with the advantages of systematic training and coordinated command – 
„[T]hey know more about war than the gangs‟: consequently, it should be possible for 
purpose-trained „government gangs‟ to defeat many times their number of disorganised and poorly 
led insurgents.
106
     
      To illustrate this, Wingate recounted his early intelligence-gathering patrols, and lessons learned. 
 The two most important were that, firstly, his „government gangs‟ should be supported by an 
intelligence network capable of identifying bottlenecks in the rebels‟ routes of movement and supply, 
critical vulnerabilities upon which  patrols should be concentrated, and that, secondly, the 
„government gangs‟ should pay frequent visits to Arab villages, „both arms and gangsters would be 
found there at times, and the Bedu would rapidly cease both to fear and to afford asylum to the 
gangs‟.107    Given that villagers would almost certainly detect and report the „government gangs‟‟ 
presence to headmen, subtlety was pointless; far better to establish a strong presence, the better to 
impose British will upon the Arab population: 
 
      [I]t is best to pay a visit to a village on the way home, waking up the Mukhtar [headman] and     
      assembling a few villagers.  It can be pointed out to them that terror by night will in future be     
      exercised, where necessary, by  [the] Government, whose forces are close to hand and able to    
      visit any area at a moment‟s notice; that, consequently, failure to notify the presence of a            
      gang will be regarded as evidence of complicity, since the excuse of terrorism will no longer       
      be valid....It is my belief that, once the Arabs believe the truth of such statements, it will not        
      be long before cooperation is forthcoming.
108
   
 
      As to organisation, each „government gang‟ should consist of ten men, a NCO and an officer, 
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based not in an Arab village, as other British units were, but in a Jewish settlement, the one operating 
centre where they could be assured of safety between operations and from which information would 
not be leaked.
109
   These would be formed into a „Night Movement Group‟, under the command of 
a single officer overseeing all training and recruitment, coordinating action with 16th Brigade, 
collating and disseminating intelligence, and operations.
110
    Reflecting Wingate‟s experience in the 
Sudan and the „small wars‟ tradition, the wide dispersal of the units meant that command 
responsibility had to be devolved downwards as Wingate realised in drawing up tasks for the Group 
commander. However, his aim was to „coordinate all night movements from one centre which is in 
touch with all Government Intelligence Centres.‟111 
       
   Wingate established his headquarters at Ein Harod, in north eastern Palestine near the borders 
with both Transjordan and Lebanon, and covering the pipeline.
112   
In May, he was joined by 36 British 
soldiers under Lieutenant HEN Bredin of the Royal Ulster Rifles, who was appointed second in 
command, Lieutenant Rex King-Clark of the 1
st
 Manchesters, and Second Lieutenant Michael Grove 
of the Royal West Kents.  Alongside these were eighty Jewish Settlement Police, 24 of them also 
Haganah members, as Wingate no doubt knew. Officially they were JSP under British Army 
command, and were referred to as „SNS Police‟ in correspondence.113   Wingate‟s training notes from 
this period indicate that he was trying to instill doctrine in his new  command, based upon the theory 
of counter-insurgency summarised in his paper of 5 June.  That document is interesting also from the 
insight it gives into Wingate‟s approach to training: he had argued there that soldiers should have 
instilled in them tactical drills aimed at ensuring a rapid, consistent and effective reaction to 
encountering a gang at night, and at Ein Harod, the JSP, having undergone individual weapons and 
fieldcraft instruction from British NCOs, were then trained by Wingate himself, in their squads, to 
adopt set tactical responses, both as individuals and as a squad, in reaction to torch and hand signals, 
including the final signal to throw grenades and then charge home on a gang with the bayonet.
114   
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Although the evidence is open to interpretation, this might be presented as a forerunner of the tactical 
training via battle drills which became standard in the British Army in the Second World War: these 
were standard at the time in the German and Soviet armies, but were not adopted by the British until 
1940.
115  
It may be, therefore, that Wingate, a Royal Artillery officer, was „ahead of his time‟ in terms 
of infantry tactics and training. 
        The SNS saw its first action on the night of 3 June 1938, when a patrol, led by Wingate himself, 
ambushed and scattered a group of saboteurs on the pipeline, wounding two; on 11 June, two patrols 
chased a gang into the village of Danna, and in the ensuing fight, two insurgents were killed, three 
wounded and six captured.
116  
On 15 June, Wingate reported that the pipeline had not been attacked 
for a week, and that the local Arabs were now respecting curfews, arguing that this was vindication 
of his methods, which should now be expanded across Palestine.
117  This led to Wingate‟s strategy 
becoming notably more ambitious. 
        The SNS was soon extending its activities beyond ambushes to pre-emptive raids using Jewish 
fighters in majority Arab areas in an apparent contravention of official policy, as detailed already.  On 
the night of 11/12 June 1938, Wingate personally led a raid, consisting of three Squads, on the village 
of Jurdieh, on the Palestine-Lebanon border; not only was he unequivocal that his aim was to 
„destroy‟ a gang reported to sleep there, but he took the raiding force through Lebanon to hit it from 
the rear; two insurgents were killed, and Sykes reported that the Arab headman at Jurdieh then asked 
his Jewish opposite number, at the settlement of Hanita, for a truce.
118
 From July, SNS activity 
extended to pre-emptive raids on villages suspected of harbouring terrorist gangs, culminating in the 
raid on Dabburiya on the night of 10/11 July, which saw three squads operating in concert to, in the 
words of Wingate‟s official report, „find and destroy‟ the gang, an escalation from „ambush work‟ 
along the pipeline. Ten terrorists were reported killed, four bodies were recovered the following 
morning, and for this action, Wingate received the Distinguished Service Order (DSO).
119
 Given that 
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this would need to be approved by both Evetts and Haining, this suggests that Wingate‟s 
interpretation of „defensive‟ and „protective‟ operations and theirs concurred, and that the Army had 
little objection to using Jewish police on such operations, whatever the policy agreed in London.  
Wingate‟s report on Dabburiya suggested that the escalation to attacking suspected terrorist bases 
was calculated to intimidate; note the final sentence of this passage:
 
 
      The Mukhtars and villagers...represent themselves as unwilling victims of terrorism.  The            
      truth is, as my recent experiences have shown, that in these remote rural areas every fellah is       
      a potential gangster.  So long as he thinks he can escape punishment for complicity this state      
      of affairs will continue....[T]he attack on Government and the Jews is regarded with general       
      approval by Moslem peasants who have, hitherto, experienced little difficulty in persuading         
      the Government of their comparitive [sic] innocence of crimes committed in their vicinity, but,   
      in  reality, by themselves.  I attribute the cessation of sabotage on the pipeline not to any             
      change in this direction, but to the experience that anyone hanging about the line for an               
      unlawful purpose was liable swiftly and silently to vanish away.
120
  
 
      
 
      From a memorandum on the development of the SNS, produced at the same time, Wingate 
argued that the SNS should expand to a strength of over 200 from its existing strength of 90-100, 
with 150 more Jewish police, enlisted for the duration of hostilities, and more British personnel drawn 
from 16th Brigade.
121
    A characteristic trait now emerged, Wingate simply expecting the Army to 
produce whatever resources he demanded, regardless of their actual availability: „I will obtain the 
necessary transport from Jewish sources.  For its use, the Government will pay, on claims presented 
by me.  It will be dirt cheap.‟122 Wingate closed this passage by defending pre-emption: „[S]abotage 
[on the pipeline] ceased purely owing to the offensive, not the defensive measures I have taken.  So 
long as I confined myself to the line sabotage increased [sic]...‟123 Wingate, therefore, identified his 
operations unambiguously as „offensive‟ in official correspondence and was open about the role of 
Jewish supernumeraries in them.   
      Moreover, he had high-level support for this.  Haining‟s lauding of Wingate in his official dispatch 
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to London of 24 August 1938 is quoted at the head of this chapter.  Another admirer was Harris, who 
commented that the best anti-rebel work in Palestine was „done by “special” night squads (very secret) 
composed of a selected officer and up to say thirty mixed volunteer soldiers and sworn in local 
(mostly Jew) toughs‟; Harris felt that such a gendarmerie was „what is really lacking in the internal 
security provisions locally.‟124  In September 1938, Evetts placed an official report arguing that all 
three brigades in northern Palestine should form Night Squads, and stating that he had allowed 
Wingate to forward to Haining a proposed SNS structure for the whole of Palestine.
125
 Jewish 
participation in counter-terrorist operations expanded throughout 1938, in reaction to overstretch 
among British units and the collapse of the Arab police.  14th Brigade, south of 16th Brigade‟s 
operational area, organised night squads of its own, although what role Jewish supernumeraries 
performed, if any, is unclear.
126
  Another combined British-JSP night squad was raised in southern 
Palestine to protect the Palestine Electric Corporation‟s line from Zichron Ya‟akov to Rosh Ha‟ayin, 
another favourite saboteur‟s  target.127    From July, JSP mobile patrols were organised to protect 
sensitive areas; by Spring 1939 there were 62 patrols, and the JSP had exclusive responsibility for 
covering the Haifa-Lydda railway.
128
  On 11 September 1938, MacMichael granted Haining authority 
to attach 200 JSP to Army units on six-month contracts, for internal security duties.
129
  Haining 
praised a later SNS raid in his November dispatch, again not concealing its offensive aim: „Perhaps the 
most dramatic [action] of all was the Night action at KAFR LIDD...where five special Night Squads 
surrounded a gang resting in the village, killing fourteen and capturing two, together with some 
important documents.‟130   The SNS, therefore, far from being the aberration that some of Wingate‟s 
biographers portray, was just one expression of growing Anglo-Jewish military cooperation by late 
1938.
 
  
 
      Indeed, in the autumn of 1938 the SNS graduated to its last and most controversial stage - reprisal 
attacks.  Given the reactive, intelligence-driven nature of these operations, they were often executed 
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rapidly and on Wingate‟s own initiative, and there are indications that participants may frequently 
have let rage triumph over discipline.  The first such action resulted when Chaim Schturman, a veteran 
Zionist, head of the Ein Harod settlement and a friend of Wingate‟s, was killed by a mine in mid 
September.  Within hours, Wingate raided the nearby Arab village of Beit Shean (or Beisan), issuing 
orders to round up all suspected rebels and shoot those trying to escape.
131
   At least two were killed, 
but Sykes claims that accounts of this incident were later exaggerated by the terrorists for propaganda 
purposes; Brenner recalled to Sykes that Wingate suffered pangs of guilt after the Beat Shean incident, 
assembling the SNS and giving a lecture against collective punishment - British army policy at the 
time, and recommended in professional publications.
132
     
      The next large operation, in which all previous elements drew together, was launched in reaction 
to a major terrorist atrocity at Tiberias on 2 October 1938.  A large gang entered Tiberias and 
murdered nineteen Jews, eleven of them children in a nursery who had their throats slit before being 
set alight: the death toll may have been higher had the raiders not given themselves over to drunken 
looting.  The attack was a political disaster for the British, as the battalion garrisoning Tiberias, the 
1st South Staffords, did not intervene, some of its soldiers being trapped in their barracks by Arab 
machine gunners, while others in the town hid until the shooting stopped.
133
   Wingate quickly 
redeployed two squads covering another village and ambushed the gang on its way out of Tiberias, 
killing at least forty, the SNS being the only British unit to engage the Tiberias gang.
134
  On 3 October, 
the SNS caught the remainder of the gang between Dabburiya and Mount Tabor, and in a combined 
attack with the RAF, killed another fourteen.
135
  Fortuitously, the new GOC Middle East, General Sir 
Edmund Ironside, was touring Palestine, and rushed to Tiberias upon hearing of the attack, coming 
across the aftermath of Wingate‟s ambush.  Ironside approved the ambush retrospectively - having 
summarily sacked the CO of the Staffords - and replaced Wavell temporarily as Wingate‟s main 
patron.
136
   Ironside therefore became the third British general to approve Wingate‟s methods, again 
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refuting the popular image of a „maverick‟, at odds with the rest of the Army.    
        
      After Wingate 
By October 1938, Wingate was showing signs of mental and physical exhaustion, and shortly after the 
Tiberias incident, returned to Britain on leave.  In November 1938, the rebellion entered Phase Four, 
seeing the British resume large-scale offensive operations against the rebels while seeking to enforce 
a political solution.  Following the Munich conference, Britain (prematurely) ceased viewing 
Germany and Italy as a threat to her interests in the Middle East, while attempts to resolve the revolt 
peacefully broke down over disagreements over the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate and the 
British Government‟s refusal to negotiate with terrorists.137 The release of units held back for home 
defence allowed the British a more aggressive strategy than in the previous ten months, encouraged 
by the desperate state the guerrillas had reached by this time.  Terrorism turned the rural Arab 
population against them, mainly from weariness at constant village searches, curfews and other 
restrictions, but also by the large criminal element among the guerrillas using the rebellion as cover for 
drug and weapon smuggling and protection rackets, extorting primarily from the very Arab peasants 
they claimed to be„liberating.‟138 By the end of 1938, a new factor had emerged - Arab vigilante gangs, 
attacking the insurgents to extract revenge for previous atrocities.
139
 The rebellion was now 
imploding.           
      Major General Bernard Montgomery assumed command of 8th Division, including 16th Brigade, 
in December 1938.  Montgomery‟s favoured pattern of operations could have been lifted straight 
from Callwell: the British were „definitely at war‟ and any return to civilian control could only follow 
the complete destruction of the gangs in battle.
140
   There was a resumption of cordon and sweep 
operations by mobile columns and greater use than before of night-time raids on village suspected of 
harbouring guerrillas, now involving all units, not just the Night Squads.
141
   Montgomery singled out 
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16th Brigade for particular praise: „Jack Evetts require[s] no urging in this respect!  During the ten 
days ending today we have killed a hundred in my divisional areas...‟142 On 1 January 1939, 
Montgomery reported that the rebel gangs were breaking down into small groups, their activities 
limited to sniping or sabotage.
143
  
      The SNS were active throughout.  In May 1939, 16th Brigade reported that SNS activity meant 
the gangs were no longer operating from villages, and therefore were cut off from their main 
sanctuaries and sources of supply: however, locating them was becoming more difficult; more night 
ambush work was the solution, „A few highly trained night squads and ambush patrols can have 
greater moral and material effect than columns.‟144  Some of this evidently involved the Arab 
vigilantes, a „special platoon‟ of the 2nd Leicesters cooperating with „pro-government‟ Arabs from 
autumn 1939.
145
  Contrary to much of the literature, not only did the SNS survive Wingate‟s 
departure from Palestine, but use of the method expanded.  As the idea of using a „third force‟ 
preceded Wingate‟s arrival, so it continued after his departure. 
      Whatever the benefits of the method, the involvement of Jews in applying it was now a major 
issue, and it was now that Wingate became the political embarrassment his biographers depict. He 
arrived in London just as the Royal Commission, set up by the British government the year before 
under the chairmanship of Sir John Woodhead, aimed at producing a plan for the partition of Palestine 
agreeable to both communities, published its report.
146   
Woodhead recommended a truncated Jewish 
state, minus Galilee and the Negev, with Jerusalem to remain under the Mandate, and a ban on any 
further Jewish immigration. The report was endorsed by the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm 
MacDonald, when introduced to Parliament in November 1938.  Despite the Woodhead Report now, 
effectively, being government policy, Wingate, still a captain, aimed to get the report rejected. His 
main tool was an alternative partition plan, devised by himself, Chaim Weizmann, President of the 
International Zionist Organisation and, later, the first President of Israel, and an old friend of 
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Wingate‟s, and Ben-Gurion, in which the Jews would surrender Galilee and Haifa in return for taking 
full possession of the rest of Palestine from Tel Aviv down to Aqaba: Wingate discussed this with 
Lord Lloyd, the former High Commissioner in Egypt and President of the British Council, with whom 
he lunched with Weizmann and Ben-Gurion on 28 October 1938.
147
    Lloyd agreed to submit the 
plan - a Jewish state completely absorbing Transjordan and differing radically from the Woodhead 
proposals - to „some of his Arab friends‟, and to MacDonald, minus Wingate‟s calls for a Jewish 
army.
148
    Wingate obtained a more sympathetic hearing from the Conservative MP, Zionist, 
anti-appeaser and former minister, Leo Amery, who became a lifelong supporter.  Amery‟s diary 
entry of 4 November 1938 gives an interesting first-hand account of Wingate‟s attitudes at the time: 
 
      He gave me a pitiful story of the feebleness, timidity and actual cowardice of the Palestine          
      administration in the face of Arab terrorism.  Even Haining, who on the whole has backed him,  
      is afraid for political reasons to police the Palestine-Trans-Jordan frontier with anything              
      except the [Transjordan] Frontier Force which is Arab and makes no real attempt to prevent      
      the smuggling of arms.
149
   
 
 
      Perhaps the two most prominent contacts Wingate made in this period were Basil Liddell Hart 
and Winston Churchill.  Liddell Hart was acquainted with Weizmann, Ben-Gurion and Amery, and 
was perhaps aware of the SNS and the nature of its operations already.  Wingate presented Liddell 
Hart with copies of a number of his training papers and reports and on 11 November 1938, Liddell 
Hart produced a letter of introduction to Churchill, in which he described Wingate, ironically, as 
having a „Lawrence-like role‟ in Palestine, but - almost certainly parroting Wingate‟s own views – 
claimed Wingate was „hampered by the hesitation of politicals out there to give permission for the 
expansion of the special force to an adequate role‟; he included copies of Wingate‟s papers „likely to 
interest your military mind.‟150  Wingate seems to have first met Churchill not through this letter, but 
at a party in London on 30 November, providing at first hand his opinion of the current situation in 
Palestine and the operational effectiveness of the SNS.
151
    Burchett saw a link between this meeting 
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and Churchill arguing, during the debate on the Woodhead Report, that he had it on „high military 
authority‟ that the Jews could handle the revolt themselves if they were allowed to raise their own 
armed forces.
152
 Wingate subsequently obtained a private meeting with MacDonald, although a 
record of their conversation has not survived.
153
   
      Therefore, not only was a British Army officer, of relatively junior rank, leading Jewish units in 
offensive operations in a majority Arab area, contravening policy agreed between the Army, the High 
Commissioner and the Colonial Office, but he provided documentary evidence of this to Liddell Hart 
and Churchill, two of the most garrulous individuals in British public life, in addition to approaching 
the Secretary of State and members of both Houses of Parliament, in an unsubtle attempt to pressure 
British Government policy.  It is probably because of this, not because of any innate hostility to 
Wingate‟s military ideas, that the attitude of Wingate‟s military superiors, particularly Haining - who 
had sanctioned the creation of the SNS, praised Wingate in official communications, approved his 
DSO and apparently turned a blind eye to the discrepancies between SNS activity and agreed 
policy - changed.  In December, Wingate was ordered back to Jerusalem and reassigned to GHQ; he 
was not to lead the SNS, or any other Jewish unit, again, and was subsequently banned from entering 
Palestine whether on duty or on leave.
154
 It was also during this period that one of the most-cited 
incidents of Wingate‟s career took place.  Wingate‟s annual Confidential Report for 1938, authored 
jointly by his immediate superior, Wing Commander Alan Ritchie, head of military intelligence in 
Palestine, and by Haining, praised Wingate‟s imagination and energy, but both commented, in 
uncompromising terms, that Wingate‟s attachment to the Jewish cause was affecting his judgement 
and his effectiveness as an officer.
155 
 Wingate‟s response was to exercise the right of any officer, to 
appeal to the King over an adverse personal report, although he was persuaded to drop the matter 
before the matter got to Buckingham Palace.
156 
 It is apparent, then, that Wingate‟s fall from favour 
coincided with his return to London and his attempts, as a captain in the British Army, to influence 
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British government policy on behalf of the Zionists.    
      This coincided with an apparently terminal breakdown in Anglo-Jewish relations.  Upon returning 
to Palestine, Wingate entered into another controversy.  It is noteworthy that, while the Night Squad 
method continued in favour, there was evidently a growing lack of enthusiasm among the British high 
command for Jewish involvement.  On 23 January 1939, an 8
th
 Division Intelligence Conference 
published a report stating its opposition to „the dressing up of Jews as British soldiers; in particular it 
is considered undesirable to have a proportion of Jews in SNS detachments; these should be entirely 
British‟ because „if it is desired to conciliate the Arab, we should not provoke him by using Jews in 
offensive action against him‟.157 This was a restatement of agreed policy, whatever the abrasive 
language.  Wingate‟s response was to send a lengthy written complaint to Montgomery, who not only 
supported his view, but promised to recommend Jewish squadsmen for decorations.
158
   However, 
this took place against the background of a downward slide in Anglo-Jewish relations, accelerated by 
the publication in May 1939 of the MacDonald White Paper, which took the recommendations of the 
Woodhead Report a stage further: there would be no Jewish state, Jewish immigration was to cease 
after five years, and a majority Arab- Palestinian state was to be created after ten years.    The White 
Paper‟s publication was followed by a 24-hour general strike by Jewish workers on 18 May 1939 and 
violent demonstrations in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, during which a British policeman was shot dead 
by a sniper; from July to September „armed Jews both in parties and as individuals‟ carried out 
sabotage attacks on both urban and rural areas and „bodies of armed Jews entered Arab villages and 
demolished Arab houses in retaliation for outrages.‟159  As the Jews were now viewed as a greater 
threat to order than the Arabs, a change in British policy was precipitated.  In his last dispatch as GOC, 
of July 1939, Haining commented that the White Paper had „damped the flames‟ of the Arab rebellion, 
but was turning the Jews against the British, as demonstrated by Jewish rioting and an increase in 
bombings by the Jewish terrorist organisation Irgun Zvai Leumi, the military arm of the Zionist 
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Revisionist movement, which argued that peaceful co-existence between Jews and Arabs was not 
then possible.
160
 The relationship between the Army and the Haganah, on which the SNS had hinged, 
ended as the Army began to treat Haganah and Irgun as they had previously treated Arab terrorists. 
 In his first dispatch of August 1939, Haining‟s successor, Lieutenant General Sir Evelyn Barker, 
reported that 43 Jews had been arrested for „illegal drilling‟, another 38 had been tried and sentenced 
to lengthy prison terms, and that, in his view, many Jews were clearly preparing for „armed 
intervention‟.161  This, and Haining‟s shifting attitude to arming the Jews, suggests an attitude among 
many in the British political-military establishment that the Jews should be supported for as long as 
doing so served British interests in the region or at least did not threaten them, which allowed Jews 
and British to work together for mutual benefit against a common threat.  However, should the Jews 
become a threat to British interests, they should be dealt with as „severely‟ as the Arabs before them. 
It only was at this late stage, from late 1938 onwards, that Wingate‟s views and those of the rest of 
the Army can be identified as „parting company.‟   
       
      Conclusions  
Militarily, Wingate‟s ideas worked.  Evidence for this includes the reduction of attacks on the 
pipeline - and their resumption after Wingate left - the satisfactory impact of the Jurdieh and 
Dabburiya raids and the dislocation of the gangs from their village bases reported not only by Wingate 
but by HQ 16th Brigade a year later.
162
  Indeed, they may have been too successful, being possibly a 
factor in shifting the impetus of the terrorist offensive southwards to Judea in autumn 1938 - when 
few other British units were engaged in offensive operations in Galilee.
163
 These operations can be 
viewed as furthering a tradition in British „small wars‟ practice beginning with units such as the 
Gurkha Scouts of the Northwest Frontier.  Moreover, it was to continue after 1945, as the use of 
specialist forces and „government gangs‟ has become standard counter-insurgent practice in several 
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armies, not least the British.  Units formed by Wingate‟s protégés, Bernard Fergusson in Palestine in 
1946-47 and Michael Calvert in Malaya in 1950-51, Frank Kitson‟s „counter-gangs‟ in Kenya in the 
1950s, and the Omani Firquat of the 1960s and 70s had much in common with the SNS, mixing 
British troops with local irregulars, operating from bases inside insurgent territory and using the 
insurgents‟ own operational and tactical methods against them; the British Army has institutionalized 
this via 22 Regiment, SAS, re-founded by Calvert in Malaya, whose soldiers have often had a role 
analogous to that of the British troops in the SNS.
164  
 It would be extravagant to attribute all this to 
Wingate‟s influence, but he can be seen as fitting comfortably into a „tradition‟ in the British Army‟s 
approach to counter-insurgency. 
      Friction between Wingate and his peers in Palestine arose from his involvement in the Mandate‟s 
politics.  The Wingate of the biographies was truculently Zionist almost upon arrival, the authors 
claiming this guaranteed the enmity of his colleagues and superiors, who, except Wavell, only backed 
him under duress.  However, viewing Wingate‟s actions within their historical and institutional 
context reveals a complex, evolving relationship, in which Wingate initially had the unforced support 
and protection of British senior commanders, but lost it gradually due to his becoming a political 
liability.  This liability status extends beyond that of a decorated serving officer publicly opposing 
government policy: that Wingate apparently had permission from Haining to carry out offensive 
operations involving Jewish police, in a disputed region, is a matter of official record; so is the policy 
agreed between the War Office, the Colonial Office, the GOC and the High Commissioner, that 
Jewish police or militia would not be used for offensive operations in majority Arab areas.  There is 
a clear contradiction between Government and Army policy here. When and if this became known, 
as likely when Wingate contacted Lloyd, MacDonald, Amery, Liddell Hart or Churchill, it had the 
potential to cause an almighty public scandal endangering Britain‟s status as the Mandatory power, 
and inflaming Arab opinion across the entire Middle East.   
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      It is here that a key point of departure between Wingate‟s ideas and the rest of the Army emerges. 
While many British officers advocated arming the Jews, and praised them as soldiers, at no point, 
anywhere in official correspondence and reports in the public domain, is this linked to fulfilling Jewish 
political objectives at the expense of Arab.  Indeed, Wingate‟s operations with the SNS seem to have 
stemmed from an institutional culture placing operational and tactical imperatives ahead of political 
ones and so contradicting the holistic approach of later editions of FSR.  The Army‟s aim throughout 
was the defeat of insurrection against British authority through military means, in which political 
niceties seem to have been forgotten or disregarded.  Belief that the British Army was anti-Semitic, 
rather than realist, seems to have arisen from Wingate‟s interpretation of British policy.  Not for the 
last time in its history, the British Army was caught between two uncompromising ethno-religious 
nationalisms, each regarding any attempt at even-handedness, conciliation or compromise as betrayal. 
Throughout 1936-39, for instance, the British Government faced repeated accusations from Zionist 
lobbies in Britain and the USA of pro-Arab bias and not doing enough against the insurgents.
165
   This 
was almost certainly intended to pressure the Colonial Office in directions it would rather not go, and 
seems not to have reflected the Army‟s apparently sincere attempts at even-handedness.  For instance, 
Haining‟s decision to reform the Palestine Police was affected, in part, by the „Tendency to 
"pro-Arab" bias on the part of [the] British superior cadre instead of being wholly impartial. [Italics 
Mine]‟166    Moreover, the Army seems to have been prepared to give the Jews the benefit of the doubt, 
attributing most of the post-1938 trouble to recently-arrived young sophisticates, Haining, for 
instance, expressing to MacDonald, in August 1939, a belief that recent Jewish immigrants, „brought 
up in the tradition of Russian Nihilism‟ were responsible for much of the Jewish violence.167    
Ben-Gurion commented that the British Army „did not always support the pro-Arab leanings of the 
Administration and knew the difference between the Arab gangs and the Hagana [sic].‟168    Moreover, 
others joined Wingate in his suspicion of the „politicals‟ in the Colonial Office.  In January 1939, 
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Major General Richard O‟Connor, commanding a division in southern Palestine, wrote to Edward 
Keith-Roach, District Commissioner for Jerusalem, castigating him for perceived over-familiarity 
with the Mufti: „The Husseinis have openly declared war on the British regime; they instigate 
assassination, arson and every sort of disloyalty; whilst I find on all sides, the inclination to act at their 
dictation and to find excuses for their conduct.‟169  
      It could be concluded, therefore, that the Army‟s attitude in Palestine was one of pragmatism, 
prioritisation of restoring order over political imperatives, and of apparent impartiality between the 
two communities, as demonstrated by their willingness to use both Jews and law-abiding Arabs as 
military assets while taking a tough line against terrorists of both ethnicities.  In taking the part of one 
of those communities while demonising the other, Wingate departed from this and, indeed, could be 
presented as the antithesis to Arabists such as Keith-Roach.  This belief was communicated to Liddell 
Hart and Amery, and possibly to Burchett and Mosley, all of whom apparently accepted Wingate‟s 
view unquestioningly (and Burchett‟s imposing his own agenda cannot be discounted), as have 
subsequent biographers.  Where Wingate did part company with prevailing military opinion, it was in 
intensity, rather than direction, and his personality and politics made him more of a „maverick‟, at this 
stage, than his military ideas, which conformed to established British practice in counter-insurgency 
and British strategy in Palestine.  Yet, even his politics did not damage his career prospects, as the 
next chapter will demonstrate.  
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                                                                 CHAPTER FIVE  
 
                                                   WINGATE IN ETHIOPIA, 1940-1941 
 
This brilliant action….as a feat of arms carried out by a minute regular force supporting 
irregulars in very difficult country against an enemy greatly superior in numbers and 
armament can have few parallels. 
- Lieutenant General Sir Harry Wetherall‟s Dispatch on operations in western Ethiopia, 19411 
 
Wingate took me round various offices at Headquarters.  As he shambled from one to another, 
in his creased, ill-fitting uniform and out-of-date Wolseley helmet, carrying an alarm clock 
instead of wearing a watch, and a fly-whisk instead of a cane, I could sense the irritation and 
resentment he left in his wake.  His behaviour certainly exasperated [General Sir William] 
Platt, who anyway had little sympathy with irregular operations.  I once heard Platt 
remark…‘The curse of this war is Lawrence in the last’   
        - Sir Wilfred Thesiger
2 
 
 
      Introduction 
 
This chapter examines Wingate‟s role in East Africa in 1940-41, where he organised and commanded 
guerrilla operations in the Gojjam region of Italian-occupied Ethiopia.  These operations have 
contributed significantly to the apocrypha about Wingate.  The most persistent story is that Wingate 
„restored‟ the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, to his rightful throne by coup de main, under the 
noses of the British Government and Army, who planned to turn Ethiopia into a British protectorate. 
This is taken for granted in Ethiopia
3
 but has also entered the literature, predictably, via Mosley
4
 and 
Rooney, who, in a paper given to the British Commission for Military History in 1997, stated 
explicitly that: 
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      At the end of the campaign in June 1941, to the chagrin of Platt‟s two divisions advancing          
      from the north, and Cunningham‟s three divisions coming up from their base in northern             
      Kenya, Wingate stole the limelight and personally escorted the Emperor Haile Selassie into         
      his capital, Addis Ababa.
5
  
 
 
      Rooney also saw in Wingate‟s Gideon Force the direct ancestor of the Chindits: 
 
 
      [Wingate‟s] acute observation both of his own forces and the enemy enabled him to build up      
      a body of ideas which came to fruition in plans for the Chindits.  To keep in touch with his          
      columns Wingate established effective wireless communication, and this was the key to all          
      future Chindit operations.
6
  
 
 
      Rossetto also presented Wingate‟s ideas on guerrilla operations as completely original, a new 
form of warfare, based on Liddell Hart‟s „indirect approach‟.7   A study of contemporary documents 
and testimony - including Wingate‟s own papers - suggests that these views may require some 
revision.  Creating and training purpose-designed British Army units to operate in enemy-occupied 
territory in cooperation with local partisans had been the remit of the Military Intelligence (Research) 
[MI(R)] branch of the War Office at least since 1939, and Wingate‟s Gojjam operation was one of 
several initiated in 1940 not by Wingate, but by MI(R)‟s Middle Eastern sub-branch, G(R).  MI(R) 
formed an integral part of British strategy, post-Dunkirk, wherein the perceived impossibility of 
defeating German regular forces in battle, at least in the short term, led the British toward a more 
Fabian strategy, born of necessity, based on blockade, long-range aerial bombing, subversion by 
bodies such as MI(R) and, later, SOE, and operations by various types of special force.  Wingate‟s 
operations in Ethiopia should therefore be placed in the context of this strategy and his ideas, 
presented before, during and after the Gojjam campaign, should be compared with MI(R)/G(R) 
doctrine - and the term is appropriate here - as devised largely by Colonel (later Major General) Colin 
Gubbins, later Director SOE.  It emerges that Wingate inherited an existing operation applying 
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Gubbins‟ recommended operational procedures faithfully, and produced subsequently a set of 
operational procedures of his own derived partially from Gubbins‟ and partially from his own 
experiences in Palestine and Ethiopia.  Perhaps the biggest difference was that Wingate insisted, 
increasingly, on concentration of force and resources, rather than the dispersal and economy of effort 
that was the hallmark of other MI(R) operations.  Wingate‟s methods moved away from subversion 
and partisan warfare - about which he seems never to have been enthusiastic - towards use of 
purpose-designed regular forces, menacing the enemy‟s lines of communication, with occasional 
support from local irregulars.
8
    This evolved into the model presented in Wingate‟s post-Ethiopia 
papers, which introduce another key theme of his military thought: „attacking the enemy‟s plan‟, 
disrupting their preparation for their main effort via establishing a constant, nagging threat to their 
points of critical vulnerability, distracting their attention, forcing them to disperse their forces, and 
creating a situation friendly forces could exploit.
9
   Wingate‟s Ethiopia operations therefore develop 
old themes and introduce new ones.  
 
      British Strategy, 1940-41, and the development of special and raiding forces   
Chiefs of Staff meetings throughout May and June 1940, facing the imminent expulsion of British 
ground forces from France, dwelt regularly on economic warfare, bombing and the „spread of revolt‟ 
as the main means of maintaining hostilities.  Indeed, By 25 May, with the British Expeditionary Force 
pocketed around Dunkirk, they had become „the only way‟ to do this.10  On 7 June, the Director of 
Military Operations, Major General Sir John Kennedy, speaking from a brief prepared by MI(R) 
proposed to the Chiefs of Staff that: 
 
      We are certainly not going to win the war by offensives in mass and the only way of success       
      is by undermining Germany internally and by action in the occupied territories.  German              
      aggression has in fact presented us with an opportunity never before equaled in history for          
      bringing down a great aggressive power by irregular operations, propaganda and subversion      
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      enlarging into rebel activities...Seen in this light, the war may be regarded as an                           
      inter-connected series of wars of independence....It must be recognised as a principal that not     
      only are these activities part of the grand strategy of the war, [but] probably the only hope of      
      winning the war...
11
    
 
 
      It was assumed, during and after the German invasions of France and the Low Countries, that 
covert operations were a cornerstone of Axis strategy.  Detachments of the Brandenburg special 
operations units of the Abwehr, German military intelligence, often wearing civilian clothing or Dutch 
and Belgian uniforms, had carried out deep reconnaissance and seized bridges ahead of advancing 
Panzer columns, and this may have been the inspiration for widespread rumours of „Fifth Columns‟ 
of  traitors operating in Allied countries.
12
  MI(R) made much of reports that Germany was organising 
a worldwide network of „Fifth Columns‟ and it was taken for granted in official circles that sabotage 
and subversion by traitors would feature prominently in any German invasion of England.
13 
        Ironside, now Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, ordered the creation of „Ironside Units‟ to 
counter this threat, thereby providing an opportunity for Wingate.  Upon his final return from 
Palestine in 1939, Wingate was promoted major and assigned as adjutant of 56th Light Anti-Aircraft 
Brigade, a Territorial Army formation forming part of the air defence of the Kent coast.  On 1 June 
1940, Wingate contacted Ironside suggesting he could form a SNS-type unit from the brigade to 
counter „Fifth Column‟ activity in England.   Ironside asked Wingate to present a formal proposal to 
General Huddleston, now GOC Northern Ireland, who, according to Wingate, „was delighted by the 
proposed force and said it was exactly what was needed to curb activities disloyal elements and 
encourage loyal elements [sic]‟   By 6 June, Wingate had 150 volunteer soldiers and ten officers from 
56th Brigade.   However, when he reported to GHQ Home Forces the same day, in discussions with 
Major General Bernard Paget, Ironside‟s Chief of Staff, it apparently emerged that Haining, now the 
Deputy CIGS, „had strong personal objections‟ to Wingate.  Wingate met a different reception at the 
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War Office the same day, no objections being raised other than that the deployment of his unit in 
Northern Ireland might provoke the IRA. Moreover, Ironside told Wingate he intended to deploy his 
force, once it was ready, telling him to report to General Sir Ronald Adam, GOC Northern Command; 
Ironside and Adam were both keen to deploy Wingate‟s proposed unit to deal with a rumoured „Fifth 
Column‟ in Lincolnshire, and when Wingate met with Adam‟s staff, he was instructed to produce the 
unit.   Upon returning to GHQ Home Forces to expedite its assembly, he discovered he had to submit 
details of its establishment to the War Office for approval; having done so, he learned the War Office 
„might or might not approve after an indefinite period for consideration‟, and there the matter rested 
until the threat of invasion receded in August.
14
 Far from his being a pariah, some senior officers were 
prepared to give Wingate‟s ideas a hearing and to find work which fit his talents.  Moreover, 
Ironside‟s support provides further evidence for Wingate‟s ability to cultivate powerful benefactors, 
allowing him to circumvent normal military chains of command and which was also to have 
considerable bearing upon his career, as will be demonstrated shortly. 
      More important, however, for Wingate‟s development was the strategy Britain adopted from the 
summer of 1940 through to early 1942, which made extensive use of special units and organisations 
to wage „unconventional‟ warfare.  Among the few who speculate on why Britain formed so many 
such units in 1939-45, General Sir John Hackett saw them as arising from the British tradition of 
„adventurous individualism‟ blending with new technology, the aeroplane and wireless in particular, 
and the realisation of the vulnerability of modern armies to threats to their communications (themes 
Wingate took up later).
15
 Among historians, John Keegan sees a key factor as being Winston 
Churchill‟s military romanticism, and apparent denial that wars of his day were decided by mass 
attrition rather than by acts of  daring by small bands of heroes.
16
 Indeed, as early as 1917, Churchill, 
then a backbench MP, had drafted a paper calling for the development of specialist sea-landing forces 
to capture islands off the German coast by coup de main, and Churchill was to be Wingate‟s most 
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powerful and enthusiastic patron.
17
 If placed in its historical and strategic context, however, the early 
development of such forces seems more prosaic: they were one of the few means of Britain 
maintaining hostilities, post-Dunkirk.  In June 1940, Churchill, now Prime Minister and Minister for 
Defence, ordered that offensive operations should be carried out against the coast of occupied 
Europe, and the task of commanding these raiding operations - the objective being „to mystify the 
enemy and cause him to disperse his forces‟ - was assigned to Lieutenant General AGB Bourne of the 
Royal Marines, with Evetts attached to his staff as Director, Raiding Operations.
18
   Unfortunately, 
assets for  such „harassing‟ operations were minimal, consisting of the six Independent Companies 
formed by MI(R) and MI(R)‟s Training Centre at Inverailort (see below); four more Independent 
Companies were in training for „minor [amphibious] raids‟ by the end of July, but it was recognised 
by the War Cabinet that the lack of equipment, particularly landing craft, would limit them to 
small-scale raids for the foreseeable future.
19
 Bourne was also promised elements from Britain‟s 
fledgling airborne forces, Churchill, having observed the impact of German Fallschirmjägern in the 
Low Countries, ordering the creation of a „Parachute Corps‟ of 5,000 men in response.20  
Contemporary documents indicate this was envisioned initially as a raiding force, destroying vital 
objectives and drawing off large Axis formations or carrying out minor harassing operations including 
sabotage, intelligence gathering or cooperation with resistance movements, all roles Wingate would 
assign to his LRP forces in Ethiopia and Burma.
21
   At Churchill‟s urging, specialist equipment for 
raiding and amphibious operations were developed rapidly – the first Landing Craft, Tank, was being 
tested by October 1940 – and by the end of 1940, a new command, Combined Operations Command, 
under Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, was overseeing the development of amphibious and raiding 
operations.
22  
In March 1942, Keyes was succeeded as Director, Combined Operations by 
Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten, who was to be another Wingate patron.       
      The development of these forces was accelerated by the strategy set at Chiefs of Staff meetings 
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from August to November 1940, which was based on the assumption that defeating the Wehrmacht 
directly was not currently feasible, but that Germany‟s rapid expansion left her open to attacks on her 
oil and heavy industry, disrupting which would create „unemployment, critical shortages...and general 
economic disorganisation.‟23   Consequently, Britain should tighten her economic blockade on 
Europe, combine it with a RAF bomber offensive against German industry and use diplomacy to keep 
potential German allies neutral.
24
  Moreover, every effort should be made to encourage resistance in 
Axis-occupied territory, leading to an expanded role for MI(R), previously an obscure branch of the 
War Office.
25
             
   
      MI(R), G(R) and covert operations in 1939-40 
 
Perhaps one reason why the relationship between Wingate and MI(R) has not been investigated is that 
the history of MI(R) itself remains unwritten – the historians of SOE, William Mackenzie, MRD Foot 
and Mark Seaman, all discussed MI(R) summarily and in terms of its input into SOE, for instance.
26
 
However, from 1939 through to its absorption into SOE in 1940, MI(R) played the leading part in 
devising British policy towards „Para-Military Activities‟, which it encapsulated as: 
 
      [A]ll the new features of war involved in the modern German conception of war as total and      
      continuous.  It therefore comprises activities both in peace and war which may be summarised    
       as follows:- 
       a) In Peace 
       Organisation of the civil populace for war....Propaganda...as an attack on                                   
       psychology....Political and intelligence activities in other countries, including the                         
       infiltration of personnel and creation of potentially treasonable organisations.  
        b) In War 
       The above activities, coupled with overt acts of violence against the  enemy in the form of         
       sabotage, etc., other than those carried on by the regular forces of the State, operating               
       regularly - together with irregular operations of regular forces.
27
        
 
         
 
      In September 1939, three separate organisations were tasked with this: Section D of the Secret 
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Intelligence Service, which oversaw sabotage, subversion and misinformation via individual agents, 
Electra House, the Foreign Office department handling propaganda, and MI(R) in the War Office.   
MI(R) developed from GS(R), the research section of the Directorate of Military Operations and 
Intelligence of the War Office, formed in 1938 with a bland remit: „Research into problems of tactics 
and organisation under the direction of the DCIGS.‟28   In March 1939, Section D and GS(R) 
presented a joint paper to the Chiefs of Staff arguing that the German seizure of Czechoslovakia and 
designs on the Balkans had opened up the possibility of „an alternative method of defence...to 
organised armed resistance...based on the experience we have had in India, Irak [sic], Ireland and 
Russia, i.e. the development of a combination of guerilla and IRA tactics.‟29  In April 1939, MI(R) 
was tasked with putting this into action, instructed by the CIGS, General Lord Gort, to study guerrilla 
methods with a view to producing a „guerilla FSR incorporating detailed tactical and technical 
instructions, applying to each of several countries‟ including assessing their vulnerability to such 
activity.
30
  Lieutenant Colonel JCF Holland, head of GS(R) since 1938, co-author of the April 1939 
paper, and an enthusiast for guerrilla warfare since fighting the IRA in 1919-1922, presented his 
report in June.
31
  This was based on a reading list including Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Edgar Snow‟s 
Red Star Over China, the memoirs of General von Lettow-Vorbeck, studies of the Francs-Tireurs in 
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and the Arab rebellion in Palestine.
32
  Holland stated that: 
 
      [I]f guerrilla warfare is coordinated and also related to main operations, it should, in                    
      favourable circumstances, cause such a diversion of enemy strength as eventually to present       
      decisive opportunities to the main forces of his opponent [sic]. It is therefore an auxiliary            
      method of war of which we have not yet sufficiently exploited the possibilities.
33
       
 
      Holland considered guerrilla activity to be the only viable means of supporting Britain‟s Allies in 
central Europe and had already established Missions at British Embassies in Eastern Europe to gather 
information on potential subversives and the suitability of the country for guerrilla operations and 
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recommended the creation of teams of guerrilla and sabotage specialists to support them.
34
   After this, 
MI(R)‟s role expanded to „Research and preparation of projects for irregular operations as a 
contribution to normally conducted operations [and] Operation of such projects when they are not the 
function of any [other] organisation or HQ‟35  This was the definition to which Wingate worked from 
Ethiopia to the early stages in his operations in Burma. 
      MI(R) had also produced its „guerilla FSR‟, a series of pamphlets by Lieutenant Colonel Colin 
Gubbins, an old friend of Holland and fellow veteran of the Irish „troubles‟, assigned to MI(R) at 
Holland‟s request.36 These, and Holland‟s subsequent strategic recommendations, constituted an 
identifiable doctrine in that subsequent MI(R) operations - including in Ethiopia - can be seen as based 
upon Gubbins‟ pamphlets. MI(R)/G(R) also brought a number of individuals who were to serve with 
Wingate into the special operations world, including Michael Calvert and Peter Fleming, and Simon 
Fraser, Earl of Lovat, who became Chief Instructor at MI(R)‟s training centre at Inverailort and who 
Wingate tried to recruit in 1944.
37
    MI(R) had also established a sub-branch, G(R), at GHQ Middle 
East in Cairo, and in October 1940, instructors from Inverailort were sent to establish schools in 
Australia and Burma, the Burma school still being in place, under Calvert‟s command, when Wingate 
arrived in 1942 and some of its instructors going on to command Chindit columns.
38
    
      MI(R) doctrine accepted that to meet British strategic ends, guerrilla activity should be fostered 
pro-actively and perhaps initially even against the wishes of the majority of the target population.
39
 
Consequently, Gubbins‟ key pamphlet, The Art of Guerilla Warfare, was based throughout on the 
scenario of resistance against occupying forces, in cooperation with the forces of external Allies as 
part of an international conflict.  Gubbins‟ summary of the aims of guerrilla activity, from The Art of 
Guerilla Warfare outlined that: 
 
      The object of guerilla warfare is to harass the enemy in every way possible within all the             
      territory he holds to such an extent that he is eventually incapable either of embarking on a war, 
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      or of continuing one that way already have commenced.... This object is achieved by                   
      compelling the enemy to disperse his forces in order to guard his flanks, his                                 
      communications, his supply detachments, etc., against the attacks of  guerillas, and thus so to     
      weaken his main armies that the conduct of a campaign becomes impossible...The whole art       
      of guerilla warfare lies in striking the enemy where he least expects it, and yet where he is           
      most vulnerable: this will produce the greatest effect in inducing, and even                                   
      compelling, him to use up large numbers of troops in guarding against such blows.
40
         
 
 
 
     This should begin with sabotage by individuals or small groups, escalating via „The action of larger 
groups working as a band under a nominated leader, and employing military tactics, weapons, etc., to 
assist in the achievement of their object, which is usually of a destructive nature‟ to „the culminating 
stage of guerilla warfare...large formations of guerillas, well-armed and well-trained, which are able 
to take a direct part in the fighting by attacks on suitable hostile formations and objects in direct 
conjunction with the operations of the regular troops.‟41 A concept Gubbins may have derived from 
Lawrence, and which played an important part in Wingate‟s thinking from 1941, was superior relative 
mobility in the operational environment concerned, which, combined with superior intelligence, 
would allow the setting of a tempo with which a more formally organised and commanded enemy 
could not cope. From the Art of Guerilla Warfare: 
 
      It is mobility, in information and in morale that the guerillas can secure the advantage, and          
      those factors are the means by which the enemy‟s superior armament and numbers can best be   
      combatted.  The superior mobility, however, is not absolute, but relative - i.e. to the type of        
      country in which the activities are staged, to the detailed knowledge of that country by the          
      guerillas, etc.  In absolute mobility, the enemy must always have the advantage - i.e. the use        
      of railway systems, the possession of large numbers of motors, lorries, armoured cars, tanks,      
      etc...By the judicious selection of ground, however, and by moves in darkness to secure              
      surprise, the guerillas can enjoy relatively superior mobility for the period necessary for each      
      operation.  The enemy will usually be in a country where the population is largely hostile, so      
      that the people will actively co-operate in providing information for the guerillas and                   
      withholding it from the enemy.  The proper encouragement of this natural situation...will            
      ensure that the guerillas are kept au fait with the enemy‟s movements and intentions,                  
      whereas their own are hidden from him.  [Emphasis Gubbins‟] 42 
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      Above all, Gubbins argued, guerrilla action hinged upon leadership: „The central authority must, 
and perforce will be, some man of prestige or weight who has been a leading personality in the 
territory in time of peace...Leaders of local partisan bands will be selected from those of standing or 
mark in the locality who possess the necessary attributes of personality.‟43    However, British officers 
should be attached, „either to serve directly as commanders, more particularly in the higher spheres, 
or as specially qualified staff officers or assistants to guerilla commanders.‟44    The larger the 
movement, „the greater the need for a leaven of regular officers to carry out the basic work of simple 
staff duties, and to effect liaison with the regular forces‟, an arrangement becoming more formal as the 
movement progressed: 
 
     In cases where the guerillas are a nation in arms, or part thereof, fighting for their freedom in       
     alliance with or assisted and instigated by a third power which is willing and anxious to render     
     all assistance to them, it will usually be advisable for that third power to be represented by a         
     mission at the headquarters of the guerilla movement.  The duties of such a mission                      
     would be to provide expert advice, to ensure liaison, to arrange the supply of arms,                      
     ammunition, money, etc., and to provide leaders and assistants to leaders, if such were found       
     to be necessary.
45
   
 
 
 
      The Mission would, in most cases, come to resemble a „guerrilla GHQ‟, its remit including 
identifying likely partisan leaders, providing them with weapons, ammunition, explosives and 
wirelesses, liaison with outside regular forces and devising an overall plan of campaign; at later stages, 
it would provide technical experts and trained staff officers to coordinate the guerrilla bands and 
provide them with a degree of regular organisation; Gubbins implied, but never stated, that another 
function was to ensure that guerrilla action could be directed to British strategic ends.
46
     
      Summer 1940 also saw MI(R) contemplate the use of specially organised regular units to operate 
behind enemy lines either alone or in cooperation with partisans.  This is pertinent to Wingate in 
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identifying a set of military procedures that the previous Wingate literature has either ignored or 
missed completely: specifically, the use of specialist light infantry, supplied by airdrop and using close 
air support in lieu of artillery, to establish a permanent presence in the enemy rear, was discussed by 
MI(R) almost three years before Wingate raised such units in Burma.  On 7 June 1940, MI(R) finished 
its „Appreciation of the Capabilities and Composition of a small force operating behind the enemy 
lines in the offensive‟, to „disrupt enemy L of C, destroy dumps and disorganise HQ‟, its methods 
being „to travel fast...avoid organised opposition as much as practicable, except at the objective [and] 
to attack the weak points in the enemy‟s organisation, make the sites untenable as long as possible and 
then, in most cases, depart.‟47  This would be in support of main forces: 
 
      [I]t would appear essential that this force should act in conjunction with an attack by the main    
      regular formations.  In such circumstances, there would be fewer men to spare for sentries,         
      fewer troops available for pursuit so that the effect of an interruption of L of C might be more    
      effectual, if not decisive.  To act before such an offensive might serve to wear down the              
      enemy and to keep more of his forces on L of C but would make surprise less attainable.
48
   
 
 
 
      The force must travel light, its supplies carried by mules, camels or coolies, to maximise mobility, 
and any heavy equipment required would be flown in or airdropped.
49
   The main fire support should 
come from the air: „After a short aerial bombardment and before the enemy had time to emerge from 
their shelters, the operating force should drive home their attack.  This calls for careful organisation 
and a high standard of co-operation and combined training, as well as good communications.‟50 In a 
late paper, from August 1940, Holland predicted that the strategic overstretch of Germany and Italy 
meant that „irregular tactics‟ would become normal for the British Army, foreseeing the use of 
helicopter-borne spearhead forces to seize landing-grounds with reinforcements arriving on short 
takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft, with most supplies delivered by air.
51 
 Helicopters aside, this 
bears some comparison with Wingate‟s final model of operations as put into practice on the second 
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Chindit operation in 1944.     
      Therefore, many ideas Wingate put into practice in 1941-44 were on paper before the end of 1940, 
and given that Wingate‟s Gojjam campaign was specifically a G(R) operation, and Wingate called for 
an expanded G(R) organisation in Burma upon his arrival there in 1942, it is difficult not to see a 
connection.  However, formally establishing any direct link would be difficult: Wingate was not 
mentioned in any MI(R) documents, except for situation reports from G(R), and, as reiterated 
throughout this thesis, Wingate never credited any source but himself for his ideas.    
      G(R) remained independent after MI(R)‟s absorption into SOE in the summer of 1940: given the 
greater opportunity for cooperation with regular operations in the Middle East, both Holland and 
Wavell, now Commander in Chief, Middle East, felt that G(R)‟s activities should be controlled by 
Wavell‟s Headquarters, with SOE maintaining a „watching brief‟ and supplying some of its funding.52 
Its personnel remained staff officers at GHQ Middle East, and had been busy, establishing an office 
in Khartoum under Lieutenant Colonel Terence Airey, to oversee operations in Italian East Africa, 
sending Missions to Somaliland - where an Operational Centre (see below) and a large body of local 
partisans were active throughout April and May 1941 -  West Africa and the Belgian Congo, and was 
recruiting Arabic speakers for Missions to the Middle East.
53
    However, from June 1940, its main 
task was escalating revolt in Italian East Africa. 
       
       G(R) and resistance in Ethiopia 
The literature claims almost universally that the British „establishment‟ opposed the incitement of 
resistance in Ethiopia, and that the whole idea would have died without Wingate.  Burchett claimed 
that „Cairo and Khartoum were thick with missions of various kinds, most of them backed by glorified 
camp followers who were looking for concessions and special areas to exploit as soon as [Ethiopia] 
was occupied.‟54 Haile Selassie was ignored by these „international sharks...racketeers and stock 
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market strategists‟ until Wingate arrived and told him to appeal directly to „the people of England, 
America and China‟, after which Churchill „settled the hash of the speculators‟ while Wingate flew the 
Emperor into Ethiopia as a fait accompli, the revolt arising therefrom.
55
  Mosley had Wingate adopt 
the cause of the Emperor as a personal crusade, hand-pick a team of fellow believers - including 
Dodds-Parker and Airey, both of them in actuality serving with G(R) months before Wingate 
arrived - and use Wavell‟s and Churchill‟s authority to remove those in his way; again, according to 
Mosley, the resistance did not begin in earnest until Wingate and the Emperor arrived in Gojjam.
56
 
Sykes was aware of  SOE - although he could not reveal this, as its existence was classified until the 
1960s - but he did mention the „department of the General Headquarters known as G(R)‟, and 
discussed its role in Ethiopia obliquely.
57 
 Both Sykes and Royle emphasised the lack of enthusiasm 
for Haile Selassie and Ethiopia among the British high command, and portrayed the Gojjam campaign 
almost as a „three man band‟, between Wingate, Colonel Daniel Sandford, who will be discussed 
below, and the Emperor.
58
  Even Anthony Mockler, who discussed the activities of the various G(R) 
Missions in detail, implied that Wingate devised the operational doctrine for the Gojjam operation 
himself.
59
    Likewise, Shirreff, in an otherwise meticulous history of the Gojjam revolt, did not 
mention G(R) at all - Dodds-Parker, for instance, was merely a „staff captain at GHQ‟ - and presented 
the thesis that the entire Gojjam operation was originated by Sandford, the „hero‟ of his book.60  
Conversely, MRD Foot presented the operation as a SOE project, even though G(R) were still de 
facto a separate organisation, under the command of GHQ Middle East.
61
     
       Little of this is supported by contemporary documents.  Ethiopian resistance to the Italians was 
chronic from 1936, and Harold Marcus related that from 1937, the Ethiopians had logistical support 
from the French Deuxieme Bureau and, from 1938, training from anti-fascist Italian veterans of the 
International Brigades, courtesy of the Comintern.
62
    Nor, contrary to much of the Wingate literature, 
were the British idle: Electra House accumulated 10,000 rifles and a large treasure chest in Sudan 
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from 1938, and around the same time, Dodds-Parker, then a District Commissioner in Sudan, issued 
several hundred rifles to his friend, the Ethiopian aristocrat, Ras Mesfin, on condition he did not use 
them until Italy declared war on Britain.
63
   In late 1938, Captain Richard Whalley of the SDF 
corresponded with the Foreign Office on the possibility of a „scallywag show‟ in Ethiopia, requesting 
„H.S. ESQ‟ be sent to East Africa with „a prearranged plan with HMG for cooperation during, and 
after, event‟, allowing Whalley to recruit Ethiopian refugees in Kenya, forming them into a guerilla 
unit with which „I shall try to annihilate the Italian company in vicinity Lake Rudolf...capture all arms 
for use further into the country, to arm tribesmen, &c, for the drive of Italians on to SDF‟; a 
concurrent offensive, under the joint command of the explorer and friend of the Emperor, Wilfred 
Thesiger, and the Ethiopian Crown Prince, would threaten Addis Ababa.  If Whalley could be 
supplied with 4,000 rifles, 200,000 rounds of ammunition, 10,000 Maria Theresa dollars (Ethiopian 
currency) and enough wirelesses to coordinate his guerillas, „it would go down to history [sic] as one 
of the greatest routs ever.....‟64 That guerrillas could pin down Italian effort sufficiently enough to 
prevent their army in Italian East Africa being a threat to Sudan or Kenya was to be a common 
argument in the months ahead, Major Mallaby of the War Office commenting to ED 
Cavendish-Bentinck of the Foreign Office on 27 April 1939 that this may be the only feasible way to 
hold Sudan, given the small size of its garrison.
65 
      Yet, when MI(R) inherited this project in mid 1939, it found little enthusiasm from British 
authorities in Khartoum.  Khartoum reported that the Italians had pacified completely southern and 
eastern Ethiopia, and that the only resistance was in the west, the heartland of Ethiopia‟s traditional 
ruling ethnic group, the Amhara: supporting resistance was therefore viewed in Khartoum as not 
worth the effort and likely to provoke an Italian invasion of Sudan.
66
  However, this did not preclude 
contingency planning, and G(R) produced a list of likely operatives for Ethiopia, the most significant 
being Colonel Daniel Sandford and Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Boustead.
67
    Sandford, a retired British 
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officer, had explored in Ethiopia since 1907, farmed there since 1921 and, from January 1935, acted 
as an advisor to Haile Selassie, becoming a close confidant.  Sandford escaped from Ethiopia during 
the invasion of 1935 and from his home in Guildford he then corresponded and visited regularly with 
the Emperor, in exile in Bath, over the next three years.
68
  In September 1939, he was working in 
Wavell‟s intelligence cell in Cairo, from where he was sent to Platt by Wavell „to retain at your 
discretion for work in connection with the ABYSSINIAN project.‟69  Another former Army officer, 
Boustead spent many years in the Sudan Political Service before joining the SDF in 1939.  In October 
1940 he was named specifically in the first MI(R) proposal to penetrate western Ethiopia, a plan to 
take two squadrons of the Sudan Horse up the Nile Valley; however, G(R) then designated him as 
Commanding Officer (CO) of the Frontier Battalion of the SDF, raised specifically to garrison G(R) 
bases on the frontier and inside western Ethiopia, in which capacity Boustead served under 
Wingate.
70
           
      In September 1939, Ironside and Wavell‟s Chief of Staff, Major General Arthur Smith, produced 
a policy for the „conquest of Abyssinia‟ incorporating „Native risings encouraged by Guerilla tactics 
by British columns and by Propaganda‟, in which Sandford evidently had much input.71  These „native 
risings‟, it was emphasised, should not go off at „half-cock‟, part of the caution of the Sudan 
authorities being attributed to fear that a „half-cock‟ operation was exactly what was going to 
happen.
72
    To prevent this, it was recommended that a „Guerilla Commandant‟ should be appointed 
to the staff in Khartoum to oversee a G(R) staff including „several guerilla leaders‟, to ensure the 
rebellion was prepared and timed properly.
73
  As to operations, Ironside suggested that „small camel 
columns should be formed and should live on the country‟, and in southern Ethiopia, „small 
self-contained columns mainly for harassing purposes on the lines of East Africa Campaign of last 
war.‟74    Wavell felt „that there has been a tendency in the past to look on an offensive in Abyssinia 
too much on the "regular operations scale".  He feels - with the CIGS - that operations should be 
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conducted more on the lines of those undertaken by Lawrence of Arabia.‟75 These were to substitute 
for an invasion of Italian East Africa, freeing regular forces for the Mediterranean.  This was the wider 
strategic context for the revolt until the end of 1940, the period covering Wingate‟s arrival and initial 
preparations.
76
   
       From October 1939, Sandford, under Wavell‟s orders, contacted resistance leaders inside 
Ethiopia, and also pressured the authorities to allow Haile Selassie to come to Sudan as soon as 
possible.
77
 Dodds-Parker, recruited into G(R) from the Grenadier Guards in 1940, reconnoitred the 
Sudan-Ethiopia border, assessing the chances of rebellion in border regions, while GHQ Middle East 
ordered the assembly of arsenals near the border and the recruitment of British and Ethiopian 
volunteers for several G(R) Missions which, once Italy declared war, would enter Ethiopia to 
distribute arms, coordinate the rebellion and provide the resistance with technical support, as 
prescribed in Gubbins‟ pamphlets.78 Consequently, when Italy declared war, on 10 June 1940, Wavell 
could issue operational instructions to G(R) that very day.  The intent was to „spread the revolt over 
the whole of ITALIAN EAST AFRICA and so harass the ITALIANS as to make them expend their 
resources on internal security.
‟79
 This would be supported logistically and directed, via the G(R) 
Missions, by the overall British commander in the region concerned – General Sir William Platt, the 
GOC Sudan, in the case of Gojjam - who would also send „Technical Advisors‟ to assist resistance 
leaders.
80
    A secret appendix to the Operational Order went into detail: Missions were to enter 
Ethiopia, thereby: 
 
      a) Giving technical advice to the ABYSSINIAN Rebel Leaders 
      b) Co-ordination of the activities of the various Rebel Leaders 
      c) Acting as a channel for communications between C in C Middle East and the Rebel                
      Leaders for political and administrative purposes.
81
   
 
 
 
      Also conforming to Gubbins‟ prescriptions, each Mission controlled several Report and Advisory 
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Centres (later re-designated Operational Centres), moving forward of the main Mission to: 
 
      a) In an advisory capacity...form a link between the Mission HQ and outlying Rebel Leaders. 
      b) …[P]rovide a link in the supply organisation between the bases and the Rebel bands. 
      c) As representing the Mission to advise the local Rebel Leader.
82 
 
 
 
      This would ensure coordination with British strategy.  The Head of the Mission was designated 
explicitly to control rebel operations in central Ethiopia via controlling their supplies: „To do so, he 
must have the necessary prestige, and this can be most easily acquired if the Rebels learn to regard him 
as the authority through whom they apply for the assistance they require.‟83 Sandford was to 
command Mission 101, the largest, tasked with penetrating the Gojjam plateau, the heartland of the 
Amhara elite, and then believed to be the main centre of resistance.  On 21 June 1940, Platt issued 
operational instructions: Sandford was to „coordinate the actions of the Abyssinians under my [Platt‟s] 
general direction‟; Mission 101 was to be established inside Ethiopia by 1 August 1940, and should 
direct the rebels to prevent the Italians deploying troops away from northwest Ethiopia.
84 
      This received a boost when Haile Selassie, dispatched by the British Foreign Office on Churchill‟s 
orders, arrived in Khartoum on 27 June 1940.  Mission 101 entered Ethiopia on 12 August 1940, 
Sandford deciding already that central and eastern Gojjam should be Mission 101‟s main area of 
operations because it was the most accessible rebel area from Sudan. It was also the best location to 
spread the revolt in the directions ordered by Platt, its central position in western Ethiopia granting 
access to the main roads heading north and south from Addis Ababa, the capital and main 
administrative centre.  Early deployments were successful.  By mid September Sandford had 
established a base at Sakala, in northern Gojjam, and persuaded rival Ethiopian chiefs to begin 
guerrilla attacks against the Italians with gifts of arms and money; Boustead‟s Frontier Battalion had 
established supply dumps on the frontier and was escorting supply convoys to the Mission.  Sandford 
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also informed Platt that the locals were enquiring when Haile Selassie would return, in his view 
essential if the resistance was to be escalated.
85
 He was encouraged greatly by what he saw as the keen 
response to a proclamation from the Emperor spread by Mission 101 and dropped as leaflets all over 
Ethiopia, and recommended that the Emperor should establish a forward headquarters on the natural 
fortress of Mount Belaiya by the end of November 1940.
86
     
      Unfortunately, the parlous state of GHQ Middle East‟s logistics led to the resistance taking a low 
priority.  Haile Selassie saw this as arising from hostility from the „establishment‟ in Cairo and 
Khartoum, communicating this opinion in several telegrams to Churchill.
87
 This was one issue 
addressed by the Ministerial Conference at Khartoum on 28-31 October 1940, at which the Minister 
for War, Anthony Eden, General Jan C Smuts, the South African Prime Minister and member of 
Churchill‟s War Cabinet, Wavell, Platt and General Sir Alan Cunningham, the GOC East Africa, 
formulated policy towards Ethiopia.  Wavell‟s appreciation was that Italian East Africa was cut off 
and running out of supplies, so the resistance should be sufficient to contain them.  Consequently, the 
border posts at Gallabat and Kassala should be retaken, then used as entry points for supplies to the 
resistance.
88
    Platt projected he could retake Gallabat by mid November, and Kassala thereafter, 
provided he received reinforcements, while Cunningham could begin operations against Kismayu, in 
southern Italian East Africa, by January 1941.
89
 The conference also decided upon policy towards the 
Emperor: it was agreed that, while there were doubts about his acceptability to the Amhara nobility 
and other tribal groups, he was still the best available rallying point and should be used as such.
90   
This 
conference, therefore, placed the Emperor at the heart of the resistance, by British government policy 
and military strategy, well before Wingate‟s arrival in East Africa. 
      Of equal interest is the meeting between Eden, Wavell, Platt‟s Chief of Staff, Brigadier Scobie, 
and Majors Brown and Sugden of G(R) on 29 October, at which the hitherto haphazard 
arrangements for the resistance were revealed to a clearly furious Eden. It emerged that just 5,073 out 
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of a promised 10,000 rifles had been issued to the resistance, most of these being ancient, single-shot 
Martini-Henrys, re-chambered to .303 calibre and intended originally for Local Defence Volunteers 
in England; just 735 of the more modern Lee-Enfields were available, and Ethiopians arriving on the 
frontier asking for weapons were being turned away.
91
  There were two responses: the recruitment 
of „free‟ Ethiopian battalions from refugee camps in Kenya and Sudan, which had begun already, 
should be escalated, and, as Haile Selassie had requested British officers to train and command them, 
it was agreed that this should be „examined‟; moreover, as the battalions‟ principal task would be to 
act as the Emperor‟s bodyguard once he entered Ethiopia, they should be trained as regular infantry, 
not guerrillas.
92
    Secondly, and most significantly for this thesis: 
 
      Another request was for an officer representing the British Army to whom, in Colonel                
      Sandford‟s absence, the Emperor could address military questions.  It seemed evident...that        
      what was needed was a senior staff officer to do for the revolt here what Colonel Sandford was 
      doing the other side of the frontier.  At present there was no coordination.  General                     
      Wavell said he would appoint an officer for this purpose.
93
              
  
 
        Conforming with the Operational Order of 10 June, G(R) Technical Advisors would be attached 
to the resistance, which now, at Haile Selassie‟s insistence, would be designated officially as „patriots‟, 
and the creation of the Report and Advisory Centres would be accelerated.
94
    As to the „senior staff 
officer‟ to liaise between the revolt and the Emperor, Amery and Wavell were both firm that this 
should be Orde Wingate.  Amery had by then been recalled to the Cabinet by Churchill, as Secretary 
of State for India and Burma, and was to be Wingate‟s highest-placed supporter (and one of the most 
enthusiastic) until after the first Chindit operation, when Churchill replaced him.  In August 1940, 
Amery had written to Lord Lloyd proposing Wingate should lead „whatever Jewish force is raised in 
Palestine‟, but when Lloyd rejected this, Amery suggested him for Ethiopia.95  The same month, 
Amery wrote to Haining, the Deputy CIGS, suggesting Wingate could be used in either the Middle 
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East or Ethiopia, making the telling observation that Wingate was „[n]ot altogether easy to fit into any 
ordinary disciplined organisation but very much the man for a small show on his own.‟96    
Interestingly, in the light of  his former differences with Wingate, Haining replied saying that, in 
response to Amery‟s suggestion, he had cabled Wavell offering him Wingate as „suitable for leading 
irregulars or rebels in Abyssinia.‟97 Wavell had apparently cabled London already to request Wingate 
„to fan into flame the embers of revolt that had smouldered in parts of the Abyssinian highlands ever 
since the Italian occupation‟, as he put it after the war, although Wingate‟s initial remit was less 
ambitious.
98
    Wingate arrived in Khartoum in early November, his official role delineated in a letter 
from Platt to the Emperor of 10 November.  He was appointed General Staff Officer 2 (GSO2) on 
Platt‟s staff, as a major, with the duty of promoting the rebellion; „He will maintain close touch with 
Your Imperial Majesty on all military matters connected with the rebellion, and will represent my 
Headquarters in such matters.‟99 Circumstances point to Wavell summoning Wingate to administer 
„shock therapy‟ to what he perceived as a flagging operation, unlikely to endear either of them to its 
planners.  Captain Dodds-Parker was attached to Wingate as his General Staff Officer 3; a detailed 
description of the duties of this job might not be strictly relevant to this thesis, as Dodds-Parker 
appears in reality to have been involved almost entirely in pacifying the numerous senior officers 
Wingate offended over the following months.
100
 Far from being a lone voice, driving an operation 
no-one else wanted, Wingate was expected to do what he did by senior commanders in the theatre.  
                      
      Wingate takes charge           
By October 1940, G(R)‟s efforts centred on Mission 101‟s supply base at Faguta and an outstation, 
Mission 101 North, under Major Arthur Bentinck, in the Lake Tana region, north of Gojjam.  
Whalley was supporting patriots in southwest Ethiopia from the Boma plateau in southern Sudan, 
and other Missions were forming.
101
 Having met the Emperor in Khartoum, Wingate flew to Faguta 
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to confer with Sandford, intending to improve cooperation between Khartoum and Mission 101.
102
  
Wingate noted that his visit, of 20-22 November 1940, „served its main purpose which was to 
convince me that my plan was workable‟, yet the record of this meeting provides the earliest evidence 
for the different approaches to the rebellion advocated by these two officers.
103
  Sandford was pleased 
that regular supply convoys would now be coming his way, and by the impending arrival of the G(R) 
Operational Centres, which were being formed in Sudan and which Wingate would train (see below), 
and offered advice on their organisation.
104
   However, Wingate wanted logistical support for the 
rebellion to be the sole responsibility of the Operational Centres, under his command, whereas 
Sandford preferred the existing arrangement wherein the Mission was responsible for distributing 
arms and money (echoing Gubbins).
105
   Sandford had decided already that British „Advisory and 
Store Centres‟ should be established in Gojjam, with dry-weather roads being built back to Sudan, 
along which supplies for the patriots should arrive, along with Haile Selassie and his bodyguard, at the 
earliest available opportunity.  The aim was to secure Gojjam as the stronghold of a „Free Ethiopian‟ 
Government and a base for guerrilla offensives against the roads running north from Addis Ababa to 
Eritrea and southwest to the Kenya border.
106
        
      The contrast with Wingate‟s proposed strategy, as presented in his official Report of the 
operation, is marked.  It is here, not the politics or strategic aim of the rebellion, that Wingate parted 
company with his peers: 
 
      Hitherto we had made the mistake of appealing to the cupidity and self interest of the                  
      Ethiopians by offering them money and poor quality war material.  These qualities were all on    
      the side of the enemy.  Courage, faith and self respect, these were the qualities we could appeal  
      to successfully because they were on our side.  We had first to convince the Ethiopian,               
      suspicious as he was of all white men, of our bona fides.  This meant he must see us fighting       
      not by his side but in front of him.  His contact with our young officers must convince him          
      that...we were not only brave soldiers but devoted to the cause of his liberties.
107 
 
 
      Wingate proposed that the British should not just send personnel in to distribute arms and money 
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and perform staff work:  
 
      [C]ease trying to stimulate the revolt from without, using agents, but...enter amongst the            
      patriots using small columns of the highest fighting quality, with first class equipment, to             
      perform exploits and to teach self sacrifice and devotion by example instead of by precept.          
      By doing so we should not only fan the revolt to proportions that really threatened the               
      enemy’s main bases, but should also assume its direction and control - a most important factor 
     in any future settlement. [Italics mine]
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      These passages come from Wingate‟s final Report, written months after the campaign.  However, 
that Wingate was not arguing retrospectively is construable from the organisation and training he 
provided his penetration forces, which were divided into three types, the G(R) Operational Centres, 
an independent Ethiopian mortar platoon, drawn from Ras Mesfin‟s retainers, and the two regular 
battalions, one Ethiopian, the other Boustead‟s SDF Frontier Battalion.  Wingate intended to form 
ten Operational Centres, each consisting of a British officer (captain, major or SDF Bimbashi), five 
sergeants and 200 Ethiopians divided into ten guerilla squads, intended not to advise, but to fight: „By 
doing exploits [sic] these young officers were to obtain an ascendancy over the patriots in their areas 
and were to keep in constant touch by wireless with the directing staff.  The latter would thus be able 
to direct the available force into the most profitable channel.‟109   Wingate‟s aim, therefore, was not, 
apparently, to create a mass resistance movement, fighting a protracted guerrilla campaign, but to 
insert regular fighting units, led by British and British-trained Ethiopian officers, to wage war deep in 
the Ethiopian interior.  
      Some of Wingate‟s training notes survive, indicating that his ideas were still rooted largely in FSR, 
combined with his experiences in Palestine and his views on the relationship between war and politics. 
Echoing Palestine, Wingate saw an enemy whose „national characteristics‟ made them vulnerable to 
the kind of action he was proposing: „Here Italians would have to fight under conditions which 
brought out their worst qualities: conditions demanding bold manoeuvre, junior leadership, and 
ability to endure hardships.... Naturally timid, they preferred to think in terms of defence.‟110   Wingate 
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referred also explicitly to FSR, a unique citation of a source for his military ideas other than himself: 
 
        We are all familiar with the principles of war laid down in Field Service Regulations.                 
        According, however, to the character of the warfare we are engaged in, one or other of these   
        principles is predominant.  The most important of all these principles, in all forms of                
        warfare, is surprise, and the next to surprise, its opposite, security.[Italics mine]
111
  
 
 
 
      Wingate therefore interpreted the Principles of War according to his mission and preferences, as 
FSR recommended.  He put surprise on top of his list, giving his reasons in lecture notes for the 
Operational Centres, wherein it was clear again he intended them to have a tactical role; compare his 
choice of words with Lawrence‟s in Seven Pillars: 
 
      In other types of warfare the enemy tends to form a line of defended areas which shut out           
      penetration by enemy forces until after his own collapse.  In guerilla warfare, however,               
      conditions exist which make it possible for our forces to live and move under the enemy‟s ribs.   
      Surprise is always possible to guerillas, and the only limitation is security.
112
  
 
 
      Note also that Wingate was unequivocal, at this stage, that he was waging guerrilla warfare, 
rebutting Rossetto‟s challenge to those who describe Wingate as a guerrilla theoritician.113 Surprise 
was obtainable by the use of new weapons, „unexpected forms of propaganda‟ but, most commonly, 
„by the use of unexpected boldness.‟114  Security arose from knowing the enemy, particularly how 
they would react to any given situation, and taking appropriate action to forestall this.
115
   Both 
required high levels of efficiency, and therefore, of selection and training of personnel.
116  
  To Wingate, 
therefore, guerrilla warfare was a matter for professional experts, not amateurs – as he clearly came 
to view Sandford.  There is some overlap with Gubbins detectable here. 
      This view is reinforced by Wingate‟s preferred training methods.  As in Palestine, Wingate taught 
tactics through battle drills, instilled via explanation on sand models, demonstration by instructors, 
and imitation until the squads matched his required standard.
117
 The aim was apparently to instill set 
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tactical methods and responses upon guerrilla forces via formal training, a move towards their 
„regularisation‟ and not something mentioned in any MI(R) or G(R) document.  As to the strategy 
these trained guerrillas would execute, this evolved organically as the campaign progressed and so 
must be reconstructed from Wingate‟s subsequent training memoranda, operational orders and the 
testimony of others.  Initially, he echoed Seven Pillars of Wisdom, almost certainly unconsciously, but 
also some of Gubbins‟ proposed guerrilla strategy: 
 
      Guerillas aim at bringing the enemy to a stand-still in the heart of this own occupied territory.     
      It is impossible for any enemy always to present an unbreakable front at all points.  Where his     
      troops are living, training, resting, recreating and recovering from the effects of conflict with       
      our regular forces, the enemy is compelled to lay himself open to attack.  In normal conditions   
      he counts upon his foe being unable to attack him in his rear areas; he counts upon the local        
      population being either friendly or cowed.  Guerilla warfare, in the first place, is therefore           
      possible only when a large proportion of the civilian population surrounding the enemy's back    
      areas is friendly to the guerillas.  Where this is so, however, unrivalled opportunities exist for      
      ambush and surprise of every description.  The essence of guerilla warfare is...surprise                
      combined with security.
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      Wingate‟s aim, evidently, was to initiate an offensive inside Italian occupied territory, tied to 
British strategic aims, built around his „trained guerillas‟ supported by rather than supportive of the 
patriots.  He also revived a common theme: creating a sense of his ubiquity in the mind of the enemy 
via use of superior mobility, as Lawrence proposed in Seven Pillars - something which Wingate 
would perhaps not have appreciated having pointed out – and Callwell had done in Small Wars. 
      Wingate decided, while visiting Sandford, that Haile Selassie should establish a preliminary 
headquarters at Mount Belaiya, approximately halfway between the frontier and Gojjam.  By 
December 1940, G(R) had secured enough camels to begin sending convoys to Belaiya to build a 
supply dump sufficient, Wingate estimated, to support the two regular battalions and the Operational 
Centres, and the first Operational Centre entered Ethiopia in late December.
119
 However, his logistics 
soon fell victim to the environment, Wingate noting that: 
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      I had hoped that Sandford‟s Mission would succeed in purchasing some five thousand mules      
      to take over from the camels in the precipitous areas.  It proved unable to provide these and the 
      camels had to go wherever we went, with the result that the majority died in the course of the    
      campaign.
120
  
 
 
 
      In fact, all of the 15,000 camels G(R) purchased in late 1940 were dead by June 1941, Wingate 
reporting that they died through stubbornly refusing to eat the plentiful grazing on the Gojjam 
plateau.
121 
Whatever the cause, the mass attrition of the camels, the principal means of transport, 
inflicted considerable strain upon the campaign in its early stages and the expedition‟s precarious 
logistical state was to be another factor causing Wingate‟s doctrine to evolve in practice. 
           
      The doctrine evolves  
The strategic context changed during training, initially as a result of the debacle at Gallabat on 6-10 
November 1940, where Brigadier William Slim‟s 10th Indian Brigade‟s attempt to take a pair of 
Italian-occupied forts on the Sudan-Ethiopia border failed ignominiously - Slim losing all of his tanks 
and some of his British troops fleeing in panic – but then due to the swift Italian defeat in North 
Africa.
122
 Wavell called a conference in Cairo on 1-2 December 1940 to update British strategy in the 
Mediterranean; present were Wavell, Platt, Cunningham, General HM Wilson (GOC Egypt) and Air 
Marshal Longmore, with Wingate invited to speak on the progress of the rebellion.  Wavell informed 
the conference of Compass, to be launched ten days later, and ordered that pressure be stepped up 
concurrently on Italian East Africa.  In the south, pressure would be exerted „by means of small 
mobile columns‟ operating from Kenya, Cunningham being ordered to advance on Kismayu, in Italian 
Somalia in May or June, after which a penetration should be made into southwest Ethiopia in 
conjunction with forces operating from Boma in Sudan.
123
 These would presumably consist largely 
of Whalley‟s patriots, as Wavell intended the main effort to be via guerrilla activity:   
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      The ruling idea in my mind...at this conference was that the fomentation of the rebel                    
      movement...offered with the resources available the best prospect of making the Italian               
      position impossible and eventually reconquering the country.  I did not intend...a large scale        
      invasion...I intended that our main effort should be devoted to furthering and supporting the       
      rebellion by irregular action.
124
  
 
      This was but a small part of Churchill‟s strategy, emerging during December 1940, reacting to the 
rapid collapse of the Italians in Libya and the German buildup in Bulgaria, threatening Greece and 
Yugoslavia.  On 31 December 1940, Churchill ordered that Italian forces in Italian East Africa should 
be destroyed by the end of April 1941, thus releasing British troops for deployment elsewhere. Wavell 
reinforced Sudan with 5th Indian Division, straight from India, plus two bomber squadrons, with 4th 
Indian Division redeploying from the Western Desert during December and January. The end of 
November 1940 saw the under-strength 1st South African Division, two African Brigades, two 
fighter squadrons and two bomber squadrons deployed under Cunningham in Kenya.
125 
 Operations 
were to begin on 19 January 1941, with Platt‟s 4th and 5th Indian Divisions striking at Kassala while 
Cunningham‟s 1st South African Division and 11th and 12th African Brigades pushed into Italian 
Somalia with the objective of capturing the capital, Mogadishu.
126
 There was no initial intent to drive 
on into greater Ethiopia, and Platt‟s stated aim for the Gojjam rebellion was to pin Italian forces which 
might otherwise be used to reinforce Kassala, conforming with Holland‟s prescribed role for 
MI(R).
127
 Wingate understood this implicitly and agreed with Platt a bold move to distract the Italians, 
taking the campaign to its next stage: 
 
       I pointed out to General Platt that at that moment, Xmas 1940, the enemy was prepared for      
       us either to advance in force towards Gojjam, or to make out a major attack on Eritrea. He       
       would rapidly transfer air forces to whichever front he considered the most dangerous.  Platt‟s  
       attack could not begin until the end of January.  If the Emperor entered a few days in                 
       advance this would divert the enemy‟s attention and lead to the preliminary transfer of enemy    
       aircraft.  The plan was approved.  The necessary covering operations were carried out; and,      
       on 20th January 1941, the Emperor crossed the frontier at the place chosen by me on the River 
       DINDER.
128 
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      Platt felt the presence of the Emperor would increase Italian interest in the Belaiya-Gojjam area; 
thus his insertion had the aim of supporting Platt‟s thrust into Eritrea, as Wingate understood.129 
Moreover, under the influence of Sandford‟s reports, it was still hoped the Emperor‟s re-entry would 
bring a mass uprising, although Wingate was already circumspect: „The patriot forces appear, as I 
expected, to be able to move at will.  They have their being within the guts of the enemy.  Such forces, 
however, must be wisely directed or they tend to get out of control and invite disaster.‟130 Wingate 
was fulfilling the remit laid out in operational orders issued before his arrival, through applying his 
own interpretation of FSR and MI(R)/G(R) doctrine.  This formed part of an overall military strategy, 
devised by Wavell, and part-driven by Sandford, in which guerrilla operations in the name of the 
Emperor played an integral part, and which would have developed without Wingate‟s participation. 
       Nevertheless, Wingate‟s ambition was soon evident.  Having established the Emperor at Belaiya, 
on 6 February Wingate and Sandford flew back to Khartoum for a conference on policy for the 
campaign, on 12 February.  Platt chaired the conference and also present were Terence Airey and 
Brigadier Maurice Lush, Platt‟s Deputy Chief Political Officer (and Sandford‟s brother-in-law).  
Wingate had written previously to Platt suggesting an expanded G(R) organisation, proposing 
himself as GSO1 and „Commander of British and Ethiopian Forces in the Field‟ with Mission 101 
assisting him.
131
 This was confirmed at the conference, an indicator of Wingate‟s standing at the time: 
Wingate, promoted Lieutenant Colonel, would „direct the patriot operations in the field‟, while 
Sandford, now a Brigadier, was appointed the Emperor‟s personal advisor.132 
         
 Wingate‟s operational plan, approved at the conference, was again clearly not one for a 
protracted guerrilla campaign: 
 
      My primary objective was to drive the enemy out of Gojjam.  After that I intended to move on   
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     and cut the North and South communications between the capital and Dessye [not „harass‟, as    
     Platt instructed].  I knew the enemy would attack as long as possible along his Roman roads,       
     and that, if I wanted to fight him, I must do so on these roads.  I knew that he would resent the   
     attack of Haile Selassie as an assault on his prestige and that if he were not hard pressed he          
     would resume the offensive....With these facts in mind I made the following plan.  I would           
     divide my force into two parts, in the proportion of one to three.  The weaker force should          
     contain the Northern Italian Force until reinforced and strong enough to go on and cut the           
     Dessye-Gondar road.  The stronger force, under my own  immediate command I would direct    
     upon the Nile bridge at SAFARTAK [at the far western edge of Gojjam, on the main road           
     from Addis Ababa into Gojjam] thus cutting the enemy's retreat, and then proceed by a                
     process of night attack plus fifth column penetration to reduce the various garrisons.
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      Wingate‟s attitude was that of an orthodox British commander of the time: it was his 
„Master-Plan‟, and not to be revised by outsiders or those lower down the chain of command. The 
northern thrust, commanded by Major Anthony Simonds, summoned to East Africa at Wingate‟s 
request, was already moving towards Bahr Dar Giorgis as Wingate and the Emperor entered Ethiopia, 
and consisted of No.2 Operational Centre and No.3 Patrol Company of the SDF Frontier Battalion; 
it was to be known as Beghemder Force, after Beghemder province, northeast of Gojjam, in which it 
was to operate.
134
    The main body, aimed at Safartak, Wingate designated Gideon Force, a title he 
had wanted to give the SNS.                                     
      It was Simonds who first drew attention to perhaps the major factor affecting the subsequent 
evolution of Wingate‟s plan.  The first situation report Wingate received upon his return to Belaiya 
on 15 February 1941 was a letter from Simonds at Engiabarra, on the main Italian road behind 
Dangila.  Upon climbing the Gojjam escarpment, Beghemder force had been asked to leave the 
immediate area by the locals, and Simonds noted: 
 
      There is a very distinct and noticeable apathy in the Gojjam, an attitude that "why fight & get     
      killed, we have suffered enough for five years, let the British conquer the Italians & then we       
      can take back Ethiopia for ourselves."  This is a very real attitude and you must face up to it.
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       This was corroborated by other Mission commanders: G(R)‟s Mission 107 found the Galla and 
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Amhara of southern Ethiopia keener on killing each other than the Italians; Major Arthur Bentinck, 
commanding Mission 101 North in Beghemder, faced constant complaints about alleged British 
duplicity towards Ethiopia and refusals to cooperate unless more rifles were forthcoming.
136 
Contemporary papers indicate that there was no such thing as a „typical‟ patriot. As irregulars, their 
performance often depended on their standard of leadership which, to Ethiopians, was linked to rank: 
the retainers of senior Amhara nobles were full-time warriors and generally disciplined, aggressive 
and sometimes recklessly brave; those lower down the social scale - the type most prevalent in 
Gojjam - were often little more than opportunist Shifta, and could be more of a menace to their own 
side, and to civilians, than they were to the Italians.
137
 It was probably with this and Simonds‟ growing 
concerns over the lack of aggression of „patriot‟ elements – expressed in subsequent correspondence 
- in mind that Wingate issued a standing order on 9 February, restricting the issue of weapons to 
Ethiopians.  Each Operational Centre carried 230 Springfield Rifles - a gift from the US 
government - eleven machine guns and large amounts of grenades and explosives; Wingate ordered 
that: 
 
      All this war material belongs to the Operational Centre and will on no account be issued to any  
      patriot who is not going to become part of the Operational Centre and operate directly and         
      permanently under its command...Issue of Springfield rifles to local feudal patriots is                   
      prohibited until further orders.  The policy is to issue the feudal retainers with                              
      French rifles, or other inferior equipment.  If possible issues to feudal retainers should be             
      avoided altogether.
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      This contradicted MI(R)/G(R) doctrine and Sandford‟s interpretation of why the Mission had 
been deployed in Ethiopia.  Wariness about patriot support - escalating rapidly into vitriolic contempt 
about their motivation and effectiveness - seems to have been the major factor shifting Wingate from 
the idea of a general guerrilla campaign to one of a small number of units operating under regular 
command and control.  As early as 7 February, he had sent a communication to G(R) Khartoum based 
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on his own observations and Simonds‟ reports: 
 
      Reference issue arms and ammunition (.)  SANDFORDs proposed issues run counter to             
     [Platt‟s] approved scheme and in my judgement [sic] lead to a situation out of our control (.)       
     Small number patriots reaching BELAYA are not recruits for us to train Emperors bodyguard    
     as agreed but emissaries local chiefs to whom they return (.)  Their arming should take                 
     second place if we do it at all (.)…. SIMONDS reports left at BELAYA                                      
     confirm...uncoordinated patriot activity.
139
  
 
 
      A day later he confided in Boustead: 
 
 
       I am worried about...these numerous chits authorising feudal patriots to draw arms.  As you      
       can see for yourself at BELAYA arms given to feudal patriots are arms thrown away in nine     
       cases out of ten - and we haven‟t arms to throw away....Further, do not forget that the              
       campaign will be fought by the armed forces.  These are the Operational Centres,                    
       the Ethiopian Battalion and the forces under your own command.  The supply and                   
       maintenance of these is your first consideration.  Forgive me if this is already perfectly clear   
      to you, but as these views are not entirely shared by certain other people, you may have been    
      given a one-sided picture. [Italics mine]
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      Those „certain other people‟ clearly included Sandford, whose actions throughout the campaign 
indicated that he saw its objective as a mass guerrilla uprising in western-central Ethiopia, to be 
achieved by issuing arms to patriots as far and wide as possible.  By March 1941, he was probably 
alone in this hope.  Not only was he opposed by Wingate and Boustead, based on what they saw as 
good evidence, but Bentinck, in Beghemder, was now reporting constant squabbling among chiefs 
over who got the most rifles, which were then used largely for bribing potential followers, wastage 
of G(R)-issued ammunition in frequent and incessant celebratory fusillades, and a racket involving 
„patriots‟ selling their G(R)-issued rifles to Shifta or even the Italians.141   Such experiences probably 
lay behind Wingate‟s standing order of 9 February, banning issues of weapons to patriots.                
       By early March, Mission 101 had a permanent line of communication (LOC) back to Sudan, with 
Royal Engineer units constructing a motorable track, allowing stores to be lorried to Matakal, on the 
western edge of Gojjam, from where they would be carried forward to Burye by camel convoy, and 
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a South African Air Force flight of three Ju-52s began regular shuttle flights from Sudan to Burye on 
17 March.
142
 Consequently, Wingate‟s „Master-Plan‟ now resembled less a guerrilla campaign than 
an offensive by an unusually organised and under-strength regular brigade, a situation emphasised by 
its fixed line of communications and regularizing of its training, logistics and staff arrangements.  
Indeed, as the campaign progressed a resemblance to the „small wars‟ model of all-arms, 
self-contained columns, supported by local irregulars, driving in behind the enemy, becomes apparent. 
      Moreover, Wingate‟s tactical approach increasingly resembled that of British forces concurrently 
engaging the Italians in North Africa.  The biggest engagement of the campaign was on 6 March, 
when the Italian garrison of the fortified town of Burye – 6000 men, with armoured cars and close air 
support – retreating towards Debra Markos, the largest town in central Gojjam, following incessant 
guerrilla attacks on its lines of communication by the Operational Centres, took Gideon Force‟s 2nd 
Ethiopian Battalion by surprise at the Charaka River.  In the subsequent battle, the Italians stormed 
defensive positions arranged hastily by 2
nd
 Ethiopians and eventually broke through, effectively 
destroying the battalion – which fought hard throughout - although taking 650 casualties 
themselves.
143
 In his official reports and private correspondence on this action, Wingate dishonestly 
portrayed this as an attempted „decisive battle‟ – he had „turned‟ the Italians out of a strong defensive 
position and was now trying to destroy them on the march by using his force‟s superior mobility to 
establish blocking and ambush positions onto which they were „driven‟ (almost as Callwell 
recommended and O‟Connor‟s XIII Corps had done with larger Italian forces in North Africa); had 
he air support, the Italians would have been annihilated.
144   
He gave further impression, therefore, that 
his aim was swift victory through mobile, but „conventional‟ warfare rather than the gradual 
wearing-down of a guerrilla campaign. 
      Furthermore, where local irregulars were involved, it was in support of regular forces; note 
Wingate‟s stated tactical aim in the following passage: 
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      The modus operandi of the small regular forces is to ambush and cut                                            
      communications and deliver night attacks, etc. on isolated positions.  At the same time, by          
      their presence they stimulate neighbouring patriot activity.  After a few days in a given locality    
      a large but temporary patriot force collects and cooperates with the regular nucleus.  The           
      enemy, perpetually harassed, eventually decides on flight, when an opportunity occurs for           
      causing his complete disintegration through air action.
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      In pursuit of the new aim, Boustead was made CO of Gideon Force, with Wingate promoted to 
Commander of British and Ethiopian forces in Gojjam.
146
  By early March, news reached Gideon 
Force of the defeat of the main Italian force in Ethiopia, at Keren, and Wingate banked upon this 
producing three things: firstly, the greater air support upon which his mobile operations would hinge; 
secondly, the final collapse of Italian morale, arising from fear that the British would now pour 
reinforcements into Gojjam; thirdly, a boost in Haile Selassie‟s authority leading to an escalation of 
patriot activity, now it was clearer who was going to win.
147
  These cohered into a modified version 
of his „Master-Plan‟: 
 
      The patriot forces...which the Emperor‟s authority and prestige can raise, are not such as to       
      enable them to deliver successful assaults on the enemy‟s fortified positions; they are such as      
      to be able to forbid the enemy‟s movement and to pursue his forces once he leaves [them].         
      Our...object, therefore, after re-equipping and reinforcing the regular nucleus, will be to              
      produce on the spot a large patriot force under the direct command of His Majesty the Emperor 
      in person.
148 
   
      Wingate therefore apparently had some use for the patriots.  The first and most obvious was as 
a guerrilla force harassing Italian communications and small forces on the move while leaving „high 
intensity‟ conventional fighting against larger forces and defended positions to the regular troops of 
Gideon Force.  The second was playing a part in the increasing use of bluff, propaganda and 
psychological attack marking Wingate‟s subsequent operations in Ethiopia.  On several occasions, 
beginning at the key Italian fortified town of Debra Markos on 30 March, Wingate communicated 
with the Italian commander, offering terms and implying that the Italians had a brief opportunity to 
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surrender to British regular forces, who would abide by the Geneva convention, and if refusing this, 
they would be left to the patriots, who would not.
149
 Even the erudite Dodds-Parker took it for 
granted that the patriots would castrate any white man, British or Italian, falling into their hands, and 
Wingate took this fearsome reputation - in actuality largely unjustified - and turned it into a weapon, 
another example of his noting the tactical value of „national characteristics‟.150  This produced one of 
the best-known episodes of Wingate‟s career – and the one of which he was seems to have been most 
proud – his inducing the surrender of an 14,000-man Italian force to an Ethiopian one less than a third 
of its size at Addis Derra in May.  He employed the same „scare tactics‟ he had planned for Debra 
Markos, his initial message, of 19 May, reading: 
 
      1. Since our last encounter at Debra Markos I have been engaged on the difficult task of             
       organising your ex-Colonial troops into guerilla brigades. One of these, led by Ras                     
       Kassa [Haile Selassie‟s cousin and the most skilful of the patriot leaders, whose sons had           
       been murdered by the Italians after surrendering under a false amnesty] I have brought with me 
       from Addis Ababa.  Two more are on the way...  
      2. In addition to these guerilla forces, a patriot contingent two thousand strong has just reached 
      me... 
      3. As you are no doubt aware, the Duke of Aosta [the Italian governor of Ethiopia] and his        
      army have surrendered to-day to the British Forces at Amba Alagi [this was true]. 
      4. I have been ordered to withdraw all British personnel from your neighbourhood during the     
      rainy period, leaving the conduct of the operations against you to the very considerable               
      guerilla forces under Ras Kassa...who are now assembling around you...I linger here for             
      perhaps twenty-four hours more only in the hope that you will decide not to                                
      sacrifice needlessly the lives of so many brave men...If you refuse this last offer, control               
      passes out of my hands...
151
   
   
 
      This was a bluff; Ras Kassa‟s forces were almost out of ammunition and starting to go home, and 
the largest force of „patriots‟ in the area were local Muslims, armed by the Italians but who had 
defected upon hearing of Aosta‟s surrender. Yet, the Italian commander at Addis Derra, Colonello 
Saverio Maraventano, confirmed in his memoirs, cited by Shirreff, that Wingate‟s psychological 
tactics were the key factor in his surrender, on 23 March: 14,000 Italians had been induced into 
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capitulation by 5,000 patriots and 150 British.
152
 Again, Wingate‟s methods indicated a strong belief 
in „national characteristics‟, and that they could be meshed to produce a desired military outcome, in 
this case, from „soft, panicky Italians‟ facing „merciless Ethiopian savages‟.  An interesting comment 
on Wingate‟s methods is that reports show that this was not an isolated ruse - as it has been presented 
in Wingate‟s biographies - but common practice by the British throughout the latter stages of the 
operation.  Boustead made similar threats to leave the garrison of Debra Tabor to the charity of the 
patriots on 19-20 May, although he and Simonds were withdrawn before it could tell; on 22 May, 
Thesiger induced the garrison of Agibar fort to surrender with a similar threat.
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 Indeed, it may be 
that Wingate and Boustead arrived at the technique jointly, inspired possibly by a communiqué 
Wavell proposed to send Aosta after the British liberated Addis Ababa, telling him that unless the 
Italians capitulated immediately, Wavell would be unable to protect Italian nationals except in areas 
already under British occupation.
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  Wingate was perhaps again showing he was not above 
borrowing ideas from others, but then claiming them as his own. 
      
       The impact of the Gojjam operation on Wingate’s ideas 
The two principal sources for Wingate‟s ideas in the immediate post-Ethiopia period are his 
„Appreciation of the Ethiopian Campaign‟, submitted to GHQ Cairo on 18 June 1941, and „The 
Ethiopian Campaign, August 1940 to June 1941‟, produced after his return to London in November 
1941.  The „Appreciation‟ illustrates Wingate‟s tendency to write strategic manifestos rather than 
straightforward reports, as at its core is Wingate‟s advocacy of his new theory of Long-Range 
Penetration – his first use of the term - distilled from „lessons learned‟ from Gojjam.  He opened by 
disparaging his famous relative: „It became increasingly clear that the type of operation usually 
associated with the name of Lawrence, is wasteful and ineffectual.  In fact, psychologically, it is wrong, 
and deprives us of much of the best support available‟155 The „Wrong Method‟ had been 
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demonstrated in Ethiopia (by implication, by Sandford): 
 
      On entering the area, the commander gets in touch with the local patriot leader, and after an       
      exhortation, suggests that the leader can do something to help out some operation.  The patriot  
      at once replies that he desires nothing better but has no arms...The commander asks how much  
      he wants [and]...promises a fraction which he hands over and waits for results.                            
      These are nil....or, possibly, bogus reports of activities this type of commander believes to be      
      true.     
           The patriot argues thus: "This person evidently needs my...help; so much that he is willing to 
      part with arms he must know I have only the most rudimentary idea of how to use.  Ergo, he      
      has no one to fight for him, and so is prepared to give me this substantial bribe.  Therefore,         
      he is in a weak position, and may well be beaten.  If that happens I shall be in the soup.               
      That is an argument for not fighting, but no argument for not taking what he offers....I think       
      on the whole, that the best and kindest way will be to accept the help with gratitude; to hold it    
      in trust in case some day I can use it safely against the common enemy, and, meanwhile, to get   
      to learn how to use it by settling once and for all that dispute over the water with the Smiths.
156 
 
 
      The „Right‟ method entailed a commander entering enemy territory with „a small but highly 
efficient column with modern equipment and armament, but none to give away‟ and asking for 
nothing more than information:  
 
      The patriot goes away thinking - "This is curious.  The force is very small, but no doubt much    
      larger ones are at hand, or he wouldn‟t be so confident....I‟d better watch this."   
      The...commander carries out a successful night attack.  Next day comes the patriot                     
      saying - "Why didn‟t you tell me you intended to attack?  I could have been of great help to        
      you." 
      "Oh well you have no arms, and you‟re not a soldier.  And after all why should you get killed?    
      That is our job....you have no arms or ammunition, and I have none to spare." 
      "It is true that I have very little ammunition, but what I have I want to use in support of my        
      flag." 
      "Very well, come along with me.... [I] can probably find some useful work for your followers.    
      But I shall judge you by results, and if you make a mess of it, I shan‟t be able to use you             
      again." 
      Result - the patriot rushes to the fray with keenness and devotion.  He regards the commander   
      as his leader.  It is a privilege to help him.
157 
       
      This „corps d‟elite‟ would be more effective than „peddlers of war material and cash‟ because 
resistance depended upon appealing „to the better nature, not the worse...We can hope that the rare 
occasional brave man will be stirred to come to us and risk his life to help our cause....All the rest - the 
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rush of the tribesmen, the peasants with billhooks, is hugaboo‟.158  Local support was essential 
because of the pattern of operations Wingate saw developing since 1939 - deepening the battle by 
penetrating the enemy‟s rear areas.159  Wingate introduced Long Range Penetration with a rough 
definition (several others would be offered over the next two years): 
 
      The German, so far, has not had to attempt long range penetration (as distinct from sabotage)    
      because he had always had the advantage of numbers and weight of armament, and so is             
      usually conducting an offensive.  But an army whose main forces are compelled...to adopt a       
      defensive role cannot in the nature of things conduct short range penetration (i.e. penetration      
      that links up at once with a general forward  rush, which has, in fact, a tactical, as opposed to     
      a strategical employment. Such penetration is carried out by mass descents of parachute troops, 
      by small armoured thrusts with accompanying air contingents, and other means of close              
      penetration.) Long range penetration can, however, be more effectual man for man, and             
      weapon for weapon, than close penetration....[W]e are not discussing sabotage here, but            
      something far more effectual: actual war and rebellion on the enemy‟s L. of C. [lines of               
      communication]and in his back areas.
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      This should be the role of specialist units, „given the best armament available for [the] purpose‟ 
and „under the command of the commander in chief of the whole theatre of operations.‟161 Operations 
should be targeted carefully: 
 
      The force should be given an objective such that the gaining of it will vitally effect [sic] the         
      campaign in question.  It is a common error to think that something has been achieved when      
      forces have been assembled in desolate areas far from points vital to the enemy.  Something is    
      achieved only when the enemy‟s communications have been effectively broken and his armed     
      forces in the rear areas destroyed.  This is done only by hard fighting.
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      To succeed in this „hard fighting‟, the force commander should have available dedicated air 
support, with air staff at his headquarters, which should also include staff heads from all the existing 
branches, and a propaganda officer.
163
 Planning should be guided by what Wingate called „doctrine‟. 
As Wingate might, again, not have appreciated having pointed out, this echoed Lawrence‟s „doctrine, 
the idea that produces friendliness‟, the political message that military action should send to allies and 
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potential allies in enemy-occupied territory, that British forces were „on their side‟164: „The force must 
operate with a definite propaganda...or creed of war...based on truth, and not lies.  Lies are for the 
enemy.  The truth is for our friends.‟165        
      Wingate‟s second missive, „The Ethiopian Campaign‟ was shorter, with more emphasis on 
narrative and „lessons learned.‟  The Gojjam operation now centred upon the patriot uprising: „In 
Ethiopia the local population not only made possible the advance of the British armies, but a separate 
patriot campaign played a decisive part in the defeat of the enemy‟s plan and the conquest of Italian 
East Africa.‟166  This represented Wingate‟s first mention of „defeating the enemy‟s plan‟, a concept 
not dissimilar to Lawrence‟s „arranging the enemy‟s mind‟, entailing using manoeuvre and diversion 
to force him to dissipate his forces, prevent him concentrating for battle and distract him from his main 
effort.
167
  Wingate concluded the „Ethiopian Campaign‟ with a proposal that British strategy should 
centre upon penetration operations:
 
 
      It is a mistake to imagine that operations of the kind described are possible only in a country       
      like Abyssinia.  They are possible wherever there is a patriot population....The scale of the          
      success, and the magnitude of the odds, even making every allowance for the nationality of the   
      enemy, justifies the belief that campaigns in other countries where there are  patriots, even          
      when occupied by Germans, will prove practicable....Let us select a force in the manner              
      described, let us train it, let us arm and equip it suitably, let our military command regard it         
      with favour, let aircraft be allotted for its support; and you will have a force many times as          
      strong and efficient as the force with which I gained these successes.  I may say in                       
      passing that the type of fighting I refer to has nothing to do with the operations of Commandos. 
      I am talking of forces which live and fight in the heart of the enemy‟s territory.168 
 
 
 
      Suitable theatres included Spain, Morocco and Algeria and, as Japan had entered the war in 
December 1941, „In the Far East there must already be several areas where such a force could operate 
with great detriment to the enemy.‟169  Moreover, penetration operations should spearhead the 
liberation of Europe:     
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       All modern war in inhabited areas is war of penetration.  The military problems correspond to   
       those of revolt....If we are to control the first stages of liberation in Europe in order to avoid      
       general anarchy, we had better start assembling forces of the type I have described.  Their          
       ultimate aim will be to form that coordinating and controlling element which alone will allow     
       us to bring hostilities quickly and finally to a close.
170 
 
   
      This melded MI(R)/G(R)‟s doctrine and organisation with Wingate‟s own tactical and 
operational methods, adapted from his previous experience in Sudan and Palestine.  It can therefore 
be seen that Wingate‟s Ethiopia campaign not only fitted nicely into Allied strategic culture of the time, 
but played a major part in the development of his military ideas and practice, producing a theory of 
war behind enemy lines.  This appears to be an evolution from Gubbins‟ doctrine for such operations, 
enunciated in his pamphlets in 1940, and is similar to certain proposals MI(R) was offering at the time 
of its absorption into SOE.  However, Wingate‟s innate distrust of „patriot‟ forces led him to see these 
operations as the province of specially-trained regulars, not local partisans.   
      It serves the purpose of this thesis to identify some of the lessons others drew from the Gojjam 
operation.  Dodds-Parker related that the use of aircraft for resupply – albeit limited – guided him in 
organising the first covert supply flights into Yugoslavia in 1942.
171 
The Operational Centres had 
performed satisfactorily in Ethiopia, both as fighting units and foci for resistance, and were to be used 
by SOE as Operational Groups and „Jedburgh‟ teams in Europe and Asia in 1944-45.172   However, 
the most obvious difference between SOE‟s activities and those proposed by Wingate was scale.  The 
Jedburghs were military personnel who operated in uniform, but were not the substantial fighting 
units Wingate envisaged, consisting as they did of two Allied officers and a wireless operator; 
moreover, their role was to distribute arms and coordinate the activities of resistance elements with 
Allied offensives.
173  They therefore resembled Gubbins‟ model for such units rather than Wingate‟s. 
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      The following chapters examine how these ideas – Wingate‟s and G(R)‟s - evolved when 
confronted with a radically different scenario, albeit one which Wingate anticipated - facing the 
Japanese in the jungle of Southeast Asia.  They also detail the reception they received from Wingate‟s 
peers in that theatre.     
                 
       
                                                NOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE 
 
      NOTE: References to „Box I' and „Box II' below are to Wingate‟s Abyssinia Papers, held in two 
boxes in the Department of Documents, Imperial War Museum.   
1. Quoted in Shirreff, Bare feet and Bandoliers, p.212 
2. Thesiger, Life of My Choice, p.320 
      3.   Shirreff, Bare Feet and Bandoliers, pp.150-153, 178, 285-286, 293; Thesiger, Life of My 
Choice, pp.433-434; the high regard in which Wingate is held in Ethiopia is clear from 
communication the author had with the son and granddaughter of the patriot leader, Ras Mesfin, in 
2003-2005 
      4. Mosley, Gideon Goes to War, especially pp.137-138 
      5. David Rooney, „Command and Leadership in the Chindit Campaigns‟, in Gary Sheffield (ed) 
Leadership & Command: the Anglo-American Military Experience since 1861 (London: Brassey‟s 
1996), pp.142-143 
      6. Ibid, p.286 
      7. Rossetto, Orde Wingate, pp.70-72 
      8. Colonel OC Wingate, Commanding British & Ethiopian Troops Employed, „Appreciation of 
the Ethiopian Campaign‟, GHQ ME - 18/6/41, several copies in IWM Wingate Papers, Appendix D, 
pp.3-5, 9-10 
      9. See Colonel OC Wingate DSO, „The Ethiopian Campaign, August 1940 to June 1941‟, several 
copies in the IWM Wingate Abyssinia Papers, p.2, for Wingate's first use of this term. 
  
186 
      10. Appendix A to Aide-Memoiré on the Co-Ordination of Subversive Activities in the 
Conquered Territories, in PRO HS8/259, MI(R), Strategic Appreciations, 1940 
      11. Brief for DMO for COS Meeting of 7/6/40, in PRO HS8/259, p.1 
      12. For what the Allies suspected about German special forces, see FO Miksche, Paratroops 
(London: Faber & Faber 1943), p.65; PRO WO208/2998, „Enemy Air-Borne Forces', pp.10, 25 
      13. Review of German Organisation, Auxiliary to Traditional Machinery, built up to assist in the 
achievement of German strategical and political aims, in PRO HS8/261, MI(R), Operational Reports, 
1939-1940; JP(40) 253, Minutes of War Cabinet Joint Planning Sub-Committee of 17 June 1940, in 
PRO CAB84/15; „Chronology of events following a proposal to establish a special type of unit to deal 
with penetration of enemy units behind lines, either by tanks, by parachutists or air-borne troops‟, Box 
I, p.1 
      14. „Chronology‟, pp.1-2; Ironside to Wingate of 9 June 1940, Box I; Royle, Orde Wingate, 
pp.165-166 
      15. Hackett, „Employment of Special Forces‟, pp.27-28 
      16. Keegan, introduction to Churchill's Generals, pp.3-5 
      17. Winston Churchill, The Second World War single volume edition (London: Cassell 1959), 
pp.297-300 
      18. War Cabinet Joint Planning Sub-Committee, Directive to Lieutenant-General Bourne, Report 
by the Joint Planning Sub-Committee submitting a draft directive, in PRO CAB84/15, Para.2, Draft 
Directive attached, Paras.1-2, 8 
      19. Draft Directive in Ibid, Paras.4, 10; JP(40) 363 of 31 July 1940, in PRO CAB84/17 
      20. Draft Directive, Para.4; „Development of Parachute Troops‟, in PRO AIR2/7239, Para.1; 
JP(40) 421 of 14 June 1940, in PRO CAB84/15; Otway, Airborne Forces, p.21 
      21. „Provision of Air-Borne Forces - Air Ministry Aspect‟, 25 December 1940, Para.1, Draft 
COS Paper - Policy as regards Air-Borne Forces, 19 January 1941, both in PRO AIR/7470; Otway, 
Airborne Forces, pp.22-23 
      22. Churchill, Second World War, pp.299-300; J Thompson, War behind Enemy Lines, pp.4, 5, 
11 
  
187 
      23. COS (40) of August 1940, Strategy, in PRO CAB84/17, Paras.3, 4-7 
      24. Ibid, Paras.19-24, Annex Paras.163, 173, 178; COS (40) of August 1940, Annex, 
Paras.203-205; COS (40) 27(O) of 25 November 1940, Subversive Activities in Relation to Strategy, 
in PRO CAB121/305, Para.6 
      25. COS (40) of August 1940, Paras.8, 19-24, 189, 191-193, Annex Paras.51-56, 196-198; 
„Subversive Activities‟, Paras.4-5, 7-8; CP (40) 271 Home Defence (Security) Executive Special 
Operations Executive - Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council, 19 July 1940 Paras.a-d, 
f, g in PRO CAB 121/305 
      26. The Official History of SOE, not published until 2000 as William Mackenzie, The Secret 
History of SOE (London: St Ermine's Press 2000), see pp.7-12, 38-55; MRD Foot, SOE: The 
Special Operations Executive 1940-1946 (London: BBC 1984), pp.6-17; Mark Seaman, „”A new 
instrument of war”: the origins of the Special Operations Executive‟, in Mark Seaman (Editor), 
Special Operations Executive: A new instrument of war (Oxford: Routledge 2006) , pp.12-17         
       27. MIR War Office, Report on the Organisation within the War Office for the conduct of 
para-military activities, 25 August 1940 in PRO HS8/260, MI(R) Progress Reports 1939-1940, p.1 
      28. Colonel Holland to Brigadier Wyndham (undated) in PRO HS8/258 MI(R), Functions and 
Organisation, 1940, details policy.  
      29. „Report on Organisation', p.1 
      30. Quoted, Mackenzie, SOE, pp.8-9 
      31. GS (Research) - Report for DCIGS No.8, Investigation of the possibilities of Guerilla 
Activities, 1 June 1939, in PRO HS8/260, p.1 
      32. Ibid, pp.1-2; Holland's reading list is in PRO HS8/261   
      33. Report No.8, pp.1-2           
      34. Ibid, pp.4, 6-7; Mackenzie, SOE, pp.44-46 
      35. Appendix C to DMO Briefing for 7/6/40, Para.1 
      36. Seaman, „A new instrument of war‟, pp.10-11 
      37. DMO Briefing for 7/6/40, p.5; JP (40) 363, Minutes of War Cabinet Joint Planning 
Committee Meeting of 31 July 1940, in PRO CAB84/17; Mackenzie, SOE, pp.53-54; Calvert, 
  
188 
Fighting Mad, pp.45-46; Wingate to Mountbatten of 2 September 1943, IWM Wingate Chindit Files, 
Box II 
      38. Calvert, Fighting Mad, pp.53-58; Mackenzie, SOE, p.46; Appendix C to DMO Briefing for 
7/6/40, Para.2       
      39. „Appreciation of the Possibilities of Revolt In Certain Specified Countries by March 1941' in 
PRO HS8/259, pp.1-2; Dodds-Parker interview of 25/8/2004 
      40. Lieutenant Colonel C McV Gubbins, The Art of Guerilla Warfare (London: MI(R) 1939), 
copy in PRO HS8/256, pp.1-3       
      41. Ibid, p.1 
      42. Ibid, p.1 
      43. Ibid, p.4 
      44. Ibid, pp.6-7 
      45. Ibid, p.7, 9 
      46. Ibid, pp.16-17 
      47. „An Appreciation of the Capabilities and Composition of a small force operating behind the 
enemy lines in the offensive‟, 7 June 1940, in PRO HS8/259, p.1 
      48. Ibid, p.1 
      49. Ibid, pp.1-2 
      50. Ibid, p.2       
      51. MIR No.283/40, Irregular Tactics and Strategy, August 1940, in PRO HS8/258  
      52. „Report on para-military activities‟, p.5; Minute Sheet No.2, Register No. MIR No.309/40, in 
PRO HS8/258; CinC Middle East [Wavell] to War Office of 4 June 1941 and 16 June 1941, both in 
PRO HS3/146  
      53. CinC Middle East‟s Sitreps of 15 and 23 May 1941, in PRO WO106/2089; Appendix G to 
„Report on Para-Military Activities‟; Dodds-Parker interview of 24/8/2004         
      54. Burchett, Wingate’s Phantom Army, p.47 
      55. Ibid, p.48 
      56. Mosley, Gideon Goes to War, pp.97-110 
  
189 
      57. Sykes, Orde Wingate, pp.236-237 
      58. Ibid, pp.240-251; Royle, Orde Wingate, pp.178-202 
      59. Anthony Mockler, Haile Selassie’s War: The Italian-Ethiopian Campaign, 1935-41 (New 
York: Random House 1984) especially p.285 
      60. Shirreff, Bare Feet and Bandoliers, pp.22-28, 68 
      61. Foot, SOE, pp.251-264 
      62. Professor Harold G Marcus, „Ethiopian Insurgency against the Italians, 1936-1941‟, 
unpublished paper, 1997, pp.7-8, 11-12                  
      63. „Extent of MIR Activities in the Past, At Present, and Possibilities for the Future' in PRO 
HS8/258, pp.6-7; Cipher Telegram No.341 to Sir M Lampson (Cairo) Foreign Office 26th April 
1939, in PRO CO323/1670/4, Abyssinia: coordination of arrangements to foster rebellion, 1939; 
Dodds-Parker interview, 25/8/2005 
      64. Whalley to ED Cavendish-Bentinck of 21 February 1939, in PRO FO371/23377       
      65. Major Mallaby, WO, to Cavendish-Bentinck of 27 April 1939, PRO FO371/23377 
      66. MI(R) Report No.2: Progress Up To date and Action if War Breaks Out Early, in PRO 
HS8/260, pp.16-17; Major General Arthur Smith to HQ RAF Middle East of 10 April 1940, in PRO 
WO201/2677 
      67. Held in PRO WO201/2677      
      68. Shirreff, Bare Feet and Bandoliers, pp.4-7.  Sandford‟s home in Charlotteville, Guildford, is 
still called „Sandford House‟ 
      69. Wavell to Platt of 29 September 1939, in PRO WO201/2677 
      70.  List in PRO WO201/2677, Paras. 2, 4; Report by Colonel Elphinston, G(R), on visit to 
Khartoum, PRO WO201/2677, Para.4; Cablegram from Khartoum to DMI of 25 May 1939, in PRO 
WO201/2677; Douglas Dodds-Parker, Setting Europe Ablaze: An Account of Ungentlemanly 
Warfare  (London: Springwood 1983) p.57 
      71. Smith to Platt of 28 September 1939, in PRO WO201/2677, Para.2 
      72. Ibid, Para.2       
      73. Ibid, Paras.2, 5-6 
  
190 
      74. Ibid, Paras. 2, 7 
      75. Ibid, Para.2 
      76. General AP Wavell‟s Dispatch on East African Operations, in PRO CAB120/471, p.1; 
OHM1, pp.391-392                    
       77. Shirreff, Bare Feet and Bandoliers, pp.23-26 
       78. Ibid, pp.26-28; Dodds-Parker, Setting Europe Ablaze, p.57 
       79. GHQ Middle East Operation Instruction No.1 – 10/6/1940 in PRO HS8/261, Para.2       
 
       80. Ibid, Para.4 
 
       81. Ibid, Para.9 
 
       82. Appendix B to Operational Instruction No.1, Paras.1-2 
 
       83. Ibid, Para.4 
                     
       84. Quoted, Shirreff, Bare Feet and Bandoliers, p.30 
                                 
      85. Major EA Chapman-Andrews, „Abyssinia‟, in PRO FO371/24639, pp.1-2; Attachment to 
Sandford‟s Dispatch of 20 November 1940, in PRO CAB106/934; OHM1, p.403 
 
      86. Chapman-Andrews, „Abyssinia‟, p.3                    
 
      87. See, for example, Sir Ernest Thompson‟s internal memorandum of 29 August 1940, in PRO 
FO371/24635, or PRO CAB106/356, pp.8-9, 12 or Haile Selassie‟s telegram to Churchill of 23 
August 1940, intercepted by the FO and now in PRO FO371/24635          
      88. Wavell, „East African Operations‟, pp.1-2 
      89. OHM1, p.392 
 
      90. Ibid, p.404  
      
      91. „Record of Meeting held at the Palace, Khartoum, on the 29th October 1940 - The Abyssinian 
Revolt‟, in PRO FO371/24639, pp.1-2 
      92. Ibid, p.7 
  
191 
      93. Ibid, p.7       
      94. GHQ ME Operational Order No.1, Para.10 
 
      95. Amery, Empire at Bay, p.603 
 
      96. Amery to Haining of 24 August 1940, in Churchill Archives Amery Papers File AMEL 2/1/31 
      97. Haining to Amery of 24 August 1940, in Churchill Archives Amery Papers File AMEL 2/1/31 
      98. Wavell, Good Soldier, p.62 
 
      99. Platt to Haile Selassie of 10 November 1940, Box I 
       
      100. Dodds-Parker interview of 25/8/2005 
 
      101. Chapman-Andrews, „Abyssinia‟        
       
      102. Wingate, „Ethiopian Campaign‟, p.5 
      103. Wingate, „Appreciation', Appendix D, pp.1-2       
      104. Wingate, „Ethiopian Campaign‟, pp.5-6; „Appreciation', p.3; Sandford‟s Dispatch of 1 
December 1940, in PRO CAB106/3050, Paras.9-11                   
      105. Sandford‟s Dispatch of 1/12/40, Para.10  
      106. Colonel DA Sandford, „Notes on Plans for Abyssinian Campaign', 10 November 1940, in 
PRO CAB106/3050             
 
      107. Wingate, „Ethiopian Campaign‟, p.6 
 
      108. Ibid, p.6 
 
      109. Wingate, „Appreciation', Appendix D, p.6 
 
      110. Wingate, „Ethiopian Campaign', p.7 
      111. Major OC Wingate, „Sand-Model Lectures illustrating strategy and tactics of Ethiopian 
Campaign Lecture No.1 - First Principles‟, 11 January 1941, Box I, p.2 
      112. Ibid, p.2 
      113. Rossetto, Orde Wingate, pp.72-74, 438-439  
      114. Wingate, „Lectures‟, p.2 
      115. Ibid, pp.2-3 
  
192 
      116. Ibid, p.2       
      117. Ibid, p.4 
      118. Ibid, p.4             
      119. Wingate, „Appreciation', pp.9-10 
      120. Wingate, „Ethiopian Campaign', pp.6-7 
      121. Sykes, Orde Wingate, p.246; Wingate, „Appreciation‟, Appendix D, p.8  
      122. Thesiger fought at Gallabat with the SDF, qv. Life of My Choice, pp.315-318; see also 
Shirreff, Bare Feet and Bandoliers, pp.52-53 
      123. Wavell, „East African Operations', p.2 
      124. Ibid, p.2 
      125. Ibid, p.2       
      126. OHM1, pp.397-399, 407-408 
      127. PRO WO106/2290, pp.40-42; PRO WO201/297, p.3 
      128. Wingate, „Ethiopian Campaign‟, p.9 
      129. PRO WO201/297, p.3 
      130. Wingate‟s „Notes on Sandford‟s Dispatches‟, 17 November 1940, Box II, Para.5                
      131. Undated letter from Wingate to Platt in Box II 
      132. Minutes of a Conference held at HQ Tps in the Sudan, 12 February 1941, Box I, Paras. 2, 
3(a)-(e); Wingate, „Ethiopian Campaign‟, pp.9-10; Shirreff, Bare Feet and Bandoliers, p.88            
       133.  Wingate, „Appreciation‟, pp.9-10 
       134.  Ibid, p.10       
       135. See, for example, Simonds to Wingate of 12/2/41, Box II 
       136. PRO WO178/36, „War Diary, 101 Mission, Northern Section‟, compiled by Major AWD 
Bentinck, entries of 15 and 19 September 1940, 24 and 25 November 1940; see also Report by Major 
Neville, commanding Mission 107 in southern Ethiopia, in PRO WO201/91       
       137. PRO WO291/297, p.11; PRO WO201/308, pp.44-47; Simonds to Wingate of 12/2/41; 
Thesiger, Life of My Choice, p.331; PRO CAB106/952, pp.62-63, 93-94 
      138. Wingate, „Ethiopian Campaign‟, p.9; undated from Wingate to Platt in Box II; Minutes of 
  
193 
a Conference held at HQ Troops in the Sudan, 12 February 1941, Box II, Paras.2-3        
      139. Wingate to G(R) of 7 February 1941, Box II 
      140. Wingate to Boustead of 8/2/41       
      141. Bentinck‟s Diary entries of 15 and 23-27 September 1940, PRO WO178/36        
      142. Colonel OC Wingate, „Notes for Lt.Col. Airey, Dambatcha, 11 March 1941‟, Box II, Para.4; 
Wingate, „Appreciation‟, Appendix A, p.4, „Ethiopian Campaign', p.10; Edmund Stevens, „Writer on 
the Storm: Memoirs of a Correspondent at War‟, unpublished manuscript in IWM Department of 
Documents, pp.65-66  
      143. Wingate to Sandford of 7 March 1941, Box II; Wingate, „Ethiopian Campaign‟, p.10; 
Wavell‟s Dispatch of 9 March 1941, Folio 385 of PRO WO106/2088; PRO WO201/297; Thesiger, 
Life of My Choice, pp.335-336, the latter being the most honest account of the battle from an 
eyewitness 
      144. Wingate, „Ethiopian Campaign‟, p.10; Wingate to Sandford of 7/4/41 
      145. Wingate, „Appreciation‟, p.3 
      146. Wingate, „Ethiopian Campaign‟, p.10 
      147. Gideon Force Operational Order No.2, 13 March 1941, Box II       
      148. Wingate to Airey of 31 March 1941, Box II 
      149. Communiqué, Commander, British and Ethiopian Forces, GOJJAM, calling DEBRA 
MARKOS, 30 March ‟41, Box II       
      150. Dodds-Parker, Setting Europe Ablaze, p.63, and interview of 25/8/2004  
      151. Commander, British and Ethiopian Forces, to the Commander, Italian Forces between Addis 
Derra and Agibar, 19 May 1941, Box II 
      152. Shirreff, Bare Feet and Bandoliers, p.206       
      153. Report on Operations at Debra Tabor - HQ Frontier Battalion, 29th May 1941, Box II, 
Paras.11-13; Thesiger, Life of My Choice, p.348 
      154. CinC ME to WO of 12/4/41, PRO WO193/379 
      155. Wingate, „Appreciation‟, p.4 
      156. Ibid, p.4 
  
194 
      157. Ibid, pp.4-5 
      158. Ibid, pp.5-6 
      159. Ibid, p.6 
      160. Ibid, p.7 
      161. Ibid, pp.7, 10 
      162. Ibid, pp.6-7, 13-14; see also Wingate, „Ethiopian Campaign‟, pp.4-5 
      163. Wingate, „Appreciation‟, p.6 
      164. Lawrence, „Evolution of a Revolt‟, p.69, „Guerilla Warfare‟, p.890 
      165. Wingate, „Ethiopian Campaign‟, p.1; „Notes Relating to Possible Employment‟, Box II 
      166. Wingate, „Ethiopian Campaign‟, pp.13-14 
      167. Lawrence, Seven Pillars, pp.200-202 
      168. Wingate, „Ethiopian Campaign‟, pp.14-15 
      169. Ibid, p.14 
      170. Ibid, pp.14-15 
      171. Dodds-Parker, Setting Europe Ablaze, p.67 
      172. Ibid, pp.72-73; PRO HS7/111, SOE Oriental Mission, March 1941-May 1942, pp.30-31 
      173. Mackenzie, Secret History of SOE, pp.603-606 
                                                       
 
      
 
    
 
                     
       
     
                
 
  
195 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                   
                                                                CHAPTER SIX 
             WINGATE IN BURMA (1) – THE ORIGINS OF THE CHINDITS,                                  
                                                                   1942-1943 
 
Only in one direction did there seem any prospect of action in the near future.  It lay in the 
person of a broad-shouldered, uncouth, almost simian officer who used to drift gloomily into 
the office for two or three days at a time, audibly dream dreams, and drift out again….In our 
frenzy of planning, we used to look on this visitor as one of those to be bowed out, as soon as 
it was possible to put a term to his ramblings; but as we became aware that he took no notice 
of us anyway, but that without our patronage he had the ear of the highest, we paid more 
attention to his schemes.  Soon we had fallen under the spell of his almost hypnotic talk…  
- Brigadier Bernard Fergusson1 
 
Wavell used Wingate…as in irritant to stir up his junior generals.  He did this by extolling his 
original ideas on war and battle in a self-confident and masterly manner.  [When Wingate 
first met Slim] Slim pointed out that he had just taken over, he was not impressed by the units 
under his command who had not been taught how to fight orthodox warfare let alone 
guerrilla warfare and that he had no troops at all to spare for what he considered useless and 
unnecessary diversions. 
      -   Brigadier Michael Calvert
2 
                                                             
       
      Introduction – Wingate’s Doctrines for Burma 
 
This chapter opens a discussion of Wingate‟s ultimate operational doctrine, as demonstrated in 
Operations Longcloth and Thursday, the Chindit operations of 1943 and 1944, and Wingate‟s 
writings of the time.  In the absence of any previous detailed survey of Wingate‟s papers from this 
time, discussion of the thought behind the Chindit operations has been speculative, impressionistic 
and sometimes contradictory.  This is observable even among Wingate‟s subordinate commanders: 
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Bernard Fergusson, the proud Highlander, saw similarities between Wingate‟s methods and those of 
Robert the Bruce in the hills of Galloway and Carrick in 1307, while John Masters, Brigade Major and 
later acting commander of 111th Brigade on Operation Thursday, stated explicitly they were based 
on the Long Range Desert Group.
3
  Among the biographers, Sykes whimsically saw their origin in the 
childhood games, set in a fantasy kingdom, Wingate played with his brother and sisters in their back 
garden at Godalming.
4
  More prosaically, both Luigi Rossetto and Shelford Bidwell saw the Chindit 
operations as practical application of Liddell Hart‟s „strategy of the indirect approach‟ (and Liddell 
Hart claimed Wingate as a disciple) but Bidwell, who admired Wingate but was dismissive of Liddell 
Hart, commented „Wingate was no "Liddell Hartist".  He was a "Wingate-ist": in his arrogance he 
admitted no mentor‟, a phenomenon supported by evidence presented already in this thesis.5 Rossetto 
and John W Gordon suggested that LRP also represented a derivation from and solution to Japanese 
„short range penetration‟ tactics, a proposition refuted by Wingate‟s presenting his ideas on LRP 
several months before his arrival in Burma.
6
  Although his evidence is circumstantial, exaggerated and 
simply wrong in places, Rooney‟s conclusions, that LRP operations in Burma evolved from those in 
Ethiopia, came closest to those arising from a survey of relevant documents, from which it can be 
demonstrated that Wingate adapted the model of LRP operations advocated in his Ethiopia reports 
to the circumstances of Burma, this then evolving organically with the strategic situation.   
      In actuality, Wingate‟s papers reveal three distinct operational models devised for Burma, moving 
away gradually from the „Ethiopian‟.  The first, devised in 1942, prior to the British retreat from 
Burma, was never put into practice: this involved a straightforward adaptation to East Asian 
conditions of the doctrine Wingate had experimented with in Ethiopia: a guerrilla campaign involving 
indigenous „patriot‟ irregulars trained and led by a revived G(R), stiffened by a hard core of 
purpose-trained regular troops.  Wingate‟s second model resembled that presented in his 
Appreciation of the Gojjam campaign.  This emphasised „deepening the battle‟ through columns of 
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Chindits, purpose-trained regular light infantry, supplied by airdrop, attacking or threatening vital 
logistical targets deep behind Japanese lines with the intent of disrupting their planning process and 
forcing them to divert forces away from the main battle.   This model was experimented with on 
Operation Longcloth.  The third model added an air-land element, his columns now being inserted 
behind enemy lines by glider and operating from defended temporary airstrips or „Strongholds‟, from 
which they were supplied and reinforced, as part of a general offensive.  The aim here was again to 
distract Japanese attention from the main battle, but with the more ambitious intent of steering their 
forces against the Strongholds and into situations where they could be destroyed in detail.  The 
growing scale of the forces under Wingate‟s command is also notable.  Wingate‟s initial model of 
operations involved a force similar in size and organisation to the one he commanded in 
Ethiopia - four columns created from two battalions, supporting the activities of a number of G(R) 
Operational Centres. By 1943 and Operation Longcloth, this had become a brigade-sized force of 
eight columns and when Operation Thursday was launched a year later, it was with a force equivalent 
in manpower to two British Infantry divisions, supported by a specialist unit of the United States 
Army Air Force (USAAF) comprising fighters, bombers and a large transport element.  At the time 
of his death in March 1944, Wingate was proposing a continent-wide offensive involving the 
equivalent of an Army Group.  Wingate‟s ideas and the forces at his disposal evolved with the 
strategic situation. 
      Yet here, as in Palestine and Ethiopia, Wingate presented an identifiable doctrine tailored to his 
interpretation of the cultural strengths and weaknesses of his opponent and intended to fulfill his 
interpretation of Allied strategy.  Other British commanders in Southeast Asia did likewise, and their 
interpretations, and the recommendations stemming there from, must be compared and contrasted 
with Wingate‟s to fulfill the intent of this thesis.  This centres on the problem Wingate, Slim and other 
British commanders in Southeast Asia shared, as of 1941-43 - how to beat a Japanese Army which 
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terrified its opponents.  It therefore allows the thesis to investigate different solutions to the same 
problem. 
 
      British and Japanese operations and tactics, 1940-41    
When Wingate arrived in India in March 1942, he found an atmosphere not unconducive to the kind 
of operation he advocated.  Not only were G(R) and SOE active already in the region, but also there 
were a number of other specialist units and formations planning to operate against Japanese rear 
areas.
7
    From early 1941, the anticipated scenario in Asia was a Japanese attempt to weaken the 
resistance of China, which they had invaded in 1937, by cutting the Burma Road, China‟s main supply 
route from Southeast Asia, which ran across Burma - British Imperial territory - from Assam in India 
with another branch south to Rangoon, Burma‟s capital and main port.8 In 1940, the Japanese began 
to pressure the British diplomatically to close the road.   The British viewed this as indication that the 
Japanese might use force to close the road, and in November, Major General LE Dennys was 
appointed Military Attaché to the Chinese Government in Chungking, but was also designated, 
secretly, as head of Mission 204, a G(R) Mission under the orders of Far Eastern Command (and 
which had apparently survived the rest of that organisation‟s absorption into SOE).9   In April 1941, 
the Commander in Chief, Far East, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, wrote to the War 
Office arguing that, as a contingency, a corps of Chinese guerrillas should be created, consisting of 
fifteen companies commanded by officers from the Indian Army, with specialist British personnel 
attached for demolitions work, a guerilla school being created in Burma to train them.
10
  
Brooke-Popham requested a Royal Engineers officer as chief instructor and Major Michael Calvert 
was relocated from Australia, where he had been chief instructor at a similar school created by MI(R) 
for the Australian Army.
11
  Mission 204 was given the remit, „By providing the cadre for a Chinese 
Guerilla Corps d‟Elite [sic], to contain the maximum number of Japanese forces in China and relieve 
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pressure on British forces elsewhere.‟12  The role of guerrilla forces was therefore to be diversionary, 
defensive and as substitute for action by main armies, as in earlier operations in East Africa.  
        This was also apparent in the strategy developed over the following months, Brooke-Popham 
writing to London in August to argue that, while Britain should avoid direct confrontation with Japan, 
this did not preclude Dennys suggesting to the Chinese that they should prepare demolitions of key 
sites in southern China, nor the infiltration into areas adjoining Burma of „personnel trained in 
demolition work‟, nor the opening of arms smuggling routes across the Himalayas.13   The War Office 
communicated to Wavell, the new Commander in Chief, India, in September 1941 that, given 
Britain‟s strategic situation, were the Japanese to attack the Burma Road, the only practicable 
response would be „infiltration of [a] limited number of British personnel into China to assist guerilla 
operations and demolition work.‟14   The Chinese should not be informed, and such action could not 
be attributed to the British Government, but to „volunteers‟ perhaps akin to the International Brigades 
of the Spanish Civil War or the American „Flying Tigers‟ fighting the Japanese already in China.15   
The main component of Mission 204, Calvert‟s guerilla school at Maymyo in Burma, was therefore 
given the cover name of „Bush Warfare School‟, and his trainees were organised into cadres called 
„Commandos.‟16  For personnel purposes, Mission 204 came under GOC India, who was permitted 
to expand its numbers and budget, although operational command was delegated onto Dennys.
17
   It 
was anticipated the Mission would operate in Southeast China, around Canton and Hong Kong, and 
in east-central China around Hankow, and it was proposed to create another guerrilla school, at 
Liyang.
18 
      Other covert warfare organisations were active in this region. SOE established its Oriental 
Mission in Singapore in May 1941, to organise guerrillas in China, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies; 
in July, they set up No.101 Special Training School near Singapore to train civilian and military 
personnel to form „stay behind parties‟ in the event of Japanese aggression in Southeast Asia; another 
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Mission was set up in India, on Amery‟s initiative, in August, and reported directly to the Viceroy.19 
Soon, Sir Frank Nelson, head of SO2, the department of SOE which had taken over most of the roles 
of MI(R), was suggesting that Mission 204 should be „amalgamated‟ with SOE,  producing a „line to 
take‟ from the War Office: Mission 204 trained British officers to lead Chinese guerrillas after the 
beginning of war with Japan: SOE operated in civilian dress and could be active before hostilities 
broke out.
20
  There was a rather obvious lack of enthusiasm for SOE from the British military in 
Southeast Asia, discussed at length in Charles Cruickshank‟s history of SOE‟s activities in the Far 
East; Cruickshank suggested that this was due to the military‟s general hostility to covert operations 
not under its direct control, and did not mention Mission 204.
21 
      The question of who was responsible for which kind of operation became a side-issue when 
hostilities finally erupted in December 1941.  In mid-December, GHQ India proposed that if the 
Japanese continued their offensive into Malaya, and reinforced it by road and rail links running 
through their puppet-ally, Thailand, the British should form defended bases at all points leading from 
Burma into Thailand from which „small mobile guerilla columns‟ should operate into Thailand, 
against airfields and railways.  Behind this, a field force of at least two divisions should be prepared 
for an offensive into northern Thailand in April 1942, concurrent with a Chinese offensive from 
Yunnan, southern China; the columns should begin training „at once‟, implying a new and separate 
organisation from Mission 204.
22
   While never acted upon, this proposal is interesting, given GHQ 
India‟s alleged hostility to Wingate‟s not dissimilar proposals.      
      The plan was not enacted because the Japanese struck in Burma first, and it was soon apparent 
that G(R) and SOE faced an opponent far more able in covert operations than themselves.  Louis 
Allen, Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper all discuss the extent to which the anti-British Burmese 
nationalist movement had become effectively a tool of Japanese Military Intelligence, skillfully using 
the myth of the „Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere‟ - an analogue to Wingate‟s „doctrine‟, 
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claiming the Japanese aimed at an Asia of free, equal nation-states - to suborn the Thakins or 
„Masters‟, the young urban intellectuals who led the movement.  Bayly and Harper also echo Wavell, 
Slim and Calvert in speculating on the extensive – but largely circumstantial - evidence for Japanese 
infiltration of the Indian National Congress: Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army 
aside, there was the coincidence of the emergence of Mahatma Gandhi‟s „Quit India‟ movement with 
the retreat from Burma, Gandhi‟s call for any Japanese invasion to be met with passive resistance, and 
the large and bloody Congress-agitated uprising in northeastern India, which continued into 1943 and 
included apparently carefully planned sabotage of communications into Burma, which Wavell took 
for granted was the work of „enemy agents‟.23  SOE admitted the subversion of the Thakins caused 
them some difficulty, and it was to have considerable bearing on penetration operations in Burma in 
1942-43, including Wingate‟s.24  The extensive resources the Japanese invested in cultivating 
Burmese nationalists paid off in 1942: as if to confirm the efficacy of both Holland‟s and Wingate‟s 
ideas, the invasion of Burma saw the Japanese make extensive use of Burmese agents to spread the 
propaganda of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and this produced the desired result
25
: there was extensive 
arson and sabotage in British-occupied towns, Slim admitting that saboteurs got „short shrift‟ when 
caught; more direct was General Joseph W Stilwell, heading the US Mission to the Chinese 
Nationalist Leader, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang‟s de facto chief of staff and commander of Chinese 
forces committed to Burma, who approved a standing order that Burmese saboteurs should be 
summarily shot.
26
  Of even greater use to the Japanese was the „screen‟ of  Fifth Columnists, up to two 
miles deep, preceding their advancing army and guiding them to and around British positions, some 
interesting support for Wingate‟s argument that the best use for local partisans was to improve the 
mobility of regular forces.
27 
 Infiltration by Fifth Columnists also crippled another British special force. 
The special units of the Burma Frontier Force (BFF) had been raised in 1941 to delay and harass any 
Japanese advance into Burma from Thailand; these were irregular units, consisting of around 500 
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Burmese under British officers with local knowledge, each unit organised into two mounted troops 
and three infantry companies.
28
  While providing a useful screening role in the British retreat from 
Burma, like many other local forces, it was hastily assembled, poorly equipped and eventually 
disintegrated through desertions.
29 
 The untrustworthiness of many Burmese also forestalled SOE‟s 
plans to create „stay behind‟ parties in Burma.30  
      Penetration forces were an integral part of Japanese doctrine.  Captured Japanese Combat 
Instructions, translated and circulated among British commanders for intelligence purposes, indicated 
a doctrine applying a concept of manoeuvre warfare which was sophisticated, yet also of its time, in 
being rooted in ethnic and cultural assumptions about the superiority of Japanese over Westerners.  
The principal objective of Japanese doctrine was to „smash and disrupt the enemy‟s command 
organisation‟, it being presumed that cowardly Gaijin would panic without direction from above.  
This would be compounded by cutting their supplies by concentrating effort against airfields, supply 
dumps and lines of communication.
31
  Japanese commanders issued simple, broad orders, usually 
detailing a single objective, and subordinates were expected to „demonstrate initiative‟ in pursuing 
this (although they often failed egregiously to do so).  Tactically, emphasis was on noisy frontal 
attacks by „jitter parties‟, allowing larger forces to use cover or darkness to infiltrate weak spots in the 
enemy front line, or turn his flank, to deliver the main attack against his supplies and 
communications.
32
   
      In the 1942 Burma campaign, and again during XV Corps‟ ill-fated offensive in the Arakan in 
December 1942-March 1943, reliance on motor transport for supply tied British forces to narrow 
fronts centred upon roads and motorable tracks, leading to, as Slim put it, British strategy in 1942-43 
being based upon „a rather nebulous idea of retaining territory‟ and the dispersal of Anglo-Indian 
forces along Burma‟s widely-spaced roads.33   Consequently, the jungle was left to the Japanese, 
whose doctrine seemed purpose-designed for such conditions.  The Imperial Japanese Army was a 
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predominantly light infantry force, trained to live off the land - or by plunder - and to use enemy 
supplies, including weapons and ammunition: that Japanese units could operate temporarily 
independent of any communications against a foe who could not survive without them created almost 
perfect conditions for Japanese tactics, as described in the 1943 British doctrine for jungle warfare:
 
 
      The Japanese always tried to advance on as broad a front as possible, making use of all               
      available communications as to routes of approach.  On gaining contact, their methods were       
      to fix a front and attack by encirclement....Encirclement was usually made in the form of             
      simultaneous attacks in depth, one coming in on a smaller arc than the other.  The                       
      shallower attack would normally come in at a depth of about 1,000 yards and would probably    
      be initiated by the commander of the leading battalion, while the deeper attack would come in    
      at a distance up to five miles, and would probably be initiated by the regimental commander.
34
    
 
 
      „Hooking‟ forces moved in concentrated columns without scouts or picquets, relying on the 
jungle for cover and local Burmese for guidance and intelligence, to establish fortified blocks across 
main supply routes 5-6 miles behind the front line, in areas difficult for artillery or tanks; some of these 
were very large, it taking a two-day battle to remove one established at Prome during the 1942 
campaign.
35
  Notes from Theatres of War, the British Army‟s periodical digest of „lessons learned‟ 
from operations, emphasised the shock effect upon British-Indian units, presuming they were facing 
no more than a large patrol in front, suddenly finding a Japanese battalion or regiment dug in astride 
their line of supply and retreat.
36
   Slim noted British commanders acquiring „a road block mentality 
which often developed into an inferiority complex‟.37  
      Japanese doctrine seemed therefore almost purpose-designed to exploit British weaknesses, and, 
at Wingate‟s arrival, the British Indian-Army was suffering from major morale problems, the most 
obvious manifestations referred to by contemporaries as „Green Hell‟ or „Super-Jap‟ syndrome.  The 
jungle was an alien environment not only to the British, but to most Indians: there is strong 
contemporary testimony that the combination of darkness, poor visibility, unfamiliar noises and the 
apparent ubiquity of the Japanese had deleterious psychological effects, one anonymous report 
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referring to the jungle „Having a marked effect on [the] nerves of young troops.‟38  In another 
example of ethnic stereotyping, the view spread that the Japanese soldier, toughened by an arduous 
oriental upbringing and the Samurai ethic, was fully „at home‟ in the jungle, and his superior fieldcraft, 
ability to keep going „on a handful of rice‟ a day and maniacal devotion to his Emperor meant he 
would always have a decisive advantage over his pampered, city-bred white opponents.
39
   The author 
„Aquila‟ was more balanced than most, but tells much of attitudes in 1942-44 – note, once again, the 
ethnic stereotyping: 
 
      It soon became clear that the country was so difficult that small parties of  Japanese with their    
      greater mobility could only too easily threaten our  unwieldy land lines of communication, and    
      that European troops requiring a cumbersome commissariat organization behind them were at    
      a great disadvantage....What was needed was some way of alleviating this deadlock                    
      whereby better troops were being defeated and out-manoeuvred by the Japanese, who took to   
      the conditions in Burma as apes to the jungle.
40
  
 
 
       To many, this seemed hopeless; on two separate occasions, in April 1942, Alexander and his 
Chief of Staff, Brigadier TJW Winterton, admitted to Stilwell that British soldiers were „simply afraid 
of the Japs‟ - and Stilwell, who hated the English possibly more than he did the Japanese, made 
frequent amused references to „windy Limeys‟ in his diaries.41   Prior to transferring to Wingate‟s 
command from Wavell‟s staff, Bernard Fergusson was told by a colleague: „You‟ll be mad to go into 
the jungle with Tarzan [Wingate was nicknamed after Edgar Rice Burroughs‟ jungle-lord, then 
featuring in a popular series of films starring Johnny Weissmuller]...The fellow‟s a crackpot.  In any 
case, the British cannot compete with the Japanese in the jungle.  It‟s suicide to think you can crawl 
through their lines.  They‟ll hunt you down every time.‟42   It was probably with such attitudes in mind 
that Fergusson made numerous sardonic references to the „Green Hell‟ in his published work.43 
      This malaise gave cause for concern at the highest levels.  The Official History recounted that 
Churchill had firm - and predictable - ideas on what remedial action to take, of some contextual 
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interest for any study of Wingate in Burma: 
       
       He demanded that new commanders should be found, that troops whose morale had been         
       lowered should be severely disciplined and that, if regular Indian Army troops were incapable    
       of fighting the Japanese in the jungle, commando formations should be developed.
44 
 
 
      Churchill determined on re-taking Burma as part of Britain‟s long-term strategy for defeating 
Japan, but there were differences with the Americans on to how to proceed.  Appreciations by the 
War Cabinet and Combined (British and American) Chiefs of Staff, made in 1942, were that Japan 
would not invade India, and that Japanese strategy would henceforth be entirely defensive, aimed at 
inducing war-weariness among the Allies.
45
   In response, Churchill demanded Japan „should be 
engaged all over her Empire, to maximise the overstretch on her already inefficient resources.‟46   This 
would involve the re-conquest of Burma, a strategic objective for both Allies, but for different reasons. 
In January 1942, Churchill wrote to Wavell that „China bulks as large in the minds of many 
[Americans] as Great Britain‟ and that the US Chiefs of Staff considered the Burma Road 
„indispensable for world victory.‟47   To the Americans, clearing the Burma Road was a means to an 
end - breaking the blockade of China quickly so that Chinese forces could be strengthened, the better 
to pin Japanese forces away from the Pacific, with China also being used as a secure base for a bomber 
offensive against the Japanese home islands.
48
 This strategy was favoured by 
Chiang - predictably - and by General Claire Chennault, commander of the „Flying Tigers‟ and, from 
March 1943, of the US Fourteenth Air Force, based in China, and possibly the only westerner Chiang 
trusted.
49
  Washington therefore pressed for the earliest possible re-opening of the Burma Road, a 
strategy necessitating an Allied offensive into northern Burma.
50
  In the interim, they established what 
was, at the time, the largest airlift in history, the air-bridge from India over the „Hump‟ of the 
Himalayas to Chungking, the Chief of Staff of the USAAF, General HH Arnold, making this a 
strategic priority from early 1942.
51 
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      The British, specifically the old Imperialist, Churchill, had no sympathy with the venal Chiang, the 
War Cabinet concluding in 1943 that opening the Burma Road would help China „on psychological 
rather than practical grounds.‟52   The British objective was to regain their colonial possessions in 
Burma, Malaya and Singapore.
53
   Throughout 1942 and into 1943, Churchill pressed Wavell to carry 
out a seaborne invasion of southern Burma, with the objective of retaking Rangoon, then driving 
north to clear the Burma Road while incidentally securing the rest of Burma, and he and Mountbatten 
argued consistently for sea landings in southern Burma, Malaya, Singapore and the Andamans until 
the diversion of resources for the invasion of Europe finally rendered this impossible.
54
 
      How Wingate‟s operational concepts fit into Allied strategy in Burma is detailed below, but it is 
notable that he presumed, from his arrival, that the British would launch a land offensive from India 
through northern Burma - as Wavell seems to have intended - and also seemed keen on obtaining the 
goodwill of the Chinese through demonstrating British resolve to defeat the Japanese on the Asian 
mainland.  Consequently, his operational thought was more consistent with American strategy than 
British, and he was to obtain rather more cooperation from the Americans than from GHQ India or 
from 14th Army.  Before either of these strategies could be enacted, some means of defeating the 
Japanese Army at the tactical and operational level in the jungles of Burma would need to be devised. 
 
        British thought on jungle warfare 
As early as 1906, Callwell had outlined the demands of jungle warfare.  Thick cover, and the absence 
of roads, made normal communications or logistics impossible, so operations should consist of the 
methodical advance of small infantry columns with local scouts and guides, their supplies being 
carried with them by coolies or animals. There should be as much devolution of command authority 
as possible, the main tactical units being the platoon or section. The jungle offered tactical 
opportunities for those willing to use „guerrilla‟ methods - infiltration, flanking and turning, ambush 
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and surprise raids, and small fortified positions, if sighted correctly, could hold up far larger forces; the 
risk of outflanking and infiltration necessitated all-round defence, centred on fortified bases.
55
           
     
      Similar points were made in the first post-retreat British „doctrine‟ for jungle warfare, summarised 
in Military Training Pamphlet Number 52 - Forest, Bush and Jungle Warfare Against a Modern 
Enemy, published in August 1942 and representing prevailing British thought on jungle warfare as of 
the first Chindit operation and the first Arakan offensive.  MTP52 drew upon the British experience 
in Malaya and Burma (where there were so many „successes‟ the uninitiated might think the British 
won) but there were also almost as many examples derived from Germans fighting in pine forest in 
Poland and Russia, and in the Ardennes in 1940.
56
   At the heart of MTP52 was maintaining mobility 
in heavy forest, which it saw as essential to maintaining the initiative; this hinged upon training troops 
to travel light, on choosing the right porterage - it was conceded that commanders might have to 
reduce their motor transport - and by allowing junior commanders to exercise their initiative.
57
    Poor 
visibility made control of sub-units difficult, leading to a perceived need to attack „within well defined 
courses‟, and MTP52‟s core objective, the control of roads: 
 
      All control must centre on the road or main communication, which is generally the only              
      tactical feature of any importance.  To gain control of the road is of major importance in             
      winning a battle.  Provided that the road is held in depth, that the maximum numbers are held as 
      a mobile striking force for counter-attack and that the means of control exist to alter the defensive 
      organization quickly for the purpose of countering encirclement no amount of enveloping tactics 
      or infiltration can be decisive.
58 
 
 
      Extensive use should be made of fighting patrols, the aim of which should be to gather 
information on the enemy through raids and probes and to detect and ambush „hooking‟ forces.59  
Offensives should consist of fighting patrols advancing along „main axes of communication‟, battle 
beginning when these contacted the enemy.
60
  Once battle was joined, the aim should be „the 
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elimination of the enemy‟s control, the centre of which will almost invariably be on the main axis or 
road, as a preliminary to the annihilation of his forces‟ to be achieved by encircling, infiltration or 
direct assault down „the main axis‟.61  It was presumed that other arms‟ participation would be 
essential, artillery laying a „rolling barrage‟ down the main axis, tanks or armoured cars driving down 
the road to burst through enemy blocks, as they had failed to do numerous times in 1942.
62
   
      As to defensive tactics, the jungle made surprise attacks, infiltration and outflanking almost 
inevitable, therefore, defences „must be both mobile and aggressive.‟63    Defence should be in depth, 
consisting of fortified positions organised for all-round defence, each containing sufficient supplies to 
be self-sufficient „for several days‟.64 Each position would be a pivot for a „mobile striking element‟, 
a large fighting patrol sweeping the surrounding jungle, providing early warning of any attack, and 
ambushing any incoming enemy.
65
    There is some resemblance to the system of „boxes‟ first used by 
Auchinleck in North Africa in 1941, albeit on a far smaller scale.  Each „box‟ was a fortified position, 
held by a brigade with all its supplies, its tactical role being as a block of artillery and anti-tank 
firepower: if attacked, the „box‟ was to halt the enemy with massed artillery, while a reserve of tanks 
and motorised infantry counter-attacked his flanks and rear.
66
  The model of the „box‟ and MTP52 
would be developed to Asian conditions both by Lieutenant-General Geoffrey Scoones, commanding 
IV Corps at Imphal-Kohima, and by Wingate, there being a notable resemblance between the „boxes‟, 
MTP52‟s defended positions and the „Strongholds‟ used on Operation Thursday. 
      Another section of MTP52 inviting comparison between Wingate‟s methods and others‟ is that 
on the use of „Local Volunteers and Guerilla Forces‟.  This conformed largely to the model advanced 
by MI(R) and G(R), pre-Ethiopia.  Specialist officers and NCOs should be attached to existing 
resistance movements, with members of the local settler population - farmers, planters, forest 
officers - or Colonial Office officials advising them, in order to provide the resistance with 
organisation and liaison with regular forces.  However, irregulars should not be relied upon; they 
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tended to fight in their own time and to their own agenda (as Wingate had discovered in Ethiopia) and 
so the best use for them was as a diversion, harassing the enemy rear areas and forcing him to redeploy 
troops away from the front.
67
  This contrasts with Wingate‟s belief that the offensive against the 
enemy rear was the task of regulars, a model he was determined to apply from his arrival in Burma. 
   
      Wingate’s first operational model - G(R) and Gideon Force Revisited 
 
Wingate arrived in India because Amery, his old benefactor, had suggested to the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, that he might prove useful in the Far East and 
Wavell, Wingate‟s other benefactor and now a Field Marshal and Commander in Chief, India, agreed 
enthusiastically.
68
  Upon arrival, Wingate found himself an unattached major, acting lieutenant colonel, 
with a loose brief from Wavell to see what he could do to organise operations behind Japanese lines, 
in order to create „breathing space‟ to allow conventional forces to reorganize themselves for the 
re-conquest of Burma.
69
  Guerrilla action was once again being used as a substitute for conventional 
operations, and again because it was one of the few viable options available.  As in East Africa, 
Wingate prioritised imposing a degree of coordination upon the existing Army units, Mission 204 and 
the BFF, then moulding them into his own model of „penetration warfare‟.70 
      Dennys was killed in an air crash before Wingate could meet him.
71
   Consequently, Wingate‟s 
first contact with Mission 204 came when he visited the Bush Warfare School on 22 March 1942, 
where, despite the presence at the School of a number of old G(R) hands who had known Wingate in 
Ethiopia and almost universally distrusted him, he and Calvert impressed each other greatly and began 
both a productive professional partnership and a close friendship.
72
 Wingate also met with Lieutenant 
General TJ Hutton, commanding Burma Corps („Burcorps‟) the senior British operational 
commander in Burma, and other senior officers, and three days after visiting Maymyo, he produced 
his first document, „Notes on Penetration Warfare, Burma Command, 25/3/42‟.  Wingate‟s aim was, 
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from the beginning, to execute the kind of operations in depth he advocated in his reports on Ethiopia, 
and therefore did not take inspiration from the Japanese, although there were similarities, and he did 
cite aspects of their doctrine in support of his own proposals.  By this time, Mission 204 had been 
converted into a fighting unit, three squads, made up of Calvert‟s instructors and trainees, attached to 
17 Division in Burcorps for raiding and sabotage operations.
73
 Wingate began his „Notes‟ by arguing 
that assigning the Mission 204 squads to divisional-level command, and constraining the depth of 
penetration attacks to just behind the front line betrayed an ignorance of modern warfare and wasted 
a precious asset: 
 
      Owing to the failure of the Chinese to implement General Dennys‟ Mission, the Contingents       
      have been placed at the disposal of the nearest formation Commanders.  These Commanders      
      are admittedly ignorant of the technique of employing such troops, and it is evident that they      
      will become mere raiding parties, implemented for the occasion with what regular troops are      
      required and can be spared. 
            Such is not war of penetration, and no considerable results can be expected from such          
      employment...
74
  
 
 
 
      Wingate then presented a new description of Long Range Penetration.  As in his Ethiopian 
„Appreciation‟, it consisted of combining specially trained regular columns and local partisan forces 
to attack targets far enough behind enemy lines to have a „strategic‟ effect.  LRP‟s part in „strategy‟ 
hinged on technological advance: 
 
      Modern war is war of penetration in all its phases.  This may be of two types - tactical or            
      strategical.  Penetration is tactical where armed forces carrying it out are directly supported by   
      the operations of the main armies.  It is strategical where no such support is possible, e.g.           
      where the penetration group is living and operating 100 miles or more in front of its own            
      armies. 
            Of the two types, long range penetration pays by far the larger dividend on the forces            
      employed.  These forces...are able, wherever a friendly population exists, to live and move          
      under the enemy‟s ribs, and thus to deliver fatal blows to his Military organisation by                  
      attacking vital objectives, which he is unable to defend.  In the past, such warfare has                  
      been impossible owing to the fact that the control over such columns, indispensable both for       
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      their safety and their effectual use, was not possible until the age of easily portable wireless         
      sets.  Further, the supply of certain indispensable materials...was impossible until the                   
      appearance of communication aircraft.
75 
 
 
      The „Notes‟ also indicate that Wingate‟s view of the efficacy of indigenous resistance forces had 
not changed: such forces could prove effective when pitted against occupiers wary of losses, 
restrained in their use of force and constrained by a morality which forbade reprisals against the 
civilian populace.  If facing a ruthless opponent, prepared to kill prisoners or destroy property in 
reprisal for guerilla action, insurgent forces‟ emotional ties to the populace would place major 
constraints upon their freedom of action: the Japanese and the Germans were just such opponents.
76
 
Wingate‟s answer was to insert columns of regular troops to protect guerrilla forces, to divert enemy 
attention from them, and to stimulate further revolt by their example:    
 
      When opposing ruthless enemies, such as Japanese or Germans, it is wrong to place any             
      reliance upon the efforts of the individual patriot, however devoted.  Brutal and widespread        
      retaliation instantly follows any attempt to injure the enemy‟s war machine, and, no matter          
      how carefully the sabotage organisation may have been trained for the event, in practice they      
      will find it impossible to operate against a resolute and ruthless enemy....All                                 
      concerned, Military and civilian, should disabuse their minds of the fallacy that there are              
      going to be any guerilla operations in Burma except those that can be carried out under the        
      aegis, and in the neighbourhood of regular columns.  Guerillas are born and not made.                
      Essentially a guerilla soldier is a man who prefers death on his own terms to life on the                
      enemy‟s.  Such were the Rifi in Morocco, and the majority of them were killed; such                   
      were the Caucasian Moslem insurgents against the Soviet troops…they were mainly                   
      exterminated; such were the Ethiopian guerillas, who continued to fight for 5 years after the       
      Italian occupation; they were steadily being exterminated when we intervened....Mere dislike      
      of the enemy does not produce guerillas.  Burning hatred based on religion or other ideal [sic]    
      will do so.  It is clear, however, that in Burma we need not expect to find guerilla operations,     
      actively carried on by groups favourable to ourselves or hostile to the enemy, without                 
      considerable encouragement on our part.  Such encouragement will be provided by the               
      creation of long range penetration groups, who...will both take advantage of and sustain the       
      resistance of local patriots.
77 
 
 
 
      Direction by such columns could also ensure a degree of coordination with regular forces in 
theatre, as Gubbins stated in The Art of Guerilla Warfare and Wingate in his „Appreciation‟, and both 
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documents agreed it would ensure political coordination, particularly that guerrillas would not pursue 
their own interests to the detriment of Allied objectives, a major problem in Gojjam.
78
   
      As to the organisation and direction of LRP operations, Wingate recommended forming a G(R) 
cell at the headquarters of whatever formation under which the LRPG group would operate.
79
 This 
should consist of officers with „at least some comprehension and previous experience of the special 
problems they will be expected to solve.‟80    The best way to produce officers with the appropriate 
experience would be to use a combination of Calvert‟s instructors and officers of Mission 204 rotated 
through his school: „The object should be to use the instructional side of war of penetration as a means 
of affording change of occupation to officers on operational duty and also to ensure that all instructors 
have recent experience of the application of the principles they are teaching.‟81  The cell would 
oversee a LRP group under the direct command of the corps commander, who would also provide 
the troops; the LRP group would strike at objectives selected by the corps commander „the gaining 
of which will decisively influence the enemy‟s operations.82  
      The „Notes‟ formed the basis of a series of lectures Wingate delivered to senior British and 
Chinese officers over the next few days, but events were overtaking him already.  On 29 May, a 300 
strong penetration force of G(R), BFF and Royal Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Musgrave of 
Mission 204, operating on 17th Indian Division‟s right flank on the west bank of the Irrawaddy, was 
surprised and destroyed by a larger Japanese force at the village of Padaung.  This was precipitated 
by a combination of Japanese „hooks‟ (which Wingate described as „short-range penetration‟) 
infiltration of the village by hostile Burmese and disguised Japanese soldiers, and the abysmal 
performance of the BFF, many of whom threw away their weapons before the Japanese were even 
encountered.
83
 The Padaung disaster opened Burcorps‟ whole western flank, and in the following 
three days, the Japanese penetrated the front of Burcorps in several places, making the Corps 
unwilling to spare troops or staff facilities to implement Wingate‟s proposed LRP organisation.  
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Wingate noted that „There is little doubt that the Corps Commander [now Slim] was fully justified in 
taking this view.‟84 
     Upon returning to Maymyo on 2 April, Wingate wrote an „Appreciation of chances of forming 
Long Range Penetration Groups in Burma‟, presenting a series of proposals updated and adapted 
from the „Notes‟, for the situation developing on Burcorps‟ front.  Among the factors listed by 
Wingate as affecting his appreciation, he noted the destruction of the Musgrave force and the 
unsuitability of BFF troops, but he also emphasised the similarity of Japanese methods to his own: 
 
      [T]he Japanese have successfully done what we hoped to do.  They have penetrated the              
      Western Hills (using the sympathies of the local  inhabitants), with columns of irregular and        
      lightly armed troops who have been allotted the vital role of cutting the communications of         
      our main force....Whether the enemy intends to use this penetration on a large scale, or only       
      on the limited scale we have witnessed, is uncertain.  It is, however, certain that he stands to       
      gain very greatly by pushing this penetration northwards as fast, and is great numbers, as            
      possible.  The areas he is now entering...are old rebel areas, where he will find                             
      enthusiastic support.
85
  
 
 
 
       Wingate‟s view of the failure of the Musgrave force marked his becoming more specific about 
the objective of LRP operations - to disrupt the enemy‟s decision-making process through 
threatening points of critical vulnerability in his command and logistical infrastructure, or to impose 
his will upon the enemy, the stated aim of British doctrine in both „small‟ and major wars.  He began 
by again castigating what he saw as British commanders‟ inability to appreciate the value of such 
depth operations: 
 
      Lt Col Musgrave‟s force was not used as a force of penetration, but simply as a corps of            
      observation, with the function of observing and delaying the enemy....There was in fact no          
      penetration on our side of any kind, either short range or long range...Lt Col Musgrave‟s            
      operation was merely a delaying action. 
             Small forces cannot prevent large forces from carrying out their plan. They can, if                
      properly used...compel the larger force to alter its plan by creating an important diversion, i.e.     
      by positive and not negative action. Forces which have the role of penetration should never,       
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      therefore be told to prevent the enemy from carrying out some operation, but should be              
      given the task of surprising and destroying some important enemy installation or force, which     
      will have the effect of changing the enemy‟s plan.  They will...thus prevent the enemy from         
      doing what he intended to do, but the means for doing so are purely offensive and not                 
      defensive.
86
  
 
 
 
      Wingate argued that, while appreciating that the situation prevented the immediate creation of 
penetration forces, failure to create a G(R) cell at Burcorps HQ would result in the existing G(R) 
assets being squandered like Musgrave‟s.  Such a cell would be responsible for penetration operations, 
recruitment and training, liaison with SOE, police and civil administration, obtaining currency, and 
propaganda.  As to the type of units to carry out these operations, Wingate recommended the 
breakup of four infantry battalions - two British and two Indian - to be melded with existing G(R) 
elements to form two groups of four columns each.  Most significantly, Wingate mentioned for the 
first time resupply by air, the keystone of subsequent operations, demanding „Communication aircraft, 
sufficient to deliver 20 tons a week over a carry of not less than 300 miles‟, and „R.A.F. Officers of 
Bomber and Fighter experience allotted to columns and Group H.Q.‟ as well as wireless sets with a 
range „not less than 300 miles.‟87  
      Two factors resulted in Wingate‟s initial concept of LRP operations for Burma being supplanted. 
The first of these was the collapse of the Allied front in Burma and the subsequent retreat.  The second 
was the hostility of most Burmese to the British Empire, reflected in the large number of spies, 
partisans and saboteurs recruited by the Japanese. The antagonism between British and Burmese 
forestalled any attempt to raise a large patriot resistance for Wingate‟s columns to support, but this 
was possibly never his main intention.  However, the largely Christian northern Burmese hill tribes, 
the Chins, Kachins and Karens, remained strongly pro-British, and were soon resisting both the 
Japanese and the Thakins fiercely, allowing free passage for any penetration force through the hills 
of western and northern Burma they inhabited.  Indeed, there was to be considerable competition for 
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the hill tribes‟ affections among various British special and covert forces.88  The earliest of these was 
the Burma Levies, founded in the Chin and Kachin Hills at the behest of the Governor of Burma, 
Reginald Dorman-Smith (Eric Dorman-Smith‟s older brother) in December 1941 by Lieutenant 
Colonel HNC Stevenson, a former Frontier Service official who supported the Kachins‟ aspirations 
to independence from the Burmese with the same zeal that Wingate supported the Jews. Stevenson‟s 
2,000 Karen guerrillas were soon receiving SOE resources and training, and were acting in concert 
with the SOE-led North Kachin Levy (NKL), a force some 600 strong, which provided intelligence 
on Japanese movements in the area.
89   
These forces‟ activities may have delayed the Japanese advance 
into the Shan States of northern Burma for two days, and they also protected the flanks of retreating 
British forces and guided stragglers and civilians to safety. Once Burma was overrun, they were 
ordered to hide their weapons and await the return of the British.
90 
Irregular and penetration forces 
were therefore active under British command before Wingate‟s arrival. 
      The retreat led to Wingate producing a new model of LRP operations more in common with that 
presented at the end of his Ethiopia „Appreciation‟, and, in several ways, a reaction to Japanese 
military doctrine.  This will now be compared with other proposed British answers to the problems 
posed by Japanese tactical methods.  
 
      Different appreciations  
Allied commanders detected two key vulnerabilities in the Japanese Army.  Firstly, Japanese logistics 
were abysmal. Several times in 1942, Japanese operations in Burma and elsewhere were built around 
limitations of supply even more than the British, and their offensives might have been halted were they 
not able to use captured Allied supplies and vehicles; during the battle for New Guinea, Japanese 
troops were ordered to capture supplies post-haste in order for future offensives to be possible.
91
  
Actual systems of supply were pre-modern: prior to his Japanese 15th Army launching the 
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Imphal-Kohima offensive in 1944, Lieutenant General Mutaguchi Renya‟s request for fifty road 
building companies and sixty mule companies was denied by Southeastern Army Headquarters in 
Rangoon, and he was reduced to using bullock carts, locally requisitioned cattle and a few motor 
vehicles to carry his supplies, diverting material away from other fronts in Burma to accumulate the 
stocks needed.
92
   Slim appreciated this early: shortly after taking over XV Corps in May 1942, he 
consulted a Chinese general (unnamed) who had participated in the Chinese defeat of the Japanese at 
Changsa, the only victory against them at that time.  Thanks to their „very small administrative margin 
of safety‟, the trick, Slim perceived, was to „lock‟ the Japanese in battle for the nine days for which 
they usually had supplies available, prevent them capturing one‟s own supplies, and counter-attack 
when they ran out, a model Slim applied against Mutaguchi at Imphal-Kohima in 1944.
93
    
      It was the other perceived Japanese weakness that interested Wingate, and from it developed a 
different conception of how to beat them.  From jottings in his notebooks
94
, public statements
95
 and 
training pamphlets written subsequent to Longcloth, it is evident that Wingate was less awed by 
Bushido than many at the time or since: 
 
      The Japanese is as unpredictable as the village pye dog.  One moment he will cringe and fawn    
      on the stranger, and at the next he will snap or bolt.  This is his natural make up, but his              
      military doctrine and carefully fostered belief in his own national superiority has introduced         
      a predictable quality to his tactics and conduct on the battlefield when things are going well.       
      By exploiting these we can shake his faith in his invincibility and superiority and allow his            
      natural character to come into play.
96
  
 
 
      This was noted by others.  As early as 1937, Stilwell and other American observers of the war in 
China had noted the repetitiveness and predictability of Japanese tactics and the lack of initiative of 
even senior Japanese commanders.
97 
 Even „hook‟ attacks followed set drills: in Defeat into Victory, 
Slim cited the Japanese divisional commander who squandered an opportunity to destroy the remains 
of 17th Indian Division by over-rigid adherence to orders; told to bypass Rangoon and attack it from 
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the west, he established a strong roadblock to cover his flank, on the main road leading north out of 
Rangoon, trapping British forces there; despite the scale of British attacks against the block indicating 
the gravity of the situation, once the remainder of the Japanese division had passed, the block was 
withdrawn, allowing the British to escape.
98
  This phenomenon was visible elsewhere: Australian 
forces in New Guinea reported Japanese troops apparently blindly following orders, and if confronted 
with an unexpected situation, there would be a noticeable pause as they worked it out, during which 
they could be hit very effectively with a counterattack.
99 
A consensus was emerging among some 
officers, therefore, that, far from being a force of „supermen‟, the Japanese Army had flaws which 
Allied commanders could 
 
exploit; where there was disagreement was on how.  Slim tended, 
increasingly, towards tying the Japanese into battles in which superior British firepower could be 
brought to bear so that they could be induced to sacrifice men and physical resources. Wingate felt, 
however, that perceived weaknesses in mindset and command philosophy could be exploited through 
movement and infiltration, his aim being to impose his will upon the Japanese. 
       
      Wingate’s second model - Long Range Penetration, supported by air 
Wingate took a dialectical approach to the problem of how to beat the enemy, building his operational 
theory around how the weaknesses of the Japanese soldier and his commanders - which he saw 
principally as their lack of initiative and confusion at the unexpected - could be exploited via the 
strengths of their British counterparts.  In an article on Longcloth written for the Army Bureau of 
Current Affairs in late 1943, Wingate argued the best means of bringing „Japanese national character‟ 
into play was by attacking the decision-making process of Japanese commanders, freezing them into 
indecision and denying command to the soldiers, who, lacking personal initiative, needed it more than 
Westerners:  
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      [T]he Japanese mind is slow but methodical.  He is a reasoned, if humourless, student of war      
      in all its phases.  He has carefully thought out the answer to all ordinary problems.  He has          
      principles which he applies, not over-imaginatively, and he hates a leap in the dark to such an      
      extent that he will do anything rather than take it....On the other hand, when he feels he knows   
      the intention...of his enemy he will fight with the greatest courage and determination to the last   
      round and drop of his blood. 
             The answer is evidently never to let him know the intentions or strength of his enemy but     
      always to present him with a situation which he does not thoroughly understand....Our own        
      methods, as opposed to those of the Japanese, were always to present him with a new situation  
      which he could not analyse...
100 
       
 
       Japanese inflexibility and predictability, Wingate reasoned, meant that the salient characteristics 
of the British soldier, „firstly, intelligence in action, i.e., originality in individual fighting, and, lastly, 
on the morale side, great self-reliance and power to give of his best when the audience is smallest‟, 
could become tactical advantages.
101
 British military effort should be directed in a specific way, 
summarised in Wingate‟s training notes for Longcloth: 
 
      To use a prize-fighting parallel, in the forward areas the enemy‟s fists are to be found, and to      
      strike at these is not of great value.  In the back areas are his unprotected kidneys, his midriff,     
      his throat and other vulnerable points.  The targets...may be regarded, therefore, as the more      
      vital and tender portions of the enemy‟s anatomy.  In the nature of things, even when he             
      realises the threat that [we] constitute to his tenderer parts, the enemy cannot provide the           
      necessary protection...except by dropping his fists, i.e., withdrawing troops from the frontal        
      attack against his main adversary.
102
   
         
      The main tool would be Long Range Penetration: „This is strategical as opposed to tactical 
penetration.  It influences not only the enemy‟s forward troops but his whole military machine, and 
his main plan.‟103 Whereas MTP52 advocated penetrating the Japanese front line to attack it from 
behind, Wingate felt it „a fatal error‟ for LRP units to engage Japanese front-line troops.104   Instead, 
they should penetrate 2-300 miles behind Japanese lines, to establish bases from which attacks on 
lines of communication could be launched.
105
   From a late 1942 paper on projected LRP operations: 
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      The effect of these attacks will be the allotment of enemy troops to the pursuit and destruction   
      of Columns.  Immediately therefore, after the attack on a major objective, the force will split       
      into single Columns each with a suitable role in the L of C Area.  Columns will employ the         
      methods taught during training to lead the enemy punitive Columns on a wild goose chase.         
      The diversion they will create in this manner should compel the withdrawal from forward           
      operational areas of very considerable enemy forces for the defence of L of C installations, and   
      pursuit of Columns.
106
   
 
      
 
      These attacks would not be guerrilla raids, but assaults by regular troops on targets of strategic 
importance to the Japanese, which might involve them fighting large formations: however, guerrilla 
methods - dispersal, concealment, superior fieldcraft - would be used to infiltrate defended areas, 
avoiding combat until necessary: „Colns [sic] achieve their results by skilful concentration at the right 
time and in the right place, when they will deliver the maximum blow against the enemy.  The essence 
of LRP is concentration, the method of dispersal is only a means to achieve ultimate concentration.‟107 
Killing Japanese troops and destroying supplies was less important than diverting Japanese forces 
from their main effort: „The withdrawal of enemy forces from forward areas to protect their long and 
vulnerable lines of communication from incessant spasmodic attacks by Columns, should compel the 
enemy to alter materially his plan of operations, and should thus assist the achievement of our own 
objective.‟108  
      LRP forces would require technological help to maintain them so deep inside hostile territory.  It 
was in logistics and communications that Wingate began to depart from prevailing doctrine: MTP52 
still envisaged the British relying on „orthodox‟ lines of communication, with supplies being 
accumulated in the operational area at lorry heads, and then carried forward by animals or porters, 
hence the continued emphasis on controlling roads.  Wingate‟s forces would be supplied entirely from 
the air, columns carrying supplies with them by mule, bullock or horse, thereby freeing them from the 
scarce road network to manoeuvre cross-country.
109
 Air support was central to LRP, along with  
another important innovation of the inter-war years, the portable wireless; according to Wingate: 
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      [LRP] is made possible by two factors comparatively new to war...These factors are firstly, the  
      power of wireless to direct and control small or large bodies of men in the heart of enemy           
      territory, and, secondly, the power of aircraft to maintain such troops with essential supplies;      
      to make physical contact with them where this is necessary; and finally, and most                        
      important, to employ them to make its own blow against the widely scattered and invisible         
      enemy effectual.
110 
                     
 
      Supply by air of units with no ground lines of communication was not a new concept, having been 
used since the Iraq campaign in 1917.  Holland and others in MI(R) had discussed resupply of 
penetration forces by air as early as 1940, as covered already, and Calvert authored a pamphlet - now 
lost, or not in the public domain - on this subject while with MI(R).
111
    Gideon Force had been 
supplied partially by South African Ju-52s flying into its rear base and SOE was, by 1943, carrying 
out regular supply flights to resistance forces in occupied Europe.  MTP52 had commented that air 
transportation „was not practicable in thick jungle‟, but parachutes or gliders could be landed in 
clearings, an assumption shared by Wingate until the latter stages of Longcloth.
112
   This may have 
been based on experience gleaned during the later stages of the 1942 retreat, where the British had 
begun using aircraft to resupply front-line units via airdrop; moreover, from June 1942, when their 
ground lines of supply were cut by the monsoon, a number of outlying detachments, including Fort 
Hertz, relied entirely on air resupply and reinforcement.
113
   More ambitious use of air supply was 
made in New Guinea, scene of the first major land victory over the Japanese: Australian troops, 
retreating across the Owen Stanley Mountains, had been supplied partially by air, while during the 
Allied counteroffensive of October 1942-January 1943, the 2/126th US Infantry Regiment had been 
supplied exclusively by air.
114
  Recognising the necessity for such a capability, in late 1942, India 
Command began to raise air supply units from the Royal Indian Army Service Corps (RIASC), the 
first being ready in time to support Longcloth, and Slim at XV Corps was, by 1943, considering the 
possible use of air supply to support an entire division.
115
    Moreover, Allied forces were taking other 
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steps to reduce their reliance upon road bound logistics.  Australian forces in New Guinea used mules 
for transport from 1942, and the period following the retreat from Burma saw 17th and 39th Indian 
Divisions begin conversion to „Indian Light Divisions‟, consisting of just two brigades rather than the 
usual three, with only a light scale of jeeps and four-wheel drive lorries, relying mainly upon six Mule 
Companies of the Royal Indian Army Service Corps (RIASC) for logistical transport and with their 
engineers and artillery operating entirely on an animal-pack basis, with the intention of removing their 
reliance upon roads.
116
  Air supply and light formations based upon animal transport would therefore 
have featured in the British effort in Burma without Wingate.   
      However, Wingate was suggesting what Holland and others had been advocating in 1940, that 
specialist penetration units, resupplied solely by airdrop, carrying supplies by animal-pack, with close 
air support replacing artillery and tanks, could penetrate into the enemy rear, wage war on their lines 
of communication, and evade retribution through carefully timed dispersal and superior mobility.  
Such columns could also be a vital auxiliary to Allied air offensives: „[F]orces of this nature are better 
placed than any other ground forces to assist the air arm to direct its strategic offensive, supply it with 
detailed air intelligence, and exploit on the spot the opportunities created by its attacks.‟117 
Consequently, there should be an integrated air-land offensive against Japanese rear areas: 
 
      Columns should not be ordered to exploit strategic bombing unless this is in accordance with     
      the general plan of operations of the force.  The Columns are the means by which such               
      exploitation is rendered possible, not that by which it is carried out.  Provided the force has         
      gained the upper hand over the enemy, such exploitation will be carried out by the                      
      Guerilla organisation, which will grow as the Force succeeds in imposing its will on the               
      enemy...i.e. R.A.F. co-operation must be aimed to help the Force win the battle against the         
      enemy L of C organisation.
118 
 
 
 
      Wingate also argued that „It is most desirable that co-operating aircraft should be kept on the job, 
and not be changed with every action‟   - for part of the Allied air effort to be dedicated to supporting 
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LRP operations.
119
 Wingate‟s view of air operations echoed the developing Allied doctrine for 
tactical airpower, then being shaped in the Middle East by Air Marshals Arthur Coningham, Arthur 
Tedder and Harry Broadhurst.  Most influential was Coningham, commander of the Northwest 
African Tactical Air Force from February 1943, who demanded that the first priority of a tactical air 
commander should be to guarantee air superiority via the destruction of enemy aircraft, after which 
Allied airpower should be massed against enemy reserves and supply columns, close support of the 
army on the battlefield coming below this on the list.
120
 According to Richard Hallion, one of 
Coningham‟s keenest disciples was Lieutenant Colonel Philip Cochran, who served as a fighter pilot 
with the USAAF in North Africa before jointly commanding No.1 Air Commando on Wingate‟s 
second LRP operation, Operation Thursday.
121
 It is unclear whether Wingate was familiar with these 
developments.  However, it is apparent from his papers that Wingate agreed that the best use of 
airpower was destroying enemy communications and reserves: however, he differed from 
Coningham in two ways.  Firstly, in adding a ground element to the offensive against enemy 
communications; secondly, in insisting that LRP forces should have organic air support.  Coningham 
was firm that air operations should be controlled at Army or Air Force level, all missions requiring 
approval from the Air Force Commander, who would cooperate with the Army Commander without 
being subordinate to him, and would have sole responsibility for setting airpower priorities in the 
theatre of operations.
122
   Wingate was to demand that air elements supporting LRP should be under 
the LRP commander, presumably an Army officer.      
      Indeed, Wingate was unequivocal that, to have maximum strategic effect, LRP operations should 
be directed by a single, specialist commander: from his 1943 LRP pamphlet comes the argument that 
columns, coordinated by radio, could operate to a „Master Plan‟, using superior mobility to 
concentrate against points of critical vulnerability and, having dealt with them, could disperse into 
smaller, faster and more elusive elements before moving on:   
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      Brigades operate independently of each other, but under the centralised control by wireless of    
      the L.R.P. force Commander.  Similarly columns normally penetrate enemy held territory           
      independently on a wide front but controlled by the Brigade Commander by means of wireless.  
      Two or more columns having individually affected penetration may be                                         
      concentrated for a particular operation...Having achieved the object they will again separate,      
      thereby retaining their advantages of mobility and elusiveness and preventing the enemy from     
      concentrating superior force and pinning them down.
123
 
 
 
      This would produce the strategic impact Wingate sought: 
 
 
      L.R.P. forces by deploying Brigades from different directions many hundred miles apart, and      
      by dispersing the columns of each Brigade over a wide area, force the enemy to guard every       
      vital point in the whole of his rear areas so he will be weak everywhere and strong nowhere.
124
 
 
 
 
      LRP and other penetration forces in Allied strategy, 1942-43 
      
LRP forces needed to be melded with extant Allied strategy, which opens two issues: how Wingate‟s 
proposed organisation would cooperate with the other special and penetration units being assembled 
in India, and how far they may have departed from the role and status of such forces elsewhere in the 
British Army at this stage in the war. 
      To begin with, other penetration forces in Asia.  Lieutenant Colonel HNC Stevenson‟s Burma 
Levies have been mentioned already.  SOE planted agents and stay-behind parties among the hill 
tribes during the retreat, but did not begin operations in earnest until 1943.
125
   Two new forces were 
also present.  The first of these was the American covert operations organisation, the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS).
126
    OSS agents were also operating in Burma by 1943, but controlled by 
Stilwell in Chungking, and their activities were not only uncoordinated with, but sometimes 
duplicated those of British special forces, it was suspected by SOE, with Stilwell‟s tacit 
encouragement.
127
    The second was „V‟ Force, raised by Wavell from the Assam Rifles, a police unit 
comprised of Gurkhas under British officers, trained by SOE to act as the „hard core‟ of a 
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10,000-strong guerilla force recruited from hill tribes on both sides of the Burma-Assam border and 
intended to harass Japanese communications when they invaded India – a remit not entirely dissimilar 
to that of G(R)‟s Operational Centres in Ethiopia before Wingate took charge of them.128   When the 
invasion did not happen, „V‟ Force was switched to covert intelligence gathering and liaison with the 
local population, operating through a combination of small, irregular tribal units and individual 
agents.
129
  Penetration operations, some not dissimilar to those described by Wingate, were, therefore, 
already being planned and initiated upon his arrival in Southeast Asia. 
      That Wingate‟s LRP units should be separate entities from these „guerrilla‟ forces was accepted 
early.  Rough lines of demarcation were set at a meeting chaired by the Director of Military 
Operations, Burma, Major General Osburne, on 24 April 1942, at which Wingate, Stevenson and 
Colin Mackenzie, head of SOE‟s Oriental Mission, discussed „guerilla operations in Burma.‟  
Osburne opened by encapsulating policy for guerrillas vis a vis LRP units - „Former mosquitoes, latter 
regular dets. - Both working in co-operation for common cause‟ – this „common cause‟ being a 
common plan, made by the commander-in-chief, combining the actions of regular units, LRP and 
guerrillas.
130
  Wingate then explained the role of LRP as it stood at this stage: „Colns of all arms 
varying in strength and composition in accordance with each particular situation....say, inf. coy, 
section of mountain artillery, Sapper and Miner detachment, signal detachment, intelligence and 
guerilla personnel‟, each column carrying supplies for three weeks, the remainder delivered by air.131 
Targets would be airfields, headquarters, depots and railheads, the objective „creation of insecurity in 
rear areas of L. of C.‟132   Stevenson and Wingate agreed that cooperation between LRP and 
guerrillas would be essential, and therefore, arming and directing the hill tribes should be a priority.
133
 
Osburne would recommend to the Commander in Chief, Burma (General Sir Harold Alexander) that 
a LRP Brigade be formed, suggesting a force based on two battalions supplied by India Command; 
a LRP training centre should be formed in India, with Mission 204 co-located with it; Wingate 
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estimated he could train this Long Range Penetration Group (LRPG) in eight weeks, after which it 
could be deployed to support operations against Akyab or Moulmein, in southern Burma.
134
   
However, Mackenzie argued that northern Burma provided greater opportunities for cooperation 
with guerrillas, and it was agreed that Stevenson and SOE should maintain guerrilla activity there until 
the LRPG was ready for operations.
135
   Subsequently, in June 1942, Wingate was appointed acting 
Brigadier and received authority from the War Office to form his LRPG, to which Mission 204‟s 
reinforcements would be directed, effectively marking the end of G(R) as an independent entity.
136
  
Despite this early cordiality, Brigadier DR Guinness, the Deputy Head of SOE‟s Oriental Mission, 
recorded that Wingate „disliked and suspected‟ SOE – a sentiment shared with a number of other 
senior British military officers.
137 
      Wingate would eventually be assigned three infantry battalions, formed into 77
th
 Indian Infantry 
Brigade, a cover name, as it contained no Indian troops, other than Gurkhas.  That this was intended 
as a fighting, rather than a raiding force is apparent from its organisation.  The Brigade was divided 
into eight columns, four mainly British and four mainly Gurkha, each commanded by a major and 
intended to operate independently, and consisting of a column headquarters, an infantry company, a 
reconnaissance platoon from the Burma Rifles, a support section, with two three-inch mortars and 
two Vickers machine guns, an animal transport section, with eighty mules or bullocks, an air liaison 
section, with an RAF officer and wireless operators, a Commando platoon, of personnel from 
Mission 204, a medical team and a Royal Signals detachment, for communication with brigade 
headquarters and other columns.
138  
As discussed at length previously, such columns had been the 
basis of „small wars‟ operations since the nineteenth century, and, their moves coordinated by wireless, 
had been the mainstay of actions in Palestine and on the Northwest Frontier in the 1930s; „Jock 
Columns‟ had been used by XIII Corps and then by Eighth Army in North Africa.  Where Wingate 
differed from before was in turning these ad hoc formations into semi-permanent units, designed to 
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attack the enemy‟s infrastructure, behind his main armies in order to disrupt his planning and 
preparation before and away from the main battle.  This echoes proposals made by JCF Holland in 
particular in 1940 and also refutes Gordon‟s claim that Wingate lacked „operational awareness‟ – 
indeed, it may be advanced in support of a claim that Wingate was one of the first British commanders 
to develop an awareness of a level of war between the strategic and tactical which would later be 
identified as the „operational.‟139 
      Wingate was perhaps fortunate to still have Wavell‟s patronage, as the institutional mindset 
forming the background to his operations in Ethiopia and, indirectly, to LRP, was mutating.  As early 
as January 1942, official misgivings were expressed about the perceived over-use of Jock Columns 
by Eighth Army in North Africa, to the effect that they could not press home attacks or hold ground 
and were instilling a „tip and run‟ mentality in many officers.140  When Montgomery arrived to 
command Eighth Army in August 1942, he decreed that „The policy of fighting the enemy in brigade 
groups, Jock columns, and with divisions split up into bits and pieces all over the desert was to cease. 
 In future divisions would fight as divisions [emphasis Montgomery‟s]‟141 At Alamein in October, the 
objective was to secure breaches in the Axis front line via a series of methodical battles of destruction, 
and in pursuit of this, Eighth Army fought strictly to Montgomery‟s „Master Plan‟, the basic fighting 
formation being the division, and control of artillery being centralised at Corps level.
142
 Moreover, 
from mid 1942, as GHQ Far East continued to allow Special Forces commanders to settle a division 
of labour between themselves, GHQ Middle East created a new branch, G Staff Raiding, to 
coordinate the actions of the expanding crop of special forces in its region both with each other and 
with the main armies.   Some coordination was necessary. By the end of 1942, David Stirling was 
presiding not only over the SAS, now at battalion strength, but a French SAS Squadron, the Greek 
Sacred Squadron, the Folbot Section of the Royal Marines and the Middle East Commando, a total 
strength of over 1,000.
143
   The LRDG had expanded to two squadrons, supported by two privately 
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acquired Waco aircraft, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Prendergast after Bagnold was appointed 
an Advisor at GHQ Middle East. From 1943, it also comprised No.1 Long Range Demolition Group, 
which preferred to be known as Popski‟s Private Army, after its commander, Major Vladimir 
„Popski‟ Peniakoff, a Belgian of Russian parentage.144   Alongside these Army-controlled units were 
the Royal Marines Special Boat Section and various guerrilla and resistance movements organised by 
SOE.  
      As to roles, the LRDG retained its primary role of reconnaissance, Hackett, and the official 
historian of the desert war, Major General ISO Playfair, paying tribute to its Road Watch patrols, 
which kept a detailed census of all Axis military traffic along the main coastal road from 
April-November 1942, providing some prior warning of major Axis operations, while Montgomery 
himself referred to its finding a route through the „sand sea‟ to the south of the Mareth line, in 
December 1942, allowing the New Zealand Division to outflank this position in the battles of the 
following March.
145
   Prior to March 1942, the LRDG had the additional task of scouting for the SAS, 
and conveying it to its objectives, the latter‟s role being the destruction of Axis aircraft on the ground 
and interdiction of supplies.  The SAS destroyed 126 Axis aircraft in twenty airfield attacks between 
December 1941 and March 1942, including 37 in one raid on Christmas Day 1941.
146
   In summer 
1942, the SAS became independent of the LRDG upon acquiring its own armed jeeps, and by July, 
had hit every Axis airfield within 300 miles of the front line.
147
  During the Alamein battles, the SAS 
destroyed thirty German aircraft on raids near Sidi Haneish, but after this, Stirling was redirected to 
Rommel‟s communications, including ports, ending this period with an expensively unsuccessful raid 
on Benghazi.
148 
      An un-codified British Army „doctrine‟ for penetration forces was, therefore, emerging by late 
1942. The theatre-level command was to direct them against enemy rear areas in support of the main 
battle, evident in the deployment of the various British Special Forces in North Africa in 1942 and the 
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proposed roles for their counterparts in Burma, as agreed by Wingate and the other penetration force 
commanders in April 1942.  However, differences were also apparent: it is clear from contemporary 
sources that in Europe and the Middle East, special forces were expected to produce „empirical‟ 
results of direct use to the main armies - information gathered, enemy aircraft destroyed or enemy 
supplies interdicted, for instance.
149
   In the Far East, perhaps due to Wavell‟s influence, the aim 
remained more esoteric, and as it was in 1940 - to divert and overstretch enemy forces and disrupt 
their planning process.  An illustration of this difference comes from Hackett‟s recalling the LRDG 
complaining to G Staff Raiding that SAS raids were disrupting their activities through the large 
numbers of Germans sweeping rear areas after an SAS attack, forcing the LRDG to vacate those 
areas - yet a heavy enemy response, leading to forces being redeployed from the front, was Wingate‟s 
stated objective.
150
 Another difference was also emerging - scale.  Whereas the North African forces, 
V-Force, SOE and the others operated in small units, or covertly, Wingate proposed to insert a 
brigade-sized force, with some logistic elements and air support, into hostile territory for an extended 
period.                              
 
            Conclusions 
The first Chindit operation represented an evolution from the model of operations Wingate advocated 
after Ethiopia, which, in turn, evolved from the doctrine for covert operations devised by Holland and 
Gubbins in 1940.  Wingate‟s new model differed from what had come before in centring upon regular 
soldiers, rather than irregular partisans, formed into purpose-designed all-arms columns, to establish 
a permanent presence on and near enemy lines of communication; there they would carry out 
harassing attacks upon supplies and communications, using their superior mobility to evade 
retribution.   As such, the Chindits bear a superficial resemblance to the „Jock Column‟ model, 
adapted to the jungle conditions of Southeast Asia.  However, they also resemble the frontier columns 
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used in „small wars‟ pre-1939 and, indeed, Callwell advocated directing columns against enemy 
communications as much for their psychological as their physical effect, as did Wingate, forty years 
later.   As mentioned above, the 1930s had seen the use of wireless to coordinate the action of frontier 
columns into a single „Master Plan‟, experiments in re-supplying them by air, and some use of aerial 
bombing as a substitute for artillery in their deployment.  Wingate was able to observe some of these 
developments in action in Palestine, and they were carried over into operations against regular forces 
in North and East Africa in 1940-41, a theatre in which he was involved.  It can therefore be argued 
that rather than being based on any specific theoretical model, the Chindits were an organic 
development from Wingate‟s previous experience and from existing British Army and G(R) practice. 
      As noted above, Wingate was probably fortunate that his old patron, Wavell, was still theatre 
commander upon his arrival, as not only were there the first stirrings of doubt about the efficacy of 
mobile, dispersed operations, but this period saw the emergence of the two most successful British 
Army commanders of the Second World War, Montgomery and Slim, both of whom advocated the 
use of concentrated force to engage in „decisive battle‟, fought to a „Master Plan‟.  Moreover, while 
Special Forces formed part of this new model, and were to continue to do so until the end of the war, 
their role was growingly subsidiary and they were expected to deliver a measurable return for the men 
and resources dedicated to them.  Wingate revised his doctrine in the light of lessons learned from 
Operation Longcloth, and developments subsequent to it.  This will be placed in the context of Allied 
and Japanese operations in Burma in 1944 – Slim‟s in particular - in the next chapter.    
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                                                               CHAPTER SEVEN 
WINGATE IN BURMA (2) – OPERATIONS LONGCLOTH AND THURSDAY, AND THE        
              SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT OF LONG RANGE PENETRATION 
 
We were a well-balanced fighting force, 20,000 or more men, all potential Jap-killers and no 
hangers-on, going to the hub of the situation in order that we might cut some of the spokes.  
Then with pressure on the rim, the whole structure might break down. 
- Brigadier Michael Calvert1 
 
I found Wingate stimulating when he talked strategy or grand tactics, but strangely naïve 
when it came to the business of actually fighting the Japanese.  He had never experienced a 
real fight against them, still less a battle.  The Japanese, unlike the Italians, were not to be 
frightened into a withdrawal by threats to their rear; they had first to be battered and 
destroyed in hard fighting. 
      - Field Marshal Lord Slim
2 
 
      Introduction – Operation Longcloth and its impact 
 
This chapter outlines the impact of Operation Longcloth, the first Chindit operation, and subsequent 
events on Wingate‟s military ideas through to his death in March 1944.  Longcloth was planned 
initially as an attack on Japanese communications along the line of the Irrawaddy river and beyond,  
supporting a combined British-Chinese offensive into northern Burma, but when the offensive was 
cancelled, due to a combination of logistical problems and characteristically uncooperative behaviour 
from Chiang, Wingate persuaded Wavell that the operation should proceed as an experiment to test 
the ideas summarised in the previous chapter.
3
  Longcloth duly went ahead, from February to May 
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1943, 77
th
 Indian Infantry Brigade penetrating to the Irrawaddy and beyond, destroying a number of 
bridges and blowing the railway between Mandalay and northern Burma, the main Japanese supply 
line to their forces in the north, in more than seventy places.
4 
The brigade learnt valuable lessons, 
perhaps the most important of which was that well-trained and acclimatised British troops had little 
to fear from the jungle. They learned that there were more types of bush than the simple 
„primary/secondary jungle‟ given in official training publications, each providing its own tactical costs 
and benefits, and provided that noise and camouflage drills – which Wingate enforced rigidly – were 
respected, a large force could become virtually invisible to air and even ground forces unless at very 
close range, a notable feature of Longcloth being the large number of successful ambushes of 
Japanese forces. Also noticeable was the apparently growing lack of aggression of the Japanese, who 
seemed satisfied, in many cases, to confine themselves to shelling positions they thought were held 
by Chindit forces with mortars and artillery, from a distance.
5  
 There was a consensus, even among 
Wingate‟s critics, that one of the benefits of Longcloth was the irreparable puncturing of the „Super 
Jap‟ myth.6   
       Wingate‟s faith in the new technology was at least partially vindicated: he was in regular wireless 
communication with 77
th
 Brigade‟s parent formation, IV Corps, in Assam, until late March, by which 
time he was over 170 miles behind Japanese lines, and was also able to coordinate airdrops - at one 
point, sixteen sorties delivered 70,000 pounds of supplies over a 48-hour period. It was also 
discovered that, contrary to the protestations of previous training documents, supply drops could be 
made in thick jungle, meaning that it was no longer necessary to concentrate upon clearings or other 
obvious dropping zones.
7  
 Longcloth
 
demonstrated that a brigade-sized formation could penetrate 
over 100 miles behind enemy lines to attack his deep communications, supplied entirely by air, 
provided it had adequate air support.  Such had been forecast by Holland and others at MI(R) in 1940.  
      The operation was not an unvarnished success, however.  77
th
 Indian Infantry Brigade began the 
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operation in February with 3,000 men, and by the beginning of June, 2182 had returned to India.  Of 
the missing 818, 120 were soldiers of the Burma Rifles – a regiment recruited largely from the hill 
tribes – who stayed behind voluntarily to organise resistance; 430 had been taken prisoner, and 450 
were dead.
8  
Moreover, many of those who returned were suffering from malaria, malnutrition, or, in 
many cases, both, and would be unfit for further soldiering without an extensive period of medical 
care.
9  
 Fergusson was unequivocal about the causes of this – the short rations upon which Wingate 
kept the Brigade throughout the operation: in postwar correspondence with Slim he recounted 
having to abandon starving soldiers by the trackside, completely unable to help them, and that he had 
threatened to resign if Wingate did not rectify this problem before any further operations.
10  
 Another 
potential resignation issue had been Wingate‟s alleged „abandonment‟ of hill tribes who had helped 
the Chindits to the retribution of the Japanese.
11  
 Wingate, therefore, had critics from within his own 
forces.  
      At the political level, Longcloth strengthened British claims to be playing an active part in the war 
against Japan, something of growing importance in Britain‟s politico-strategic dealings with the 
Americans.  The Allied strategic agenda for 1943 was set at the Trident conference, in Washington in 
May 1943.  Trident saw considerable acrimony develop between the British and Stilwell.  Stilwell, 
believing the Chinese were on the point of collapse and suffering incessant nagging from Chiang and 
his cronies, pressed for an overland offensive into northern Burma, to re-open the Burma Road, 
before the end of the year: he was backed in this by his old friend General George C Marshall, Chief 
of Staff of the US Army.
12 
 Chiang, under Chennault‟s influence and with some support from 
President Roosevelt, advocated building up American airpower in China, Chennault claiming that 
with 150 fighters and eighty bombers, he could sink 500,000 tons of Japanese shipping in six months, 
severing their communications with China from the air.
13 
 Churchill and Brooke opposed this, based 
on reports from Wavell that no offensive into northern Burma would be possible before at least 
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November 1943, due to the need to build all-weather roads and railways into Assam, adjacent to 
Burma, and that re-opening the Burma road could only be expedited by re-taking Rangoon, by sea 
– Operation Anakim -  and then pushing northwards, this requiring a buildup of forces for an 
amphibious landing in southern Burma, not for a land offensive in the north.
14  
 A compromise was 
reached by which there would be a buildup of US airpower in India, air supply to China would be 
escalated to the 10,000 tons per month Chennault estimated would be necessary for his air offensive, 
there would be limited seaborne operations against Arakan, in southern Burma, and overland 
offensives from Assam and Yunnan aimed at tying down Japanese forces which might be deployed 
elsewhere and with the long-term aim of re-opening the Burma Road.
15  
It was also decided that a new 
Allied theatre-level command, Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), should be created to oversee these 
operations – and, given Churchill‟s strategic priorities, some wags suggested that SEAC actually 
stood for „Save England‟s Asiatic Colonies‟.16 
      Churchill was disappointed by GHQ India‟s reaction to these proposals.  Wavell reported that 
morale in India was still low, that the rapid expansion of the Indian Army in 1942-43 meant that 
further training was necessary before any offensives could be contemplated and that communications 
in Assam and upper Burma were so undeveloped that only those areas of Burma with all-weather 
roads – almost none - could be re-taken.17   On 7 July, news reached Churchill of Longcloth, and he 
communicated with Brooke and the other British chiefs of staff comparing GHQ India unfavourably 
with Wingate („[A] man of genius and audacity…The Clive of Burma‟) and suggesting that Wingate, 
still only an acting brigadier, should take charge of all offensive operations against Burma.
18  
 Brooke, 
who admired Wingate but recognised his limitations, moved to head off this outburst of Churchillian 
enthusiasm, and seems to have dissuaded Churchill from putting Wingate in charge in Burma at a 
private meeting on 25 July 1943: however, they agreed on the value of LRP operations, and next day, 
Churchill minuted the Chiefs of Staff ordering „Maximum pressure [in Burma] by operations similar 
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to those conducted by General [sic] Wingate, wherever contact can be made on land with the 
Japanese.‟19  Churchill‟s admiration was strengthened further by his reading Wingate‟s official report 
of the operation, and Wingate was summoned to London to meet with Brooke and to make the 
necessary measures for an expansion of LRP forces.  Upon his return to London, Wingate was invited 
to Downing Street by Churchill, who proposed that Wingate should accompany him to the next 
inter-Allied conference, Quadrant, in Quebec in August, arranging also that Lorna should accompany 
them.  Churchill aimed to show the Americans that the British shared their resolve to defeat the Axis 
on the European and Asian mainland, also taking along Wing Commander Guy Gibson VC, the 
commander of the „Dam Busters‟ raid (who seems to have taken a major dislike to both Wingates).20 
Wingate was now at the pinnacle of his influence. 
      Operation Thursday was a direct result of decisions made at Quadrant, based upon Wingate‟s 
presence there, the conference seeing Wingate, invited by Churchill initially for cosmetic purposes, 
meet with Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of Staff and thereby exert major influence over theatre 
strategy in Southeast Asia.   The memorandum and outline plan Wingate produced for the Chiefs of 
Staff on how northern Burma might be reoccupied during the dry season of 1944 marked a departure 
from prevailing British opinion, although this was one of the key objectives set by Trident.
21
 This 
memorandum does not appear to have survived, which is unfortunate, given all that flowed from it: 
however, it is summarised in other documents and the Official History.  Wingate proposed a force 
of 19,000 British, 7,500 Gurkhas or Africans, 6,000 mules and ponies and 100 jeeps, supported by 
12-20 Dakotas.
22
 These would form three LRP Groups (Brigades), one to be inserted into northeast 
Burma from China to attack communications from Mandalay to Bhamo, one to attack the 
Shwebo-Myitkyina railway and one to operate in central Burma against communications from 
Kalemyo to Kalewa.  The intention remained the same as before: 
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      The purpose of [these] operations was to create a state of confusion in enemy-held territory by   
      disrupting his communications and rear installations, which would lead to progressive                 
      weakening and misdirection of his main forces, and to indicate suitable targets for the tactical     
      air forces which would enable the strategic air offensive to be driven home.  Such                        
      operations would inevitably produce favourable opportunities for an offensive by the main          
      Allied forces...
23
 
 
      The aim was to enable a major offensive in north Burma, British forces advancing on Pinlebu and 
Indaw from Assam, and Stilwell‟s Chinese moving along the Hukawng Valley to take Myitkyina and 
thereby reopening the Burma Road.
24
 Longcloth had demonstrated that LRP Groups could not 
operate for more than twelve weeks without replacement, and so three further Groups would be 
required: these could also support a further offensive into southern Burma in 1944-45.  Wingate also 
predicted that „Since the only effective answer to penetration was counter-penetration‟, the Japanese 
would respond to the 1944 offensive with an attack on IV Corps‟ communications in Assam: 
consequently, two further Groups should be created to strike back at the communications of Japanese 
forces carrying out this offensive.
25
   Wingate also proposed the creation of a LRP Headquarters of 
corps level - a lieutenant general‟s command - with two „wings‟ of four LRP Groups each; veterans 
of Longcloth would form the nucleus of this force: what was required was to create in India „a 
machine for turning out LRP groups at a steady and increasing rate.‟26 
      The Chiefs of Staff ordered that Wingate be allocated 70th Infantry Division – which caused 
enormous bitterness at GHQ India, as it was the only fully trained and equipped British division in the 
theatre.  He also received a brigade of 81st West African Division, and the creation of a force 
headquarters was authorised by the Chiefs of Staff, with the option to attach the whole of 82nd West 
African Division at a later date.
27
  The Chiefs proclaimed confidence in Wingate‟s ideas: „We fully 
support the general conception of these Long Range Penetration Groups and feel they will be most 
useful in the war against Japan.‟28 These ideas formed a key part of British proposals made at Quebec, 
where the British Chiefs of Staff outlined their proposal to raise six LRP Groups, and argued that 
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Wingate‟s proposed operation had the potential to re-open the Burma Road - a major departure from 
their original intent to avoid northern Burma altogether.  In subsequent meetings with President 
Roosevelt and the American Chiefs of Staff - Generals George Marshall and HH („Hap‟) Arnold for 
the Army and USAAF respectively and Admiral Ernest King for the US Navy - Wingate described 
Longcloth and outlined his proposals for a future expansion of LRP.
29
 Marshall and Arnold were to 
have a major indirect influence upon the subsequent development of Wingate‟s ideas. 
      Quadrant decided as follows: 
 
      - There should be a British Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia, with an American 
Deputy, presiding over a combined staff and Naval, Air and Army Commanders-in-Chief.  Admiral 
Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed Supreme Allied Commander, with Stilwell as Deputy.  
British-Indian ground forces allocated to operations in Burma were formed into 11th Army Group, 
under the Army Commander in Chief, General Sir George Giffard; 11th Army Group comprised the 
new Fourteenth Army, under Slim, and Eastern Command, a training and administrative formation 
under the command of Auchinleck as CinC India.
30
 
 
      -  China was to be kept in the war, and the striking power of Allied air forces in China to be built 
up, through expanding the air route from Assam to China across the „Hump‟.31  
      - „[O]ur main effort‟ should be ground operations aimed at re-opening land communications to 
China.
32
   Mountbatten‟s first task was to study and report on the feasibility of amphibious operations 
against northern Sumatra, southern Burma and the Kra Isthmus of Thailand and, most significantly 
for this thesis, „To carry out operations for the capture of upper Burma in order to improve the air 
route and establish overland communications with China.  Target date, mid-February 1944‟, 
dependent upon the state of communications in Assam.
33
    By implication, this would involve 
Wingate‟s enlarged LRP force, executing operations based on the outline plan he had presented to the 
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British Chiefs of Staff en route to Quebec - in other words, at least eight LRP Brigades being inserted 
into northern Burma with major Allied ground offensives from Assam and Yunnan to exploit the 
situation created thereby, leading to the clearing of Burma, north of the 24th Parallel, and the 
re-opening of the Burma Road.  This was emphatically Wingate‟s interpretation of Quadrant: in 
correspondence covered below he cited Quadrant repeatedly - even after developments elsewhere 
caused its objectives to be modified - in support of demands that the role of LRP, and resources 
allocated, be preserved and escalated.  
      Whatever the misgivings of GHQ India, LRP operations went ahead in northern Burma in 1944, 
and on a greater scale even than predicted by Wingate at Quadrant.  This was enabled largely by 
extensive material support from the Americans, particularly Arnold, who, apparently at 
Mountbatten‟s request, created and assigned a specialist unit of the USAAF, No.1 Air Commando, 
under Colonels John Alison and Philip Cochran, to provide dedicated air support for future Chindit 
operations.
34 
 Further indication of the investment the Americans put into Wingate was the scale of 
equipment they supplied his expanded LRP organisation: Lee Enfield rifles and Sten Guns were 
replaced by American Garands, communications were enhanced by American „walky-talky‟ 
hand-held radios and, perhaps most fondly remembered by former Chindits, Wingate‟s favoured diet 
of dried fruit and Shakapura biscuits was replaced by American K-Rations.
35
 They also committed a 
brigade-sized American Army unit, Brigadier General Frank Merrill‟s 5307th Provisional Infantry 
Regiment, codenamed Galahad but known more widely under its newspaper propaganda nickname, 
„Merrill‟s Marauders‟.  Galahad consisted of 3,000 volunteers, including many Pacific veterans, and 
was intended to form the basis for three American LRP Groups; it formed in the USA in September 
1943 and arrived in India in late October to begin training in Wingate‟s methods; accordingly, it had 
700 mules allocated and USAAF pilots attached to coordinate air resupply and act as forward air 
controllers.
36
  Interestingly, Wingate never accepted Galahad was a LRP unit, because it had not 
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trained under his direct supervision, had not made use of his training literature and was only under his 
command for one exercise.
37
   Galahad never served under Wingate operationally, and was to be used 
by Stilwell as a short-range penetration force, performing „hooks‟ around Japanese forces in his 
advance down the Hukawng Valley in February-June 1944 before acting as conventional infantry in 
the final battles around Myitkyina, the main objective of the offensive.
38
 
 
      Indications of London‟s support for Wingate included the breakup of 70th Division and the 
lobbying for other British, Commonwealth and Allied forces to be assigned to the LRP role.  In 
September 1943, the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Archibald Nye, suggested 
that an Australian brigade should be re-organised and retrained for LRP - whether it would be 
deployed to Burma is unclear   - while in early 1944, Chiang assigned 200 Chinese troops to go to 
Silchar to undergo LRP training, an arrangement aborted by Wingate‟s death.39  Wingate had 
previously announced he would resist attempts to set up LRP Groups with „untrained, 
untested...troops from China‟ but was more enthusiastic about another proposal, agreed between 
Churchill, Brooke and Mountbatten at Quebec, that three Commandos, under Lord Lovat, should be 
assigned to SEAC as an amphibious LRP Group under his training and command.
40  
 Churchill‟s 
support was key throughout this period, and such was Churchill‟s enthusiasm for Wingate that when 
the latter was struck with typhoid upon his return to India in October 1943, Churchill ordered daily 
reports on his health from the GOC India, General Auchinleck, something, it might be surmised, that 
he might not have required for most other major generals.
41
 Such high-level backing possibly explains 
why Wingate was able to bypass both GHQs India and Fourteenth Army with the frequency and 
alacrity which he did over the following months. 
      The political-strategic context for Wingate‟s ideas had, however, evolved by March 1944, and the 
launch of Thursday.  Upon arriving in India in October 1943, Mountbatten flew to Chungking to 
confer with Chiang, who agreed that two Chinese Armies would participate in the Quadrant 
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operations, one operating from Ledo in northern India under Stilwell, the other from Yunnan; 
however, he made his support contingent upon an amphibious operation, supported by an Allied 
battle fleet occurring concurrently somewhere in Southeast Asia - as usual, his reasoning was opaque, 
but this demand was to have consequences.
42
   In November 1943, Chiang reiterated this demand at 
Sextant, the conference of Allied leaders and the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Cairo: Mountbatten was 
promised a battle fleet and sufficient sealift for three divisions, and in late November, Chiang agreed 
that all Chinese forces in India should be assigned to SEAC.
43
   Yet, in December, the combined 
Chiefs of Staff ordered that all SEAC‟s amphibious assets return to Europe, pending Operation 
Overlord.
44
 Chiang, accusing the Americans and British of „breach of faith‟, cancelled the Yunnan 
offensive.
45
     
      The only operations left available to SEAC were less ambitious than those decided at Trident and 
Quadrant: 
      - Maintaining supplies across the „Hump‟ at 10,000 tons per month, with the priority being 
supporting Chennault‟s US 14th Air Force in its offensive against Japanese shipping in the China 
Sea.
46
    
      - An overland offensive in Arakan, by the British 15th Corps of Fourteenth Army.
47
    
      - An offensive from Ledo by Stilwell‟s Chinese Army, with the intention of clearing the Burma 
Road as far as Myitkyina.  Stilwell‟s Chinese American Taskforce (CAT), known also as Ledo Force 
and consisting of two American-trained Chinese divisions, began its advance in December 1943, with 
several thousand troops from the US Army Corps of Engineers constructing a new road (the „Stilwell 
Road‟) and a pipeline behind it.  By the end of the month, Mountbatten was complaining in official 
communications about the slowness of the CAT‟s advance and its „bad tactics‟ against the Japanese; 
by February 1944, it was trying to advance through the dense „creeper country‟ of the Hukawng 
Valley against strong resistance from the elite Japanese 18th Infantry Division, slowing it further.
48
   
  
249 
      - Operation Tarzan, the dropping of the recently formed Indian Parachute Brigade on the vital 
Japanese airfield and supply centre of Indaw, with 26th Indian Infantry Division then being flown in 
to exploit.
49
    This, and the Yunnan and CAT offensives were intended to be mutually supportive, and 
the slowness of the CAT advance led General Sir George Giffard, the Commander in Chief 11th 
Army Group and SEAC‟s overall ground force commander, to decide, by the beginning of December, 
„that the operation as planned is no longer feasible‟ although operational instructions were still 
issued.
50
  
      - An advance across the Chindwin from Assam by IV Corps, to pin Japanese forces that might 
otherwise face Stilwell.
51
 
      - Most pertinent to this thesis, operations in the Japanese rear by Wingate‟s LRP Groups, with the 
intention of easing Stilwell‟s advance down the Hukawng Valley and creating a situation that the IV 
Corps offensive from Assam could exploit.
52
    December 1943 saw Mountbatten send Wingate to 
Chungking to persuade Chiang - unsuccessfully - to renew the Yunnan offensive, which would now 
consist of a limited Chinese advance to exploit action by 77th Brigade, inserted by air into northeast 
Burma around Bhamo, planning proceeding on this presumption into 1944.
53
  Consequently, 
throughout late 1943 and early 1944, LRP assets in India were built up to six brigade-sized 
groups - fewer than the eight mandated at Quadrant and considerably fewer than the possible sixteen 
that would have resulted from the various proposals for Allied and Commando LRP Groups - formed 
into a double-strength division, given the cover name of 3rd Indian Infantry Division but referred to 
officially as Special Force.  Special Force consisted of 14th, 16th, 23rd, 77th, 111th and 23rd West 
African Brigades, supported by the Air Commando, with Wingate, now promoted major general, in 
overall command.  Major General WG Symes, the former GOC 70th Infantry Division, was 
appointed Deputy Commander, and Derek Tulloch was Brigadier, General Staff.   For operational 
and logistical purposes, Special Force formed part of Fourteenth Army and were under Slim‟s orders 
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for Thursday, the military-strategic implications of which will be examined below.      
      Therefore, the political and military-strategic context for Wingate‟s ideas, as of late 1943, was 
shaped partially by him.  It centred, increasingly, upon an overland offensive in northern Burma to 
either reopen the land route to China or, more realistically, pre-empt and spoil Japanese moves against 
India.  This was the scenario upon which Wingate had predicated his LRP operation, as presented at 
Quebec.  Moreover, the Combined Chiefs of Staff authorised a massive expansion of LRP forces, 
including American, Commonwealth and Chinese troops, to participate in these operations.  
Therefore, far from being an „outcast‟, at the military-strategic level of the war, Wingate was now 
closer than ever to achieving his aim of creating what he viewed as a new form of warfare, or, at least, 
a new type of unit.  Among those expressing reservations about an overland offensive were Giffard 
and Slim: a review of their alternative plans and operational models provides a good illustration of 
differences between Wingate‟s ideas and those of other senior Army commanders in Southeast Asia 
in 1943-44.         
         
      Giffard, Slim and ‘Tactical Overmatch’   
In a review of projected operations, written in December 1943, Giffard, as Army Group Commander, 
expressed pessimism about the ability of LRP brigades in northern Burma to draw off sufficient 
Japanese forces to speed Stilwell‟s advance, and argued that logistics would slow the advance of IV 
Corps to the point where the Japanese could re-deploy to meet any threat posed. He was also 
dismissive of a proposal to reinforce the Chinese-American Task Force with British or Indian troops, 
pointing out that India command could spare just one division and that moving even this would 
require a major logistical effort involving the redirection of at least two air transport squadrons from 
elsewhere.
54
   He proposed an alternative plan involving an advance by IV Corps from the Kabaw 
Valley to capture and drive through a road to Kalewa, a town on the River Chindwin, combined with 
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continuous operations by LRP Groups in northern Burma, with the intention of forming a firmer base 
for Allied offensives in 1944-45 while inflicting maximum casualties upon the Japanese.
55
 What is 
interesting about this plan is that Giffard seems to have envisaged a major offensive role for the 
Chindits, possibly even seeing them as a surrogate for the CAT advance.    
      Slim was more ambivalent, both about an offensive into northern Burma and the role of LRP.  
Indeed, given the importance of Defeat into Victory in shaping postwar perceptions of Wingate, and 
their respective roles in 1944, as commander of the main army facing the Japanese and originator and 
commander of the major offensive effort in northern Burma for that year, it would be pertinent to the 
thesis to compare and contrast Slim‟s and Wingate‟s proposals for defeating the Japanese in some 
detail.  Sources are available for a survey of Slim‟s military thought, but are limited.  Slim‟s papers are 
held at the Churchill Archives at Churchill College, Cambridge, but consist largely of private 
correspondence, most of it post-war, and notes for post-war lectures on the war in Burma, many of 
them consisting of little more than prompts or headings. Contemporary papers from Slim‟s period in 
command of Fourteenth Army are limited to orders of the day – morale-building or congratulatory 
messages to the troops.  Not only does this raise the issue of upon exactly what Anderson and Lyman 
have based their assertively-worded accounts of Slim‟s military ideas, but it means that those who 
wish to research these ideas for themselves must rely upon a combination of Defeat into Victory, 
passages in Slim‟s postwar correspondence – in particular that with Kirby, who consulted him 
regularly during the writing of the Official History –  documents held in other collections and 
observations of Fourteenth Army in action. 
      From Slim‟s correspondence, it emerges that the literature – including Defeat into Victory and the 
Official History – has played down the acrimony between Slim and Wingate. In actuality there seems 
to have been a deep animosity, personal and mutual, which, in Slim‟s case, appears to have hardened 
in the decade after Wingate‟s death.  Writing to Giffard in April 1956, Slim commented of Defeat into 
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Victory that he had been „a little too kind‟ to Wingate, and in April 1959, told Kirby, in reference to 
the Official History, that  he was being „too generous‟ to the Chindits in assessing their contribution 
to the Imphal battles – and, as discussed in the literature survey, neither of these works is notably 
charitable to Wingate or the Chindits in their published form.
56  
He was even more pungent in a letter 
to Bernard Fergusson (who agreed broadly with his assessment): „Personally I doubt if  [Wingate] 
was a genius except for short intervals, even though he had what most people consider a qualification 
for the role in that he crossed the border line of lunacy…more than once.‟57  In a private note on 
Sykes‟ biography of Wingate – which was critical of Slim – Slim expressed a belief that Wingate was 
lying when he claimed that he had a direct right of appeal to Churchill, and even if he had, it was 
„subversive‟ of his command of Fourteenth Army; the impact of Longcloth, moreover, had been 
blown out of all proportion as „propaganda‟.58  In earlier correspondence, he dismissed Wingate‟s 
argument that LRP could be the main offensive arm in Burma as „a nonsense‟ and played down 
Wingate‟s role in the development of air supply, commenting that the model of air supply applied by 
Fourteenth Army in the „Admin Box‟ battle in Arakan in February 1944 was actually that applied 
subsequently, not that used on the Chindit operations.
59
  This vitriol did not all go in one direction: in 
a 1970 interview, following Slim‟s death, Fergusson recounted that Wingate had „no confidence‟ in 
Slim, spread „anti-Slim propaganda‟ among the officers of Special Force in the buildup to Thursday 
and even referred to Slim as a „stupid ass‟ in front of others.60  This probably explains the approach to 
Wingate taken in their published works not only by Slim, but by Kirby, who leaned heavily upon 
Slim‟s version of events.  It might, therefore, be easy to see the differences between Wingate and Slim 
as arising simply from a clash of egos rather than ideas, but, while this was undoubtedly a factor, even 
a cursory survey of Slim‟s approach to defeating the Japanese shows there were profound intellectual 
differences as well. 
      Slim‟s priority throughout 1943-45 was to defeat the Japanese Army in Southeast Asia as 
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cost-effectively as possible.  Units making up Fourteenth Army had known nothing but defeat for 
nearly two years, and whatever the impact of Longcloth on morale at home, their confidence was low. 
Consequently, 1943 saw Slim and Auchinleck instigate a programme of major re-organisation and 
training emphasising jungle tactics, survival skills and aggressive patrolling, culminating in a 
succession of large scale raids and shallow thrusts into occupied Burma in late 1943 and early 1944. 
The intention of this was not only to harden the British Indian Army to jungle warfare, but also to kill 
off the „Super-Jap‟ myth for good.61 Slim and Lieutenant General Geoffrey Scoones, commanding IV 
Corps, evidently intended to do this via avoiding anything resembling a „fair fight‟, applying such 
overwhelming numbers and firepower in these operations that the Japanese simply would not stand 
a chance.  This began even before Quadrant and the creation of Fourteenth Army: on 10 July 1943, 
a company of Lincolnshire Regiment - approximately 100 men - attacked a Japanese machine gun 
post - probably fewer than ten; on 17 August, a company of 1/10 Gurkha Rifles, supported by artillery, 
attacked another Japanese machine gun post.
62
    As the summer progressed, the raids escalated into 
major spoiling attacks summarised by Slim as „attack[ing] Japanese company positions with brigades 
fully supported by artillery and aircraft, platoon positions by battalions.‟63    The aim was to build 
confidence: „[W]e could not at this stage risk even small failures.  We had very few, and the individual 
superiority build up by successful patrolling grew into a feeling of superiority...We were then ready 
to undertake larger operations.‟64    Slim was also unequivocal that tanks should be used „in the 
maximum numbers available‟, even in jungle warfare, on the basis that „The more you use, the fewer 
you lose‟, this becoming an unofficial motto for the whole of Fourteenth Army.65  This principal was 
to be applied to major operations in 1944: during the second Arakan operation of February 1944, 
Slim deliberately built up his numerical superiority in ground forces to five-to-one over the Japanese 
because, he claimed, once again, Fourteenth Army could not afford another defeat.
66
  Slim‟s aim, 
therefore, was to apply overwhelming force at the battlefield level in order to ensure the tactical defeat 
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of the Japanese. 
      Logistics, a previous major British weakness, were also evolving.  Partially at Mountbatten‟s 
behest, resupply by air was practiced by all units in the hope of reducing reliance on ground lines of 
communication and the size of logistical echelons of combat units, with General Arnold creating 
specialist USAAF Combat Cargo Groups to complement this new arrangement.
67
    Not only were 
LRP units trained and organised to carry out offensive operations supplied purely by air, but so were 
two brigades of 81st West African Division, one of which was assigned to Wingate, the other serving 
with its parent formation in the Kaladan Valley, covering the flank of XV Corps‟ offensive in Arakan 
in January-February 1944.
68 
 At one point during the Imphal-Kohima battles of February-June 1944, 
eight divisions were supplied purely by air, and six were moved largely by air also.
69  
This was air 
supply on a scale that even Wingate had not envisaged. 
      As 1944 opened, British forces in Southeast Asia prepared for larger-scale operations.  Slim 
argued consistently that the war in Burma could be resolved only by the destruction of the Japanese 
armies in battle, entailing the concentration of the utmost force against their main fighting 
formations.
70
   His stated aim in building up the five-to-one advantage in the second Arakan operation 
was to „smash‟ the Japanese offensive and so build British confidence.71   Likewise, at Imphal, his aim 
was to „smash‟ the attacking Japanese armies, not hold or seize territory.72  The aim of attacking 
Meiktila in February-April 1945 was to „bring the Japanese to a decisive battle.‟73  As of the beginning 
of 1944, the wish to fight a battle of destruction shaped Slim‟s plans for the impending battle at Imphal. 
Appreciating the Japanese skill in short range penetration and that in a country as vast as Burma, static 
lines of defence could always be turned, Slim and Scoones adapted the „box‟ concept to Southeast 
Asia.  Fortified „boxes‟ would be established along the Japanese line of advance, giving them no 
option but to attack or leave their own lines of communication open to counter attack by mobile 
forces operating from the „boxes‟ or from neighbouring areas.  Upon taking command of Fourteenth 
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Army, Slim ordered that all forward units, upon finding their lines of communication threatened or cut, 
should stand fast and dig in for all-round defence, whereupon they would be supplied exclusively by 
air, and ordered his logistical staff to intensify training in air supply accordingly.
74
  As it became 
apparent that the Japanese were about to launch an offensive into Assam via the Imphal plain, the 
defensive plan adopted by Slim and Scoones - IV Corps held the main front in that area - put these 
orders into practice: 
 
      The plan for what we knew would be the decisive battle was first for Imphal plain to be put        
      into a state of defence.  This entailed the concentration of the scattered administrative units         
      and headquarters into fortified areas, each of which would be capable of all-round                       
      defence...The two all-weather airfields at Imphal and Palel, vital to the defence both for              
      supporting air squadrons and for air supply, became the main strong-points or „keeps‟ in             
      the defence scheme.  The garrisons of these fortified areas and keeps were to be found mainly    
      by the administrative troops themselves, so that the fighting units and formations would be         
      free to manoeuvre in an offensive role.
75 
 
 
 
      The four Indian divisions in IV Corps would carry out a fighting withdrawal from the edge of the 
Imphal plain while these strong-points were built behind them. Two of these divisions would then 
combine with the Indian Parachute Brigade and an independent tank brigade to form a mobile striking 
force, which would be reinforced by two or three more divisions arriving by rail and air from other 
fronts.
76
  The objective was to weaken the Japanese through defensive firepower before 
counterattacking utilising concentration of force: „The Japanese would...be allowed to advance to the 
edge of the Imphal plain, and, when committed in assaults on our prepared positions, would be 
counter-attacked and destroyed by our mobile striking forces, strong in artillery, armour and 
aircraft.‟77  
       The difference between Slim‟s concept of operations and Wingate‟s was summed up eloquently 
by the American official historians, Romanus and Sutherland: Slim wanted to draw the Japanese 
forward onto ground of his choosing in order to destroy them, Wingate to force them back by a threat 
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to their rear.
78
  Wingate‟s Strongholds bore some resemblance to „boxes‟, as will be discussed below, 
but were to be used as part of an offensive, their main aim being to divert enemy strength away from 
the main advance through threatening their lines of communication: the prime purpose of Slim‟s 
boxes was to draw the enemy into battles of destruction.  Moreover, Slim‟s assumption was that the 
Allies, at least initially, would be on the strategic defensive, enunciating in 1942 that: 
   
      The surest way of quick success in Burma is not to hammer our way with small forces through   
      jungle when the Japanese has every advantage, but to make him occupy as much area as             
      possible, string himself out until he is weak, and then, when we have got him stretched, come     
      at him from sea and air.  By luring him northwards...we get a better chance to get in behind        
      his forward troops.
79
  
 
 
      It would be necessary to lure the Japanese forward in order to bring Slim‟s intentions to fruition. 
This was not incompatible with Wingate‟s ideas - he had, after all, predicted a Japanese offensive into 
Assam at Quebec - and he was to view the Imphal offensive as an opportunity to turn Thursday from 
a supportive to a decisive operation, as will also be covered below.  However, a major difference soon 
emerged as to where the decisive blow against the Japanese should be struck, by IV Corps in Assam 
or by Special Force in northern Burma.  Slim‟s view was that the Chindits were „strategic cavalry‟, 
but, unfortunately, he did not present his views on what the role of cavalry in general should be.
80
  
However, it as apparent from Defeat Into Victory and his postwar correspondence that he was 
supportive, with qualifications, of Wingate‟s original concept, a lightly equipped force harrying 
Japanese communications in support of a general offensive.
81
   Another illustration of Slim‟s view of 
the role of penetration forces were the complaints he sent to Mountbatten in June and September 
1944 to the effect that, for all the different penetration forces then operating in Burma – SOE, OSS, 
the Secret Intelligence Service, Army Intelligence Corps, Royal Marines and others – he was 
receiving little or no intelligence from inside Burma.
82
   However, from late 1943, Wingate‟s view 
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was that air supply and support meant that LRP Groups were now capable of striking decisive blows 
against Japanese main forces with Allied main forces advancing to occupy territory cleared thereby; 
Wingate‟s Chindits would, therefore, be the main „strike arm‟, with the rest of the Army reduced to 
support.  This concept must now be described, beginning with the role of the Air Commando, before 
moving on to look at the role of Strongholds before investigating how Wingate‟s ideas compared 
with those for similar operations in Burma.     
        
       The Air Commando 
It was the attachment of No.1 Air Commando that seems to have begun the process by which 
Longcloth evolved into Thursday.  No.1 Air Commando consisted initially of: 
      - 13 C-47 (Dakota) Transports 
      - 12 Norseman C-64 Light Transports 
      - 150 Waco (Hadrian) Gliders 
      - 100 L-1 and L-5 Light Aircraft 
      - 6 YR-4 Helicopters - the first helicopters to be deployed on any operation 
      -  30 P-47 (Thunderbolt) Fighters.
83 
 
      By the commencement of Thursday, the Air Commando was supplemented by a squadron of 15 
B-25 Mitchell medium bombers and its Thunderbolts were replaced by P-51 Mustangs.  The 
Mustang‟s 2,000 mile range had already allowed it to escort USAAF bombers from Britain to Berlin, 
changing the course of the air war in Europe, and it now bestowed similar depth, in theory, to LRP 
operations.
84
  The Commando‟s air-ground potential was enhanced, prior to Thursday, by a US 
Army combat engineering company with air-transportable bulldozers, tractors and other digging and 
construction equipment.
85
  Moreover, four Dakota squadrons of the RAF, and two of the USAAF, 
supported Special Force at various times.
86
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      According to its joint commanding officer, Colonel John Alison, the Air Commando‟s missions 
were: 
 
      A) To increase substantially by gliders and light transport, potential capacity of the R.A.F. and    
      10th U.S. Air Force to maintain L.R.P.G.s by air 
      B) To increase actual mobility of columns themselves by providing air lifts over difficult terrain   
      where no tactical advantage in surface penetration.
87
 
 
      Once its gliders and transport elements had placed Special Force behind Japanese lines, the 
Commando‟s primary role would be battlefield close air support, and, from late 1943, the Air 
Commando trained and exercised with Special Force, with particular emphasis upon this role.
88
   
There was also practice of glider landings and supply drops, and it is interesting to note that Alison 
saw his mission as improving the mobility of the Chindits, just as Wingate was moving towards the 
more positional approach of the Stronghold.   
   
            
 
       The Stronghold and its consequences 
The attachment of the Air Commando inspired Wingate to develop the LRP concept further.  Having 
to infiltrate the Japanese front, then following this with a long and arduous march to Japanese areas 
of critical vulnerability, might now be avoided.  The Air Commando‟s gliders might now land advance 
parties of engineers deep in occupied Burma, there to construct airstrips on which transport aircraft 
could fly in LRP forces.  The idea seems to have grown from a short-lived plan to insert 77th Brigade 
to Paoshan, in northern Burma by air; Wingate had planned for the rest of Special Force to infiltrate 
into northern Burma on foot, as on Longcloth, but in January 1944, it was discovered that the 
Japanese were covering all the crossings of the Chindwin, in order, the British believed, to prevent this 
very thing.
89
 Mountbatten then ordered Wingate, Slim and Major General GE Stratemeyer, 
commander of Eastern Air Command, responsible for air operations over Burma, to devise a plan for 
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the aerial insertion of a LRP force; it was calculated that Troop Carrier Command, SEAC, and the 
Air Commando had sufficient aircraft to lift two LRP brigades into northern Burma in early March 
1944 and another two later in the month, meaning that just two brigades would have to march in.
90
 
Consequently, Thursday became an airborne operation - the largest of the war so far - aimed at 
establishing air-supplied Strongholds from which Chindit columns could attack Japanese 
communications.    
      This was not an original concept.  As discussed already, Holland and others at MI(R) had 
theorised on such operations nearly four years before, and Gideon Force had been part-supplied by 
air.  OSS had established several permanent airstrips for supply, reinforcement and casualty 
evacuation in Japanese-occupied Burma by the end of 1943.
91
   However, as with air supply in general, 
Wingate parted from previous practice in intent and scale, arguing that such bases could be pivots for 
large-scale offensive operations.  The Chindits might now be capable of establishing a permanent 
presence in the Japanese rear, deepening the main battle, with close air support providing the main 
offensive punch and divisional sized forces being flown in to exploit.
92 
According to Tulloch, such 
operations would hinge upon five conditions: 
 
      1. An operational area in which LRP...formations could move swiftly and undetected in the        
      dry season. 
      2. Air superiority over the Japanese but not at his stage amounting to complete air supremacy    
      (...Monsoon conditions...would immediately preclude regular supply by night) 
      3. An enemy whose supply lines were known...and which were so sited as to be vulnerable to     
      a degree, since the country across which they ran did not permit deviation from the main            
      supply routes. 
      4. Reliable and accurate support by bomber and fighter aircraft available which would replace     
      the artillery support accorded to normal formations.  (This could only be relied on during the      
      dry season) 
       5. Last, but not least, an assured supply line virtually impregnable during the dry season....The   
       vital common factor was ‘in the dry season‟.  In monsoon conditions Long Range Penetration  
       Forces lost their mobility and their fire power, while regular supplies could not be maintained    
      [Italics Tulloch‟s].93      
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      Consequently, to allow LRP operations to continue during the monsoon, Wingate intended to 
create safe harbours behind enemy lines from which smaller-scale raiding operations could be 
continued during the rains; during his discussions with Mountbatten in London in summer 1943, 
Wingate proposed to create Dakota-capable airstrips in the jungle around Indaw, an area he had 
surveyed during Longcloth.
94
  The attachment of gliders and transport aircraft now meant that the 
concept of the air-supplied offensive base could now be applied. 
      The basis of future LRP operations would now be the „defended airport‟ – Wingate‟s initial 
terminology - or Stronghold.  As with many other concepts in Wingate‟s military thought, the origins 
and intent of the Stronghold concept have divided opinion.  To Kirby, the Strongholds began as 
simple defended airstrips supplying Chindit columns, which evolved into fortified strong-points, 
which the Japanese could then be induced to attack, following Wingate‟s discussing IV Corps‟ plan 
of defence with Scoones, a view shared with, and probably inspired by Slim.
95
  Otway, the official 
historian of British airborne forces, viewed them as pivots for offensive operations by LRP columns.
96
 
John W Gordon contended that Wingate‟s aim was to establish a permanent presence in the Japanese 
rear, sustained by air supply, and thereby „engender paralysis‟, a more radical and ambitious intent 
than that viewed by other authors.
97
   Royle saw the Strongholds as pivots, „well defended safe 
haven[s] which would provide a secure garrison from which...columns could attack and harry the 
Japanese forces.‟98   John Bierman and Colin Smith perhaps came closest to Wingate‟s concept, 
describing the Strongholds as „semipermanent operational bases...inserted by airlift deep inside enemy 
territory‟, but then, characteristically, undermined themselves with spurious anecdotes of dance bands 
flown in to entertain the defenders.
99
  
      Most authors have been satisfied to simply muse upon the origins and perceived tactical role of 
the Stronghold and, indeed, much of what they say is corroborated by Wingate‟s papers.  However, 
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a reading of these papers indicates that Wingate had a role for the Strongholds beyond that of a mere 
„base‟: they were to lie at the heart of an entire new operational model and military strategy for 
defeating the Japanese.  This becomes apparent from Wingate‟s much-quoted and reproduced 
memorandum on Strongholds, which began by outlining their tactical and logistical functions: 
 
      The Stronghold is an asylum for L.R.P.G. wounded. 
      The Stronghold is magazine of stores. 
      The Stronghold is a defended airstrip. 
      The Stronghold is an administrative centre for loyal inhabitants. 
      The Stronghold is an orbit round which Columns of the Brigade circulate.  It is suitably placed   
    with reference to the main objective of the Brigade.   
      The Stronghold is a base for light planes operating with Columns on the main objective.
100
  
 
 
      Each Stronghold would be established by two columns of a LRP brigade, either marching in or 
landed by glider, securing a suitable area of flat, cleared ground.  Engineers would then fly in and 
prepare an airstrip, upon which the rest of the brigade would be flown in and the position would be 
fortified with the addition of artillery, anti-aircraft guns, and at least one line infantry battalion as 
garrison troops.  Once completed, each Stronghold would consist of a fortified area, incorporating 
earthworks and minefields, large enough to hold a battalion or two columns, two troops of artillery, 
and a rest area for up to 200 personnel.  An adjacent airstrip would be cleared, with taxiways into the 
Stronghold itself; while the strip should be Dakota-capable, it would used primarily by light aircraft 
to deliver small amounts of supplies and evacuate wounded, Wingate suggesting that ten such aircraft 
should be dedicated to each Stronghold.  The bulk of supplies would still be delivered by air-drop in 
or around the Stronghold.
101
   Wingate recommended that Strongholds should be as inaccessible as 
possible to Japanese forces, being built in the centre of approximately thirty square miles of broken 
country, not well served by roads or trails and only passable to pack animals, but with friendly villages 
in the area.
102
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      Part of the reason for this was that Wingate had another purpose for the Stronghold more 
ambitious than a simple raiding base: carrying the „box‟ concept into the enemy rear.  The objective 
now would not just be to divert Japanese forces away from the front, but to lure said forces into 
situations where they could be destroyed in detail:  
   
      The Stronghold is designed to fulfill [sic] a definite function in the employment of L.R.P.G.s;      
      a function which has hitherto been neglected.   In all our recent contacts with the Japanese it       
      has been apparent that any dug-in defended position sited in remote areas where it is almost        
      impossible to assemble a concentration of artillery and extremely difficult to make accurate         
      reconnaissance without heavy losses is capable of a most obstinate and prolonged defence          
      against greatly superior force....From this I draw the inference, firstly, that it is foolish to direct   
      attacks against defended enemy positions if by any means he can be met in the open, and,           
       secondly, we should induce him to attack us in our defended positions.  It is obvious that           
       columns of L.R.P. have an unrivalled chance of meeting him in the open and that, therefore,      
       they should even more rarely need to attack him in his positions.  In fact, it may truly be             
       said that they should do so only when the position concerned has already been isolated by the    
       action of Columns for a considerable time, or there is other reason to suppose that the position  
       will put up a weak resistance.   We wish, therefore, firstly to encounter the enemy in the open    
       and preferably in ambushes laid by us, and secondly to induce him to attack us only in our          
       defended Strongholds.
103 
 
 
      Wingate understood that LRP attacks upon Japanese lines of communication would result in the 
Japanese trying to locate and destroy the columns‟ own source of supply.  Each Stronghold, therefore, 
would have at least two „floater columns‟, patrolling the surrounding countryside out to a few 
thousand yards with the intention of detecting and slowing down any approaching Japanese force.
104
 
These would drive off any Japanese reconnaissance patrols which would, hopefully, provoke the 
Japanese to commit a larger force, of around regimental strength; this probably would not have the 
benefit of tanks or artillery support, as the country in which the Stronghold was located meant that 
only ordnance which could be man or mule-packed could be brought in, and any attempt to build 
roads would provide a prime target for attack by floater columns.
105
  Upon this force approaching, the 
Stronghold commander should reinforce his floater columns:  
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      In this way, the enemy is met under ideal conditions; making an approach whose route can be     
      forseen [sic] through country with which we are more familiar than he, and compelled to            
      move slowly to cover his road construction.  Under these conditions, two Columns should         
      find little difficulty in cutting up a regiment.
106
 
 
      Should the Japanese reach the Stronghold, they would have to attack its fortifications under 
attack from behind by floater columns.
107
   However, the main „killing instrument‟ would be airpower, 
delivered upon Japanese forces concentrated for attack upon the Strongholds, principally by the Air 
Commando‟s Mitchells and Mustangs, the latter doubling as light bombers and ground strafers; 
Special Force also had a squadron of RAF Vengeance dive bombers train with it, although this was 
reassigned elsewhere by Thursday, despite Wingate‟s protestations.108   
      In December 1943, Wingate stated to Mountbatten his belief that future war would hinge upon 
the close air support of infantry on the ground, and that the Chindits were forerunners of this.
109
   
Unlike the RAF, whose doctrine still emphasised pre-planned attacks, USAAF pilots had trained in 
battlefield close air support, „on call‟ from troops on the ground, since 1941; their aircraft carried HF 
radios allowing direct communication with ground troops, unlike the VHF radios used by the RAF, 
meaning that the Air Commando‟s Thunderbolts or Mustangs could provide faster and more flexible 
response than the RAF, with the Mitchells being held back for pre-set attacks on areas targets such 
as supply dumps or large troop formations.
110
   During Thursday, Wingate ordered that priority in the 
use of the Mitchells should be given to bombing the heavy Japanese concentrations around the 
„Broadway‟ Stronghold and the „White City‟ block established by Calvert‟s 77th Brigade astride the 
main Japanese lines of communication, with the secondary role of breaking up Japanese formations 
assembling for counter-attacks, providing some evidence that Wingate was seeking to use these 
positions to lure the Japanese into destructive battle.
111
  In an operational order for Thursday, 
Wingate referred to „[The] Development of close support aircraft...in close co-operation with 
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columns in order to give the latter the equivalent of artillery and armour support, thus raising the 
potential of the 3rd Indian Division to that of an abnormally active Army Corps‟ and that the 
attachment of the Air Commando was „unique in conception and should help us to apply 
revolutionary methods.‟112  
      Strongholds, with airpower support, would leave the Japanese with no option but to commit a 
large force, of divisional size or above, with considerable air assets of their own in support, all of 
which would have to be diverted from elsewhere.
113
 The Brigade commander then might recall 
columns from other LRP operations in order to reinforce the Stronghold or the floater columns, but 
this should not be at the expense of threatening Japanese lines of communication, so drawing in 
further Japanese forces to protect them.
114 
 The Strongholds were intended, therefore, to remove 
Japanese from the front line and tempt them into combat in their own rear areas, under conditions 
where their own reinforcement and resupply would be difficult.  Japanese operational and tactical 
strengths would be rendered irrelevant; in particular, air supply would deny them the opportunity to 
defeat British forces through short-range penetration.  There were other benefits for the British: air 
supply and movement also meant that problems of terrain became less important, as Bernard 
Fergusson stressed in a lecture to the RUSI in 1946.
115     
There is a detectable resemblance between 
the Strongholds and the pattern for the defence of the Imphal Plain devised by Slim and Scoones, 
Wingate also hoping to force the Japanese into „killing zones‟, in his case by using the air route to 
establish fortified positions on or near their communications then, once they were lured in, defeating 
them through battlefield airpower and counterattack from the rear by mobile forces.  Slim noted 
caustically: „Scoones must have been amused to find this [the boxes] appear as a new Wingate 
method of defence‟ and it is not unreasonable to see Wingate‟s tactical inspiration laying in Slim‟s and 
Scoones‟ plans for the decisive battle against the Japanese.116   
      However, the Strongholds also supported the model of LRP Wingate had been advocating since 
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1941.  One of the aims of Thursday was to raise a revolt among the Kachins, Lieutenant Colonel DC 
Herring being ordered by Wingate to recruit, train and then command Kachin guerrillas against 
Japanese lines of communication; consistent with Wingate‟s Ethiopia reports, and his directives and 
memoranda of 1942, this was to happen only in areas where Chindit columns could support and 
protect them, with a Stronghold to be established in Kachin country from where these could operate, 
something which apparently led do a clash with SOE, who had agents operating in the same area and 
to a similar mission.
117
    Fergusson added a further role to the „Aberdeen‟ Stronghold from which his 
16th Brigade operated on Thursday, a permanent - so he thought at the time - centre of British 
government and administration, protecting the local tribespeople from the Japanese and distributing 
food and medical supplies flown in from India.
118   
The aim throughout, however, was to use the air 
route to establish a permanent presence on and around enemy lines of communication, which would 
consist of specialist penetration forces cooperating with local partisans, the type of operation that 
MI(R) were speculating upon in 1940.  LRP now also contained a major airborne element, and it 
would therefore be appropriate now to compare and contrast Wingate‟s new LRP concept with the 
projected use of other airborne forces in Southeast Asia.
 
 
      Thursday as an airborne operation 
 Thursday differed radically in both scale and intent from other airborne and air-mobile operations 
planned for Southeast Asia, as can be illustrated by a brief overview of Tarzan, Operation Mailfist, 
the planned seizure of Bangkok and Singapore set for November 1945, and the actual use Slim made 
of air-portable units in Fourteenth Army‟s offensives of 1944-45.  One obvious difference is that 
Tarzan and Mailfist made extensive use of parachute troops.  In June 1941, the Commander in Chief 
India, had been authorised to form an airborne brigade, but a shortage of gliders meant that only a 
parachute brigade – 50th Indian Parachute Brigade, a largely Gurkha formation - was formed.  In 
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November 1943, following a visit by Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Browning, the overall 
commander of Britain‟s airborne forces, Mountbatten proposed to form an Indian Airborne Division, 
which would consist of one Indian and one British airborne brigade and an Indian glider borne brigade, 
this being approved by the Chiefs of Staff, provided it could be met from manpower from within India; 
Major General Ernest Down was appointed commander.
119
  Although not dwelt upon in any 
documents or literature, it would appear that Wingate and Down were competing for scarce trained 
manpower and even scarcer aircraft in the same period.  In December 1943, Wingate complained to 
Mountbatten that the Parachute Brigade was using 60-70 transport aircraft he felt should be his, even 
though „Parachutists are becoming obsolete...‟120      
      As noted already, Wingate was nicknamed „Tarzan‟, and it is possible that the plan was named, 
mockingly, after him, as, according to the Official History, he was unequivocal that the plan to drop 
50th Indian Airborne Brigade on Indaw derived from the Memorandum he wrote for the Chiefs of 
Staff at Quadrant.
121
   Tarzan was to support the offensives from Ledo and Yunnan: as with 
Thursday, Indaw was the major objective, and it was also planned for air supply to maintain 50th 
Indian Parachute Brigade and 26th Indian Infantry Division inside Burma, astride a major Japanese 
supply node, throughout the monsoon.
122
  Similarities with Wingate‟s concept are, therefore, 
apparent. 
      Mailfist, planned for the summer of 1945, would have involved one of the largest and most 
ambitious airborne operations of the war.  In October 1944, it was decided to proceed with the raising 
of the 44th Indian Airborne Division, consisting of two brigades, one parachute, one gliderborne.
123
 
This would form in Rangoon with 6th Airborne Division, which had spearheaded the Normandy 
landings and the Rhine crossings of March 1945, to form a SEAC Airborne Corps under the 
projected command of Lieutenant General Sir Richard Gale, who had commanded 6th Airborne 
Division in 1944-45.
124
  Mailfist, interestingly, bore some resemblance to Wingate‟s concept in that 
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it hinged upon taking a major objective purely by airborne attack, but was also similar in concept to 
Tarzan.  Don Muang airfield, to the northwest of Bangkok, would be seized by the glider brigade of 
one division, after which the remainder of the division, another infantry division and corps elements 
would be flown in; two parachute brigades would be dropped to the north of Bangkok to prevent its 
reinforcement while the other two divisions attacked the city, defended, it was projected, by just one 
Japanese division.
125
 Rather than carry out an extended campaign against Japanese communications, 
aimed at destroying Japanese units inside their own territory as Wingate intended, airborne units 
would seize a major strategic objective. 
      The above operations were hypothetical: in reality, 50th Indian Parachute Brigade first saw action 
as conventional infantry during the Imphal-Kohima battle, and its one combat drop was made against 
a mere thirty Japanese at Elephant Point, outside Rangoon, on 1 May 1945.
126
    Historically, the 
offensives of late 1944-1945 saw Fourteenth Army use airborne troops of a very different type, one 
brigade each of 5th and 17th Infantry Divisions being reorganized and re-equipped to be completely 
air-portable, the other two being fully mechanised.  Each of these divisions was intended to advance 
with a mechanised or armoured group forward, tasked with seizing an airfield or a suitable site for one; 
airfield engineers would fly in to prepare the site, followed by the air-portable brigade, which would 
secure the airfield as a pivot for the next bound or reinforce the advancing mechanised troops as the 
situation demanded; Fourteenth Army aimed to have at least one such airfield every fifty miles.
127
 
Mountbatten and Slim both wrote enthusiastically of this technique‟s application in 17th Division‟s 
attack from the Irrawaddy to Meiktila in March 1945, and IV Corps‟ rapid advance from Mandalay 
to Rangoon the following month.
128 
  This close integration of ground and airmobile operations is 
different from Wingate‟s concept, in that the aim was to use the air route to reinforce a ground 
advance by large formations, although the use of airfields as pivots of manoeuvre is a common idea 
between the two.    
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      It is interesting to note that some thoughts were being expressed on Wingate‟s „place‟ in British 
military thought and practice already, by some of his colleagues.  In a memorandum of November 
1943, Calvert ruminated upon a detected similarity between LRP and the strategy applied by the 
Duke of Marlborough in the Low Countries in the 1700s.  Seventeenth century warfare, Calvert 
argued, hinged on fortified supply bases and therefore tended to revolve around sieges; Marlborough 
had upset this by forcing his enemies to fight him in open battle, after which their bases fell rapidly.
129
 
Likewise, in North Africa, armoured forces defeated Axis forces in the open desert, allowing infantry 
divisions to move up to assault their forts.
130
    Calvert also saw the Chindits delivering decisive blows 
against the Japanese, their role being to defeat Japanese forces in the field, then contain them in their 
bases, allowing heavier forces to advance and besiege them.
131
   However, this required changes in 
tactical doctrine: columns would infiltrate into Japanese rear areas, whereupon they would 
concentrate as brigades astride lines of communication, forcing the Japanese to attack them under 
unfavourable circumstances.
132 
 Calvert‟s objective, therefore, was to use LRP to draw the Japanese 
into battles of destruction in their own rear areas; this came some time before Wingate presented his 
Stronghold concept and a Calvert influence cannot be discounted, although, as usual, Wingate 
credited nobody but himself for his ideas and there is no documentary evidence of any link.       Almost 
at the other end of the scale was Brigadier WDA („Joe‟) Lentaigne, who commanded the Chindit 
111
th
 Brigade on Operation Thursday and who would succeed Wingate in overall command of the 
operation following his death.  According to his brigade major, John Masters, Lentaigne was horrified 
by the expansion of Special Force to nearly two divisions in strength and Wingate‟s intent to go after 
large Japanese formations, a sentiment he repeated to Tulloch, post-Thursday.
133
    Two brigades, as 
was planned, pre-Quadrant, he argued, were sufficient to pin larger numbers of Japanese forces but 
this needed to accompany offensives by the main armies both to allow and exploit this. Although 
Special Force had six brigades, Lentaigne believed they had insufficient firepower to be able to fight 
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major battles and the only way for it to have this would be to divert air assets away from the main 
front.
134
    Upon learning of the Air Commando, Lentaigne conceded it might ease this problem, but 
not to the extent that Wingate hoped.
135
  Although Lentaigne left no memoirs, from Masters‟ account 
it appears that the prevailing view in 111th Brigade was that the Chindits should be a guerrilla force 
aiming at battle avoidance.
136 
      Wingate, therefore, parted company with his colleagues in SEAC in several ways.  Most 
obviously, as of 1943-44, was his advocacy of the use of airborne and air-portable troops to carry the 
battle into the enemy rear.  While this resembled the „box‟ defences used in North Africa and by 
Fourteenth Army in Arakan and at Imphal-Kohima, Wingate intended to use air movement to turn 
this from a defensive to an offensive method by placing his „boxes‟ on or near Japanese lines of 
communication in such a way that the Japanese would have to counter-attack under unfavourable 
conditions.  Given the scale and intent of his post-Quadrant LRP forces, and the way in which Special 
Force fought the Japanese during Thursday, it would be inaccurate to describe Wingate, as of 1944, 
as a commander of guerrillas or Special Forces.  The next section reinforces this conclusion further 
by reviewing how his ideas were evolving even in the final period of his life, the period of Operation 
Thursday, February-March 1944.  The salient characteristic of this period is, as his command and 
apparent ambition grew, so did Wingate‟s conviction that LRP forces were evolving from a 
supportive role to being the main „strike arm‟ in modern warfare, and his determination to use 
Thursday to demonstrate this. 
 
 
      Thursday as ‘decisive operation’ 
A common theme running through Wingate‟s correspondence in the buildup to Thursday was his 
objection to another limited operation.
137
 There were also complaints about inadequate support from 
GHQ India and Fourteenth Army for Special Force‟s training programme, the limited scale of troops 
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Slim was willing to spare to garrison the Strongholds, and the perceived lack of ambition of the 
proposed exploitation of Thursday.  These illustrate the very different views of Wingate, 
Mountbatten and Slim towards the strategic role of LRP in general and Thursday in particular. 
      This began in December 1943, when Giffard was asked to comment on the feasibility of 
large-scale LRP operations in northern Burma.  In an Aide Memoiré of 28 December, Giffard stated 
that the prognosis was not good for the operation Thursday was supposed to support, Stilwell‟s 
advance down the Hukawng Valley.  The plan to reinforce Stilwell with a British brigade foundered 
on the only two brigades available not yet having animal transport, and, moreover, their redirection 
would reduce SEAC‟s reserves further.  As far as flying in troops to reinforce the Chindits, either the 
objective would have to be within a few days‟ march of the front line, or they would need to secure 
an all-weather airfield, or the force would have to be extricated before the monsoon; the minimum 
force should be a brigade, anything smaller being liable to being „mopped up‟.  This, and supporting 
aircrew, would have to be retrained; finally, airborne forces might take excessive losses from Japanese 
air defences. Giffard concluded that „I do not...consider that this is a feasible operation this spring.‟138 
Wingate‟s response to Giffard, his commander-in-chief, was characteristically pungent: the Chinese 
would not, in his view, fight alongside Indian troops anyway; a British brigade could have another‟s 
mules assigned to it; garrison troops would not require retraining, nor would aircrew, who would 
simply be ferrying them between airfields; Wingate closed by accusing Giffard of opposing any kind 
of LRP operation, along with GHQ India and Fourteenth Army.
139
    
      Wingate‟s feud with these headquarters continued into January 1944, even as preparations for 
Thursday advanced.  In a memorandum - possibly not circulated - of 9 January 1944, he reviewed the 
impact of developments since Quadrant on the proposals he had made there.  His main argument was 
that without any large-scale Allied offensive to follow up, the Japanese could concentrate against the 
Chindit brigades, who would then be left with no option but to break up and retreat.  He devised the 
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Stronghold concept partially as a precaution against this, but with the absence of a general offensive, 
their object, to attract Japanese attention away from the front, would be defeated before the operation 
even began.
140
 There were also regular complaints about the non-cooperation of the RAF, too 
frequent and repetitious to be cited in detail.
141 
       Wingate‟s mood improved on 11 January 1944, when intelligence was circulated, for the first 
time that the Japanese 15th Army was concentrating east of the Chindwin for their Imphal offensive, 
the brainchild of 15th Army‟s commander, Lieutenant General Mutaguchi Renya.  Wingate‟s brigade 
commanders, surveying potential crossings of the Chindwin, had already found them all blocked by 
Japanese troops.
142
  Wingate predicted an offensive similar to that he foretold at Quebec, an attack 
on IV Corps‟ lines of communication, developing into a possible counter-penetration against 
Stilwell‟s communications.143  In response, he urged upon SEAC an airborne counter-penetration 
aimed at 77th and 111th Brigades establishing fortified blocks along the railway between Mohnyin 
and Mawlu and destroying railways south of Wuntho – Mutaguchi‟s main lines of supply - while 16th 
Brigade seized the airfield and communications node at Indaw and destroyed Japanese supplies and 
communications in the surrounding area.  The Stilwell offensive would continue, and one brigade of 
IV Corps would cross the Chindwin to exploit the Chindit landings: „Such an operation...will defeat 
the enemy‟s main effort, and even bring his plan to a disastrous end.‟144 All that was required was for 
Special Force to be given priority use of 500 gliders and sixty Dakotas.
145
   Wingate, therefore, 
believed he had found a means by which LRP could defeat the Japanese at theatre level.   
      Tulloch provided further evidence in support of this with his testimony that Wingate, secretly, 
devised a „Plan A‟ and a „Plan B‟ for Thursday. „Plan A‟ was the original plan, to support Stilwell‟s 
attempt to re-open the Burma Road; „Plan B‟ involved doing this plus committing two LRP brigades 
against Japanese 15th Army‟s communications as it attacked Assam.146   „Plan B‟ would require LRP 
forces to operate during the monsoon, and Tulloch claimed that Wingate devised the Stronghold 
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concept partially in response to this need.
147
  A problem for the historian is that there is little 
corroboration of a complete and explicit „Plan B‟ of the type Tulloch describes from any of Wingate‟s 
papers, or, apparently, in any other contemporary document, even the „Stronghold‟ memorandum, 
although this latter implied that the Chindits might be committed against heavier Japanese forces than 
hitherto.   However, that Wingate might have planned a „decisive‟ operation, rather than a supportive 
one, emerges from his operational orders.  In his Operational Order for Thursday of January 1944, 
Slim issued the following instructions to Special Force: 
 
            1. COMMAND 
           You will operate under my command in accordance with the following                                   
            instructions.... 
           3. ROLE 
           Your role is to create a situation which will:- 
           a) Assist the advance of Combat Tps (LEDO Sector) [Stilwell] 
           b) afford a favourable opportunity for YOKE force to advance [in the hope of getting            
            Chiang to change his mind] and 
           c) provide opportunities for exploitation for 4 corps [sic] 
           Of these tasks the most important is to assist in the advance of Combat Tps (LEDO Sector)  
          [Italics Mine].
148
   
 
      Compare this with Wingate‟s Operational Order of 2 February 1944, his stated intention being „to 
compel the enemy to withdraw from all areas in BURMA north of the 24th Parallel‟ a similar, but far 
more ambitious remit to that given him by Slim.
149
 He would obtain this by seizing Indaw; Bernard 
Fergusson, whose task this would be, agreed that Indaw was the point of critical vulnerability of 
Japanese forces in Upper Burma: 
 
      It was the last and northernmost centre of communications possessed by the Japanese.  Roads    
      radiated from it north, south, east and west; the Myitkyina railway ran through it from south to  
      north, and the subsidiary spur line to Katha...Around and in it was a cluster of important             
      dumps, supporting the whole force opposing General Stilwell in the north, and                            
      capable also of supplying the divisions opposing our army on the Chindwin.
150 
 
      Neutralising Indaw would disrupt severely the communications of the Japanese 18th Infantry 
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Division, then slowing Stilwell‟s advance down the Hukawng Valley, and of the Japanese 31st 
Infantry Division on the Chindwin and would, it was hoped, compel the Japanese to alter their plans 
for northern Burma.  This perhaps explains Wingate‟s design for Thursday, his language not 
suggesting a guerrilla operation but something more akin to the ideals of  Field Service Regulations: 
 
      16th Infantry Brigade, 77th Indian Infantry Brigade and 111th Infantry Brigade will converge     
      upon the focal point of INDAW in such a manner and with such timing as to cut effectually the  
      enemy communications with 31st and 18th Divisions.  The governing principle of the                  
      operation is concentration at the decisive point.  The decisive point for operation                         
      "THURSDAY" consists of a circle 40 miles radius whose centre is INDAW within which           
      therefore I intend to concentrate twenty-four columns....Towards the end of the operations it     
      will become a battle of wills.   We will stay where we belong at INDAW...
151 
 
 
      Calvert, now commanding 77
th
 Brigade, was even more explicit, stating his aim in the „Intention‟ 
paragraph of his operational orders for his battalion commanders: 
 
      By the cutting of his L. of  C. and by inflicting as much damage as possible on his men and         
      material, to gain such moral and material ascendancy over the Japanese in this area that he will   
      be forced to withdraw his remnants south of parallel 24 [degrees] in defeat and rout.
152 
 
 
      The Imphal offensive began in late March 1944, and brought the Japanese onto ground of Slim‟s 
choosing, onto IV Corps‟ boxes and away from Stilwell‟s advance in the north.  Mountbatten 
commented that „our hopes were considerably raised by this Japanese offensive [but] the situation 
was at times to prove extremely dangerous for us.‟153  Now that the offensive was developing, 
Fourteenth Army was reluctant to commit more troops or aircraft to Thursday; in particular, it 
needed every available Dakota to supply IV Corps‟ „boxes‟, and to airlift in 5th Infantry Division from 
Arakan following the defeat of the subsidiary Japanese offensive there.
154
  Special Force had begun 
flying into northern Burma on 5 March, and within three weeks, three Chindit brigades – 77th, 16th and 
111
th
 – were operating against Japanese communications, two Strongholds („Broadway‟ and 
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„Chowringhee‟) had been established over 100 miles inside Japanese controlled territory, with 
another („Aberdeen‟) under construction, and Calvert‟s 77th Brigade had constructed the „White City‟ 
block right across the railway, and was under fierce Japanese attack. The literature refers to 
Wingate‟s desire to fly in two more LRP Brigades to attack Mutaguchi‟s lines of communication (the 
„Plan B‟ described by Tulloch), and his subsequent request, direct to Churchill, for four more Dakota 
squadrons to be diverted to India from elsewhere so they could fly in: however, this is usually done 
either to illustrate differences of opinion and style between Wingate and Slim, as done by Kirby and 
Slim himself (who does not mention the message to Churchill) or as a sign of Wingate‟s strategic 
prescience, as by Tulloch himself.
155
  The documents tell a more intricate story, illustrating the real 
strategic aims of both commanders at this time, and providing some contemporary evidence for 
Wingate‟s „Plan B‟ and a desire to use the Chindits to inflict a strategic-level defeat upon the Japanese. 
 
 
     This originated with a conversation Slim had with Tulloch on 8 March, wherein Slim stated that 
he might need the Chindit 14th and 23rd Brigades, Wingate‟s designated reserve, to reinforce Imphal, 
and – yet more evidence for their difficult personal relationship - allegedly told Tulloch not to inform 
Wingate.
156
   An ensuing meeting saw Slim agree that if the two brigades were inserted into Burma 
within the first twelve weeks of Thursday, before they were due to relieve the first three brigades, then 
they would operate under Wingate‟s command; Tulloch also claimed Slim agreed they should be used 
against the rear of Japanese 15th Army.
157
  This now, apparently, became a priority for Wingate.  On 
12 March, he sent a memorandum to Mountbatten - which has not, apparently, survived - outlining 
his „Plan B‟, based on inserting the two brigades across 15th Army‟s communications at Meiktila and 
Pakokku.
158
   On 15 March, Tulloch signaled Wingate, reporting a discussion with Colonel Bert 
Lyons, the US Army Liaison Officer at HQ Fourteenth Army, concerning Wingate‟s intent to keep 
five brigades inside northern Burma throughout the monsoon; this would require a greater scale of air 
transport than hitherto and, given the need to maintain supplies over the Hump, a request should be 
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made for two or three Dakota squadrons to be diverted from another theatre.
159
 On 16 March, 
Wingate replied, expressing astonishment at the move by air of 5th Infantry Division from Arakan to 
Assam, and that the aircraft used „would be better employed on exploiting victory‟; the move should 
not divert Special Force from introducing 14th Brigade into Burma forthwith.
160
   On 17 March, 
Tulloch reported that „some staff‟ were urging Slim to attach 14th Brigade to IV Corps, Slim 
agreeing with Tulloch that this would be a „gross misuse‟ of a LRP Brigade.  Tulloch felt that „the 
more Japs cross the CHINDWIN the better, as if our plans succeed they should never return‟; 14th 
and 23rd Brigades should be inserted into northern Burma, as „they will be worth ten times as much 
to 4 Corps placed BEHIND the enemy than they would be placed in front.‟161      
      Corroboration for „Plan B‟ came from Fergusson, perhaps the most measured and reliable source 
from this time: 
 
      Wingate told me all this at Aberdeen [16
th
 Brigade‟s Stronghold] on the 23rd of March, and       
      confided also that the situation might affect his famous Plan.   Already, he said, he was being      
      urged to keep his two remaining brigades, the14th and 23rd, under his hand, in case they were   
      needed to help repel the Japanese advance.  This he was determined not to do.  His was an         
      offensive move, as opposed to the defensive strategy to which we had so long been                     
      thirled, and which irked intolerably his fiery spirit.  Rightly or wrongly...he foretold that the         
      Japanese effort would overreach itself, and that pourvu que ça tienne, the Jap armies would       
      eventually starve.  To remove his remaining Brigades out of reach of the High Command, he      
      proposed to commit them both forthwith, before his right to do so had been abrogated. 
             14 Brigade was to come in first...and they would co-operate with me against Indaw,            
      working south from Aberdeen and then threatening against Indaw from the west.  23 Brigade    
      would follow, but Wingate had not made up his mind where to send them. [Italics mine - 23rd   
      Brigade would eventually be used in the Imphal-Kohima battles in a short-range                          
      penetration role, as Wingate and Tulloch feared].
162 
 
 
      On 21 March, Wingate apparently bypassed Slim, sending a signal to Mountbatten for direct 
communication to Churchill.  Wingate saw the Imphal offensive as a major Japanese mistake 
„which...can be made [to] prove fatal to them.‟163 All that was required was for Churchill to direct four 
more squadrons of Dakotas to India for Wingate‟s use and to give him his „full backing‟; although 
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Wingate made no direct link between Thursday and Imphal in this signal, his attitude can be inferred: 
 
     Success of THURSDAY means no more hump and the destruction of four Japanese divisions     
     (.)  Get Special Force four transport squadrons now and you have all Burma North of                  
     twenty-fourth parallel plus a decisive Japanese defeat (.)  But get use these four squadrons and    
     let the truth be told about what has happened and is happening (.)  General SLIM gives me his    
     full backing (.)
164 
 
 
      This was not the view of Wingate‟s colleagues.  Mountbatten passed on the signal to Churchill, 
but appended his comments: while SEAC could never have too many transport aircraft, he and 
Giffard were mystified as to why Wingate needed these extra squadrons, and he had asked Air HQ 
SEAC „to investigate this question as a matter of urgency‟; he also commented upon the „hysterical‟ 
tone of Wingate‟s communication and told Churchill that Wingate was „showing signs of strain‟ – 
according to Slim.
165
  Moreover, Giffard had returned from the front, where he had discussed the 
situation with Slim: they had agreed that the expulsion of the Japanese from west of the Chindwin and 
then from northern Burma would be a slow process, and they would have to be defeated on the 
Imphal plain first; however, more transport aircraft would speed the process, and so they supported 
the request for additional Dakotas - albeit with a different agenda from Wingate‟s.166  Slim‟s attitude 
was summed up in two communications to Giffard of 22 and 23 March.  He opened the first by 
outlining what he saw as the essentials of jungle warfare, „well trained, tough infantry and Air 
Transport‟; he felt vindicated by the advance of Stilwell‟s forces, the February „Admin Box‟ battle in 
Arakan and „the promising situation of the Special Force behind the enemy lines.‟167 The Japanese 
15th Army was not only committed against IV Corps, but under pressure from Stilwell to the north 
and Wingate from behind; Slim felt that with enough aircraft to fly in reinforcements to Imphal, „we 
can, within the next month, smash the enemy forces West of the CHINDWIN [and] be presented with 
an opportunity whose exploitation might easily lead to a really major victory.‟166  However, more air 
transport was needed urgently, in order to supply Allied forces without ground communications, but 
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also to allow „reinforcing formations, e.g. additional LRP Brigades or other formations can be flown 
in behind the enemy. [Italics mine].‟169   Slim was already having to request aircraft be diverted from 
the „Hump‟, and so desired not only four additional RAF Dakota squadrons, but five USAAF, also.170 
On 23 March, Slim repeated his argument, reporting that he did not have enough aircraft to support 
either IV Corps or Special Force, but with sufficient aircraft, he would have the opportunity to win 
a major victory.
171
  This would depend upon „the employment of all Special Force and elements of 4 
Corps East of the CHINDWIN‟; consequently, Slim backed Wingate‟s request for further aircraft.172 
That same day, Churchill sent a reply from London to the effect that he did not think that the tone of 
Wingate‟s message was „hysterical‟, that he intended to broadcast the success of Thursday to the 
British people, and that he was prepared to make direct representation to President Roosevelt to get 
the Dakotas required.
173  
 Wingate‟s influence still went high, and Tulloch claimed that as a result of 
Wingate‟s signal, five USAAF Dakota squadrons and one RAF were diverted from the Middle East 
to India, but these figures are closer to those in Slim‟s request than Wingate's.174 
      It can be argued, therefore, that operational differences between Slim and Wingate were subtler 
than previous authors have allowed for.  Slim, apparently, wished to increase the scale of Special 
Force‟s operations behind Japanese 15th Army, but as a means of supporting Stilwell‟s advance, 
which, along with Thursday and Imphal, Slim saw as one great battle for Assam and northern Burma, 
to be won via overstretching Japanese strength and then defeating it in extended fighting.  Wingate‟s 
aim was to win a rapid, major victory inside northern Burma: the Imphal offensive drew Japanese 
forces forward and away from his area of operation, giving him an opportunity to exploit.  In the event, 
Slim allowed Wingate to fly 14th Brigade into Burma on 21 March, and the fly-in of 14th Brigade and 
3rd West African Brigade (the latter designated as Stronghold garrison troops) was completed by 12 
April and in an operational instruction issued on 27 March, three days after Wingate‟s death, 14th 
Brigade was ordered specifically to cut road and rail communications behind Japanese 31st Division, 
  
278 
forming the northern pincer of Mutaguchi‟s offensive, suggesting that Wingate‟s intention, at the time 
of his death, was to shift to a counter-penetration aimed at defeating the Japanese offensive.
175
   This 
was the only operational order issued by Wingate linked to the „Plan B‟, as described by Tulloch, but 
it is compelling evidence for this plan.          
      However, the most compelling evidence for Wingate‟s envisaging LRP as a new and decisive 
form of warfare is a series of memoranda he sent to Mountbatten shortly before his death, in which 
he outlined his vision for LRP, post Thursday.  On 10 February 1944, he wrote to Mountbatten 
arguing that Fourteenth Army should build its entire offensive doctrine around LRP forces; in doing 
so, he revealed again the intent behind Thursday: 
 
      It does not seem to be realised that if Operation „THURSDAY‟, which is being carried out by    
      unsupported LRP Brigades, succeeds in driving the Japanese out of Northern BURMA, the       
      superiority of LRP to normal formations in a normal operation…will have been abundantly        
      proved, and there will no longer be any grounds for claiming that normal Divisions have             
      any function in South East Asia.  They should instead be broken up into LRP Brigades               
      (Airborne), Assault Brigades, and Airport Garrison Brigades, organized into larger formations   
      corresponding to divisions and corps but with rather different scope and functions…176 
 
 
      These forces, Wingate argued, would form a viable alternative to Operation Culverin, the 
proposed amphibious invasion of the Dutch East Indies (which Mountbatten purportedly preferred to 
an overland offensive in Burma).  Should Culverin be abandoned, Fourteenth Army should launch an 
overland offensive towards Hanoi and Bangkok, LRP Brigades leap-frogging from Stronghold to 
Stronghold: 
 
      In the van will be the deeply penetrating columns, a mass of enemy between them and the           
      territory occupied by us.  The operations of these columns will progressively force the enemy     
      to withdraw.  In territory from which he has withdrawn, normal communications may be built    
      up, and garrisons living in fortifications introduced.  At certain distances behind the forward       
      wave of penetration will come defended airports.  In the van with the LRP Brigades will be        
      Strongholds with their Garrisons….The capture of BANGKOK and HANOI may well result     
      in the giving of an amphibious role to India Command (Nov. 45) and the LRP thrust would        
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      then continue to carry a chain of defended airports across CHINA to the coast where it would   
      meet up with seaborne forces.
177 
 
       
      Wingate detailed the tactical role of these forces in another paper, of February 1944: 
 
      The process of conquest would probably follow the lines which are to be worked out in              
      Operation „THURSDAY‟, i.e. severing of communications, establishing Strongholds in areas     
      inaccessible to wheeled transport, introducing Garrisons into areas evacuated by the enemy,       
      which will become defended airports, and this way gaining control of the whole territory.
178 
 
 
       It can be concluded, therefore, that Wingate viewed Thursday as a test of a new form of warfare 
in which LRP forces would be the decisive arm.  The objective would be strategic victory via airborne 
invasion, either by forcing the Japanese to fall back from occupied territory by threat to their 
communications, or destroying their forces by forcing them to contest control of vital territory on 
unfavourable terms.  What had begun, in early 1942, as a series of proposals for supplementary 
guerrilla operations had returned to the vision that Wingate had presented in his post- Ethiopia papers, 
of LRP being used to bring hostilities to a conclusion.  The final part of this chapter will describe what 
happened in reality, post-Wingate‟s death, and will bring the investigation of differences between his 
military thought and that of his peers to an end. 
      
             After Wingate – ‘All Chindits Now’? 
There was almost universal agreement in SEAC that Thursday had demonstrated the efficacy of air 
supply to troops engaged at the front.  According to „Aquila‟, writing on the Burma campaign in the 
RUSI Journal in 1945, air supply „...has enabled us to achieve great economies in manpower, in 
motor transport and in the provision of road-making material, and has given our forces a flexibility 
which has allowed them to overcome all the disadvantages with which we were faced in the initial 
stages of the Japanese war.‟179    During the Allied offensives into Burma in 1944-45, Fourteenth 
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Army received nine-tenths of its supplies by air; at the operational level, two divisions were able to 
continue their advance through the Kabaw Valley in August 1944 thanks to air supply, and the 
outflanking move during Slim‟s victory at Meiktila in February-March 1945 was sped by both air 
supply and air reinforcement.
180
  Slim consulted Fergusson about air supply prior to these 
operations
181
 and Mountbatten was unambiguous on how the technique originated:  
 
      [N]o one would claim that Wingate invented Air Supply because it was well known.  But what  
      he did was to prove that military ground forces could operate with no other form of supply at     
      all, other than air supply.  And these lessons were taken up with practically the whole of the        
      14th Army on air supply, of which Wingate was the pioneer.
182 
 
      So, far from „inventing‟ a new form of warfare, Wingate had synthesized existing ideas and had 
demonstrated their effectiveness.  This point was emphasised again at a lecture to the Royal United 
Services Institute in May 1945, by Air Marshal Sir John Baldwin, Deputy Air Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief, India, who commented that: 
 
      I consider that the air is the key to any operations across northern Burma.   Burma is a sea of     
      tropical jungle and has in itself been regarded as a  barrier to any movement from West to East   
      in so far as ground troops are concerned, but it does afford the shortest and quickest route by     
      which we have a chance of hitting the Jap where it hurts most...I feel that the lessons                   
      we have learned in the Wingate operations have shown us how it is possible to overcome           
      this...barrier and to develop a combined air and ground attack against the Japanese.
183
  
 
 
 
      However, while certain techniques used by Special Force became standard in subsequent SEAC 
operations, there was less enthusiasm about the concept of Long Range Penetration itself.  Slim‟s and 
Kirby‟s misgivings have been cited already, but there was criticism at the time.  A memorandum 
prepared by Headquarters, 11th Army Group, on Special Force, post-Thursday, noted that: „In 
general, the Long Range Operations of 3 Indian Div from March to May had a comparatively limited 
effect compared to the effort deployed.‟184   But, it noted, the actions of Galahad, on Stilwell‟s flank, 
and 23rd Brigade at Imphal „both paid considerably greater dividends by directly assisting the advance 
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of the main forces, which alone are capable permanently of securing the advantages gained by 
LRPGs.‟185    It went on to describe the perceived shortcomings of LRP Groups: 
 
      LRPGs, which could more logically be called "penetration groups", are detachments; their use    
      therefore should accord with the same principles applicable to other detachments i.e.                   
      sufficiently strong and mobile to avoid defeat in detail, but otherwise their strength should be      
      kept to a minimum....Their reliance on mobility forbids their use where the enemy has good        
      communications.  Lack of heavy weapons makes them unsuitable for attack on fortified              
      positions or for prolonged operations in any one area against growing enemy opposition.
186
  
 
 
      The Chindits, should, therefore, be limited in future to „medium range penetration operations in 
conjunction with the main forces for limited periods‟, tasks including harassing enemy 
communications, protecting the flanks of larger formations, seizing or constructing airstrips for air 
transit troops, and attacking key enemy installations or headquarters.
187 
This is a far cry from the 
decisive role Wingate envisaged for them, and the emphasis upon „mobility‟ suggests misgivings 
about operations based upon Strongholds.  
      Lentaigne and Tulloch were aware of these feelings.  In a letter of 13 April 1944 to Major General 
CE Wildman Lushington, the Assistant Chief of Staff at SEAC, Lentaigne commented that there was 
a „definite  feeling‟ at GHQ Delhi that LRP Brigades should be attached to normal divisions „to be 
used in a parochial manner as Divisional Cavalry‟; Lentaigne argued that „We are, I feel, essentially 
GHQ troops and should never be grouped at a level lower than an Army.‟188    Likewise, in September 
1944, Tulloch also expressed the view that 11th Army Group was planning to de-centralise control 
of LRP Groups to corps or divisions, this arising from over-emphasis in assessments of „lessons 
learned‟ from the 1944 battles upon 23rd Brigade and, indeed, Tulloch did not help his case with 
GHQ India or Fourteenth Army by referring to Imphal-Kohima, which had seen three Japanese 
divisions destroyed, and was described by Mountbatten as the „Thermopylae‟ of the Burma War, as 
a „strategical success‟ and a „tactical victory‟ for the Japanese on the basis that no ground had been 
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taken by the British.
189
  This suggests either that Tulloch had misunderstood Slim‟s intentions entirely 
or that he was viewing the battle through the filter of his own agenda.  Tulloch proposed that all 
troops in India should be trained to operate under air supply - which they were, largely, by the time 
he wrote this letter - with Special Force being kept „for more ambitious roles‟ and was confident that 
Slim backed him in this.
190 
      The reality is that there were no more LRP operations, and in January 1945, surviving elements 
of Special Force were absorbed into the newly-raised 44th (Indian) Airborne Division.
191
 
Mountbatten proclaimed „There is no more need for Chindits.  We are all Chindits now‟192, and an 
argument could be presented that the extensive use of air supply and air movement by all formations 
of Fourteenth Army had relieved Special Force of its „special‟ nature, thereby rendering it redundant. 
 
      Conclusions - Thursday in context        
Operation Thursday marked the end of an evolving body of military thought and operational practice 
that can be traced back to Sudan and pre-1939 „small wars‟.  The operation took the existing concept 
of LRP and enhanced its aerial element: not only were LRP columns supplied by air, but now they 
would use the „vertical flank‟, being delivered by air to near key points on the enemy‟s 
communications, to establish long-standing, air supplied bases, the aim being to force the enemy into 
attacking them under unfavourable circumstances, adding to the attrition of his armed strength.  
Moreover, close air support would enhance the lethality of LRP formations to the point where they 
could engage large enemy formations with a real chance of defeating them.  That Wingate intended 
to use this method to inflict a theatre-level defeat upon the Japanese is suggested by what Tulloch 
described as his „Plan B‟ for intervention in the Imphal-Kohima battles.  It can be inferred from 
documents and contemporary testimony that Wingate hoped that, with Japanese 15th Army 
committed comprehensively against IV Corps in Assam, he could direct the bulk of Special Force, 
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including the two reserve brigades, against its rear, not only cutting the main Japanese supply arteries 
but their lines of retreat, also, forcing them to divert forces away from the Assam front to be destroyed 
by hurling themselves against his Strongholds.   
      Thursday’s „place‟ in Wingate‟s military thought is therefore as a final evolution of the concept 
of LRP that he presented in his reports on the Ethiopia campaign.  LRP had begun as a strategic 
method involving inserting teams of specialists to form the „hard core‟ of an offensive waged by 
partisans against enemy communications, a more aggressive development of the doctrine for such 
operations devised by Colin Gubbins in 1940 and applied by Wingate in Ethiopia.  Circumstances in 
Burma prevented the creation of any large partisan resistance for Wingate‟s LRP columns to support, 
so the technique centred upon regular troops trained in guerrilla tactics.  The attachment of a large air 
support element drove this process further, allowing Wingate to conceive of his LRP columns 
defeating large enemy forces in pitched battles.  This also marked the apotheosis of the British Army‟s 
use of specialist forces to wage war in the enemy‟s rear, a practice visible in the „small wars‟ of the 
early part of the century and which had been attempted in major wars by Lawrence, MI(R) and G(R), 
and the military culture in which Wingate had been nurtured.           
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                                          CHAPTER EIGHT – CONCLUSIONS 
 
          
                   I was never aware of any ‘Wingate way in war’, nor did I ever hear him        
                   talk about one. 
                   - Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker
1 
 
 
      Wingate’s ‘Place’ in British Military Thought 
Orde Wingate presented a body of military thought which evolved organically throughout his career. 
This began in the Sudan Defence Force, with his patrols against the Shifta, which informed the 
techniques he applied with the Special Night Squads in Palestine.  From this, he began to argue that 
specially organised, selected and trained military units, penetrating areas which the enemy thought 
„safe‟ to attack key enemy vulnerabilities, were the ideal means of imposing British „will‟ upon 
enemy commanders and shaping the situation to British advantage, a theme running through his 
papers and correspondence to the latter days of his career, in Burma in 1944.   
      He developed this idea further in Ethiopia in 1941, where, although inheriting an operation 
devised by G(R), a covert warfare organisation hoping to use local irregulars for this role, his 
experiences brought him to the view that such irregulars were, at best, of limited effectiveness and, 
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at worst, totally unreliable and driven by their own agenda. Consequently, guerrilla warfare in the 
enemy‟s rear should centre upon units of purpose-trained regular troops with local partisans 
assisting them.  This argument was presented in two key papers – his „Appreciation of the Ethiopia 
Campaign‟ and his official report on the operation, and he designated this method Long Range 
Penetration.  He hoped to apply this model in Burma in 1942-43, but was precluded from this by the 
situation there, in particular the large-scale collaboration between the Burmese majority and the 
occupying Japanese.  Instead, he devised his penultimate model for operations, which centred upon 
all-arms columns of wholly regular troops, „Chindits‟, penetrating through the jungle at least 100 
miles to the Japanese rear to attack critical nodes in their logistical infrastructure and, in doing so, 
disrupt their planning and preparation and create a strategic situation the Allied main armies in 
Southeast Asia could exploit.  The Chindits themselves would rely upon air supply for their own 
logistics and close air support, in lieu of artillery, for their heavy firepower.  Operation Longcloth, 
the first Chindit „expedition‟ of 1943, was intended to demonstrate the efficacy of this method, and 
taught the British Army a number of valuable lessons in jungle warfare, the most important being 
that air supply of units engaged in mobile offensive operations in jungle country was possible; this 
was to become common practice in British forces in Southeast Asia in 1943-45.  It was also 
successful enough to bring Wingate to the attention of the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, who 
took him to the Quebec conference in August 1943, where he met, and equally impressed, President 
Roosevelt and the American Chiefs of Staff.  On the strength of these meetings, not only did 
Wingate‟s Chindit forces expand in size tenfold, with their own organic air support, courtesy of the 
USAAF, but Long Range Penetration became an important element in Allied strategy in Southeast 
Asia, which, in 1943-44, centred upon an offensive in northern Burma to re-open the Burma Road 
and land communications with China; indeed, it emerges from contemporary documents that, had 
certain proposals made by other senior officers been enacted, Wingate‟s forces would not only have 
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been even larger than they eventually were, but would have included LRP units from many Allied 
nations also.  
       The addition of an aviation element led Wingate to become more ambitious, and to advocate 
air-landing Chindit columns in the enemy rear to establish permanent bases not only from which they 
would carry out an extended campaign of harassment of Japanese communications with generous 
close air support, but which would induce the Japanese into battles of destruction by forcing them 
to attack these bases.  Operation Thursday, the second Chindit operation of 1944, was intended by 
Wingate not only to demonstrate this model of operations, but prove to the world that this was a 
new, and potentially decisive form of warfare which could inflict a theatre-level defeat upon the 
Japanese on its own.  Hence, Wingate‟s different interpretation of the aims of the operation from his 
peers – they envisaged a supportive operation, intended to help the „conventional‟ forces of General 
Stilwell forward onto their objectives, while his aim was to force the Japanese to „rout‟ from 
northern Burma due to the destruction of their communications.  At the time of his death, Wingate 
was envisaging a continent-wide victory arising from airborne offensives by LRP forces, with 
conventional forces reduced to holding territory they had cleared. 
      A study of the development of Wingate‟s ideas, based upon his own papers and contemporary 
documents and testimony, and placed in the context of the development of British Army doctrinal 
thought and practice of his time – 1922 to 1944 – indicates that there was no one „master source‟ for 
his ideas, nor is placing him within any particular „school of thought‟ as easy as Kirby, Slim, 
Rossetto, Heilbrunn and, to a lesser extent, Bidwell and Lyman, have implied.  He can be seen to 
have fitted into a number of doctrinal „currents‟, some long-term, others less so.  The official British 
Army doctrine, Field Service Regulations, editions of which were authored by Fuller and Wavell, 
centred upon the need for British commanders to impose a „master plan‟ coordinating all their 
subordinates towards the single aim of enforcing their will upon the enemy; an emphasis upon 
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breaking the enemy‟s will to fight and „attacking his plan‟ is visible throughout Wingate‟s career, as 
is emphasis upon working to a single „Master Plan‟ – witness his use of wireless to attempt to 
control widely dispersed forces in both Ethiopia and Burma.  Field Service Regulations propounded 
also the need to engage and destroy enemy forces in battle – as did Wingate in Palestine, Ethiopia 
and on Thursday – but also envisaged a role for forces which would penetrate the enemy rear to 
attack his „administrative arrangements.‟  Wingate, therefore, did not deviate as far from the 
„official‟ doctrine as might be supposed. 
      Other methods associated with Wingate were established operational practice in „small wars‟ 
fought outside Europe – the very arena in which Wingate obtained all his operational experience.  
The British Army had been using all-arms columns to surround and cordon off insurgent forces and 
dominate areas for decades, and, by the 1930s, not only were the actions of these columns being 
coordinated by wireless, but experiments were being carried in supporting these columns by aircraft 
in lieu of artillery, and re-supplying them by air, also.  Such columns formed the basis of British 
operations in Ireland in 1919-22, various counter-insurgencies in the Middle East and India in the 
1920s and 30s, and in Palestine, where Wingate served as an intelligence officer and with the SNS, 
in 1936-39.  These methods were carried into operations against conventional forces in British 
offensives in the Middle East and East Africa in 1940-41, operations carried out by forces and 
commanders with extensive experience in „small wars‟; in particular, much use was made of „Jock 
Columns‟, all-arms ad hoc formations, organised as much for mobility as for fighting power, to harry 
Axis communications.  Wingate‟s use of such columns, with similar intent and similar means of 
command and control, is therefore perhaps not as surprising or as „heretical‟ as some authors might 
claim. 
      Another long-standing practice from „small wars‟ and, indeed, one still visible today, is the use 
of specialist „penetration‟ forces to infiltrate and wage war inside enemy-controlled territory.  The 
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British Army had been using locally-raised units of „scouts‟ and „skirmishers‟ in colonial operations 
at least since the nineteenth century, and by the early twentieth, these were being used either to 
establish a British presence within certain designated areas – as with the „Auxies‟ in Ireland – or for 
„ambush work‟ along favoured enemy routes of movement and supply, as with the Gurkha Scouts 
on the Northwest Frontier.  Wingate‟s Night Squads therefore fit into a pattern: they included 
locally-recruited volunteers under British training, for „ambush work‟, and their role developed 
eventually to extending the British presence within a deeply hostile area of Palestine.  Again, this 
practice was continued into the Second World War, with forces such as the Long Range Desert 
Group and, later, the Special Air Service, the latter of which was revived, post-war, as a 
counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist unit.  The Chindits in particular have been identified as part 
of this trend by Heilbrunn and John W Gordon, and, again, Wingate can be seen as part of his time 
and place, not departing from them. 
      The period after 1940 saw Britain, unable to do anything more directly, adopt a strategy for 
prolonging the war based on blockade, aerial bombing and encouraging sabotage, subversion and 
guerrilla warfare inside Axis-occupied territory, an approach extended to the Japanese in 1941-42. 
The encouragement of resistance was tasked to a number of covert warfare organisations including 
MI(R) and its Middle Eastern offshoot, G(R), with the aim of using indigenous partisans as locally 
produced penetration forces, waging extended guerrilla warfare inside enemy territory culminating 
in major attacks upon his communications in support of offensives by Allied regular forces.  A 
doctrine for the raising and use of such forces had been authored in 1940 by Colonel Colin Gubbins, 
then with MI(R) and later the Director of the Special Operations Executive; this centred upon 
inserting teams of regular British personnel, trained guerrilla warfare specialists, into 
enemy-occupied territory to liaise with and train local guerrilla forces, provide them with a degree 
of planning and technical support, and ensure they were directed to British strategic aims.  The 
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application of this doctrine is visible in G(R)‟s planning for guerrilla operations inside Ethiopia, 
which Wingate took over late in their development.   
      Wingate – for reasons unclear from his papers or those of any other – escalated the role of these 
teams – by then known as Operational Centres - from liaison, training and advice to that of fighting 
units, intended to wage war on enemy communications deep in their rear and to inspire a mass 
uprising by their example.  Wingate expounded this model in his „Appreciation‟ and official report 
on the Ethiopia operation, where they formed the basis of his new doctrine of Long Range 
Penetration. He hoped to apply this model upon his arrival in Burma in 1942, but circumstances 
described already drove him towards greater „regularisation‟ and the Chindit concept.  LRP, 
therefore, might have been derived, indirectly, from the ideas of Gubbins as from any other 
individual, and, indeed, MI(R) were propounding similar concepts as early as 1940. 
      Another theme running through Wingate‟s military thought is that warfare is human-centred and 
dialectical, centring upon matching the „national characteristics‟ of British soldiers against those of 
the enemy.  Hence, Wingate, arguing that Arab guerrillas favoured warfare based upon „hit and run‟, 
advocated tactics based upon ambush and decisive close-quarter action involving cold steel (an idea 
shared with his commander in Palestine, Brigadier John Evetts), while the Japanese soldier was 
brave but obtuse, necessitating that he be fought using methods which emphasised ambiguity and 
setting a tempo he could not cope with.  These methods, Wingate argued, would build upon British 
strengths – superior training, initiative and aggression – and advantages derived from superior 
intelligence (in both the military and general sense of the term) and technology.  Such ideas were 
commonplace in „small wars‟, and, indeed, Charles Callwell and Charles Gwynn both presented 
similar arguments in their theoretical works in this field. They can also be found in other 
contemporary works relating to the war in Burma. The cultural strengths and weaknesses of the 
Japanese soldier, and how to exploit them, were themes in training pamphlets and, indeed, in the 
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memoirs of Field Marshal Lord Slim, the leading, and most respected British field commander in that 
theatre.  Wingate can again, be seen as a product of his times. 
     Yet, it was with Slim that the most major differences emerged between Wingate‟s ideas and 
those of others.  Prior to 1943, Wingate could rely at least upon a sympathetic hearing from his 
senior commanders – Evetts, Wavell and Haining in Palestine, Wavell again in East Africa and the 
early stages of his Burma operations, and Mountbatten later.  Wingate received support from these 
personages mainly because he offered viable solutions to strategic dilemmas they faced, and, at least, 
in Wavell‟s case, because Wavell himself was an enthusiast for mobile and penetration warfare, 
expressed in the patterns of operations he adopted in Palestine, in the Middle East in 1940-41, and 
his proposed operations against Japanese-occupied Burma in 1942.  As noted in the chapter on 
Palestine, there seems to have been a considerable interchange of ideas between Wingate and Evetts. 
       However, in 1943, Wingate came under the operational command of Fourteenth Army, whose 
commander, William Slim, held ideas on beating the Japanese fundamentally different from his. Both 
men aimed to engage the Japanese in battles of annihilation, but differed on how to achieve this. 
Wingate hoped that his Strongholds, and Chindit columns issuing from them to attack Japanese 
communications, would force the Japanese to attempt a counter-offensive in which they would have 
no choice to attack the Strongholds in hostile terrain and with their flanks and rear under attack from 
other Chindit elements; if they concentrated for an attack, they could be pulverised from above by 
attached airpower.  At levels above the battlefield, threats to their communications would force the 
Japanese into retreat.   
      Slim‟s method, at least for the period he had Wingate under command, also hinged upon luring 
the Japanese into battles on unfavourable ground, but, on the defensive, this involved inducing them 
to come forward into the open country of the Imphal Plain to attack IV Corps‟ „box‟ defences, 
whereupon they would be pounded by Fourteenth Army‟s superior air and firepower.  On the 
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offensive, rather than Wingate‟s technique of mobility and dispersal, Slim aimed at applying 
overwhelming numbers and firepower in order to avoid a „fair fight‟ and ensure the Japanese did not 
stand a chance.  Slim certainly had a role for the Chindits, but this was to weaken Japanese forces 
at the front by attacking targets in their rear, denying them vital supplies and forcing them to keep 
troops from the front to protect their communications.  Slim was also to use air-portable units in his 
offensive into southern Burma in 1945, but these were used to reinforce a rapid ground advance, the 
opposite of Wingate‟s vision for them.  „History is written by the winners‟: Slim was able to 
demonstrate his model of victory whereas Wingate was not, and their differences of opinion were 
expressed lucidly in Slim‟s memoirs, a major source in the literature. 
      The major conclusion of this thesis, therefore, is that the „Wingate model of warfare‟ was of its 
time, had multiple sources and enjoyed multiple institutional and cultural influences, and found a 
degree of acceptance from Wingate‟s peers and superiors until the end of his career.  Even Slim 
accepted that there was a role for LRP, albeit not on the scale that Wingate envisaged.  LRP seems 
to have grown organically from British practices in „small wars‟ and the doctrine for covert 
operations devised by Colin Gubbins in 1940.   It was adapted by Wingate to meet the strategic 
situations faced in Ethiopia and Burma, filtered through his own agenda and a number of factors 
arising from British military culture of the early to mid twentieth century. 
 
      The Literature Reassessed 
In the light of these findings, a number of previous works claiming to „place‟ Wingate in one school 
of thought or the other can be seen as manifestly over-simplified.  Indeed, as implied in the 
introduction, they might be viewed as polemics for their time, merely using Wingate as a „case study‟ 
in support of whatever set of ideas they are enthusing about.  The most obvious, and egregious, 
example was Wilfred Burchett, who tried to present Wingate as a fellow revolutionary, fighting the 
  
302 
good fight, but some investigating Wingate‟s military ideas fall into this trap also.  Elliot-Bateman 
wrote in the 1960s, against the background of Malaya and Vietnam, and Wingate was presented as 
an exemplar of „people‟s war‟.  Heilbrunn‟s and Rossetto‟s works come from the same period, but 
their emphasis is upon how penetration forces may be used to defeat larger regular forces, an echo 
not only of Vietnam, but of the prevailing scenario of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.  Lyman 
and Atkins wrote in the late 1990s and early 2000s, against the background of the post-1970s 
American and British Army‟s rediscovery of „manoeuvre warfare‟, and so Wingate and Slim were 
presented as forerunners of this.  To many authors, Wingate has been what they wanted him to be. 
      Other authors can be seen as approaching more closely the model emerging from Wingate‟s own 
papers and other testimony from the time.  John W Gordon correctly placed Wingate in the context 
of the enthusiastic use of special and penetration forces by the British Army in the Second World 
War, while Shelford Bidwell, as cited in the introduction, summarised Wingate‟s claim to have no 
peer or inspiration, although he implied that there was an unacknowledged Liddell Hart influence.  
Among Wingate‟s most prominent critics, Kirby and Slim can be seen as focusing upon one 
particular aspect of Wingate‟s operational thought and practice and criticising it: Kirby was not 
incorrect in criticising Wingate as a guerrilla leader, nor was Slim in citing him as part of his case 
against Special Forces, but both were inaccurate in implying that these particular aspects of his ideas 
were all that he was about.  In all cases, attempts to analyse and „place‟ Wingate‟s ideas were 
hampered by the inaccessibility of his papers until Lorna‟s death in 1995, this thesis being the first 
extended work to be based upon them.  Orde Wingate and the literature about him need, therefore, 
to be re-assessed in the light of his papers‟ availability and this work is the first step in this direction. 
 
      Avenues for further research 
These papers can be the starting point for further research not only on Wingate, but on military 
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operations of his time.  One theme touched upon throughout this study, but only incidental to the 
central thesis question, is the possible inspiration for Wingate‟s ideas. It has been established that he 
shared ideas with Evetts, met with Liddell Hart and derived elements of LRP from Gubbins‟ 
doctrine for covert operations, but there seems to have been little grounding in theory derived from 
reading the works of others.  Wingate seems to have been familiar with Lawrence‟s Seven Pillars 
of Wisdom and was widely read in English literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
2
, and 
a survey of works of military literature he had in his possession followed by comparing and 
contrasting them with his own thought and practice might clarify issues raised in this thesis further, 
as well as allowing a more thorough assessment of previous literature about him. 
      Another theme is the extent to which the controversy surrounding Wingate was based upon his 
presenting a form of warfare his peers found unacceptable.  Again, this has been touched upon in this 
thesis, particularly in terms of Wingate‟s relationship with Slim and GHQ India, but there is also 
plenty of implication in the literature that he had his critics in Palestine and Ethiopia.
3  
 There is 
extensive correspondence between Wingate and others in his papers, not all of it cited in this thesis, 
but some of it concerning his approach to operations and some of  this extremely heated; an entire 
alternative thesis might be written on the origins of the animosity towards Wingate, which must now 
be reassessed in the light of the findings of this one, that his ideas, when placed in their context, were 
perhaps less radical than supposed hitherto.  
      A third possible subject for investigation, following from the findings of this thesis, is an 
assessment of the effectiveness of Wingate‟s operations, a common theme in the literature, but again, 
hampered by the unavailability of Wingate‟s papers and other contemporary documents.  Calvert, 
Tulloch, Thompson and Mead all discuss this issue at great length, but now it might be possible to 
match Wingate‟s intent, as derived from his papers, with their interpretations of it; it might also be 
feasible to compare this with assessments of Wingate in other collections and contemporary 
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documents.  A reassessment of Kirby‟s and Slim‟s views of Wingate might also be possible. 
      Moving beyond Wingate, as noted above, the history of MI(R) and G(R) remains unwritten, 
apart from summaries in histories of SOE.  Wingate‟s papers, combined with the PRO papers cited 
in the chapters on Ethiopia and Burma, would be a major source for such a work, in that they cover 
the largest and most important action carried out by these organisations.   
      Consequently, it can be concluded that although this thesis has advanced the body of knowledge 
about Orde Wingate, and presents a better-balanced understanding of certain aspects of his 
relationship with the British Army of his era, he remains an interesting, controversial and sometimes 
enigmatic figure with much work still to be done on him. 
 
                                                          NOTES 
1. Interview with the author of 23/8/2004 
2. See, for instance, Sykes, Orde Wingate, pp.40-41, 335-336, 498-499  
3. In his interview with the author of 23/8/2004, Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker opined that 
Wingate‟s Distinguished Service Order for Palestine was won „not entirely honourably.‟ 
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                              GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
      Airborne Forces – Military Forces arriving on the battlefield, or in their area of operations, 
by air, either by parachute or glider. 
       Amhara – The majority ethnic group in northern and western Ethiopia and the ruling ethnic 
group in the whole of Ethiopia.  They are Christian and probably originated on the Arabian 
peninsula. 
      Auxiliaries (Auxies) – The Auxiliary Cadets of the Royal Irish Constabulary, special armed 
units formed of ex-British Army officers, formed during the Irish „troubles‟ of 1919-1922. 
      Axis – Germany, Italy, Japan and their allies in the Second World War. 
 
 
 
      Bedu (Arabic) – Bedouin.  Arab nomads or those descended from them living in settled 
communities. 
      BFF – Burma Frontier Force. 
 
      Bimbashi (Sudanese) – Acting Local Major in the Sudan Defence Force, commander of an 
Idara (qv). 
      Black and Tans – Former British soldiers, recruited into the Royal Irish Constabulary 
during the Irish „troubles‟ of 1919-1922.  The origins of the name are unclear, but are attributed 
variously to their mixed police blue and army khaki uniforms, or to a pack of foxhounds in 
County Limerick. 
      Bushido (Japanese) – The philosophy and ethic of the Samurai. 
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      Chief of Staff – Officer responsible for planning, logistics and coordination of activity 
within a military formation.  It is the principal role of the Chief of Staff to turn his commander‟s 
proposed actions into workable plans, and supervise their execution.  
      Chindits (Corruption of Burmese) – The Long Range Penetration Forces raised, trained 
and commanded by Orde Wingate in India and Burma in 1942-44.  The word comes from 
Wingate‟s mispronunciation of Chinthey, the stone griffon-like beasts which stand guard outside 
Buddhist temples throughout Southeast Asia, a half-lion, half eagle with spiritual overtones 
being seen as an appropriate symbol for combined air-ground operations in a strongly Buddhist 
country.  The mispronunciation is said to have annoyed Wingate considerably. 
      CIGS – Chief of the Imperial General Staff.  The most senior officer in the British Army, the 
Prime Minister‟s military chief of staff (qv) and the Cabinet‟s main advisor on military matters. 
 The post was held by a Field Marshal. 
      Commando (Afrikaans) – Sea-going raiding forces formed by the British in 1940, drawn 
from the British Army and the Royal Marines.  The word soon came to be a generic term for all 
Special Forces (qv). 
 
      Dakota – Military transport version of the Douglas DC-3 airliner, known as the C-47 
Skytrain in USAAF service and the DC-3 Dakota to the RAF. 
 
      Firquat (Arabic – „Company‟) Irregular counter-insurgent forces, consisting of 
ex-communist guerrillas defected to the government and trained and commanded by British 
soldiers of 22 SAS (qv), formed in the Dhofar region of Oman during the insurgency of 
1962-1975. 
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      FSR – Field Service Regulations, the officially approved British Army tactical and 
operational „doctrine‟, published in four editions between 1920 and 1935. 
  
       Gaijin - (Japanese – „Hairy Foreigner‟) Derogatory term for Westerner. 
       Galla – The majority ethnic group in southern Ethiopia.  Muslim, unlike the Christian 
Amhara (qv), but believed to have a similar origin in South Arabia. 
      GHQ – General Headquarters – the headquarters of British Army forces within a theatre, 
region or district. 
      GOC – General Officer Commanding.  A British officer, of the rank of major general or 
above, in command of all British Army forces within a formation, theatre, region or district. 
      GOCinC – General Officer Commanding in Chief 
      G(R) – Staff Branch within General Headquarters, Middle East, responsible for 
encouraging, supporting and steering armed resistance in Axis-occupied territory.  Offshoot of 
MI(R) [qv] 
      Guerrilla (Spanish – „Little War‟).  Form of warfare generally interpreted to involve 
irregular forces, operating in small units, opposing the regular forces of either foreign occupiers 
or an oppressive political regime, which they combat through sabotage, ambush, assassination, 
hit and run raids on vulnerable points, etc, while avoiding decisive military encounters through 
superior mobility, greater knowledge of local geography, and the support of the local population. 
For reasons unknown, the word is often spelt „guerilla‟ in British publications of the period 
under investigation, including those by Lawrence and Gubbins. 
      Gurkhas – Members of the Gurung, Limbu, Magar and Rai tribes of Nepal, recruited into 
the British Indian Army from 1816 onwards. 
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      Haganah (Hebrew – „Defence‟) – The Jewish underground militia, formed in Palestine in 
1920, and which every able-bodied Jewish man in Palestine was expected to join.  Its existence 
was illegal, but tolerated by the British until 1939. 
      Haj (Arabic) – The pilgrimage to Mecca, which every Muslim must perform at least once 
during his lifetime. 
      Hump – The Himalayas or the air supply route established over them by the USAAF in 
1942-45, to carry supplies to China from India after the cutting of the Burma Road by the 
Japanese. 
 
      Idara (Sudanese Arabic) - A company of the Sudan Defence Force. 
      IDF – Israel Defence Forces. 
      Insurgency – Guerrilla (qv) campaign or movement. 
      IRA – Irish Republican Army, the military arm of the Irish Republican movement, which 
waged an insurgency against British rule in Ireland from 1916 to 1922. 
      Irgun Zvai Leumi (Hebrew) – The militia of the Revisionist Zionist Movement, which 
argued that peaceful coexistence between Jews and Arabs would not be possible unless the Jews 
built an „Iron Wall‟ of invincible armed strength. 
      Irregulars – Armed forces other than those fighting in uniformed and permanently 
organised armies, navies or air forces. 
 
      Jock Columns – Ad hoc formations formed by the British Army to harry enemy lines of 
communication and carry out hit-and-run attacks on advancing enemy forces in North Africa in 
1940-42, named after Lieutenant Colonel Jock Campbell, VC, who first devised them. 
      JSP – Jewish Settlement Police. 
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      LRDG – Long Range Desert Group.  A British Special Force, formed by Major Ralph 
Bagnold in 1940 and consisting of long-range motor patrols reconnoitering and attacking Axis 
airfields and lines of communication and supply. 
      LRP – Long Range Penetration. 
 
 
 
      MI(R) – Military Intelligence (Research).  Cover name for branch of the War Office 
responsible for encouraging, supporting and steering armed resistance in Axis-occupied territory, 
particularly that by guerrillas (qv). Absorbed into the Special Operations Executive in July 1940. 
      Mitchell – US B-25 medium bomber aircraft, named after General William J „Billy‟ Mitchell, 
viewed commonly as the „father‟ of American air power. 
      Mohmands – Muslim tribesmen of the Northwest Frontier of India 
      Moplahs – Muslim tribesmen of south-west India, of Omani descent. 
      Mustang – P-51 fighter aircraft, made by North American and used by both the USAAF and 
the RAF in large numbers from 1942 onwards. 
 
      OSS – Office of Strategic Services.  The US covert warfare organisation, responsible for 
sabotage, subversion and the support of armed resistance in Axis-occupied territory. 
 
      Pathans – Muslim tribesmen of the Northwest Frontier of India. 
 
      RAF – Royal Air Force 
      RIASC – Royal Indian Army Service Corps. 
      RMCC – Royal Military College of Canada. 
      RUSI – The Royal United Services Institute, founded in 1832 by the Duke Of Wellington in 
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order to study and disseminate the lessons of military history and recent operations.  Based in 
Whitehall. 
 
      SAS – The Special Air Service.  A British Army Special Force (qv) formed by Captain David 
Stirling in the Middle East in 1941.  Re-formed by Brigadier Michael Calvert as a 
counter-insurgency force in Malaya in the early 1950s, and forming part of the current British 
Army as 22 Regiment SAS. 
      SDF – Sudan Defence Force.  Locally recruited regular force, under British officers, 
responsible for border control and internal security in Sudan. 
      Shifta (Amharic) – Ethiopian bandit 
      Sinn Fein (Irish Gaelic) – „We Alone‟, the political arm of the Irish Republican movement 
      SNS – Special Night Squads, the Anglo-Jewish counter-insurgent units formed by Orde 
Wingate in Palestine in 1938. 
      SOE – Special Operations Executive.  Branch of the Ministry of Economic Warfare 
responsible for sabotage, subversion and the encouragement and support of resistance in 
Axis-occupied territory.  Formed 1940, dissolved 1946. 
      Special Forces (UK) and Special Operations Forces (US) – Military units, consisting of 
carefully selected and specially trained personnel, usually operating in small units (less than 100 
individuals) yet intended to obtain results out of proportion with their numbers through careful 
targeting of high-value objectives, surprise, advanced or unusual weaponry and their superior 
training and aggression.  Used extensively by the British in the Second World War in the form 
of the Army and Royal Marine Commandos, the Long Range Desert Group, the Special Air 
Service, Popski‟s Private Army, etc. There is some question as to whether the Chindits (qv) 
constituted a form of Special Force. 
  
311 
      SSO – Special Service Officer.  British military officer responsible for gathering intelligence 
within a specific district. 
 
      Terrorism – The use of violence, or the threat of violence, in order to change the political 
behaviour of the target in directions desired by the perpetrators.  May be used in insurgencies (qv) 
as a substitute or supplement for guerrilla action (qv). 
      Thunderbolt – P-47 fighter aircraft, produced in the USA and used by the USAAF and 
RAF in 1942-45. 
      Thakins (Burmese – „Young Masters‟) – The traditional Burmese ruling elite, who figured 
prominently in resistance to British rule in Burma and collaboration with the Japanese.  
 
      USAAF – United States Army Air Force 
  
      Wahhabi (Arabic) – Fundamentalist form of Sunni Islam, and the majority faith in Saudi 
Arabia. 
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